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Part 1 
Trading into the 21st Century 
1 Raed Safadi 
The Evolving Agenda for Trade 
in a Globalizing World 
Introduction 
The increasing globalization of economic activity has intensified policy inter-
action in traditional areas of multilateral economic cooperation. The most 
obvious manifestations of this have involved governments in continuing 
efforts to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, to ex tend the coverage 
of liberalization efforts in such areas as government procurement and agri-
culture, and to sharpen trade rules, including those relating to matters like 
safeguards, subsidies and countervailing dulies, and antidumping. In addition, 
closer economic integration among nation states has "internationalized" a 
range of policy domains that previously were either simply neglected, or con-
sidered an exclusively national preserve, or else were subject only to comity-
like coordination and consultation arrangements. As a result, major multilat-
eral initiatives have led to negotiations, and in some instances agreements, in 
new areas such as trade in services, the protection of intellectual property 
rights, and investment. Other issues, such as competition policy and labor 
rights, have been proposed by some governments as matters ripe for interna-
tional negotiation. This chapter attempts to identify what pressures for 
increased policy commitments at the international level mean in practice in 
the area of trade. 
The deepening and broadening of the international economic agenda has 
influenced governments' approaches and priorities with respect to policy in at 
least two significant ways. First, a number of new policy areas that have either 
found their way onto the international agenda, or are under discussion, are not 
necessarily about trade perse, but rather are treated as "trade-related" matters. 
This is most obvious in the case of intellectual property rights, labor standards 
and environmental issues. In these areas, an organic link may exist between 
the issues at hand and trade policy, but it may also be the case that the trade 
policy dimension is concerned primarily with the question of en forcement. ln 
other words, the link between policies in such areas as those mentioned above 
and trade policy may reside fundamentally in the notion that the threat of 
denial of trade benefits offers an effective means of enforcing unrelated poli-
cy obligations. The practical implication of this tendency for bodies like the 
World Trade Organization is that subjects brought within the institution's 
purview will not necessarily relate to traditional areas of concern. This is but 
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one reflection of how closer economic integration among nations triggers 
broad-based policy responses from governments. 
More generally, governments have demonstrated increasing concern with 
a broad range of policy-related determinants of competitiveness. The global-
ization of economic activity has nurtured a growing interest in the numerous 
ways in which the conditions of market access may be influenced. Perhaps the 
area where this concern is most noticeable is in standard-setting and domes-
tic regulation more generally. Sensitivity to the reality that regulations can be 
manipulated to tilt the conditions of competition in favor of a subset of eco-
nomic actors, together with the realization that sharply divergent preferences 
in such matters as environmental quality and social policy are increasingly 
crucial determinants of competitive advantage, have increased pressures for 
harmonization in many policy areas. Such harmonization may be negotiated, 
or may corne about through de facto competition among regulatory systems. 
Whichever approach dominates, the imperative felt by governments to ensure 
that their economic constituencies are not placed at a disadvantage through 
sharply different approaches to policy intervention can be a source of signifi-
cant friction at the international level. Managing this friction is one of today's 
most pressing challenges for policy-makers. 
Second, globalization and a growing attachment to regionalism seem to 
have coexisted in a manner which might seem contradictory at first sight. At 
the same lime as barriers to integrated economic activity" on a global ~cale 
appear to be disintegrating, so does governments' fascination seem to grow 
with intensified cooperation bounded by a localized or regional focus. If the 
phenomenon of growing interdependence is apparent not only in respect of 
relations with near neighbors, why limit the policy response to this subset of 
players? The risk of too narrow a policy focus is that the economic benefits of 
globalization may be compromised through regional integration arrangements 
that discriminate against outsiders. On the other hand, it is probable that a 
regional approach has been preferred more because of the greater ease of 
managing a complex set of relations among a limited number of like-minded 
countries than because governments have wished to discriminate. To the 
extent that this is the case, the risk is not great that the prominence of geo-
graphically-bound policy responses to international economic integration will 
frustrate natural tendencies towards globalization. Nevertheless, the danger 
that regionalism could become a splintering and destructive force cannot be 
ignored, and should remain uppermost in the minds of policy-makers. 
In the remainder of this chapter, attention will be focused on particular 
issues that appear to be among the most significant in defining the evolving 
agenda for trade, investment and finance. The next three sections deal with, 
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respectively, trade in services, intellectual property rights and technical stan-
dards and regulatory reform. Finally, the last section offers some concluding 
remarks. 
Trade in Services 
Background 
It took more than four decades after the birth of GATI (the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) for the subject of trade in services to find its 
way onto the multilateral negotiating agenda. By about the latter half of the 
I 970s, the absence of rules and multilateral commitments on trade in services 
was beginning to be seen as a significant systemic gap. Awareness was grow-
ing of the importance of services-related activities in the world economy. The 
process of globalization probably accelerated the pace at which this percep-
tion became generalized, on account of the fondamental importance of a num-
ber of services sectors in international trade - most notably, transport, 
telecommunications and financial services. 
The production of services was increasingly seen as an independent activ-
ity, worthy of explicit multilateral attention. Prior to this, international trade 
had been seen largely through the prism of trade in goods. Services were alto-
gether subsidiary, either in the sense of being embodied in goods, or as sec-
ondary activities undertaken in the cause of facilitating the supply and com-
merce of goods. Also missing from this perception of what was important in 
the world economy was the role of investment. Investment was treated large-
Iy as a malter of domestic policy concern. The notion that investment and 
trade are merely different means of gaining access to markets, to be treated in 
a complementary fashion rather than as substitutes, is also a rather recent phe-
nomenon. 
Technological advances have also played a key role in bringing trade in 
services to the forefront of policy makers' concerns. Advances in transport 
and inform\ltion technologies have contributed to a rapid expansion of ser-
vices trade. Many international transactions, which previously would have 
been considered prohibitively expensive, have now become commonplace 
because of the ease with which people can move and communicate electron-
ically across national boundaries. These trends are retlected in the fact that 
trade in services has grown faster than trade in goods for well over a decade. 
While services exports accounted for some 16 percent of world exports in 
1980, the share had risen to over 20 percent in the early I 990s. Annual aver-
age growth in services exports was approximately 8 percent from 1980 to 
1992, compared to some 5 percent for merchandise exports. 
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Salient Characteristics of Services 
It is arguable that some of the features of services and the nature of services 
transactions have contributed to the relative neglect of services in policy dis-
course. It is useful to consider brietly a number of the differences between 
goods and services, as these are at least part of the explanation as to why the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is different in a number of 
important respects from the GATT. 
lnvisibility, Meas11reme11t and Data 
The intangible or invisible nature of services has made the measurement of 
them difficult, and resulted in significant lacunae in the existing information 
base on services transactions at both the national and international levels. For 
the most part, production and investment data on services are scarce, and it is 
virtually impossible to make international comparisons, even on a cross-sec-
tional basis. National input-output tables are the most detailed source of pro-
duction data on services, since they hclp to isolate services transactions which 
otherwise stay hidden as goods production, but few countries maintain recent 
and significantly disaggregated input-output matrices. Data on investment are 
frequently not sufficiently disaggregated for it to be possible to derive reliable 
information on trends in investment, and this problem is even more acute at 
the international level. By contrast, data on international trade in services 
have been collected on a systematic basis for many years in balance-of-pay-
ments statistics. But the statistics are highly aggregated, concentrating pri-
marily on transport and travel, and only providing a limited picture. The 
International Monetary Fund, however, has recently introduced more disag-
gregation in balance-of-payments data. 
Another problem in the sphere of data is known as the "disembodiment" or 
"splintering" question. Increased specialization has resulted in services activi-
ties being broken off from goods production. A manufacturer, for example, 
may in the past have maintained ail advertising activities in-house, with the 
consequence that the production of advertising services would simply be 
counted as an input into the production of manufactured goods. If this manu-
facturer subsequently purchases advertising services from an agency special-
ized in producing these services, then national statistics will record this same 
element of production as services production and not goods production. 
Thus, disembodiment via specialization may create the impression that ser-
vices production is increasing relative to goods production, when in effect 
some of this perceived shift is the result of structural change within the econo-
my. Another factor which may give rise to an exaggerated picture of growth in 
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the relative importance of services is simply that measurement techniques have 
improved over time. Thus, what data are available measure a growing compo-
nent of services activities in total production at least in part because the hard-
est part of measurement is being done better. Notwithstanding these sources of 
bias, however, it is clear that demand for services does rise relative to demand 
for goods as income grows, and that services-related activities are therefore 
bound to become a greater source of interest from a policy perspective. 
Simultaneity in Production and Consumption, and Physical Proximity 
A feature of most services is that they cannot be produced and then stored for 
later consumption. Production and consumption are simultaneous. This is 
clearly an additional source of measurement difficulty, and also gives rise to 
a greater tendency for "customization" or product differentiation, such that it 
can be misleading to assume that unit prices can be identified for homogenous 
output. Even the question of what represents a unit of production may be open 
to debate. 
Simultaneity in production and consumption also carry the implication 
that producers and consumers often need to be in the same location in order 
for a transaction to take place. The classic example of haircutting services 
makes this point clear, given the obvious impossibility of supplying haircut-
ting services at a distance. There are, however, some services transactions that 
may occur over distance, on account of the possibility that they can be trans-
mitted electronically. Moreover, one class of services - transport services - is 
intrinsically about bridging distance, so the question of physical proximity 
does not arise. The immediate policy implication of the importance of physi-
cal proximity in services trade is that liberalization cannot be discussed sole-
Iy in the traditional terrns of cross-border trade. It is also necessary to consid-
er commercial presence, or investment. A further point to note is that even if 
physical presence is nota technical prerequisite of consummating transactions 
in services, it is in the nature of man y service products that suppliers will want 
to be in close proximity to their customers. 
As discussed below, the significance of investment in trade in services is 
reflected in GATS, and is what makes GATS into an agreement about both 
cross-border trade and investment. It might also be argued that the promi-
nence of investment issues in trade in services has contributed to a growing 
awareness of the need to deal with investment questions as an integral part of 
the international economic policy agenda. 
A Detour: lnvestment in the GATT Context 
If rules on investment had already existed in GATT, it is possible that investment 
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in both goods and services would have been treated together, and so would 
trade in goods and services. This was. the pattern that emerged in NAFrA 
(North American Free Trade Agreement), for example, an agreement that was 
negotiated from a clean slate. The differential treatment of goods and services 
within the WTO (the World Trade Organization) framework raises questions of 
coherence that will have to be addressed in due time, not least because of the 
asymmetries between rules on goods and services that this model has pro-
duced. 
The issue of investment was taken up in the GATT context in the Uruguay 
Round (UR), eventually leading to the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS). But the TRIMS Agreement is very limited in 
scope. Sorne industrial countries, most notably the United States, had pressed 
for a far-reaching mandate to negotiate about investment in the broad sense. 
Many developing countries were unwilling to engage in such an exercise at 
that time. They believed that it would challenge a basic tenet of their devel-
opment policy, which saw the careful management of investment tlows as 
indispensable to appropriate, balanced growth. 
Investment policy, involving a mix of controls and incentives, has tradi-
tionally been used by many countries as a tool for promoting specific objec-
tives, such as technology transfer, industrialization, regional development and 
export expansion. Sorne of these objectives, like regional development, have 
also been pursued through investment incentives in industrial countries. The 
emphasis of the Uruguay Round TRIMS exercise, however, was mostly on 
trade-related investment conditionality. The subsidy aspect of investment pol-
icy was addressed in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, where regional subsidies are defined as non-actionable, provided 
they are granted in the context of an overall regional development program, 
are non-specific to an enterprise or industry, and do not result in serious 
adverse effects to the industry of another party. 
Moreover, the ability to condition and control investment tlows has tradi-
tionally been considered necessary to avoid monopolistic abuses by transna-
tional corporations. Seen from this perspective, multilateral efforts to liberalize 
investment threatened to weaken the ability of countries to pursue active devel-
opment policies. Opposition to a broad-based negotiation on investment in the 
UR was strong enough, given the disposition of interests and priorities in other 
areas (especially intellectual property rights and trade in services), for agree-
ment to be reached on a narrow negotiating mandate for TRIMS. The negoti-
ating mandate simply called for an examination of the operation of GATT arti-
cles related to the trade restrictive and distorting effects of investment mea-
sures, following which "negotiations should elaborate, as appropriate, further 
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provisions that may be necessary to avoid such adverse effects on trade." The 
use of the phrase "as appropriate," along with the conditional tense, left open 
the possibility that govemments might agree to nothing at ail. 
However, the UR TRIMS agreement only reaffirmed existing GATT rules 
on national treatment (Article III) and on the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions (Article XI). An illustrative Iist ofTRIMS identified two measures 
as being inconsistent with GATT's national treatment provisions and three as 
constituting illegal quantitative restrictions. The first category included local 
content requirements and trade balancing requirements. The TRIMS identi-
fied as quantitative restrictions included trade balancing requirements (also 
Article III-inconsistent), foreign exchange balancing requirements, and 
domestic sales requirements.' The agreement requires that WTO-inconsistent 
TRIMS must be phased out, and that no new WTO-inconsistent TRIMS are 
to be introduced during the phase-out period.' Industrial countries must com-
plete the phase-out within two years, developing countries within five years, 
and least-developed countries within seven years. These transition periods 
may be extended for developing and least-developed countries under certain 
circumstances. Ali TRIMS subject to the phase-out requirement had to be 
notified to the WTO. 
The Role of Regulation 
Given the invisible character of services, the normal requirement for produc-
tion and consomption to occur simultaneously, and the general Jack of infor-
mation about services transactions within the economy, it is unsurprising that 
regulation is a prominent feature of services activities. Governments are much 
more heavily involved in regulation in services sectors than they typically are 
in goods sectors. Two aspects of regulation in services may be usefully dis-
tinguished. 
First, in contrast to goods sectors, interventions are more often of a quan-
titative nature rather than price-based. The preference for administrative inter-
ventions of a quantitative character may be understandable in view of the dif-
ficulties of identification and measurement that plague the services sector. But 
from an efficiency perspective, price-based interventions are Iikely to prove 
better in many cases. A policy challenge in the services field, therefore, is to 
find ways of improving the information base so that greater reliance can be 
placed upon fiscal policy in the future to achieve regulatory objectives. It is 
noteworthy in this context that the GATS has very little to say about price-
related measures, basing almost ail its rules dealing with access to markets 
upon quantity-based interventions. 
Second, the impossibility of storing most services, or of distancing 
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production and consumption in a temporal sense, means that much regulation 
is of an ex ante variety. In other words, instead of focusing on output, regula-
tory interventions need to occur on the input side. This means regulating sup-
pliers rather than products. Regulators can hardly be expected to wait upon 
the consequences of a surgical intervention, for example, before judging 
whether the person performing it is capable of doing so. 
One implication of the regulatory focus on the supply side is that much 
regulation, at least in the first instance, is about authorization to enter the mar-
ket, rather than performance in the market. This automatically translates into 
a greater preponderance of regulatory interventions, since product regulation 
does not necessarily involve conformity assessment with respect to every sin-
gle unit of production, whereas if services need to be regulated, this cannot be 
achieved on the supply side via sampling. Ali service suppliers will have to 
submit to whatever procedures are required. From a policy perspective, this 
means that progress in liberalization of trade in services is highly dependent 
on progress in the field of regulatory reform. 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
Scope and Structure 
Governments exercised caution when they negotiated the GATS, providing 
themselves with ample scope to condition their multilateral commitments. 
Two aspects of the GATS that need to be distinguished are the part that estab-
lishes a framework of mies governing trade in services, and the part that sets 
out the specific sectoral commitments undertaken by Members. The latter are 
inscribed in schedules appended to the Agreement. Only some of the provi-
sions of the GATS framework agreement relate to the uni verse of trade in ser-
vices, as defined under the agreement, while others are restricted to those ser-
vice activities subject to scheduled sectoral commitments. 
Severa) provisions clearly reflect the pervasiveness of regulations in many 
service sectors, and the intent to prevent the protectionist abuse of such regu-
lations. The specific schedules indicate which service sectors each signatory 
has been willing to subject to non-general obligations under GATS. The 
schedules also provide for qualifications to the national treatment and market 
access commitments that otherwise apply to sectoral commitments. Finally, a 
series of annexes and decisions elaborate on commitments and exceptions 
with respect to different mies and sectors, and also establish a work program, 
including further sectoral negotiations. 
The oblig:>tions and disciplines set out in the GATS framework include 
mies on most-favored nations (MFNs) treatment, transparency, increasing 
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participation of developing countries, economic integration, domestic regula-
tion, recognition, monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, business prac-
tices, emergency safeguards, payments and transfers, balance-of-payments 
restrictions, government procurement, general and security exceptions, and 
subsidies. 
The scope of the agreement, the definition of trade in services, and sec-
toral coverage are laid out in Part I of GATS. The Agreement applies to ail 
measures taken by Members that affect trade in services. Trade in services is 
defined in terms of four modes of suppl y. The first mode involves the cross-
border (arms-length or long-distance) supply of a service from one jurisdic-
tion to another. This mode of delivery is analogous to international trade in 
goods, in that a product crosses a frontier. Many different kinds of electronic 
information flow occur across national borders. The second mode of supply 
requires the movement of consumers to the jurisdiction of suppliers.' Tourism 
is a good example of this mode, involving the movement of (mobile) tourists 
to (immobile) tourist facilities in another country. 
The third mode of supply is through the commercial presence of a supplier 
in the jurisdiction where the consumers are located (abstracting from export 
sales). This is the investment mode, referred to above. An important point to 
note about the investment mode is that it involves two distinct components. 
The first relates to the authorization to invest, or in other words to the setting 
up of business in another Member's terri tory. The second deals with post-estab-
lishment operations, or in other words with actually doing business. Both these 
aspects are covered by GATS. The idea of including commercial presence in 
GATS was initially opposed by many developing countries. They argued that 
commitments on service transactions under this mode of supply were tanta-
mount to a surrogate obligation on foreign direct investment, and they 
expressed unwillingness to tie in their investment regimes in this manner. 
Finally, the fourth mode entails the movement of natural persons from one 
jurisdiction to another. This is the mode under which the sensitive issue of the 
movement of labor is addressed. The Agreement makes it clear that provisions 
on movement of natural persons do not address issues relating to access to the 
employment market, nor measures regarding citizenship, residence or 
employment on a permanent basis. The fourth mode relates both to indepen-
dent service suppliers and to employees of juridical persons supplying ser-
vices. Just as with the commercial presence mode, the GATS covered both the 
right to establish a presence and the right to do business under the fourth 
mode. 
The conceptual approach underlying these modes was first developed in the 
academic literature as a heuristic device to explain the nature of international 
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transactions in services. Differentiation by modes of supply later formed the 
basis on which govemments defined market access commitments under 
GATS, permitting a choice to be made from among alternative modes. The 
use of modal distinctions is a reflection of the manner in which liberalization 
is defined under the Agreement, and the possibility of applying different pol-
icy regimes to different modes of suppl y is a potential source of economic dis-
tortion. It may also be argued that the absence of symmetry in the policy con-
ditions affecting the different modes imposes limitations on the reach of lib-
eralization. Despite early reservations about commercial presence, a tenden-
cy is discemible for scheduled commitments to be concentrated in the com-
mercial presence mode. In some cases, this may be because countries have 
attempted to use the GATS as an instrument for encouraging foreign direct 
investment. In others, it reflects the desire to avoid "regulatory competition" 
between different jurisdictions. Furthermore, where regulatory control is con-
sidered important, as in prudential controls in banking, for example, govem-
ments find it easier to impose and enforce regulations in their own territories. 
A second feature of the definition of services covered by GATS is the 
exclusion of services supplied in the exercise of govemmental authority. The 
definition of a service supplied in the exercise of govemmental authority is 
"any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in compe-
tition with one or more service suppliers" (Article 1 :3(c)). The intention of 
this provision is to permit governments to exclude basic infrastructural and 
social services which they suppl y their populations on an exclusive basis from 
the purview of the Agreement. 
The most important general obligations in GATS are the MFN principle 
articulated in Article II and the publication and supply of information aspects 
of the transparency provisions in Article III. The MFN clause states that: 
With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member 
shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member treatment no Jess favorable than that it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. 
Note that the MFN principle refers to both services and service suppliers, 
reflecting the fact that the GATS is both an investment and a tracte agreement. 
Article II of GATS also provides the possibility that Members may maintain 
MFN-inconsistent measures as long as they are scheduled in the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions. Exemptions from MFN could only be registered prior 
to the entry into force of the Agreement, and cannot be supplemented. 
Moreover, they are subject to periodic review and are in principle meant to be 
maintained for no longer than ten years. 
The MFN exemption provisions reflected the concern of some larger 
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countries that by granting MFN access to their markets, they would be losing 
the opportunity to exchange their relatively open access for further liberaliza-
tion in other markets. In other words, these countries were arguing that "free 
riding" would occur in the absence of an effective instrument to ensure reci-
procity. The issue was raised most explicitly in the telecommunications and 
financial service negotiations. Sorne 60 countries took MFN exemptions, 
affecting most significantly the audio-visual, financial, basic telecommunica-
tions, and transport services sectors. The MFN exemption in the financial ser-
vices sector was suspended pending the outcome of post-UR negotiaüons. 
MFN provisions did not apply either to basic telecommunications and mar-
itime services (except where specific scheduled commitments have been 
undertaken) pending completion of negotiations in these areas. Audio-visual 
MFN exemptions reflect European concerns about the cultural reach of US 
entertainment products, and are justified in terms of arguments about defend-
ing the national heritage. The European Union (EU) not only exercised its 
right to insist on an MFN exclusion, but also failed to make any specific com-
mitments in this sector. 
A fundamental feature of GATS is the principle of progressive liberaliza-
tion (Part IV). lt reflects the reality that governments were neither willing nor 
able simply to open up their services markets to international competition 
from one day to the next. Progressive liberalization implies a graduai 
approach, and the structure of the GATS accommodates such gradualism. 
Members have already committed themselves to enter into successive rounds 
of negotiations aimed at achieving higher levels of liberalization. The first 
such negotiation is to take place at the turn of the century. A question to con-
sider, however, is whether the GATS does indeed offer a vehicle for achiev-
ing trade liberalization, or whether its structure is such as to allow govern-
ments to support a putatively market-opening instrument while in practice 
holding off liberalization into the indefinite future. In other words, has a prop-
er balance been struck between gradualism and the graduai attainment of ever 
higher levels of liberalization? 
In considering this question, it is useful to examine certain structural fea-
tures of GATS which, it could be argued, are important in determining the 
pace of liberalization. Two of them relate to the discussion so far, and others 
are dealt with later in relation to scheduled commitments. First, there is the 
question of the scope of application of the provisions of GATS. Under the 
existing structure, few obligations in GATS apply unless a sector and the asso-
ciated modes of delivery have been made subject to specific commitments in 
the schedule of a Member. As noted above, the MFN principle in Article II and 
the transparency commitments in Article III are the main general obligations 
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of the agreement. ln addition, cert;lin provisions dealing with recognition of 
qualifications (Article VII), monopolies and exclusive suppliers (Article VIII), 
and business practices (Article IX) are of general application. The most impor-
tant gaps in general application, which have the effect of reducing the reach of 
GATS, are those relating to domestic regulation, market access and national 
treatment. 
The intensity of regulation in services, as well as the fact that the GATS 
deals with both investment and trade, makes the GATS provisions on domes-
tic regulation a crucial element of the Agreement. To the extent that the disci-
plines on regulations laid out in Article VI do not apply to unscheduled activ-
ities and sectors, the disciplinary impact of GATS is correspondingly limited. 
Moreover, only the bare bones of rules on regulations have so far been estab-
lished. These are based primarily on the notion of necessity, such that any reg-
ulatory interventions relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements should not constitute unneces-
sary barriers to trade in services. Regulatory interventions must also be non-
discriminatory and based on objective and transparent criteria. Licensing pro-
cedures must not in themselves create a restriction on the supply of a service. 
ln light of the acknowledged inadequacy of these provisions in terms of 
their generality, paragraph 4 of Article VI calls for a work program to devel-
op further the GATS provisions on domestic regulation. In addition, the 
Decision on Professional Services calls for recommendations for the elabora-
tion of multilateral disciplines in the accountancy sector. Govemments might 
consider whether regulatory disciplines should cover ail sectors, and the work 
program could provide an opportunity for extending regulatory disciplines 
beyond specific commitments in schedules, to ail services covered by GATS. 
A second structural issue relates to the difference-between a "positive" and 
a "negative" list approach to scheduling specific commitments under GATS. 
A positive list approach to sectoral coverage requires that Members list the 
sectors in which they are willing to undertake commitments, and any sector 
or activity not so listed in a Member's schedule is not subject to specific com-
mitments. The GATS has adopted a positive list approach to scheduling sec-
tors. A negative list approach, by contrast, requires that Members list those 
sectors or activities in respect of which they are unwilling to assume commit-
ments, leaving ail other sectors covered by implication. 
Three arguments are advanced as to why a negative list approach may fos-
ter greater liberalization than a positive list approach. First, it is argued that 
with a negative list greater transparency is assured, since the true coverage of 
the Agreement would be readily revealed. On the other hand, given that ail 
governments know what services are included in the established sectoral 
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nomenclature under GATS, the validity of the transparency argument would 
seem to depend on whether adequate transparency provisions per se are in 
place. rather than upon the choice of means to indicate sectoral coverage. 
The second argument is that by forcing governments to list sectors in 
which they are unwilling to accept commitments, a greater pro-liberalization 
dynamic will be created, as long lists might cause embarrassment. It is not 
altogether clear, however, why governments should be more embarrassed by 
long negative lists than by short positive ones. The third argument is probably 
the most powerful in favor of a negative list approach. It is that with a nega-
tive list, new sectors would automatically be covered by GATS disciplines, 
unless explicit action were taken to exclude them. As technology moves fast 
in many service sectors, this is a significant consideration, and may help 
explain the reluctance of governments to adopt a negative Iist approach. 
Schedules of Specific Commitments 
Articles XVI, XVII and XVIII are the core of the Agreement as far as specif-
ic commitments are concerned. Article XVI deals with market access, which 
is defined in a very specific manner. Having established that signatories will 
accord services and service suppliers treatment at least as favorable as that 
provided for in the schedules, the Article goes on to define six types of mar-
ket access restrictions that will not be adopted in respect of sectors where mar-
ket access commitments are undertaken unless there is a specification to the 
contrary in the schedule of specific commitments. In other words, disciplines 
on market access impediments will apply to scheduled commitments unless a 
reservation is registered to the contrary. This is a negative list approach nest-
ed in the overall positive list approach of the GATS schedules. The six imped-
iments or limitations on access are defined as: a) limitations on the number of 
suppliers; b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets; c) 
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity 
of service output; d) limitations on the total number of natural persans that 
may be employed; e) measures which restrict or require specific types oflegal 
entity or joint venture; and f) limitations on the participation of foreign capi-
tal. Article XVI limitations are exhaustive, in the sense that these are the only 
limitations on market access that Members are permitted to inscribe in their 
schedules. 
It should be noted that items (a) to ( d) of Article XVI are expressed in 
tenns of quantitative market access limitations - the number of suppliers, the 
value of transactions or assets, the number of operations or quantity of output, 
or the number of natural persans that may be employed. In considering the 
overall GATS objective of progressive liberalization, a question is whether it 
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would be more appropriate to express these limitations in terms of price mea-
sures rather than quantitative limitations. Access limitations could be imposed 
on foreign suppliers through fiscal measures, and perhaps even subjected to 
periodic negotiations aimed at reducing such limitations. If this approach 
were adopted, governments may then want to consider whether the frame-
work agreement contained enough provisions for applying quantitative 
restraints on services trade under particular circumstances. A structural 
change of this nature would almost certainly imply a greater degree of liber-
alization than the existing arrangements. It is questionable, however, whether 
governments would be willing, in the foreseeable future, to move in this 
direction. 
Article XVII contains the national treatment provision of the agreement. 
The approach here is very similar to that of market access, with national treat-
ment applicable only to scheduled commitments, and only then if reservations 
are not made to the contrary. National treatment is defined in the traditional 
GATT manner, as treatment no Jess favorable than that accorded to domestic 
homologues, in this case services and service suppliers. Article XVII recog-
nizes, however, that the attainment of national treatment may involve treat-
ment that is not formally equivalent, and that formally equivalent treatment 
may not yield a non-discriminatory outcome either. A significant difference 
between national treatment in GATT and in GATS is that in the former case, 
national treatment is established as a principle to be applied across the board: 
whereas in the latter case, national treatment has been given negotiating cur-
rency - it is something to be granted, denied or qualified, depending on the 
sector and signatory concerned. 
One reason why governments may have been unwilling to see national 
treatment play the same role in GATS as in GATT, or the role that MFN plays 
in GATS as a general principle, is that under the commercial presence and 
movement of natural persons modes in GATS (Modes 3 and 4), full national 
treatment is equivalent to free trade - it would guarantee unlimited investment 
rights for foreign service suppliers. While governments were willing to guar-
antee this treatment in some sectors where they made scheduled commitments 
unencumbered by national treatment limitations, this was clearly not true 
across the board. In these circumstances, if national treatment had been an 
inviolate principle not subject to conditioning, it is probable that even Jess 
would have been incorporated in the schedules than what is there at present. 
An intermediate approach to using the national treatment rule as a more 
effective instrument of liberalization would be to impose limitations on the 
nature of permissible departures from national treatment. At present, any kind 
of departure is permitted, provided the limitation is entered in the schedule 
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against the relevant sectoral commitment. The nature of departures from 
national treatment could be defined, with an emphasis on price-based mea-
sures, and these measures could also be subject to progressive reductions in 
the context of negotiations aimed at greater liberalization. Once again, it is an 
open question whether governments would be willing to embark on a struc-
tural change of this nature. 
Article XVIII offers the possibility for signatories to negotiate additional 
commitments not dealt with under the market access and national treatment 
provisions of Article XVI and Article XVII. These commitments could apply 
to such matters as qualifications, standards and licensing, and would be 
inscribed in Members' schedules. Limited use was made of this option in the 
UR negotiations. The most important aspect of Article XVIII measures is that 
they must express commitments favoring more open access, and not addi-
tional market barriers. 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, any analysis of GATS or trade 
in services more generally suffers from an acute shortage of reliable data. In 
the case of specitïc commitments, no statistical base exists from which to esti-
mate the value in trade or welfare tenns of what countries have bound. The 
only alternative is to undertake a frequency count of commitments. Such a 
procedure ignores the relative importance of different service activities, and 
takes no account of the implications of market access and national treatment 
limitations inscribed in the schedules. 
On the basis of a frequency count, industrial countries on average made 
commitments on 64 percent of ail service activities, while the comparable fig-
ures for transition and developing economies were 52 percent and 16 percent 
respectively. It is important to note that these averages conceal significant 
variance among countries within the groupings. This is especially true of the 
developing countries, of whom a number made commitments more far-reach-
ing than suggested by the average. For various reasons, commitments were 
more sparse in the audiovisual sector, basic telecommunications and trans-
portation. When these are excluded from the reckoning, the shares increase to 
82 percent (industrial countries), 66 percent (transition economy countries), 
and 19 percent (developing countries). Only five participants made more than 
100 commitments out of the population of 149 possible sectoral commit-
ments, based on the highly aggregated sectoral nomenclature developed for 
the negotiations (Austria, European Union, Japan, Switzerland, United 
States). At the other extreme, 28 countries made Jess than ten commitments. 
Clearly, considerable scope exists for increasing the level of obligations 
accepted by governments without undertaking the kinds of adjustments to 
the structure of the Agreement discussed above. Action could be taken on 
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several fronts. First, governments could reduce and eventually eliminate all 
exemptions to the MFN principle. As already noted, a presumption exists in 
GATS that this ought to occur over time. Second, governments could include 
more sectors and activities in their schedules of specific commitments. Third, 
they could reduce and eliminate the market access and national treatment lim-
itations that they have inscribed in their schedules. It has been suggested that 
the limitations which have been inscribed reflect the status quo in terms of 
policies applying at the time the commitments were made, and that in this 
sense, the GATS has yielded little so far by way of trade liberalization. Fourth, 
governments could eliminate the gap that is sometimes maintained between 
the actual policies they apply in practice and the level of commitments they 
undertake in GATS. By aligning GATS commitments with policies actually in 
place, governments would be providing greater market security and ultimate-
ly a more liberal trading environment, pending the attainment of additional 
trade liberalization which could be scheduled. 
Future Work Program 
A good place to start would be the post-UR work program, which took up sev-
eral issues on which agreement proved impossible within the time frame of 
the negotiations. In some areas dealing with sectoral negotiations, th~ pro-
gram was a "rescue" operation, designed to prevent the withdrawal of market 
access offers or the adoption of a discriminatory approach at the sectoral level. 
The work program also contains the mandate on domestic regulation referred 
to earlier, and negotiating mandates for emergency safeguards, government 
procurement and subsidies, which were all areas where it proved impossible 
to conclude within the time frame of the UR. 
Sectoral negotiations that were left over from the UR involved financial 
services, movement of natural persons, basic telecommunications and mar-
itime transport. An interim agreement on financial services, securing further 
market access and national treatment commitments in the areas of banking, 
securities trading and insurance, was accepted by some 30 countries in mid-
1995, excluding the United States. The fact that the United States is not part 
of this agreement is the reason why the negotiations will be resumed at the 
end of 1997, in the hope of securing further liberalization, fuller geographical 
participation and a longer-lasting arrangement. 
The negotiations on movement of natural persons were also completed in 
mid-1995. Most countries had made commitments on the movement of natur-
al persons in the UR, but nearly all of them were narrow, limited to intra-cor-
porate transferees, and then only to personnel at the managerial level. A few 
schedules, notably those of Canada and the United States, also contained 
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limited commitments in respect of independent professional service suppliers. 
Movement of labor is a sensitive issue for all governments, and it is notewor-
thy that even those countries pressing for better access for different categories 
of natural persons, such as lndia and the Philippines, were unwilling to offer 
much themselves. The post-UR negotiations on movement of natural persons 
brought very little by way of improvements in the schedules of offers, again 
retlecting the unwillingness of governments to forego control over what is 
universally seen as a sensitive policy area. 
As with financial services, the negotiations in basic telecommunications 
were prolonged beyond the end of the UR against a background of the risk 
that major participants, on the basis of their dissatisfaction with the overall 
package on offer, would schedule limited commitments and seek reciprocity-
based exchanges of market access on a discriminatory basis. It became clear 
before the end of the negotiations that signifü.:ant liberalization was unattain-
able within the time frame of the Round. While a few countries (such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, ChiJe 
and Mexico) had already opened up their telecommunications sectors, or were 
in the process of doing so, others (most notably the EU) were still deciding 
what to do. 
A worldwide trend toward liberalization in the telecommunications sector 
is clearly discernible. Globalization of economic activity has increased the 
importance of telecommunications as a production input, making firms much 
more sensitive to competitive disadvantages arising from poor or costly ser-
vices. This has mobilized powerful private sector constituencies in many 
countries that are pushing governments to liberalize and to eliminate or di lute 
telecommunications monopolies. The extended negotiations in this sector 
were due to be completed on 30 April 1996, but it proved impossible to meet 
this deadline. Governments have agreed to freeze their best offers until a one-
month period ending on 15 January 1997, at which time efforts will be made 
to consolidate high quality liberalization commitments from as many coun-
tries as possible. The results of these negotiations are scheduled to enter into 
force at the beginning of 1998. 
Despite the efforts of negotiators on maritime transport services, it became 
obvious towards the end of 1993 that it would be impossible to reach a broad-
based agreement on maritime services. A decision was therefore taken to pro-
long the negotiations. A number of countries have traditionally maintained 
restrictive shipping regimes. The United States, for example, prohibits foreign 
participation in cabotage.' Cabotage is widely restricted in other countries as 
well, and indeed, was exduded from the negotiations. Liner conferences have 
played a prominent role in EU shipping arrangements in various parts of the 
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world. By contrast, the Nordic countries, some EU nations, a number of Asian 
countries, and others maintain relatively open maritime regimes. When mar-
itime services were initially placed on the negotiating table, the United States 
opposed the move, seeking the explicit exclusion of the sector from GATS 
coverage. With the decision taken by the United States not to participate in the 
maritime negotiations, an agreement was made to carry forward the exercise 
into the new round of negotiations already scheduled for the year 2000. 
Tuming to those aspects of the post-UR work program dealing with rules, 
Article X of GATS consists of a negotiating mandate on emergency safeguard 
measures. A safeguard provision would allow a signatory to withdraw bene-
fits contingent upon some occurrence or development adversely affecting 
domestic production. The absence of safeguard measures at the outset would 
have presented govemments with greater difficulty had they not been given 
scope through other means to avoid the application of GATS disciplines in 
sensitive areas.' On the other hand, some might argue that safeguard provi-
sions are now needed in order to allow govemments to extend their specific 
commitments into new areas. Article X provides three years in which to nego-
tiate appropriate provisions. The mandate indicates that negotiations on emer-
gency safeguard measures will be based on the principle of non-discrimina-
tion. 
Article XIII deals with govemment procurement, which is defined as the 
purchase of services for govemmental purposes and not with a view to com-
mercial resale or use in the supply of services for commercial sale. 
Procurement is exempted from market access and national treatment provi-
sions (Articles XVI and XVII), as well as from the MFN rule in Article II. 
This exemption in GATS is similar to what is found in GATT, although in the 
latter case the exemption applies to national treatment but not the MFN prin-
ciple. Article XIII of GATS calls for negotiations on govemment procurement 
within two years. The existing govemment procurement agreement under the 
WTO, which was first negotiated in the Tokyo Round ( 1973-79), is one of the 
few agreements with membership restricted to Jess than the full complement 
of WTO signatories. 7 Indeed, only twenty-two countries have committed 
themselves to procurement disciplines, in part because of rigidities perceived 
by govemments to exist in the present agreement, but also on account of a nat-
ural reluctance by govemments to forego this particular source of patronage.8 
The existing agreement covers both goods and services, so the question aris-
es as to how this agreement would relate to any provisions on procurement 
developed under the GATS. Among the factors being considered in the dis-
cussions currently taking place are the role of transparency and national treat-
ment in procurement, and the nature of complaints and dispute seulement 
procedures that might be contemplated in any future agreement. 
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Article XV deals with subsidies but has no substantive provisions. The 
Article contains general GATT-like language recognizing that subsidies may 
distort trade, but also that they may play an important role in development. 
Negotiations are called for with a view to establishing subsidy disciplines and 
examining the case for countervailing remedies. It is noteworthy that 
Members have already accepted subsidy disciplines to the extent that they 
have made national treatment commitments in their schedules of specific 
commitments. The undertaking in such a case is not to discriminate against 
foreign services or service suppliers in granting any subsidy. The inability to 
discriminate in this way is likely in itself to impose a significant subsidy dis-
cipline. Ur.like the negotiations foreseen for safeguards and government pro-
curement, no time frame is set for these negotiations. Pending their outcome, 
signatories are entitled to request consultations when they consider that 
adverse effects result from the subsidies of other parties, and such requests are 
to be accorded sympathetic consideration. 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Background 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was 
one of the most far-reaching results of the UR. The TRIPS Agreement is by 
no means the first international effort to establish rules for the protection of 
intellectual property rights - indeed, it rests heavily on previous agreements 
such as the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention, 
and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. At 
the same time, however, the TRIPS Agreement goes much further than this 
earlier patchwork, creating a seamless network of minimum uniform stan-
dards of protection for a wide range of intellectual property on a near-univer-
sal basis. 
The pressure for strengthened rules for protecting intellectual property 
(IP) rights that emerged from the late i 970s onwards was a natural outgrowth 
both of globalization and of the increasing role of knowledge and technology 
as determinants of international competitiveness. Firms seeking to produce 
research and technology-intensive goods and services in diverse locations 
around the world, as well as those wishing to serve diverse markets for such 
products through trade, clamored increasingly for higher levels of IP protec-
tion. Without this, the owners of intellectual property argued that they would 
be unable to recoup investments made in fostering creativity, accumulating 
knowledge and developing new technologies. 
Four particular aspects of the TRIPS Agreement deserve emphasis in the 
context of intensified economic linkages among nations. First, the TRIPS 
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Agreement covers a broad range of intellectual property rights, including 
patents, trademarks and copyright. These are covered more comprehensively 
- that is, in greater depth and detail - than in any previous international agree-
ments. Second, the TRIPS Agreement has been subscribed to by ail WTO 
Members. This means that most countries, with the notable exceptions of 
China and Russia, are subject to the disciplines of the Agreement. When 
China and Russia become members of the WTO, as they are expected to do 
in due course, they will also be required to subscribe to the TRIPS Agreement. 
No scope exists for securing departures or exemptions from the rules in acces-
sion negotiations. 
Third, the TRIPS Agreement is a prime example of how an area of law and 
policy has been designated "trade-related", when it might be argued that the 
protection of IP rights has little to do with trade perse. On the other hand, the 
protection of IP rights does have much to do with the conditions of competi-
tion in markets. Whatever view is taken of the degree to which IP rights are 
linked to trade, the fact of placing the TRIPS Agreement squarely within a 
multilateral trade agreement has significant implications for the manner in 
which IP rights are protected. In particular, the WTO's integrated dispute set-
tlement system creates the conditions under which non-compliance with IP-
related commitments may be addressed with reference to a broad range of 
trade policy commitments. What this means in practice is that significant 
leverage has been created well beyond the domain of intellectual property 
rights, such that refusai to abide by the TRIPS Agreement can trigger retalia-
tory action in any number of trade areas. This possibility undoubtedly 
expands the number of countries favorably disposed towards making serious 
efforts to implement the TRIPS Agreement in full measure. 
Fourth, the TRIPS Agreement is a reflection of the recent trend in inter-
national rule-making towards a greater concern with the manner in which 
international obligations will be fulfilled. Thus, instead of considering it suf-
ficient for governments to undertake certain specified commitments, with the 
understanding that the manner in which these commitments will be carried 
out is a malter for individual governments, pressure has grown for such com-
mitments to be accompanied by supplementary undertakings as to the way in 
which they will be given force. In the TRIPS Agreement, governments have 
not only subscribed to a set of substantive IP protection standards, but have 
also signed on to a series of domestic enforcement commitments. This is a 
reflection both of heightened economic integration, giving rise to interest in a 
wider set of policy areas, and of the increased complexity of international 
rule-making that inevitably cornes with an agenda that has expanded into 
many more detailed and varied areas of policy. 
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A vigorous debate occurred during the UR negotiations on IP rights, which 
at least in the early stages of the negotiations, tended to di vide countries along 
North-South lines. It is only a mild simplification to distinguish the protago-
nists in this discussion into those that were significant generators and 
exporters of intellectual property (usually OECD countries) and those that 
were not (typically non-OECD countries). As expected, the first group was 
determined to ensure that foreign governments would provide high standards 
of IP protection regardless of the ownership of IP rights. Such rights, it was 
argued, were essential if the necessary investments were to be made so that 
creativity, inventions and technological innovations would be supplied in 
socially desirable quantities. The initial position of the second group was 
somewhat hostile to IP protection, seeing it either as a pretext for denying 
developing countries access to modern technology and know-how, or as a 
questionable means of increasing reverse resource transfers via the abuse of 
monopoly positions and payments for access to intellectual property. 
As the UR progressed, however, developing country attitudes softened 
considerably. Severa) factors explain this change of heart, thus opening the 
way for the TRIPS Agreement, which is the most comprehensive and far-
reaching IP agreement ever negotiated. Two of these factors are worthy of 
mention in the present context. First, a significant reason why net importers 
of IP became Jess negative to the idea of providing stronger guarantees of IP 
protection was the realization that the absence of adequate protection may 
well inhibit foreign investment in high technology sectors. The argument was 
that in choosing an investment location, a prospective foreign investor would 
be sig1.1ificantly influenced by differences in IP protection standards and in the 
perceived ability of the host government to enforce them. In other words, 
insisting on higher levels of IP protection could not simply be dismissed as a 
ruse to extract additional resources from poor countries. 
A second reason for a more accommodating view towards a strong IP 
regime on the part of net importers of intellectual property, and in particular 
among the more advanced non-OECD countries, was that producers in their 
countries were increasingly developing creative and technological bases 
which relied for their prosperity on adequate IP protection. Inadequate IP pro-
tection in other countries would reduce the scope for competing successfully 
in foreign markets and diminish export opportunities. Such concerns are typ-
ified, for example, by the entertainment industry in India and the computer 
software industry in many of the more advanced non-OECD countries. 
Principal Features of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement is one of the three pillars of the WTO system. The 
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other two comprise trade in goods - the traditional area of GATT concern -
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which was negotiated in the 
UR. Ali three pillars are unified as constituent parts of the Marrakech 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO 
Agreement). Apart from common provisions relating to such matters as joint 
decision-making, amendments, non-application of the Agreement between 
parties, and a range of institutional provisions, the most important unifying 
thread of the three pillars is the dispute settlement system. The system oper-
ates with respect to the entire Organization, both in terms of procedure, and 
in terms of remedies. What this means in practice is that compensatory adjust-
ments may, under certain conditions, be made in any area of the WTO in the 
event that a Member is found in breach of a WTO obligation. 
The TRIPS Agreement covers seven areas of intellectual property. These 
are copyright and related rights (rights of performers, producers of sound 
recordings and broadcasting organizations), trademarks, geographical indica-
tions including appellations of origin, industrial designs, patents including the 
protection of new varieties of plants, layout- designs of integrated circuits, 
and undisclosed information including trade secrets. In each of these areas, 
the Agreement establishes minimum standards of protection, provisions relat-
ing to the domestic enforcement of IP rights, and provisions concerning inter-
national dispute settlement. 
A noteworthy feature of the TRIPS Agreement is that it only sets mini-
mum standards. In other words, it does not prevent governments from estab-
lishing higher standards, provided that these do not infringe upon the 
Agreement, including with respect to its rules regarding non-discrimination. 
Thus, harmonization is not an objective of the Agreement, except in the nar-
row sense of establishing a benchmark below which commitments cannot fall. 
A general issue facing ail international rule-making endeavors is whether har-
monization is a desirable or attainable objective. In the field of IP, govern-
ments interested in establishing rules did not insist on harmonization, largely 
in recognition. of the reality that harmonized provisions would be constrained 
to the level attained through the minimum standards, and that it would be nei-
ther realistic nor desirable to prevent governments from imposing more rig-
orous requirements to the extent that they did not undermine the TRIPS 
Agreement. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the standards contained in 
the TRIPS Agreement are broadly similar to those in existence in many indus-
trialized countries. 
Like the rest of the WTO, the principles of most-favored nation (MFN) 
and national treatment form a vital part of the base upon which the Agreement 
is structured. These principles apply not only to the standards of protection 
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themselves, but also to the use of IP rights, their acquisition, scope, mainte-
nance and enforcement. ln other words, they apply to all obligations under the 
Agreement. Certain exceptions have been "grandfathered", however, in rela-
tion to national treatment and MFN, where such exceptions existed in earlier 
international agreements on intellectual property rights. 
Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement contains provisions on technology 
transfer to which a number of non-OECD Members attach importance. One 
of these provisions allows Members to adopt any necessary measures to pro-
mote technological development,9 provided that such measures are consistent 
with the Agreement. Article 8 also acknowledges that measures may be need-
ed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. Again, any such measures must be con-
sistent with the Agreement. 
The TRIPS Agreement is cognizant of a possible tension between the 
monopolistic effects of granting exclusive rights through law to a particular 
economic agent and the general objective of promoting competition. Thus, 
paragraph 1 of Article 40 of the agreement states that: 
Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining 
to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have 
adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemina-
tion of technology. 
The Agreement also states that Members may adopt licensing practices or 
conditions that might in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights. But the right is also recognized to take appropriate measures 
to prevent or control abuses of intellectual property rights that have an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market. The Agreement further provides 
that a Member seeking to take action against abusive practices involving the 
companies of another Member may enter into consultations with that other 
Member in order to seek cooperation through the suppl y of publicly available 
non-confidential information. 
In recognition of the fact that many countries, especially developing coun-
tries, would have to make significant changes to existing laws, and in some 
cases introduce entirely new ones, it was agreed that certain transitional peri-
ods should be permitted before Members would be in full conformity with 
their obligations. Broadly, industrial countries were given one year to impie-
ment the Agreement, while developing countries were given five years, and 
the least-developed countries eleven years. However, all Members were 
required to apply the MFN and national treatment obligations of the 
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Agreement with effect from one year from the entry into force of the 
Agreement. 
Prior to the UR, provisions relating to "special and differential treatment" 
for developing countries were often such as to provide substantively different 
obligations for developing countries. It is noteworthy that the tendency to 
vary the actual content of rules in the name of fostering development or avoid-
ing the imposition of an undue burden on poor countries has diminished 
sharply in recent years. The bulk of special provisions for developing coun-
tries agreed to in the UR were of an exclusively temporal nature, simply 
allowing developing countries a longer time period to corne into full confor-
mity with their new obligations. The TRIPS Agreement is no exception in this 
regard. 
Standards of Protection 
With respect to each of the seven areas of intellectual property listed above, 
the Agreement defines the subject malter to be protected, the rights to be con-
ferred and the duration of the protection. With the exception of moral rights 
under the Berne Convention, the substantive provisions of the Paris 
Convention and the Berne Convention are incorporated in the TRIPS 
Agreement by cross reference to the original instruments. This is the starting 
point upon which the TRIPS Agreement then builds. 
Copyright and Related Rights 
While considering the Berne Convention generally adequate, the Agreement 
does add a few provisions. One is to designate and protect computer programs 
as literary works. Another is to protect data bases, even if they contain infor-
mation not protected by copyright, provided a data base can be considered an 
intellectual creation. The Agreement grants exclusive rentai rights to authors 
of computer programs, and in certain circumstances does the same for the cre-
ators of cinemagraphic works. 
Performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations are 
ail granted specified protection. Performers can prevent recording of their per-
formances on a phonogram and the reproduction of such recordings. 
Producers of phonograms are assured exclusive rights over the reproduction 
and rentai of their phonograms. Broadcasting organizations have similar 
rights to prevent unauthorized recording, reproduction of recordings and dis-
semination with respect to broadcasts, although such rights may reside with 
the copyright owner rather than the broadcasting organization. As for the term 
of protection, if this is not calculated on the basis of the life of a natural per· 
son, then it must be at least fifty years. 
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Trademarks 
Any sign or combination of signs that distinguishes a good or a service must 
be eligible for registration as a trademark, provided that it is visually percep-
tible. Where signs do not inherently distinguish the relevant good or service, 
the authorization to register a trademark may be attainable on the basis of dis-
tinctiveness through use. Owners of registered trademarks have the exclusive 
right to prevent third parties from using identical or similar signs for any 
goods or services which are identical or similar where such use may cause 
confusion. Trademarks must be registered for at least seven years, and regis-
tration is rer.ewable indefinitely. 
A trademark can be canceled if it is not used for an uninterrupted period of 
three years, unless some valid reason exists for why it has not been used. 
Government-imposed measures, such as import restrictions, could be consid-
ered valid reasons for non-use. If another person uses a trademark with the 
approval of its owner, this shall be recognized as use. The use of a trademark 
should not be unjustifiably encumbered by any special requirements, such as 
use with another trademark or use in another fonn that inhibits the effective-
ness of the trademark. The compulsory licensing of trademarks is not permit-
ted, and the owner of a registered trademark has full rights to transfer the trade-
mark in question, with or without the business with which it is associated. 
Geographical Indications 
Geographical indications are defined as indications identifying a good as orig-
inating in a particular locality where a given quality, reputation or other char-
acteristic of the good in question is attributable to its geographical origin. 
Geographical indications are protected against any designation or presenta-
tion that misleads the public as to the true origin of a good, or which consti-
tutes an unfair means of competition. Additional protection is provided, how-
ever, in the case of wines and spirits, where neither the effects of misleading 
the public nor of interfering with competition are applied as tests in deter-
mining whether a geographical indication is being misused. Certain excep-
tions to the above provisions are contemplated, the most significant of which 
is designed to accommodate a situation in which a geographical indication has 
already become a generic tenn. If a Member avails itself of these exceptions, 
it must at the same time show willingness to enter into negotiations aimed at 
increasing the protection of geographical indications. 
lndustrial Designs 
Protection must be provided for industrial designs that are new or original. In 
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order to be new or original, they must differ significantly from known designs 
or combinations thereof, and the designs must not be dictated essentially by 
technical or functional considerations. In the case of textiles designs, which 
tend to be of commercial value for short periods of time, Members must 
ensure that requirements for securing protection are not overly burdensome or 
costly. The protection of designs prevents them from being made, sold or 
imported without the design owner's consent. Limited exceptions to these 
provisions may be granted, provided they do not conflict unreasonably with 
the legitimate interests of the owner of a protected design. Protection for 
industrial designs is granted for a minimum period of ten years. 
Patents 
Patent protection is to be available for any invention, whether a product or a 
process, in ail new fields of technology involving an inventive step and capa-
ble of industrial application. Patents must be available without discrimination 
as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced. Exclusions from patentability are permitted if 
commercial exploitation of the patent may pose a threat to ordre public or 
morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or to avoid 
serious prejudice to the environment. Additional areas where exclusion may 
be permitted are in respect of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animais, plants and animais other than micro-
organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animais other than micro-biological processes. If plant varieties are excluded 
from patentability, an effective sui generis system of protection must be 
employed. 
Where the subject malter of a patent is a product, a patent owner has the 
right to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing the product ·in question for such purposes. Similarly, patented 
processes may not be used, nor may products obtained directly from the 
process in question be used, offered for sale, sold or imported for such pur-
pose. Thus, it may be noted that process protection extends to products 
obtained directly using the protected process. Patent owners have full rights 
to assign or transfer by succession a patent, as well as to license the use of a 
patent by a third party. 
Compulsory licensing or government use are anticipated without the 
authorizati0n of the patent holder. But the right to force the working of a 
patent in this manner is heavily conditioned in a number of different ways. A 
prospective user must have made previous unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
authorization from the patent holder on reasonable commercial tenns, 
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although this requirement can be waived in a national emergency. The scope 
and duration of a compulsory license or use must be limited to the specific 
purpose for which authorization is granted, and the use must be non-exclu· 
sive, non-assignable, and authorized predominantly for supplying the domes-
tic market. Right holders must be adequately compensated, and decisions 
relating to the compulsory allocation of patent rights must be subject to judi-
cial or independent review by a higher body. The authorities may waive cer-
tain of the above requirements in order to remedy a practice found through a 
judicial process to be anti-competitive. The minimum term of patent protec-
tion under the TRIPS Agreement is 20 years from the date of filing. 
layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits 
The provisions for protecting layout-designs (topographies) of integrated cir-
cuits are based on the 1989 Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits. In addition, the TRIPS Agreement provides that protected 
layout-designs and products incorporating protected layout-designs may not 
be imported, sold or otherwise distributed for commercial purposes without 
the authorization of the right holder. In order to address the concerns that 
made the above-mentioned Treaty unacceptable to many governments, the 
Agreement added a number of provisions. These included the understanding 
that persons unknowingly using or selling integrated circuits (which may or 
may not be incorporated in products) containing unlawfully reproduced lay-
out-designs would not be liable for this action prior to their being informed of 
the situation. Also, most of the conditions dealing with compulsory licensing 
of patents apply in the event of non-voluntary licensing or government use of 
a layout-design. Layout-designs are protected for a minimum of ten years. 
Undisclosed Information 
Undisclosed information, relating to trade secrets or know-how had not been 
subject to protection under any international agreement prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement. The protection granted relates to secret information with a com-
mercial value that derives from the fact that it is secret and has been main-
tained so. Persons in control of undisclosed information must have the right 
to prevent such information from being disclosed, acquired or used in a man-
ner contrary to honest commercial practice. The Agreement also deals with 
undisclosed test data relating to governrriental approval procedures for phar-
maceuticals and agricultural chemicals. 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
The introduction of explicit provisions on enforcement was a nove) feature of 
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the TRIPS Agreement, in that such provisions had not been developed before 
in international agreements dealing with the protection of intellectual proper-
ty rights. As noted earlier, this was also a more general innovation from the 
perspective of multilateral rule-making. The basic idea behind insistence upon 
international obligations relating to enforcement provisions is a simple one -
substantive standards can be rendered meaningless if the necessary mecha-
nisms for enforcement are not in place and if no way exists of ensuring that 
such mechanisms are used as required. The provisions in the TRIPS 
Agreement on en forcement attempt to address both of these concerns, that is, 
the existence of the necessary enforcement mechanisms and their use. Thus, 
the obligations that the Agreement establishes in relation to enforcement, 
address both the substance of procedures and remedies and the practical 
working of these procedures and remedies. 
The enforcement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement seek to guarantee 
both that the owners of intellectu,al property rights can fully exercise those 
rights, and that procedures associated with the use of IP rights are not abused 
in a fashion that transforms them into barriers to legitimate trade. An impor-
tant point to make about the first of these objectives is that what the rules actu-
ally do is to underwrite the right of action of private right holders. 
Governments have agreed to guarantee these rights as a malter of internation-
al commitment. The Agreement attempts to accommodate significant differ-
ences in national approaches to these matters, while at the same time embody-
ing a sufficient degree of specificity to impose real disciplines. Enforcement 
provisions are targeted at infringing activity in general, for which civil judi-
cial procedures and remedies are contemplated, as well as at counterfeiting 
and piracy (relating to serious trademark and copyright infringements respec-
tively), in respect of which criminal procedures and border measures are fore-
seen. 
General obligations in relation to enforcement stipulate that remedies 
must be available both to prevent infringements and to deter further infringe-
ments. Enforcement procedures must be fair and equitable, and must not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entai) unreasonable time-limits or 
unwarranted delays. Parties to a proceeding are entitled to judicial review of 
legal aspects of final administrative decisions, and at least the legal aspects of 
initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case, but not to review of acquit-
tais in criminal cases. The Agreement states that no obligation is created to put 
in place a judicial system for en forcement of IP rights distinct from that for 
the enforcement of law in general, nor is there any obligation created with 
respect to the distribution of resources for en forcement of the law in favor of 
IPlaw. 
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Civil judicial procedures must exist to enforce all rights in the TRIPS 
Agreement, and certain basic features of the procedures are stipulated. 
Available remedies linked to civil judicial procedurès must include injunc-
tions, damages and in some circumstances the . forfeiture or disposai of 
infringing goods. Members must also provide for provisional measures that 
may be taken to prevent infringing activity from occurring and to preserve 
evidence. Provisional measures may be required in certain circumstances 
without the right of a prior hearing for the affected party. Measures are also 
established io safeguard against the abuse of provisional action. 
While the preferred method of dealing with IP infringements is at the 
source of the problem, the TRIPS Agreement does provide for border mea-
sures. These are particularly relevant in the case of counterfeiting and piracy, 
but border measures may also be applied in appropriate circumstances in 
respect of infringements of other IP rights. Border measures basically entai] a 
procedure by which a right holder can request the customs authorities, upon 
production of sufficient evidence, to prevent the goods in question from enter-
ing into circulation. The Agreement also spells out conditions for ensuring 
that border measures do not become a barrier to legitimate trade. These 
include the posting of a security by right owners seeking the detention of 
goods, and indemnification in the case of wrongful detention. Criminal pro-
cedures apply to willful counterfeiting and piracy on a commercial scale. 
Penalties must be sufficient to act as an effective deterrent. 
Dispute Settlement 
Previous international agreements on the protection of intellectual property 
rights did not provide any mechanism for governments to seek redress in the 
event of alleged non-compliance by another party. The WTO dispute settle-
ment machinery provides such recourse both with respect to infringements of 
substantive standards of IP protection, and domestic enforcement commit-
ments. The WTO dispute settlement procedures are significantly stronger than 
those that existed under the GATT. Most notably, procedural time limits have 
been established for every stage of the process, and losing parties to a dispute 
can no longer delay or block the adoption of dispute panel decisions. Given 
the more binding and automatic nature of the WTO juridical process, an 
Appellate Body has also been established, so that losing parties have the 
opportunity to appeal panel decisions. The decisions of the Appellate Body 
are final. 
As noted earlier, an aggrieved Member may be authorized to withdraw 
commitments in respect to a Member that fails to comply with a dispute set-
tlement panel finding and recommendation. Where such retaliation is not 
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deemed practical or effective in the same policy area as that in which a rec-
ommendation for remedial action has been made, the retaliation may be 
applied in any other area of policy covered by WTO disciplines. Both the 
increased automaticity of the system and the enhanced scope for retaliation 
are illustrative of how governments have tried to increase international 
accountability through legal due process in a world of intensified dependen-
cy. One of the effects of these changes in the dispute settlement system is to 
create a situation in which refusai by a government to comply with its inter-
national obligations would be much more visible than in the past. It is no 
longer so easy to obfuscate and procrastinate in ways which might be tanta-
mount to non-compliance, but which were never openly identified as such. 
Under the new arrangements, the stakes are much higher, since unwillingness 
to abide by the rules is in open view, and is therefore more easily perceived 
as systemic failure. 
Technical Standards and Regulatory Reform 
Background 
The rationale and appropriate role of regulatory intervention has become a 
central concern in international economic policy-making. Until comparative-
ly recently, governments considered both the objectives of regulation and the 
nature of interventions deployed to meet regulatory objectives largely a mal-
ter of domestic policy, interference with which was a threat to national sover-
eignty. The idea that regulation can be treated as the exclusive prerogative of 
individual governments is no longer tenable, if it ever was, and there is grow-
ing pressure for governments to find ways of accommodating one another 
with respect to a wide range of domestic regulatory policies. 
This is apparent at both the multilateral and regional levels, and it touch-
es upon virtually all countries in some measure. In the GATT/WTO context, 
several agreements address regulatory issues in increasingly detailed, explic-
it and intrusive ways. This trend has become particularly marked following 
the UR. In the Round, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
was reformed, and entirely new agreements that were negotiated include the 
GATS, the TRIPS Agreement, and the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Ali these agreements deal in sig-
nificant ways with domestic regulatory interventions. Moreover, the UR 
results, embodied in the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization and the Annexes to that Agreement and the associated min-
isterial decisions, declarations and understandings are a "single undertaRing" 
to which all WTO Members subscribe. 
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This is in sharp contrast to the pre-UR situation, when governments could 
pick and choose in relation to a range of agreements and associated commit-
ments. In the case of the TBT Agreement, for example, only 46 countries were 
signatories of the precursor to the present Agreement, the Tokyo Round TBT 
Code. Now some 120 countries subscribe to the strengthened UR TBT 
Agreement. According to one estimate, this expanded membership represents 
an increase of approximately US$ 182 billion in imports subject to new inter-
national discipline, representing an increase of 17 .5 percent in coverage com-
pared to the Tokyo Round Code. 
The WTO Agreements embody the international commitments that are of 
most relevance to the great majority of countries, especially non-OECD coun-
tries. Although their contents are discussed below, it is perhaps worth noting 
how the one significant WTO Agreement dealing with regulation that was not 
introduced for the first time in the UR - the TBT Agreement - has changed as 
a result of the negotiations. The significant point about all these changes is 
that they strengthen the degree of international accountability to which gov-
ernments have submitted their regulatory regimes. This is indicative of the 
direction that globalization and growing interdependence is inevitably taking 
nations. 
The first major point to note about the new TBT Agreement is that it was 
extended to product-related production and process methods (PPMs) for the 
first time. This means that the disciplines of the Agreement relate not only to 
products per se, but also to those aspects of product characteristics that may 
be attributable to the way in which a product is produced or processed. 
Second, under the pre-UR Agreement national treatment applied only to prod-
uct testing and certification programs in the field of conformity assessment. 
The new Agreement extends the non-discrimination principle to all aspects of 
conformity assessment, including registration, inspection, laboratory accredi-
tation, and quality system registration programs. Third, governments were 
previously only required to take such "reasonable measures" as may be avail-
able to them in order to ensure compliance with the mies of the TBT 
Agreement by local government bodies and non-governmental bodies. Under 
the new Agreement, they are required to accept full responsibility for the 
observation of all relevant provisions by such bodies, and also to formulate 
and implement measures and mechanisms in support of observance of rele-
vant provisions by subsidiary bodies. Similar provisions are written into the 
SPS Agreement (Article 13). 
Regulation has also been the subject of attention in regional arrange-
ments such as NAFTA, ANZCERTA, ASEAN, APEC and MERCOSUR. 10 
Bilateral cooperation has led to the negotiation or establishment of various 
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understandings and arrangements relating to regulatory policy, for example, 
between the EU and the United States, the EU and Australia, the EU and 
Canada, the United States and Australia, the United States and New Zealand, 
and the United States and Japan. The integration process of the European 
Communities is the most far-reaching of ail experiences with international 
cooperation in the domain of domestic regulation. 
The pressure for international cooperation in matters of regulation is a nat-
ural outgrowth of globalization, and of the deeper level of economic integra-
tion inevitably implied by increased international economic interdependency. 
Moreover, the removal of traditional barriers to tracte and investment in many 
countries has made regulatory interventions a far more crucial determinant of 
the conditions of competition in markets and of the ability of foreign suppli-
ers of goods and services to secure effective market access outside the con-
fines of national boundaries. Traditional tracte and investment barriers can 
often be understood in relatively straightforward terms as interventions by 
govemments to accord advantages to domestic suppliers over foreign ones -
in other words to provide economic protection. Any international agenda 
designed to address protection is also uncomplicated, since it essentially 
entails the single objective of approximating, if not attaining, unimpeded 
market access. 
But the objectives of domestic regulation are altogether more diverse and 
often more complex. Regulatory interventions may be designed to deal with 
poorly functioning markets or they may pursue non-market objectives. 
Because regulatory reform cannot simply be equated with liberalization, the 
possibility of conflicting policy objectives is ever present. Thus, for example, 
the attainment of a given social objective may not be compatible with unre-
strained market access. But at the same time, it is very well known that the 
put-ative pursuit of legitimate regulatory objectives can easily cloak a protec-
tionist intent. Regulations can be used to undo or neutralize market access 
commitments undertaken in other policy domains, such as tariff reductions, 
the removal of quantitative import restrictions, or the opening up of the 
investment regime. The policy challenge, therefore, is to safeguard the right 
of govemments to pursue legitimate public policy objectives without using 
the regulatory interventions involved as an illegitimate means of frustrating 
economic liberalization or undermining pre-existing market access commit-
ments. 
Policy discussions about regulation and regulatory reform rest on a broad 
and generally vague notion of the nature and circumstance of regulatory inter-
ventions. In these general terms, however, it may be said that regulation seeks 
to intervene in decisions and circumstances surrounding market entry, product 
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attributes, production methods, and market transactions. The central objective 
of regulatory reform is to attain efficiency in the nature and form of regulato-
ry intervention, both in the sense of attaining the "least-cost" or "least-dis-
ruptive" method of intervention, as well as minimizing undesirable side-
effects from such interventions. Regulatory reform, therefore, may cover a 
wide variety of policies. These can range from structural approaches such as 
privatization to positive rules about deregulation perse or about standard-set-
ting and standards-related procedures. 
In broad terms, there are two distinct elements in the rationale for regula-
tory intervention. One is to do with the failure of markets to fonction proper-
ly on account of structural impediments of one kind or another, usually attrib-
utable to the behavior of economic agents in the market concerned, or on 
account of market failure in the sense of externalities. The second rationale 
concerns the pursuit by governments of social goals that markets simply can-
not address. Those shortcomings of the market mechanism that reside in 
structural impediments to competition are the subject malter of competition or 
antitrust policy. They result from the ability of actors in the market to use a 
dominant position to override market forces and determine outcomes in a 
manner advantageous to their own narrow interests. 
The appropriate policy response to anti-competitive behavior depends to a 
degree upon the source of the market distortion. Sometimes it may be other 
policies of governments that give rise to the problem, in which case the solu-
tion may well be to change those policies rather than to introduce an addi-
tional layer of regulation. In other circumstances, the need may well be pre-
sent for a regulatory intervention to eliminate the source of market power. 
Sorne regulatory interventions of this nature may be ex post in the sense of 
correcting observed anti-competitive behavior, while others may already be 
written into laws proscribing certain kinds of behavior. 
The other kind of market failure alluded to above arises when the calcul us 
of private costs and benefits diverges from the calculus of social costs and 
.benefits, giving rise to externalities, or to a situation in which private eco-
nomic agents in the market behave in ways that are optimal from their per-
spective, but suboptimal in a social sense. This could arise, for example, when 
resource inputs are not priced to reflect their true scarcity value because of a 
lack of well-defined property rights over the resources. In this case, scarce 
resources will be priced too low, so that producers use them in a manner and 
at a rate that does not reflect their true value to society. In man y instances like 
the example just cited, a price-based intervention, such as a tax, would be the 
most appropriate means of bringing private and social returns into alignment. 
In other cases, such as the production of a toxic emission considered to pose 
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an unacceptable risk at any level above zero, a regulatory intervention pro-
hibiting the offending production process would be called for. 
The distinction between price and non-price interventions is important to 
make in the present context, not so much because of the efficiency consider-
ation underlying the choice of instrument (in the first example above, a gov-
ernment might have chosen the Jess efficient policy of restricting access to the 
scarce resource quantitatively instead of through influencing the price), but 
rather because the policy debate seems to have separated tax and subsidy pol-
icy from administrative or other kinds of regulatory intervention. While this 
may be useful in clarifying the issues at hand, it should be borne in mind that 
analytically, ail these different interventions are part of the same continuum 
of govemment actions that affect access to markets and the conditions of com-
petition in those markets. 
The second rationale for regulation mentioned above, that of the pursuit 
by governments of social goals not attended to by markets, is closely linked 
to the idea of market failures that generate externalities. But in this case, a 
market-related remedy may not be an option because the public policy objec-
tive which needs to be addressed is simply too far removed from the array of 
market signais to which producers and consumers respond. Regulatory inter-
ventions to protect moral values, for example, could only be achieved by a 
specific intervention targeted to that objective. A similar argument might 
apply in relation to an income distribution objective. 
Before considering the various ways in which international cooperation 
might be secured in matters of domestic regulation, it is perhaps worth high-
lighting one fondamental distinction that underlies the entire debate. This is 
the distinction between seeking to influence the objectives of public policy, 
and setting the rules about how to achieve those public policy objectives. The 
"models" of international cooperation relating to domestic regulatory regimes 
discussed below contain elements of these two aspects of regulation in 
sharply differing degrees. At one extreme, the objectives of public policy are 
considered sacrosanct, and the entire focus of rule-making efforts is on the 
manner in which these objectives are to be met. At the other extreme, coun-
tries might be so similar that they are willing to agree jointly upon the objec-
tives of any intervention. 
Similar contrasts, although not necessarily at the outer limits of the spec-
trum, are to be found in international agreements. The GATT/ WTO, for 
example, has generally been fastidious in avoiding rules that impinge upon 
the objectives of public policy - governments for the most part, but not in ail 
circumstances, retain full sovereignty with respect to what they daim to be 
the social or public policy objectives of their regulatory interventions. Other 
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agreements, on the other hand, more readily give rise to accountability in 
terms of regulatory objectives. This can happen partly through commitments 
to regulatory harmonization, and partly through "regulatory competition" 
induced by mutual recognition arrangements. 
Alternative Approaches to International Cooperation in the Field of 
Domestic Regulation 
Four different approaches to regulatory cooperation at the international level 
are discussed below. They are not mutually exclusive in terms of the regula-
tory mix that might be chosen by governments. The principle distinguishing 
feature between these different approaches is the extent to which they impose 
international regulatory commitments on governments, or lead to conver-
gence. The four approaches are, first, what has been described as "policed 
decentralization,"11 which amounts' to a set of international rules about the 
conduct of regulatory policies. Second, there is harmonization, where gov-
ernments agree to harmonize defined aspects oftheir regulatory regimes, most 
notably the substantive content of regulations. Third, international enforce-
ment commitments do not in volve efforts to harmonize anything, but do entai! 
the establishment of an internationally justifiable obligation to en force nation-
al regulations. Finally, mutual recognition agreements do not seek to harmo-
nize regulations either, but they may well lead in that direction over time. 
Policed Decentralization 
Policed decentralization describes an arrangement whereby governments 
operate their regulatory regimes independently, including in respect of the 
possibility of divergent regulatory objectives and substantive regulations, but 
subject to certain commitments relating to the operation of the regulatory 
regime. Such commitments might include non-discrimination, the obligation 
to give reasons for regulating and the means of doing so, transparency, and the 
use of the least-trade restrictive interventions. Non-discrimination refers to 
national treatment and by extension, the MFN principle. The commitment not 
to discriminate is a powerful discipline, especially in the national treatment 
sense, since it precludes the possibility of setting regulations in a fashion 
designed to disadvantage foreign suppliers or foreign products. Matters do not 
always turn out to be simple, however, because formally non-discriminatory 
interventions may still have discriminatory effects in practice, depending on 
the design of the substantive obligation, or the design of the procedures asso-
ciated with its implementation. 
The idea behind making governments accountable in the sense of explain-
ing the objectives of a regulatory intervention is that if the authorities know 
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they will be obliged to explain why they are intervening, they will be Jess like-
ly to deploy regulatory interventibns for protectionist purposes. The reasons 
for embracing the principle of transparency are self-evident. A question, how-
ever, is precisely what aspects of regulation-setting or implementation should 
be subject to transparency requirements. Clearly, publication of rules and reg-
ulations is a basic requirement. In addition, govemments may have the oblig-
ation to consult, both on the substantive content of regulations prior to their 
implementation and on all matters of implementation. The commitment to use 
the least-trade restrictive intervention to achieve a public policy objective is 
also a powerful discipline. It means that regulations must not intlict any 
unnecessary barriers to tracte, although the consequence of a regulation com-
plying with this requirement could, depending on the regulatory objective, 
still have the practical effect of limiting tracte. 
The approach of policed decentralization bears a close resemblance to 
many international rules dealing with regulation. The primary hallmark ofthis 
mode) of international cooperation is that it maximizes the tlexibility of gov-
ernments, particularly with respect to the objectives of regulatory interven-
tions, although Jess so with respect to the manner of achieving them. 
Moreover, even where international commitments go further than this, these 
principles frequently form the basis upon which more far-reaching commit-
ments are built. The WTO rules constitute the most significant set of interna-
tional commitments in the field of regulation for most countries, especially 
non-OECD countries. They are based largely, but not exclusively on the 
policed decentralization approach. 
Thus, the TBT Agreement does not define regulatory objectives. It refers 
in its Article 2 to "legitimate" objectives, but only provides an illustrative list 
of what objectives might be legitimate. Included in this list are national secu-
rity requirements, the prevention of deceptive practices, and protection of 
human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. 
These are all unexceptionable public policy goals, but reliance on a non-
exhaustive illustrative list in the Agreement means that govemments remain 
free to use regulations to pursue other objectives, provided they are prepared 
to defend them as legitimate. The approach in GATS is very similar, where in 
Article VI it only refers to a single objective, that of ensuring the quality of a 
service. The SPS Agreement, on the other hand, because it is more narrowly 
focused, is able to specify the single and exclusive objective of protecting 
human, animal or plant life or health (Article 2: 1 ). 
Turning to the question ofnon-discrimination, the TBT Agreement, which 
applies to all industrial and agricultural products, is firmly rooted in the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination, via the national treatment commitment in Article 
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III:4 of the GAIT. The latter provision states that: 
Members agree that some licensing pra.:tices or conditions pertaining 
to intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have 
adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemina-
tion of technology. 
39 
Article 2: 1 of the TBT Agreement itself states that products imported from 
the territory of any Member "shall be accorded treatment no Jess favorable 
than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products orig-
inating in any other country." This phraseology captures both the national 
treatment and the MFN principles. The SPS Agreement requires that sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures do not "unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between 
their own terri tory and that of other Members." (Article 2:3). Again, the word-
ing addresses both MFN and national treatment. 
The GATS national treatment provision is more elaborate than those men-
tioned above. It reads: 
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions 
and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to ser-
vices and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of ail mea-
sures affecting the supply of services, treatment no Jess favorable than 
that it accords to its own Iike services and service suppliers. 
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according 
to services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally 
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to 
its own like services or service suppliers. 
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be consid-
ered to be Jess favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in 
favor of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like 
services or service suppliers of any other Member. 
The wording of the first paragraph covers MFN as well as national treat-
ment. The GATS provisions address two situations in which a problem may 
arise: i) identical treatment may be discriminatory, thus calling for formally 
different treatment; ii) different treatment may be discriminatory, thus calling 
for formally identical treatment or for modified different treatment. This elab-
oration, which requires that whatever the treatment accorded is, it must not 
modify the conditions of competition in a manner Jess favorable to services or 
service suppliers of foreign origin, reflects earlier GAIT case law. 12 
In sum, the national treatment requirement is a minimum standard. This 
means that countries are not obliged to apply to imports of goods or services, 
or to service suppliers, the regulations they apply to their domestic analogues. 
In other words, nothing in the WTO prevents governments from discriminating 
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against domestic goods, services or service suppliers. In addition, the nation-
al treatment provision is not outcome-oriented, but rather opportunity-orient-
ed. For a regulation to be non-discriminatory, it must not change competitive 
opportunities in a market. 
From a regulatory perspective, then, the substantive details or procedures 
associated with a regulation do not have to be identical, as long as any differ-
ences do not modify the conditions of competition in the relevant market. At 
the same time, regulations cannot be designed so that although they impose 
identical requirements upon domestic and foreign suppliers, they do not 
afford the same competitive opportunities to foreigners. An example of a reg-
ulation according identical treatment to foreign and domestic suppliers that 
would most likely be considered discriminatory would be a requirement that 
ail lawyers wishing to practice in a particular country would have had to have 
received their formai legal training in that country. 
An obligation to give reasons for a regulatory intervention is somewhat 
related to transparency requirements. The basic idea is that if the regulatory 
authorities are obliged to ex plain their regulatory policies, this would have the 
effect of deterring protectionist subterfuge. The strength and effectiveness of 
such a requirement would depend upon what it aimed at. Such accountability 
could relate to regulatory objectives, to the substantive design of a regulation, 
or to a procedure associated with the en forcement of a regulatory requirement, 
including conformity assessment. 
The WTO agreements dealing with regulation do not contain explicit 
requirements of this nature. However, both the TBT Agreement (Article 2) 
and the SPS Agreement (Annex B) require that Members should be given 
adequate time to comment in writing about any intended new or modified reg-
ulatory intervention, where such an intervention is not substantially based 
upon international norms or practice. Moreover, there is an obligation to con-
suit upon request in relation to the written comments, and to take the com-
ments and the results of any discussion into account when formulating the 
final content of the regulation. The GATS does not contain comparable pro-
visions, but Members have committed themselves to develop any necessary 
disciplines in the regulatory field to replace the very general provisions that 
currently exist in Article VI:4. 
As for transparency requirements more generally, WTO Members are 
required to publish ail laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative 
rulings of general application insofar as these pertain to the subject malter of 
the relevant agreements. Publication should occur before implementation, 
except in particular circumstances of urgency. In addition, the TBT and SPS 
Agreements and the GATS require the establishment of inquiry points to which 
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any requests for information by other Members may be addressed. Wide-rang-
ing notification requirements are also written into ail the relevant WTO agree-
ments that touch upon regulatory matters. In general, it may be said that trans-
parency requirements, designed to rai se the degree of accountabili ty of nation-
al governments at the international level, offer a valuable means of influenc-
ing national policy while at the same time avoiding the more intrusive nature 
of approaches involving harmonization and mutual recognition. 
As noted earlier, the requirement that regulatory interventions must not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade is another effective means of control-
ling the misuse of regulations to provide protection to domestic interests in a 
relatively non-intrusive manner. The necessity test may not always be 
straightforward to interpret in specific cases where disputes arise, but it nev-
ertheless creates a strong presumption that adverse trade effects will be mini-
mized. The necessity test is explicit in the TBT Agreement (Article 2.2), the 
SPS Agreement (Article 5), and in GATS (Article VI:4). In line with the gen-
erally conservative approach of these agreements towards judgment about the 
objectives of regulatory interventions, the necessity test applies only to the 
design and procedural features of regulations. 
Harmonization 
Even the most casual empirical observation reveals that approaches to regu-
latory policy and the content of regulations differ significantly from country 
to country. In considering the case for harmonization as a mode of interna-
tional cooperation in the area of regulatory policy, it may be useful in the first 
instance to consider why regulatory objectives may differ among countries. 
Firstly, income levels are a key detenninant of the content of standards 
because of the effect of income on preferences, as well as differences in the 
ability to afford the "quality of life" goals underlying many regulatory inter-
ventions. Moreover, even if standards are fonnally qui te similar regardless of 
significant differences in income, there are often important differences in the 
degree to which standards are enforced in practice. This should be borne in 
mind by those interests seeking to impose standards on governments for 
whom the implementation of such standards is of no interest, or at least not a 
malter of priority. In addition, there are likely to be differences in tastes 
among different societies, independently of income differentials, which may 
also militate against hannonization. 
Second, standards may differ because of different geographical condi-
tions. In some cases, these translate into local differences which do not pre-
sent any significant difficulty in tenns of relations among countries, nor any 
interest in hannonization. It is hard to imagine, for example, that a building 
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code in a tropical country that does not set insulation standards for houses 
would be a source of contention, despite the fact that insulation is a signifi-
cant element of building costs in temperate climates. 
As soon as trade enters the picture, however, differences in production or 
process standards may generate friction, even if a sol id rationale exists for dif-
fering standards. In the field of environmental policy, for example, emission 
standards may well be set in line with a judgment regarding the absorptive 
capacity of the surrounding environment. For example, authorities responsi-
ble for geographical areas with low population density and little polluting 
activity are likely to see Jess need to attain high emission control standards 
than the authorities responsible for an already highly industrialized and pol-
luted center of production. Such differences in standards will bear on relative 
costs faced by producers in the two locations competing for the same market, 
and they can be a source of pressure for harmonization. While the case for 
harmonization would be hard to sustain on environmental grounds, there may 
nevertheless be grounds for legitimate concern about the abuse of this diver-
sity to gain an illegitimate trade advantage. This kind of concern is analogous, 
but diametrically opposite, to that underlying the necessity test. The point is 
that regulations concealing an illegitimate trade objective could be either too 
weak or too strong. 
In practice, it is no easy matter to set differentials in standards precisely to 
reflect the objective conditions that warrant such differences. An alternative 
to harmonization that avoids this problem is the establishment of minimum 
standards. A minimum standards approach may help to bridge wide gaps in 
national preferences while at the same time eliminating the risk of egregious 
standard-setting practices aimed at securing an illegitimate advantage. As 
noted earlier, the WTO has tended to shy away from establishing the substan-
tive content of standards, even of the minimum variety. But in the TRIPS 
Agreement, minimum standards are established in relation to the substantive 
content of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS Agreement also con tains an 
element of harmonization in the domestic enforcement procedures that are 
established to ensure that private right holders can exercise their rights 
through domestic judicial procedures. But the harmonization element of these 
obligations is relatively light, since it focuses primarily on the existence of an 
appropriate institutional setting and on a number of procedural obligations. 
While arguments based on the desirability of diversity and the inappropri-
ateness of imposing a straightjacket of uniformity in dissimilar conditions 
may be persuasive in some circumstances, there are also important reasons 
why a harmonized approach may be attractive. First, a corollary of the 
consensus implicit in the establishment of an international standard is the 
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existence of Jess scope for the protectionist capture of regulatory interven-
tions. In other words, harmonization automatically reduces the scope for 
abuse and a potential source of contention in international economic relations. 
Second, regulatory heterogeneity can carry real economic costs for foreign 
products and producers. These costs may include the requirement to submit to 
more than one conformity assessment procedure, 13 additional uncertainty as to 
the stability of regulatory regimes, higher information costs for producers, 
and the Joss of scale economies in production if differences in standards are 
sufficiently far-reaching to lead to significant differentiation of products or 
production processes. 
The WTO Agreements dealing with regulatory matters are generally cau-
tious when it cornes to harmonization, seeking to tread an intermediate path 
and avoiding any direct involvement in standard-setting activities. Article 2:4 
of the TBT Agreement states that: 
Where technical regulations are required and relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use 
them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regu-
lations except when such international standards or relevant parts 
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of 
the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental 
climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological prob-
lems. 
The Agreement establishes a rebuttable presumption that whenever a stan-
dard is adopted or applied in accordance with relevant international standards, 
it does not constitute an unnecessary barrier to trade. The Agreement also 
calls upon Members to play as full a part as possible in the preparation of stan-
dards in appropriate international standardizing bodies. 
The SPS Agreement adopts a similar approach, requiring Members to base 
their SPS measures on international standards, guidelines and recommenda-
tions when these exist (Article 3), and establishing that such standards con-
form to the Agreement in the sense of meeting the necessity criterion. The 
Agreement allows Members to establish standards that are higher than those 
existing intemationally, provided they can be justified scientifically and 
respond to an appropriate assessment of risk. Members are also required to 
participate in the work of relevant international standardization bodies, 
including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of 
Epizooties, and organizations operating within the framework of the 
International Plant Protection Convention. 
Thus, both of the main WTO agreements dealing specifically with stan-
dards encourage harmonization while at the same lime avoiding involvement 
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in standard-setting. Clearly, this is only possible by cross-reference to bodies 
that do set standards, and implicit in the work of such bodies is consideration 
of the trade-off between the lower transactions costs associated with unifor-
mity and the weight to be attached to objectively different conditions obtain-
ing in different countries. The TBT Agreement in particular does, however, 
provide a basis to challenge the trade-off implicitly settled upon in the for-
mulation of an international standard by recognizing that governments may 
have valid reasons for departing from international standards. 
The GATS approach to the harmonization objective is conservative, con-
sisting in the relatively weak requirement of taking account of international 
standards of relevant international organizations in ensuring that licensing and 
qualification requirements and technical standards do not constitute unneces-
sary barriers to trade in services. However, a recent noteworthy development 
in the direction of regulatory harmonization is the establishment of a common 
set of regulatory principles in the basic telecommunications sector. In the con-
text of negotiations on liberalization of trade in basic telecommunications ser-
vices carried over from the UR, some 30 governments have provisionally 
agreed 14 to incorporate a common set of regulatory principles in their sched-
ules of specific commitments. 
The reason for doing this is that despite the widespread trend towards the 
removal of monopoly privileges in the sector, strong elements of natural 
monopoly are likely to persist, through ownership and control of telecommu-
nications networks by dominant suppliers in the market. This market domi-
nance potentially renders the liberalization commitments of governments 
meaningless in terms of real access to markets. The common regulatory prin-
ciples establish WTO-enforceable commitments by governments to impose 
interconnection obligations upon major suppliers and they also embody a 
number of competitive safeguards against abuse of market dominance. These 
provisions are remarkable for how far they go, considering the traditional 
reluctance of governments to harmonize the substantive content of regulations 
in a WTO context. Although only 30 countries or so are likely to assume these 
commitments, they are MFN-based, which means that any WTO Member can 
raise a non-compliance challenge. One explanation for why it was possible to 
move so far in this direction in a GATS negotiation is perhaps that the subject 
matter was sufficiently specific for governments to be assured of a requisite 
degree of reciprocity and for there to be little uncertainty as to any future 
implications of the commitments. Moreover, in some respects the common 
regulatory principles are stated at a sufficient level of generality to permit 
flexibility on detail at the national level. 
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International Enforcement 
Another approach to cooperation in regulatory matters entails the acceptance 
of an international commitment to enforce domestic regulations. In other 
words, governments promise one another to enforce their respective regulato-
ry regimes and submit to the possibility of an international challenge through 
dispute settlement in the event of Jax enforcement. This approach does not 
involve harmonization, and is perhaps best suited to situations where govern-
ments are comfortable with the content of diverse regulatory regimes because 
the diversity is not considered excessive, but Jess comfortable with the degree 
of assiduity applied to the enforcement of such regimes. 
Examples of international agreements based on this approach are not 
numerous, but elements of it may be found, for example, in the TRIPS 
Agreement. Here, governments have made explicit enforcement commit-
ments, but they have been supplemented by certain provisions relating to the 
underlying enforcement regimes and procedures, as well as by the fact that 
they apply to internationally agreed 1 minimum substantive standards. 
Nevertheless, a right of international action has been created on grounds of a 
failure to respect domestic enforcement procedures, and these procedures 
have not been fully harmonized. 
Apurer example of the international enforcement mode) is the 1994 North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). This is a supplemen-
tary agreement negotiated in the context of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. In essence, the NAALC sets up cooperative machinery in matters 
of labor policy, the centerpiece of which is the right of a NAFTA Member to 
challenge another Member through NAFTA-based dispute settlement machin-
ery in the event that the latter party is considered to be failing to enforce its 
own labor laws. Remedies in the face of non-compliance with a dispute find-
ing include monetary penalties, and ultimately, retaliation through trade 
restrictions. 
Mutual Recognition 
Mutual recognition could be characterized as a market-based approach to har-
monization, insofar as the regulatory competition implicit in mutual recogni-
tion may be expected to lead over time to a narrowing of differences among 
national regulatory regimes. This convergence process, if permitted to occur, 
is Iikely to be most pronounced and rapid in circumstances where regulations 
are a significant determinant of competitiveness. lt is precisely this implica-
tion of regulatory competition that provokes governments to worry about 
mutual recognition as an assault on sovereignty, as well as about such conse-
quences as the much vaunted "race to the bottom" in standard-setting. 
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Mutual recognition, or for that matter unilateral recognition, is most like-
ly to be promoted where national regulatory regimes are already similar - a 
situation most prevalent among countries at comparable income and develop-
ment levels. This is why mutual recognition has not occurred on an across-
the-board basis, and is not likely to in any foreseeable future. Yet many inter-
national agreements, including under WTO auspices, actively promote mutu-
al recognition because of its attractiveness as a mechanism for facilitating 
tracte and eliminating any possibility of regulatory manipulation for protec-
tionist purposes. But perrnitting the establishment of mutual recognition 
agreements (MRAs) with restricted membership raises a serious prospect of 
MFN-inconsistency. Sorne would even argue that MRAs amount simply to 
conditional MFN, with ail the actual and potential discriminatory implications 
of such an outcome. On the other hand, it may also be argued that open-ended 
MRAs based on objective, pre-announced conditions of participation are 
MFN-consistent, insofar as they do not set out to discriminate against any 
party, nor prescribe the ab initio exclusion of any particular countries. 
The most extensive experience with mutual recognition is that of the EU, 
which is built on a far-reaching process of constructing a single market. It has 
taken many years for the EU to reach its present stage of integration in the 
regulatory field. Apart from certain standards-related regulation defined at the 
Community level, the EU's regulatory policies are a combination of judicial 
mutual recognition, 15 and regulatory mutual recognition. These approaches 
are supported by a commitment to the principle of free movement of goods, 
services and factors of production within the EU and by the principles of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality. At the political level, reliance on qualified 
majority voting (subject to exceptions) reinforces the integrating effects of a 
regulatory regime relying on mutual recognition. One lesson from the EU 
experience is that mutual recognition arrangements are not simple to attain, 
and may often require complicated negotiations. The recent experience of the 
United States and the EU in attempting to craft a mutual recognition agree-
ment has confirrned how complicated such negotiations can be, even when 
restricted to conforrnity assessment procedures in relation to a selected group 
of agreed products. 
The relevant WTO agreements in this area are supportive of recognition, 
whether unilateral or mutual, but they do not create strong obligations in this 
respect. The TBT Agreement encourages recognition both in relation to the 
substantive content of regulations and conforrnity assessment procedures. In 
relation to standards, Article 2.7 states that: 
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Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent 
technical regulations of other Members, even if these regulations dif-
fer from their own, provided they are satisfied that these regulations 
adequately fulfill the objectives of their own regulations. 
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In a sense, this requirement does not entai) "mutual" recognition, since 
Members are enjoined to make their own independent judgments as to 
whether they can accept the standards of others as equivalent to their own. In 
practice, however, pressures for reciprocity reduce the likelihood that govem-
ments would make favorable equivalence judgments in the absence of recip-
rocal treatment. The approach with respect to mutual recognition of confor-
mity assessment procedures is very similar. Article 6: 1 requires that Members 
shall "ensure, whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment pro-
cedures of other Members are accepted, even when those procedures differ 
from their own, provided they are satisfied that those procedures offer an 
assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or standards 
equivalent to their own procedures." The TBT Agreement also explicitly 
enjoins Members to show willingness to enter into negotiations for the con-
clusion of mutual recognition agreements with respect to conformity assess-
ment procedures (Article 6:3). 
The GATS provisions on recognition are more elaborate. Article VII: 1 of 
GATS states that for the purpose of meeting standards or criteria in relation to 
the authorization, licensing or certification of services suppliers, Members 
"may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or 
licenses or certifications granted in a particular country." The paragraph goes 
on to say that "[S]uch recognition, which may be achieved through harmo-
nization or otherwise, may be based upon an agreement or arrangement with 
the country concerned or may be accorded autonomously." The text of Article 
VII then states that: 
2. A Member that is a party to an agreement or arrangement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1, whether existing or future, shall afford ade-
quate opportunity for other interested Members to negotiate their 
accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate compa-
rable ones with it. Where a Member accords recognition autonomous-
ly, it shall afford adequate opportunity for any other Member to 
demonstrate that education, experience, licenses, or certifications 
obtained or requirements met in the other Member's territory should 
be recognized. 
3. A Member shall not accord recognition in a manner which would 
constitute a means of discrimination between countries in the applica-
tion of its standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certi-
fication of services suppliers, or a disguised restriction on trade in ser-
vices. 
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Paragraph 5 of Article VII requires that wherever appropriate, multilater-
ally agreed criteria should be used in the area of recognition. Members are 
further directed to work in cooperation with "relevant intergovemmental and 
non-govemmental organizations towards the establishment and adoption of 
common international standards and criteria for recognition and common 
international standards for the practice of relevant services trades and profes-
sions." In addition, paragraph 4 of Article VII requires that ail existing recog-
nition measures be notified to GATS, and that any new negotiations concern-
ing recognition and any new or modified arrangements relating to recognition 
must also be notified. 
Like the TBT Agreement, the GATS does not seek to dictate the pace in 
relation to recognition, but seems at the same time to espouse recognition as 
a valid instrument of trade facilitation. One reason for the more elaborate 
GATS provisions is that they pay particular attention to the risks of unwar-
ranted discrimination inherent in recognition arrangements that are Jess than 
universal. This tension between the attractiveness of recognition agreements 
and the specter of unjustified discrimination is a theme that will likely become 
more prominent in years to corne. 
Concluding Remarks 
The past quarter-century has seen much progress in strengthening the process-
es of international consultation and negotiation about global issues. 
Completion of the Tokyo and URs of trade negotiation led to broad-based tar-
iff reductions and the easing of some of the important non-tariff barriers. The 
establishment of the WTO in 1995 has greatly strengthened the permanent 
institutional mechanisms for the discussion of trade issues and the resolution 
of disputes. A larger number of countries, including the majority of ERF coun-
tries (the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey) increasingly accept the importance 
of trade as a engine of development. During the seven years following the 
launch of the UR in 1986, over 60 developing countries unilaterally lowered 
their barriers to imports and 26 have since joined GATT/WTO. Thus, mem-
bership has grown from 88 in 1985 to 130 today. 16 Moreover, both China and 
Russia as major players outside the WTO have defined their policies and pro-
grams to gain acceptance into the WTO. 
With the progressive reduction in extemal trade barriers, further promo-
tion of competition depends critically on the reform of "behind-the-border" 
barriers-notably, domestic regulation, restrictions on service sector activities, 
government procurement and subsidies. The further integration of economies 
facilitated by the removal of these barriers is sometimes referred to as "deep 
integration" in contrast to the "shallow integration" permitted by removal of 
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border trade barriers. Along with progress on the traditional agenda of tariff 
cuts, the UR built up momentum to tackle these issues - witness the reforrn 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), plus three new agree-
ments: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement 
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). 
Sorne of the unresolved sectoral issues Jeft over from the UR are now being 
tackled or are scheduled for negotiation in the next few years. 
Regional groupings, notably the EU, have worked to harrnonize national 
regulatory frameworks in the interests of improved efficiency and doser inte-
gration of partner economies. Convergence of domestic laws and regulations 
can corne about through either negotiation or de facto competition among reg-
ulatory systems. Either way, however, governments still face pressures to pre-
serve if not enhance the competitive positions of their business and Jabor 
interests. Their efforts to fulfill these expectations will continue as a signifi-
cant cause of friction at the international Jevel and managing it will remain a 
pressing challenge for international trade-related policy. 
Although the starting point for advancing the global agenda of trade lib-
eralization may look auspicious, the problems are getting much tougher and 
more complex. The remaining barriers comprise a mix of hard core protection 
of vital national interests such as farrning, and other measures supported by 
powerful lobbies or local monopolies such as anti-dumping measures. 
Protection from competition through anti-dumping measures or other means 
usually proves very expensive and is often ineffective in preserving jobs and 
companies. Repeal of anti-dumping Jegislation is unlikely, however, even in a 
long terrn horizon as it enjoys widespread political support. The most practi-
cal approach towards Jessening its threat (or making it Jess prone to capture 
by special interests) may be to introduce a stronger voice for the national 
interest via a greater involvement of competition policy agencies in decisions 
made in this area. 
Although contingency protection (such as anti-dumping measures) and 
hard-core trade restrictions remain important, the "along-the-border" impedi-
ments to trade generally are diminishing. Of greater concern are so-called 
"behind the frontier" regulations and administrative practices that powerfully 
impede certain types of trade. Many regulations reduce or eliminate domestic 
competition and some aim directly at foreign c.:ompetition. Well-known exam-
ples include "buy local" public procurement, monopoly concessions granted 
to local companies (often public companies) through bans on the entry of 
other potential players (power, postal services, telecommunications, tobacco 
and alcoholic beverage sales are examples commonly found in the OECD 
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countries ), and the regulation of professional services that mandate local pres-
ence, require local professional qualifications, restrict the establishment of 
foreign firms, or require payment of services according to standardized fees. 
Large benefits can be achieved by stimulating more competition in domes-
tic markets through regulatory reform, including deregulation. Changing the 
rules to facilitate new local entrants is a part of the process, but in markets 
dominated by large players international competition plays a vital role. 
Indeed, a strong complementarity between competition policy and trade and 
investment policy has become increasingly recognized as a key element in the 
new trade agenda. The growing interest in competition law and practice at the 
international level in part reflects these concerns: th us chapter 15 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) explicitly recognized the impor-
tance of competition policy, and Mexico took steps prior to implementation of 
the Agreement to create a competition law. Competition policies however, 
tend to have a rather limited scope and many competition-inhibiting policies 
(for instance public procurement rules) tend to fall outside the jurisdiction of 
the competition authority. The strengthening of competition policy and inter-
national agreements or understandings relating to it likely will remain high on 
the policy agenda. 
Other interactions occur between trade policy and the regulatory environ-
ment. Domestic regulations can, intentionally or not, undo or neutralize com-
mitments undertaken in other policy domains, including trade liberalization. 
Divergent preferences in domestic policy areas such as environmental quali-
ty and social policy lead to different regulations and financial charges which 
have an impact on competitive advantage. Sometimes, as in the discussion of 
intellectual property rights and environmental issues, the trade policy dimen-
sion is associated primarily with the enforcement of agreements, as the threat 
of denial of trade benefits may appear to offer an effective means of securing 
other policy objectives. Thus, at a time when many of the traditional argu-
ments for protection have been largely discounted (on practical grounds, if not 
in theory ), other kinds of justification are replacing them. In these cases, how-
ever, the traditional argument is stood on its head: the threat oftrade sanctions 
is a powerful weapon precisely because the benefits of trade are so valuable. 
The fear is that tougher trade restraints could emerge as a by-product of new 
domestic policy objectives. 
Notes 
Other TRIMS identified in the Uruguay Round discussions, but not mentioned in 
the illustrative list annexed to the TRIMS agreement, include manufacturing 
requirements, export performance requirements, product mandating requirements, 
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manufacturing limitations, technology transfer requirements, licensing require-
ments, remittance restrictions, and local equity requirements. The TRIMS agree-
ment would have needed to go further than reiterating the established interpreta-
tions of GATI Article III and Article XI in order to cover most of these measures. 
A notable omission of the TRIMS agreement, however, was its silence on export 
performance requirements (EPRs). EPRs are analogous to local requirements on 
the import side, and strongly resemble export subsidies, which are prohibited on 
manufactured goods under the WTO. 
2 It is provided, however, that existing TRIMS may be imposed on new enterprises 
during the phase-out period if this is considered necessary in order not to place 
existing enterprises subject to the same measures at a disadvantage. 
3 Both a service supplier and a service consumer could, of course, move to a third 
jurisdiction. Under GATS, this would be treated as two separate transactions from 
the point of view of the host country. 
4 Exceptions to national treatment under GATI exist in respect of subsidies and 
government procurement. 
5 The Jones Act requires that US coastal trade should be conducted by US-owned, 
US-built and US-manned vessels. 
6 Scope for restricting the application of GATS to particular activities or disciplines 
resides in the choice of whether to accept market access commitments with respect 
to particular sectors and sub-sectors, or particular modes of supply, and whether to 
impose limitations on market access or national treatment in respect of scheduled 
commitments. 
7 This is one of the so-called plurilateral agreements, for which membership is 
optional and must be separately negotiated. The other plurilateral agreements are 
the Agreement on Tracte in Civil Aircraft, the International Dairy Agreement and 
the International Bovine Meat Agreement. 
8 The signatories of the Government Procurement Agreement are: Canada, the 15 
Member States of the EU, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Korea, Switzerland, and 
the United States. 
9 Reference is made in the same context to the protection of public health and nutri-
tion, and to the public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and 
technological development. 
10 North American Free Tracte Agreement (NAFfA), Australia-New Zealand Cl oser 
Economie Relations Tracte Agreement (ANZCERTA), Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economie Cooperation Forum (APEC), 
Common Market formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (MERCO-
SUR). 
11 This expression is attributable to Sykes. See Alan O. Sykes, ( 1996), "Strategies for 
Increasing Market Access Under Regulatory Heterogeneity," Unpublished paper 
prepared as a contribution to the OECD Tracte Committee brainstorming on 
"International Contestability of Markets: Economie Perspectives," (Paris, 
February 1996). 
12 The report of the GATI panel on "United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 
1933." 
13 There could be duplication in conformity assessment procedures with harmonized 
standards as well, but a double compliance requirement would seem less likely in 
a situation where the degree of international cooperation was already sufficient to 
permit harmonization of standards. 
14 The basic telecommunications negotiations under GATS were finalized in 
February 1997. 
15 Judicial mutual recognition is an integrating force that took hold in the EU with 
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respect to non-SHEC products (products not regulated on grounds of safety, 
health, environment or consumer protection objectives) following the 1979 Cassis 
de Dijon Decision of the European Court of Justice, which in essence required that 
if free circulation of a product was permitted in one Member State, then the same 
should be permitted in others. 
16 Since the launching of the Uruguay Round in 1986, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey have unilaterally lowered their barriers to imports, mainly in conjunction 
with a reorientation of domestic policies. Morocco, Tunisia, Bahrain, the UAE and 
Qatar have since joined the GATT; Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are now in 
the process of acceding, while other countries in the region have expressed inter-
est in GATT membership and have so far held observer status inthe GATT (Iran). 
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Opening Up and Distribution in the Middle East 
and North Africa: The Poor, the Unemployed and 
the Public Sector* 
Introduction 
The process of opening up an economy to international trade and capital 
is both a desirable and precarious activity. No economy has achieved sus-
tained, rapid growth in wages and employment without making use of inter-
national markets. Yet, at the point of opening up, fear has too often been the 
dominant collective emotion, whether of specific groups or of the whole pop-
ulace, fed by anticipation of job losses or wage declines. Nowhere is this 
apparent paradox more evident - and more relevant - than in the group of 
Middle Eastern and North African economies. Until the early I 980s, almost 
ail of these countries pursued employment strategies that were dependent on 
growth in public sector employment coupled with substantial expansion of 
education for public sector jobs, with the boom and bust in employment close-
Iy linked to the oil cycle. This strategy is now bankrupt: in most countries 
public sector wages have stagnated or fallen and unemployment has risen; in 
some others, returns to education have significantly declined. One group has 
already started to follow the first path (including Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey) while another (notably Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Yemen) remains 
stuck on the second. Sorne, notably Jordan, fall in between. On the other hand, 
the West Bank and Gaza have an extreme form of the employment problems 
more as a result of the political and economic environment in which they have 
been operating, than as a result of internai policy choices. No country has yet 
completed the transition. An employment malaise is present everywhere in the 
region. 
In this chapter we review the links between long-run growth patterns, the 
process of opening up of economies and its impact on different socio-eco-
nomic groups. We mainly focus on the middle-income Arab countries that 
have been reviewed more thoroughly elsewhere by the authors,' but we also 
refer to Turkey. We discuss the overall effects on income distribution, and in 
particular we explore stylized effects on three groups: the poor or near-poor, 
the unemployed and public sector workers. 
*The authors wish tu tlwnk Ismail SeraE?eldine and the participants of the ERF trade co11ference 
in Istanbul, Turkey for their cumments. 
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The chapter explores the following three themes: 
• the historical pattern of development and the implicit social contract 
brought dividends to all until the end of the oil boom. This strategy is now 
bankrupt and is a potential disaster for poverty and employment in the long run; 
• much of the region is, or has been, on a knife's edge between two options: 
opening to trade combined with public sector reform; and hanging on to the 
old path and social contract. Political risks are attached to both paths, since 
both involve losers, but the first path can lead to robust employment growth, 
the maintenance of reasonably equal income distribution and poverty reduc-
tion, at least in the medium term. Hanging on to the old path is likely to lead 
to sharpened distributional conflicts, and further Joss of social cohesion; 
• sequencing of policy reforms matters: probably the best sequence is to 
open first, and undertake employment-reducing public sector reforms after-
wards. But interactions are key - throughout the reform period, some fiscal 
adjustments are indispensable in order to cushion reforms and buy off perma-
nent losers, while failure to follow opening with deep public sector reform can 
lead to a fragile and unstable position. Restructuring public employment is 
central to public sector reform. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section outlines the key facts 
on employment, unemployment and poverty in the region. The second relates 
these aspects to interactions between growth, openness, and education, and 
describes the actual historical pattern of development in the region. The third 
section sets the international stage in relation to the domestic plight many 
countries are in. The fourth discusses the consequences of opening up of 
economies for different groups, and the fifth looks briefly at the issues asso-
ciated with the sequencing of public sector and trade reforms from an employ-
ment perspective. 
Unemployment, Poverty and the Public Sector- Sorne 
Stylized Facts 
The region is struggling with a deep-rooted employment problem. This has 
manifested itself with the following symptoms: high unemployment, stagnant 
or falling wages, high public sector employment, and (in some) low or falling 
returns to education, in part linked to wage compression in the public sector. 
Despite a generally dismal employment situation, poverty is relatively low for 
the income level, a reflection of relatively equal income distribution. There is, 
of course, substantial diversity: in general the group of reforming countries 
(especially Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) have begun to work their way out 
of some of these difficulties; while those caught in the old growth path, 
whether due to policy or poli tics, are suffering worsening problems. And there 
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have been large changes over time, reflecting the booms or busts that have 
mirrored the oil cycle. We will frequently corne back both to the diversity and 
the boom and bust cycle, but it remains useful to start by characterizing the 
inherited situation in terms of five stylized facts. 
High unemployment. Unemployment has risen enormously and is now 
higher than in any other region of the world (Figure 1 ). On average 15 percent 
of the regional labor force is unemployed. In Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, the 
West Bank and Gaza and Lebanon, unemployment rates exceed 15 percent; in 
Egypt, Morocco, Turkey and Yemen unemployment is 12-14 percent of the 
labor force, and only in Syria is recorded unemployment Jess than 10 percent 
(Figure 2). 
In most countries, the unemployed are predominantly first-time job seek-
ers, reflecting the fast rise in labor supply as baby-boomers enter the labor 
market.' But the proportion of young workers among the unemployed is espe-
cially large in Egypt and Syria (at about 80 percent) where first time entrants 
have to line up in order to get increasingly scarce jobs. However, in Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia, reforms have shaken up previously protected indus-
tries, and over half of the unemployed have lost a previous job. 
Figure 1: Unemployment Rate by Region, 1993 
(percent) 
0 5 IO 15 20 25 
Source: Filmer ( 1995). 
Key: MENA: Middle East & North Africa: ECA: Europe & Central Asia; SSA: Sub-Saharan 
Africa: LAC: Latin America & the Curibbew1, SA: South Asia; EAP: East Asia & the Pacifie. 
Notes: The re/!,ion11l w1emplovment rates are wei/!,hted avera/!,es for li sample of countries within 
the re/!,im1 where the Y•ei/!,hts are the shares in the workin/!, ll/!,e population in 1995. For MENA 
re/!,Ùm the swnple comprises Jordun. Tunisiu. Yemen, Svria, Al/!,eria, Morocco. Iran, und E/!,ypt. 
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Figure 2: Unemployment Rates in the Middle East 
& North Africa, 1993 
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Sources: Algeria: World Bank, 1994a; Eg)pt, 1991 Labor Force Survey; Jordan. World Bank. 
1994b: Lebanon. Issa. 1993; Morocco, World Bank. 1994c: Syria, Louis, 1993; Tunisia, World 
Bank. 1995d; West Bank & Gaw, World Bank, 1994/; Yemen. Sei/, 1993. Turkey, Filmer. 1995. 
In the countries where public employment is large, unemployment is high 
among the kind of workers that are over-represented in public service. In 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the share of young workers with secondary ·educa-
tion among the unemployed is abnonnally large at between 40 and 60 percent 
(Table 1 ). In Egypt, workers with more than a secondary education represent 
26 percent of the labor force but they hold 60 percent of public sector jobs and 
make-up about 60 percent of the unemployed; in contrast, they constitute only 
about 20 percent of private non-agricultural sector employment. This pattern 
is also prevalent among women where they are disproportionately employed 
in the public sector, as in Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. In Egypt 71 percent of 
women with university degrees work for the state, and their chances of being 
unemployed are about 5 times larger than for men. This kind of unemploy-
ment tends to have long duration, young workers lining up until jobs in the 
public sector open up. 
Falling wages. The wages in the formai sector declined in most countries 
in the mid to the late l 980s and have stagnated since. In manufacturing, for 
which data exist for most countries,3 wage growth during the l 970s was com-
parable to that of East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. But while 
wage growth continued in East Asia in the l 980s, they fell in other regions, 
with particularly sharp declines in the Arab countries, by some 30 percent on 
average.4 This reflects the tail end of the oil-based boom and bust cycle and 
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the failure to achieve sustainable growth in tabor demand for other sources. 
There is again significant diversity in experiences. The sharpest recent 
declines have been in those countries that have felt the full bruni of the inter-
national oil cycle and its spillovers, and have not yet undertaken, or complet-
ed, reforms, such as Egypt and Jordan. Morocco had a more moderate decline 
in wages. Turkey experienced falling wages during much of the l 980s as part 
of its stabilization and restructuring strategy, but then witnessed a sharp real 
wage increase in the early l 990s. 
Table 1: Unemployment Structure in the Middle East 
and North A fric a 
First lime Young entrants Those with al 
Unemployment Rate* ( % ) 
job seekers (25 yrs & less) least secondary 
as %of total as % of total education as 
Year Total Men Women Rural Lrban unemployed unemployment % of unemployed 
Country ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Aige ria 1991 21.0 220 17 0 na na na 40 0 3U 
Egypt 1991 10.6 6.3 27.8 8.8 13.1 76.6 784 'i7.0 
Iran 1991 9.1 Ill 9.'i 244 12.4 10 2 na 3.l3 
Jordan 1991 18.8 na na na na 37.2 'i8.0 'i3.0 
Morocco 1991 12.1 11.6 13 0 'i.6 20.6 4'i.6 41.0 24.9 
Syria 1991 'i7 na na na na 78 () M\.O 4'i.O 
Tunisia 1993 16. I 14.7 21.9 14.8 l'i.6 42.7 'i4.'i 31.0 
WBG 1993 l'i.3 8.4 2.7 na na na na na 
Yemen 1992 123 14.0 6.0 114 16.3 32 () na 180 
Sources: Algeriu: World Ba11k. 199'1(. Morocco: 1191 LSMS; T1111isia: World Bank, /995a; 
Jorda11. World Bank. /9We: Eg:--pt. 199/ Labor F11rce Sun-er: West Ba11k wu! Gac.a (WBG!: 199/ 
Labor Force Sul"l"er; Srria: Louis. 1993; Ye111e11. Sei( 1993. 
Note: na: 11ot arni!able 
* Tite defi11ition 11( 1111e111plorn1ent in so111e rnses is 11ot co11siste11t witlt tllllt of the /11temati1111a/ 
Labor Ori:1111i.~atio11 (!LO). 
High public sector employment. The public sector is a big employer in the 
region, probably employing a higher fraction of the workforce in any region 
outside the centrally planned states. The share of the tabor force cmployed in 
the public sector is commonly hetween 30-40 percent (Figure 3). Central 
government employment varies between nearly 20 percent in Morocco and 
Tunisia to 40 percent in Jordan. In ail countries, central governments are larg-
er than the average for middle income countries;' indeed. they are larger than 
in rich OECD countries ( 18 percent).' Public enterprises employment is also 
high in several countrics. It is highest in socialist Algcria (31 percent of the 
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labor force), followed at a distance by Egypt and Tunisia (around 10 percent). 
In the OECD and Latin America, the comparable figure is only 5 percent. 
While the public sector has been large in the numbers of employees, it has 
been increasingly poor in the wages offered. In the post-oil bust/post-stabi-
lization period, the typical response of public sectors has been to keep 
expanding employment but to squeeze wages. 7 The syndrome of the large, but 
poor state is now widespread, but again particularly severe amongst those 
hard-hit by shocks and stuck in the old path. In Egypt government wages fell 
50 percent between 1980 and 1992, but government employment rose 80 per-
cent, almost entirely by 1990.8 
Figure 3: Government Wages and Employment 
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Low returns to education. Low and falling returns to education is a feature 
of some economies - though here there is a relatively sharp contrast between 
those stuck, for various reasons, and the early-reforming group. Returns to 
education are low in Jordan and Egypt, and barely exist in the West Bank and 
Gaza, but are much higher in Morocco and Turkey - comparable to an East 
Asian economy such as Thailand (Figure 4). 
Where the public sector is large, it has an important influence on overall 
wage structures. While public sector wages have fallen across the region, they 
have tended to remain higher than in the private sector for the average public 
servant. In Morocco and Tunisia, wages are higher in the public sector at ail 
skill levels.9 In Egypt and Jordan cash wages are now smaller in the public 
sector, but recent studies show that once the value of ail benefits are taken into 
account, the wage differential between the public and private sectors are about 
20-40 for the average public servant. 1° Civil service pay tends to be more sen-
sitive to seniority than the private sector, Jess sensitive to performance, and 
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less dispersed across skill levels than private wages. As a rcsult, women, older 
workers, and workers with medium levels of education tend to earn higher 
wages compared to what they would command in the private sector. The gen-
eral effect is to distort the structure of wages and the retums to education. The 
one exception is that for women lower differences in public employment may 
reflect the benefits of a public sector working against norms of discrimination 









Figure 4: Returns to Eduction for Men 
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ln Egypt, there is evidence of public sector wage compression over time. 
For other countries there is evidence of compression not over lime, but by 
comparing wage differentials among private and public sectors. ln the public 
sector, the ratio of skilled/unskilled is smaller than in the private sector, while 
the difference for unskilled is smaller.12 
Relative/y low poverty and equal income distribution. Poveny levels, 
unlike unemployment, are low by international standards. Using a conserva-
tive povcrty line of $30 per pcrson per month,1l the estimated average pover-
ty for six coumrics in the region where information was available (Algeria, 
Egypt, Lran, Jordan. Morocco and Tunisia) was 6 percent in 1990 compared 
with 28 percent in Latin America, despite only slightly lower average income 
there. 1• This reflects the relatively low degrec of income inequality in the 
region - much less than in the case of Latin America or the more unequal East 
Asian societies, such as Malaysia, but still more unequal than the former 
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centrally planned countries, such as Hungary. This relative equality of income 
and spending probably retlects a combination of relatively equal asset distri-
bution and substantial private transfers between households. 
ln most countries, the typical poor is a rural household with little or no 
land. Jordan is an exception, with private employees in urban areas account-
ing for a high fraction of the poor. Elsewhere, urban poverty, while relatively 
low, is highest amongst low-skilled workers in the infonnal sector. ln ail 
countries, poverty is strongly correlated with lack of education, and with large 
households with few bread-earners. Although some of the unemployed are 
poor, most of the poor cannot afford to remain unemployed. 
Changes in poverty have generally reflected the overall economic cycle. 
Where average incomes rose between 1985 and 1990, as in Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia, poverty fell; where incomes fell, as in Iran and Jordan, poverty 
rose. In Egypt poverty rose despite a small rise in average incomes. This 
renected an aggravation in inequality. There have also been changes in 
inequality in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. As measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient, inequality has risen slightly in Morocco (39.1 in 1985 up to 39.6 in 
1991 ), fallen in Tunisia (from 43.5 in 1975-85 to 40.2 in 1990), and has 
increased in Jordan (36.2 in 1986 to 43.3 in 1992). Thus, a lot of the reduc-
tion in poverty in Morocco and Tunisia was due to growth rather than redis-
tribution effects (which were small and positive for Tunisia and small and 
negative for Morocco). At the same lime, a measure of income dispersion 
(household income ratio of the top 10 bouom quintile) has risen in the three 
countries and especially in Jordan and Morocco.u 
Openness, Labor Demand and Education: Alternative 
Growth Dynamics 
The previous section has examined five stylized facts: high unemployment, 
falling or stagnant wages, high public employment, low returns to education 
(for some), and relatively modest poverty incidence. In this section we seek 
10 relate these to patterns of development. Sorne may see pressures on 
employment as a typical consequence of a market-oriented growth path and 
an increasingly integrated world economy - this is after ail the subject of 
intense debates in industrial countries. We first sketch a scenario of a 
virtuous long-run cycle in which openness can lead to highly favorable 
employment outcomes. We then describe the key features of the very differ-
ent actual patterns of growth pursued in much of the region that help to 
explain the stylized facts. We corne in a subsequent section to issues of 
transition. 
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A Virtuous Long-run Cycle 
The fast growing East Asian economies exemplify a pattern of growth in 
which educational expansion, investment and openness interacted to produce 
huge, sustained increases in labor incomes, large reductions in poverty and 
generally some lessening in income differentials (though country experiences 
vary). The gains have been astonishing: as a group, they have enjoyed a 
growth rates of 170 percent in industrial wage and 400 percent in employment 
between 1970 and 1990. Three relevant lessons can be distilled from these 
expenences. 
First, growth in labor incomes are essentially driven by increases in labor 
productivity. In this, the East Asian stars excelled. Rising labor productivity 
is determined by three factors: ( 1) capital accumulation (that raises the ratio 
of physical capital to labor); (2) expansion in skills (that raises the ratio of 
human capital to workers); and (3) the effectiveness with which these factors 
are combined (including gains from structural shifts, better use of resources 
and from technological change). There is some debate about what proportion 
of the better performance of East Asia is attributable to each of the three deter-
minants. Ali observers agree that capital deepening was key, and that skills' 
development mattered. Sorne think this is the whole story, others are of the 
view that in the East Asian economies, the residual, or total factor productiv-
ity growth, also grew significantly faster." We do not need to take a strong 
position on this issue since what matters is that workers were able to reap the 
gains from accumulation and technological change in the conditions prevail-
ing in the fast-growing East Asian countries. 
Second, openness was important in sustaining both labor demand and 
labor productivity growth by freeing growth in production of non-food trad-
able goods, especially in manufactures, from the constraints of domestic 
demand, and encouraging productivity-increasing structural change. These 
were made possible through the movement of workers from lower to higher 
productivity activities (at a broad level, agriculture to manufacturing and ser-
vices) and through the induced productivity growth within subsectors encour-
aged by international trade. There were large movements of labor out of agri-
culture and into secondary and tertiary activities, complemented by rising 
labor productivity in agriculture. The balance of distribution between the two 
latter sectors depended largely on the countries' comparative advantage in 
trade. In resource-poor countries such as Korea, a high fraction of workers 
went into manufacturing, while in resource-rich ones, such as Indonesia and 
Malaysia, more went into services, though labor-intensive manu.facturing 
activities remained an important source of employment growth. 
Third, there was a changing but blissful equilibrium between growth in 
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demand for skills and expansion in education systems, both of which con-
tributed to rising average productivity and underpinned the steady structural 
shift in production and trade. Ali the successful East Asian countries invested 
heavily in basic education - often in the decade or so prior to rapid growth, 
so that when growth took off, it did so in parallel with quite fast increases in 
the ski lis of the workforce. This supported the initial shift into labor-intensive 
manufacturing activities, for which basic education is usually a prerequisite, 
which was then followed by a steady move into more skill-intensive activities 
that countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia have passed through. 
Capital-deepening is obviously a blessing for labor productivity but only 
when the capital is combined effectively with labor and skills putto good use. 
But behind these developments were also a set of relationships between 
growth, openness and skills. Growth itself typically leads to rising demands 
for skills - induced by the structural transformation of production from agri-
culture to industry and services. The effects of openness are more complex. 
We return to this below, but it is worth thinking broadly in terms of two fac-
tors, both of which can be observed in the East Asian context. First, there are 
the effects of tracte on the international division of labor, and consequently the 
internai structure of demand for labor of different types of skills. Broadly 
speaking, a Hechsker-Ohlin view of the world, in which countries tracte in line 
with their factor endowments holds. This is reflected in the strong correlation 
between the structure of tracte and the ratio of ski lis to land in a country - the 
higher the ratio, the more a country exports manufactures. 17 As skills-to-land 
ratios rise, countries increase their exports of manufactures - the typical tra-
jectory of most East Asian countries, though how much manufactured prod-
ucts are exported at any one point intime also depends on how resource-inten-
sive they are. Second, however, opening up an economy can by itself induce 
the demand for skills upgrading. Analysis of firm behavior in Taiwan, China 
and Malaysia shows that export-oriented firms, especially in the more tech-
nologically advanced sectors, also train their workers much more - this pro-
vides evidence of higher demands for skills. 18 We return to these relations 
below when we discuss the process of opening up. 
Finally, the fast-growing East Asian countries have low open unemploy-
ment rates. This is the result of two factors. First, steadily rising labor demand 
and growing wages absorbed a growing labor force, and meant that new 
cohorts did not enter the market with expectations of jobs that were not met. 
Second, labor market dualism was relatively low by international standards -
wages of those in "good" jobs, primarily in the formai sector of manufactur-
ing and services, did earn more than other workers (even after adjusting for 
skill differentials), but the gaps were kept relatively low, most importantly by 
the market test of openness and relatively small public sectors. 19 
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The Arab Path: from Boom to Bust 
As the stylized facts vividly show, the countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa region did not sustain the blissful paths for labor as did most East Asian 
economies. We now tum to the relationships between their development paths 
and the adverse labor conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. However, at this 
stage we postpone the examination of the initial impact of refonns for lhose 
countries - especially for Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Arab economies were among the fastest 
growing in the world. The young States advocated modemity and "the big 
push." They invested heavily in large infrastructure projects, built state indus-
tries and erected protective walls to nurture them during infancy, and sought 
shared growth and social mobility by encouraging education and initiating 
nationalizalion and land reforms. Fueled by the regionaJ oil boom, average 
growth per worker was about 3 percent a year during the period 1965-80 - not 
far below that of East Asia. As in East Asia. rising urbanization was a com-
mon feature of this growth path. 
For the working population, this growth path brought large benefits. These 
originated from two aspects of the development pattern, where the public sec-
tor played a key role: policies that promoted the modem sector, especially 
through expansion of millions of jobs in govemment services and protected 
public enterprises; and vigorous expansion in publicly-funded education, at 
ail levels. This was to a large extent financed by proceeds from oil sales. And 
since oil was concentrated in only some of the states, it had an important inter-
national dimension, with economies with high ratios of labor to oil reserves 
- notably Jordan, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen getting access 
to the jobs and resources to underwrite this strategy through a mixture of 
workers migrating to the oil centers, and oil money nowing in (in the form of 
grants and remittances). The tabor-surplus economies exported workers 
directly ralher than moving into tabor-intensive manufactures. In a compara-
ble fashiori, large numbers of Turkish workers went to German y. 
The otd social contract kept tabor demand high, especially for educated 
workers, through policies that protected and promoted the modern sector. 
Food and consumption subsidies were also broad, bringing benefits to the 
middte classes and the poor. Unskilled workers reaped gains from domestic 
and international construction booms. And lhere was the promise of social 
mobility through education and public employment.20 
When oil prices collapsed in the mid- l 980s, the sources of employment 
growth disappeared. The combination of declining public sector revenues, 
fast-rising labor supply, rapid urbanization, and large gains in education have 
rendered the old social contract unaffordable. Since the second part of the 
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1980s, growth perfonnance has been dismal (Figure 5). Labor producciviry 
has stagnated in the non-oil producing countries and has fallen by more than 
4 percent a year in the oil producing counrries. The slow-down in the demand 
for tabor in Europe, and later in the Gulf region have depressed labor markets 
in the labor-exporting countries. At the peak in the mid-1980s, there were 
over 5 million Arab workers in the Gulf, and perhaps half as many migrants 
from the Maghreb working in Europe. This exodus accounced for JO percent 
of the labor-exporting countries' labor force on average (much more for 
Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen), boosted wages at 
home, and generated large remittances.21 
Figure 5: Annual Growth in GDP per Worker in MENA 









Il Grow1h raie or GDP pcr wort cr 196$-80 
Il Grow1h nue or GDP pcr worktr 1980-85 
D Growlh nue orGDPpcrwork<r 1985-93 
ECA LAC MENA 
(Oil 
Produccrs) 
MENA South Asia SSA 
(Non Oil 
Produccrs) 











8 GrOWth raie ofGDP pcr wort<r 196$-90 
Il Grow1h raie ofGDP pcr workcr 1980-&S 
D Growth roic of GDP pcr workcr 1985·93 
Iraq Morocco Oman Saudi Syria Tunisi3 
Arabi a 
Opening Up and Distribution in MENA 65 
Regional and European labor markets stopped growing in the mid- l 980s. 
Employment opportunities in the oil-rich economies declined dramatically in 
the wake of the Gulf war in 1991, hitting Jordanian, Palestinian, and Yemeni 
workers hard. In Jordan, retumees (about 10 percent of the labor force) 
crowded out young entrants to the labor market. 22 Although returning workers 
had invested part of their savings thereby increasing labor demand and reduc-
ing the effect of the shock, this effect was only temporary. In the West Bank 
and Gaza, the return of highly educated Palestinians from the Gulf led to a 
crash in the wages of skilled labor, pushing returns to education nearly to 
zero. 23 More recently, many Palestinian workers were hit by the reduced 
access to the Israeli labor market. In 1992, about a third of the labor force 
(mostly unskilled workers) worked in Israel. In 1995, Jess tban 10 percent 
received work permits. In Yemen, returnees represented about 13 percent of 
the labor force; unemployment soared and remained high as civil war broke 
out. 24 In Lebanon, unemployment among the population displaced by the war 
has been estimated to be twice the national average. 25 
At the same time the public sector, which was the main employer of 
skilled workers in many of the countries of the region, was under pressure. 
The limits of state-led growth were recognized in the region as early as the 
l 970s. But the massive external assistance received during the l 970s and 
early l 980s allowed the system to continue for an extra decade or so. With the 
oil bust, private demand for labor slumped, and public seëtors increased their 
hiring initially, financing their rising deficits with financial repression and 
external borrowing. In Algeria, hiring grew at 10 percent a year after 1985 
when private demand stumbled. 26 Half the new jobs created in Tunisia 
between 1982 and 1989 were in the public sector. 21 The experiences of Egypt 
and Jordan were similar. Public hiring accelerated and then stalled with the 
fiscal crisis and stabilization programs of the late l 980s. 
The private sector continued to generate new jobs until the mid- l 980s as 
rising incarnes led to increased demand for labor in the services sector. The 
construction industry al one employed more than 10 percent of the labor force 
in most countries of the region, and up to 20 percent in the Gulf.2s Protected 
private industries became large employers in Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
More recently, the rising scarcity of capital inflows, coupled with some mea-
sures of financial liberalization wreaked havoc on firms accustomed to two 
decades of cheap foreign exchange. Old firms in import-substitution sectors 
are now struggling and are a weak source of employment growth. 
Overall, the old path and the associated social contract quite effectively 
delivered expanding employment opportunities and reduced poverty for a 
while. Public employment and protected industrialization can be a source of 
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economic and employment growth for a given period of time (recall the rapid 
growth of many Latin America economies in the l 960s and l 970s). When 
there is a massive positive resource shock, it can be sustained for much longer. 
In particular, the oil revenues were able to bankroll the cycle of public 
employment growth and provision of education for entry into public sector 
jobs. But the oil boom basically hid the underlying problems of an unsustain-
able growth and employment strategy. When boom turned to bust, not only 
did past sources of employment growth - both national and international -
disappear, but the unproductive nature of many of the jobs created became a 
distressing and problematic heritage for the future. 
Why has unemployment stayed so high? As in Europe, only more so, large 
scale unemployment emerged because of the adverse effects of the bust - the 
dynamics of falling labor demand and continued rapid growth in supply. It has 
persisted because of the deep-rooted expectations of the young - especially 
the educated young now in abundant rather than scarce supply, that a sec-
ondary education was the pathway to a "good," modern-scctor job, and the 
capacity and willingness of families (especially non-poor ones) to support the 
unemployed. The old social contract is still present, if increasingly fragile, 
and within this contract, it is the state that is expected to deliver jobs, espe-
cially to the educated. 2" 
With rising unemployment many governments responded, as noted above, 
with continued expansion of public employment - most dramatically in 
Algeria since the late l 980s. But since macroeconomic difficulties prevented 
increases in spending, such expansion took place amid stagnant or declining 
wages, further contributing to the phenomenon of a large pool of unproduc-
tive labor in the public sector, with little output contribution and a negative 
influence on public savings. Unlike some Sub-Saharan African countries 
(such as Tanzania), in most cases the process of wage decline has not been 
drastic enough so as to put public sector wages below those prevailing in the 
private sector - especially when non-cash benefits and greater security are 
accounted for (in Egypt for instance ).'0 But this employment strategy tends to 
perpetuate dualism, and adds to the future adjustment problems created by a 
large, poor state sector. 
Ali three groups - public sector workers, the unemployed and the poor -
suffered when boom turned to bust, and the Jack of viability of the old growth 
path and contract became exposed. With declining resources, the specter of 
distributional conflict is now rising. Old forms of largesse - notably food sub-
sidies - have often been eut drastically, in direct competition with the public 
sector wage bill. Food subsidies were typically eut more than the salaries of 
the eli te. ' 1 In Egypt, food subsidies fell by 5 percent of GDP between 1989 
Opening Up and Distribution in MENA 67 
and 1993. The public sector wage bill fell by only 0.4 percent of GDP over 
the same period. Food subsidies were virtually abolished in Jordan between 
1990 and 1992, but the public sector wage bill kept rising, reaching 7 percent 
of GDP in 1993 (excluding military and public enterprises), an ait time high. 
In Morocco, food subsidies were eut from 5.5 to 0.5 percent of GDP between 
1981 and 1993. The wage bill rose from 11.1 to 14.3 percent of GDP over the 
same period. Only in Tunisia were food subsidies (and other social sectors) 
protected and made better targeted, falling from 3 to 2 percent of GDP in 
recent years (public sector wage bill remains constant since 1986). 
Sooner or later, change had to corne. Countries such as Egypt and Syria 
appear to be in a fragile state of paralysis. Meanwhile rising international inte-
gration is both creating opportunities and sharpening competition. 
A World of Rising Competition 
The world is becoming increasingly competitive as more and more countries 
open their borders to trade, as the capital markets are becoming increasingly 
international, and as the costs of transport and communication have fallen 
sharply.)2 The Middle Eastern and North African economies were traditional-
ly highly integrated with the rest of the world via the oil market, and with each 
other via the tabor market. There was quite a high degree of official capital 
movement from oil-rich to oil-poor countries, but probably the deepest form 
of integration for most was via capital flight to Zurich, London and elsewhere. 
However, with the partial exceptions of Turkey and then Morocco and 
Tunisia, deep integration through open trading has been limited within the 
region. In the international environment of the l 990s, failure to effectively 
integrate production structures through trade will impart high long-run costs. 
This means lost opportunities now, but more importantly countries that fait to 
integrate risk getting increasingly left behind. Much of the Arab world and 
Sub-Saharan Africa are facing this risk. We will quickly survey the three 
channels of integration for the region - via international migration, capital and 
trade - in order to provide the context for the opening up faced by the region-
al economies. 
International migration, as we have seen, was an integral part of the de 
facto growth and employment strategy of the past few decades, from countries 
with large populations relative to their oil reserves to oil-rich economies, to 
Europe and, for Palestinians, to Israel. Migration was a powerful source of 
tabor demand, with important second round effects via the spending of for-
eign-earned income, that had a powerful effect on the bottom half of the 
income distribution.)) 
This source of employment creation has now largely disappeared, and it is 
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its negative linkage effects that are now more important. Palestinians lostjobs 
in the Gulf, exacerbating tabor problems in Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, 
though these were hidden for a white (apart from the collapse of skill differ-
entials noted above) by the spending of the repatriated savings of returning 
migrants. When Israel eut the employment of migrant Palestinian, tabor diffi-
culties tumed into something closer to a tabor crisis in the West Bank and 
Gaza. Yemen has also suffered a severe retum migration shock. In addition, 
tabor market problems in Egypt and Syria are spilling over into Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
Capital flows matter as much or more than migration flows for employ-
ment outcomes. Workers need productive capital to raise their productivity, 
white movements of financial capital have a powerful immediate effect on 
macroeconomic activity, wages and employment. When capital flew out of 
the region in the l 980s, workers were left behind to pick up the bill. As with 
Latin America - only more so - capital controls proved feeble in preventing 
private outward capital flight when 'the going got rough. It is now estimated 
that privately-owned foreign assets are equivalent to some 90 percent of GDP, 
more than any other region in the world. They represent a large tax on past 
growth, but also an opportunity for the future if internai policies are rectified 
to allow for their repatriation. Sorne of the potential has already been seen in 
the significant repatriation of capital that occurred in Egypt in the early l 990s 
seduced by a combination of opening of the capital account, and the euphoria 
that flowed from the dual impulses of optimism over peace and the new-found 
international delight in "emerging" markets."' 
Capital flows into Egypt in the early part of the l 990s did benefit workers 
- overall economic activity was higher than it would have been in their 
absence and this helped the national tabor market. But capital is fickle and, to 
a first degree, cannot be controlled, as the experience with capital flight in the 
l 980s has vividly revealed. The only way to perrnanently attract capital that 
will help create sustainable jobs and raise productivity is by putting in place 
a sound political and economic environment for domestic investment. What 
happens to the progress toward Arab-Israeli peace will be a contributing fac-
tor to the willingness of both domestic and foreign capital to commit to the 
region and thos to job creation - the closer a country is to Israel, the more 
important this aspect is (that is, it is mildly important for Morocco, but obvi-
ously vitally so for the West Bank and Gaza). Economie policy has little or no 
influence over peace. But it has strong implications on the expectations over 
profits and the perceived policy risks of investing. Workers, far from being in 
conflict with capital, have an interest in promoting economic reforrns that pro-
vide the macroeconomic conditions and the economic environment where 
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capital is more secure, but eschew special incentives (whether via tax deals, 
special protection or kickbacks) that essentially are taxes on the local popu-
lace. 
Of the three channels of international integration, tracte is probably the 
most important one in the long run. Tracte is however the least exploited sec-
tor in the region (with the partial exceptions of the countries noted above). 
Meanwhile, the world is in the midst of a profound opening. Economie reform 
is leading the entry into world product markets of huge pools of labor in South 
and East Asia, the former COMECON bloc and Latin America. The Uruguay 
Round Agreements (UR) will lead to some further Iiberalization and opening 
of markets, especially with respect to labor-intensive manufactures and agri-
culture (albeit modest), and, perhaps more importantly, helping to Iock-in on 
a multilateral basis the ongoing regional process of liberalization. 
The direct effects of the Uruguay Round on the Arab world are modest and 
in some cases negative, with a net Joss of $3 billion.35 Two particular aspects 
of the UR are of particular concern to the region: the dismantling of the 
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), that will lead to lower prices of textiles, and 
the partial liberalization of agriculture and graduai removal of agricultural 
subsidies, that will lead to higher prices of foods. Since the region exports tex-
tiles and imports food, it will suffer negative terms of tracte effects overall, but 
farmers would enjoy gains in their terms of tracte (assuming international 
price increases were passed on to them). In the long run; once the migration 
effects have been factored in, the consequences are negligible for agricultur-
al and unskilled workers, and slightly negative for ski lied workers. If there is 
closer association with the European Union, however, there are much larger 
gains for farmers and, in the long run - after allowing for the effects on rural-
urban migration - small increases in agricultural and unskilled wages of some 
3 percent may occur together with a small Joss for skilled workers, owing to 
the effects of integration. 
However, the above estimates of the effects of integration do not take into 
account the more important consequences of opening up. As noted in the brief 
review of the East Asian experience, it was not the terms of tracte effects that 
led to the extraordinary long run growth. Rather, long-run growth was stimu-
lated by the èngagement in international markets - together with sound 
domestic economic policies - which created an environment conducive to the 
growth of labor-intensive activities, structural shifts in employment and over-
all productivity growth. The key lies in the inter-relationship between open-
ness and the internai growth dynamics. In this area, even Morocco and 
Tunisia have lagged behind East Asian competitors, especially in productivi-
ty growth.36 It is noteworthy, however, that Turkey with the longest and 
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deepest period of engagement in international markets, plus greater progress 
in policy aspects of integration with Europe, has a performance in productiv-
ity growth that rivais Indonesia and Malaysia. 
While an increasingly integrated world economy increases opportunities, 
it also raises the stakes. Weak domestic conditions, in terms of politics, 
macroeconomics or the microeconomic and business environment, will lead 
to paltry capital investments and vulnerability to destabilizing international 
capital flows. Many countries within the region risk being left out of the glob-
al process of integration. And while there will always be some place in the 
international division of labor, the real benefits corne from getting on to a path 
of rapid productivity growth and effective use of national skills. The next 
decade may even represent an opportunity for the region to open up its 
economies, especially with respect to Europe, before the full force of compe-
tition from Asia cornes to bear on tht!m with the removal of the MFA early in 
the next century. 
The Process of Opening Up and Labor 
We have argued that the employment strategy that has defined the old path of 
public sector expansion and education for public sector jobs is now bankrupt, 
and that the need to open up to a more integrated world is becoming ever more 
urgent. Sorne countries - notably Algeria, Egypt and Syria - are in a fragile 
statè of paralysis, in need of new economic opportunities to tackle persistent 
poverty and unemployment but fearful of the adverse effects of opening up on 
inefficient and unproductive current employment structures, especially in the 
government and public enterprise sectors. Others - Morocco, Tunisia and 
Turkey - are beginning to break out of this vicious cycle and have embraced 
the strategy of opening up as a means to do so. But they remain in the midst 
of the transition and fears over unemployment remain, as does large public 
sector employment. 
While the gains for workers from East Asian style exploitation of oppor-
tunities in the international markets may provide compelling support for such 
an approach in the long run, most politicians are more concerned with short 
term gains. It is thus the transitional effects of opening up that are likely to be 
of dominant concern. Opening up involves changes in the pattern of demand 
for different products, with indirect effects on the pattern of demand for dif-
ferent categories of labor. It also involves an acceleration of the normal 
process of creation and destruction of jobs. It is useful to <livide the effects 
into two: the effects on public sector employment - for which the question of 
destruction of unviable jobs is key; and those on the overall structure of labor 
demand for skilled and unskilled workers. 
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The effects on public employment are analytically easy to trace and prac-
tically harsh. Protected state enterprises that are engaged in tradable activities 
which are subject to the brutal winds of international competition, are likely 
to close or contract, in either case shedding labor. Both government employ-
ment and enterprise employment in services (utilities, for example) are shield-
ed from the direct effects of competition, but there will be heightened pres-
sure from the need for fiscal probity and higher quality services to raise pro-
ductivity, layoff surplus labor and bring wage scales in line with the private 
sector. We saw above that among the stylized facts about public employment 
are first that it is too large (that is, there is surplus, unproductive labor), and 
second that wages are generally not significantly out of line with the private 
sector on average, but that wage differentials are sometimes out of line. 
So the effects on public employment are likely to be negative. The key 
issue in designing a new strategy concerns the implications of opening up on 
the level and structure of private sector labor demand. We discuss this here, 
including the relationship between medium-term effects and the timing of job 
losses. In the next section we briefly turn to the implications for managing the 
joint process of opening up and public sector reform. 
The dominant popular view in rich countries is that opening up an econo-
my leads to job losses, especially amongst unskilled workers, and causes ris-
ing income inequalities (in the United States) and persistent unemployment 
(in Europe). While few observers would deny that trade with low-wage coun-
tries is a source of some job losses, the weight of the evidence in fact suggests 
that such trade contributes only part, and probably a small part, to the employ-
ment problem in rich countries. In Europe, technological change, slow supply 
responses in the creation of skills, and the functioning of labor markets play 
a much larger role." 
Fears of job losses are also common in low and middle income countries. 
ft is however important to distinguish between two processes: the effect of 
opening up on the level and structure of labor demand once changes have 
worked their way through the system; and the likely acceleration of the 
process of creation and destruction of jobs that a change in incentives will 
bring. For the Arab countries - and to some extent for Turkey - the accelerat-
ed destruction of unproductive jobs is essentially the same as the public sec-
tor employment issue, while we are, for the time being, trying to focus on the 
lasting effects on the structure of labor demand. 
The traditional view of economists is that opening up in poorer countries 
would be unambiguously good for unskilled labor. 38 This was baséd on both 
theory and evidence. Poorer countries that opened up would be expected to 
trade and produce more in activities that intensively used their more abundant 
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factors of production. Natural resources and land matter in this context - and 
we gave evidence above on the role of relative land availability in influencing 
trade patterns. There are then two reasons why unskilled labor would be 
expected to benefit from opening up in labor-abundant poorer countries: 
across labor categories, unskilled labor is abundant relative to richer coun-
tries; and for land-rich countries, expansion in agriculture involves hlgher 
demand for unskilled labor that is complementary to land. The situation is dif-
ferent for oil-rich countries, since oil production is capital and skill-intensive, 
and most labor is in services activities. These countries are unlikely to export 
labor-intensive agricultural or manufactured goods. 
Evidence for the view that opening up increases the relative demand for 
unskilled labor cornes from data on the higher unskilled-labor content of 
exports compared with (protected) import substitutes in many countries, and 
from the observed narrowing of wage differentials over time in export-orient-
ed economies - especially the four Asian "tigers": Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan, China.39 Evidence of actual changes over time is prob-
ably more compelling for a government contemplating opening ·up its econo-
my. Unfortunately, previous research on these countries has generally failed 
to take into account either the shifts in relative supply of different categories 
of labor (and, as noted above, all of the economies were enjoying the fruits of 
previous educational expansion) or the changes in labor market institutions. 
Moreover, more recent evidence, especially from studies of Latin American 
countries, show widening differentials that broadly accompanied the process 
of opening up - notably in Chile and Mexico, and also in Costa Rica and 
Colombia.40 Attempts in some of these studies to control for effects of changes 
in the relative supply of skilled workers (in all cases there was an increase in 
the relative supply of skilled workers), confirm a shift in relative demand 
away from unskilled and toward skilled workers. 
How might the process of opening up an economy lead to shifts in demand 
against the unskilled, when on the face of it, these are the abundant factor? 
The theory and evidence are still being disentangled - most of the empirical 
work that found widening wage differentials is recent.41 There are three pos-
sible explanations that offer promise: 
First, widening wage differentials is a phenomenon that has occurred in 
middle income countries whose relative shares of factors of production fall in-
between rich and poor countries and which are experiencing the effects of a 
relatively substantial increase in the international supply of goods, which are 
intensive in their use of unskilled-labor as a result of opening up to tracte of 
Asian labor-intensive countries such as China, Indonesia and Bangladesh and 
India. China's exports to the European Union have risen from 2.3 percent of 
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the ECU's total imports in 1985 to 4.9 percent in 1991. By one measure the 
relative price of labor-intensive manufactures has fallen by 20 percent 
between the mid- I 980s and early I 990s. 
Second, openness releases the market for skills from essentially domestic 
constraints. Closed economies that invest heavily in education might run into 
significant relative price changes that affect skilled labor as a result of an 
increase in the supply of educated workers. The evidence of compressed wage 
differentials in Arab countries that remained closed and suffered stagnant 
modern sector job growth is consistent with this. For open economies, the 
price of educated labor is going to be more strongly influenced by interna-
tional trade, while unskilled wages may continue to be held down by large 
supplies of labor in low-productivity agriculture. 42 
Third, some categories of exports - or features of exporting - may demand 
more skilled workers. It has often been argued that modern sector manufac-
turing requires at least basic education, in contrast to agriculture and informai 
sector services. This could be important for exports in which high quality is 
of importance. The same may apply to high-value agricultural production for 
rich country markets.43 
What do the above explanation mean for the regional economies? There is 
little time series' evidence on skill differentials, but it is striking to note that 
the three economies that have initiated the process of opening up - Morocco, 
Tunisia and Turkey - have higher returns to skills, but still not unusually high 
differentials by international standards. Those that are stuck in their old devel-
opment strategy have unusually compressed differentials. This raises ques-
tions on whether the return to education is going to be high enough to justi-
fy household investment in schooling. Opening up may restore differentials in 
countries that have suffered significant compression. Beyond this, since most 
of the oil-poor economies in the region fall around the middle of the interna-
tional income and wage levels, the effects of opening up on relative demand 
for skilled and unskilled labor are ambiguous. Much will depend on agricul-
ture, to the extent there are potential exporters of agricultural goods (that tend 
to be more unskilled intensive). This is, of course, of particular importance 
to the poor who mainly rely on income from unskilled labor on farms. Finally, 
we should re-emphasize that the net effects during the transition will also 
depend on the dynamics of creation and destruction of jobs, especially the 
timing of destruction of old protected jobs. 
The experiences of Morocco and Tunisia, the early trade reformers of the 
region, illustrate well both the opportunities and difficulties ahead. Both 
countries started to liberalize their trade regime in the early I 980s. 
Quantitative restrictions were virtually eliminated in Morocco and their 
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coverage reduced in Tunisia; maximum tariffs were reduced from 165 to 45 
percent in Morocco and from 235 to 45 percent in Tunisia. Since then, foreign 
investment has boomed, reaching $975 million in Morocco in 1993, and $600 
million in Tunisia in 1994, with subcontracting business for European firms 
(especially in textiles and clothing) taking off. 
Textiles and clothing exports increased at a rate of 15 percent a year in 
Morocco and 12 percent in Tunisia between 1985 and 1991. Labor demand 
rose fast: in Morocco, total employment rose by about 5 percent a year in 
urban areas during 1984-1994; manufacturing employment rose at 10 percent; 
employment in the manufacturing export sector rose at a rate of 20 percent.44 
But while employment expanded fast, measured average wages and produc-
tivity did not rise. The most plausible explanation is that this was due to com-
positional effects with the relative expansion of lower-wage jobs. The manu-
facturing sector was small and protected in the past, it used capital intensive-
ly and employed skilled workers at high wages - these subsectors have been 
stagnant. The new jobs created in manufacturing exports were instead labor 
intensive and lower-wage. It is precisely this adjustment that allowed employ-
ment to grow so fast in these sectors. In contrast, both wages and employment 
expanded slowly in firms producing for the internai market, although recent-
ly, the demand for skilled workers has started to rise. 
The experience of Tunisia further illustrates structural change.45 An analy-
sis of changes in employment between 1984 and 1993 that decomposes job 
creation into within-sector productivity growth and structural shifts in 
employment and growth, finds that almost ail sectors (except "other ser-
vices") enjoyed productivity increases, but there was net employment expan-
sion as a consequence of growth in output and structural shifts. Rising with-
in-sector productivity was particularly important in agriculture - the major 
Iow-productivity sector - and likely to be a major source of labor income 
growth for the poor. These changes accommodated, at rising average produc-
ti vity, a large increase in female labor force participation between the ages of 
20 and 44 (there is an offsetting effect for the youth with increased time spent 
on education). 
In reforming Morocco and Tunisia, the net effects on income inequality 
have been small. The demand for skilled workers has fallen in the protected 
industries, but has started to rise in the export industries as a result of attempts 
to increase competitiveness with better technologies and management. ln 
other words, trade reforms may have led to a reduction in income inequality; 
however, rising demand for skilled and surplus workers have pushed inequal-
ity backup. 
Let us return to the three groups in the population that we started with: 
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The poor. The poor are likely to gain from opening up, especially from the 
twin process of accelerated transfer of labor from agriculture to labor-inten-
sive manufacturing and productivity increases within agriculture. Where there 
are terms of trade gains to farmers, the opening up process will also be pover-
ty-reducing. The expansion in the demand for unskilled work was a key 
aspect in the dramatic fall in poverty experienced in both Morocco and 
Tunisia. lt accommodated the rise in female labor participation in both soci-
eties, and it allowed rural workers and those in the construction sector to get 
more productive higher wage jobs. While average wages in manufacturing 
were stagnant or falling in Morocco, the new jobs that were being created 
tended to tighten the labor market for poorer workers - those who got these 
jobs experienced significant increases in their wages. 
Public sector workers. The effects on public sector employment are like-
ly to be negative, so those that are laid-off will almost certainly suffer, at least 
temporarily. When shifts in private sector demand take place, the wage dif-
ferentials in the public sector may be restored, benefiting the more productive 
public sector workers. 
The unemployed. The net effects on the unemployed will reflect different 
phenomena. Sorne will gain from more dynamic job creation in new activi-
ties; there will also be a temporary ri se in unemployment, to the extent. inef-
ficient activities become unprotected and governmental employment reforms 
take place. Both, total unemployment and that of the educated young are still 
high in Morocco and Tunisia, in part because of labor market rigidities in the 
modern sector, but also because of the persistence of expectations and support 
mechanisms referred to in the previous section. However, both countries have 
a much higher proportion of laid off workers in the pool of unemployed. In 
1991, Morocco had an unemployment rate of 12 percent, of which 55 percent 
had previously worked and 25 percent had secondary education. By contrast 
Egypt had only slightly lower unemployment rate of 11 percent, but of the 
unemployed, only 23 percent had ever worked and 57 percent had secondary 
education. 
The international and regional evidence suggest that opening up can solve 
two long-run problems, it can both be good for unskilled labor demand and 
restore excessively compressed education differentials. However, the demand 
will be for productive, not unproductive skills, and during the transition it is 
highly likely to be also associated with job losses for some of the educated 
now in "bad" jobs. The transition period will also adversely affect the rela-
tively old who do not have productive or flexible skills, and the educated 
young who have grown up with now incorrect expectations of public sector 
job opportunities. Expectations can change - especially if governments 
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undertake credible reforms in both areas: opening up and public hiring poli-
cies. But there is likely to be a case for transfers in order to deal with perma-
nent and temporary losers. 
Sequencing and the Problem of Large but Poor States 
There are two reasons for being concerned with the design of public sector 
reforms and their sequencing in the context of opening up an economy. First, 
there is a large pool of public sector employees who correctly feel vulnerable: 
opening up will destroy many public sector jobs and some incumbents may 
not have the kind of education or the flexibility to benefit from future rises in 
demand for productive skilled workers. These workers are likely to suffer per-
manent welfare tosses (and even those with "good", flexible skills, may suf-
fer temporary welfare tosses) and are unlikely to vote for opening up. Second, 
at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels, the reform of the pub-
lic sector is a prerequisite to achieving the potential gains from opening up -
and especially the dramatic gains from jumping onto dynamic development 
paths as exemplified by the experiences of the East Asian economies. 
Macroeconomics matter even more after opening up, because fiscal impru-
dence is swiftly punished in a world of mobile capital. Micro reforms count 
because they in the end determine the macroeconomic public sector position, 
via the effects of wage and public enterprise policy, and because of supply 
side effects on efficiency of production, most of ail in the education sector. 
In the past, the overwhelming rote the state has played as an employer has 
distracted it from focusing enough attention on the core issues of macroeco-
nomic stability, infrastructure, fiscal justice, or education. What is less recog-
nized is that it has also reduced the ability of reformers to pursue trade liber-
alization. From a distributional point of view, opening can lead to increased 
fiscal pressures on the state. Old forms of public employment in inefficient 
public enterprise activities are turned into open tosses and white aggregate fis-
cal imbalances become much less tolerable in an open economy. It is true that 
most of the region's economies have undertaken major fiscal adjustments 
prior to or in conjunction with trade reform; but the structural reforms of the 
public sector have been relatively neglected: privatizing or closing inefficient 
public enterprises, restructuring the state-sponsored education systems, laying 
off of surplus govemment workers, and developing rational pay; none of these 
measures have figured in the core of the fiscal changes, even in the leading 
reformers. 
With large numbers of public employees who have suffered real wage 
declines, macroeconomic stability is at the permanent mercy of wage increas-
es. The public sector wage bill (excluding public enterprises) ranges from 
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10 percent of GDP in Egypt to 15 percent in Morocco. In most countries, the 
fiscal deficit would rise by 2 to 5 percentage points of GDP if public sector 
employees manage to regain the losses they have sustained in the second part 
of the 1980s. This is precisely what initiated a financial crisis in Lebanon in 
1991, and in Turkey in 1994, ending in both cases with large devaluations and 
huge losses for workers. The credibility of the refonn program is undennined 
by this fiscal fragility. 
The fear of fiscal instability is also taxing the refonn agenda. In the coun-
tries with large public enterprises, such as Algeria, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, 
measures to increase competition through, inter alia the liberalization of 
prices, investments, or trade will increase the losses of the public enterprises 
and ultimately enlarge fiscal deficits. Financial market refonns also hurt those 
public enterprises with traditionally large capital to labor ratios and high debts 
to the banking system. Morocco and Tunisia have, like most countries in Latin 
America, promoted import substitution by protecting private industry. Trade 
liberalization has hurt the tïnancial sector. In contras!, many countries of the 
Mashrek (Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Syria) have instead built state industries; 
for these countries, trade reforms hurt both the lïnancial sector and the fiscal 
accounts. 
The most advanced country in tenns of trade success, Turkey, vividly 
illustrates the fragility of opening up without deep public sector refonn. In 
Turkey, incarne inequality deteriorated following the implementation of the 
refonns of the early l 980s: the state eut price support for agriculture and in i-
tiated simultaneously financial liberalization; profits became a much larger 
share of incarne; and labor was repressed. By 1989, political liberalization 
and the resumption of competitive politics led labor to become more active 
and wages rose sharply under union pressure. But because the problems of a 
large public sector wcre not resolved during the reform period, wage pressure 
led to largcr fiscal delïcits, inflation, and a foreign exchange crisis in 1993 
that ended up eroding away most of labor's previous gains. Turkey's experi-
ence exemplifies how distributional conflicts, centered on public sector 
involvement in the economy, can jeopardize the process of opening up that is 
potentially a source of rapid employment and productivity growth. 
Is the answer to reform public scctors tïrse Did the early refonners, who 
(largely) opened up first and thcn faced the public sector problcms, get it 
wrong·) The answer to both question is probably not. A scenario of public 
sector reform lirst (or evcn simultancously) implics public employment 
declines, as well as welfare losscs amongst a key base of political support, 
prior to reaping any of the gains from opening up. As notcd throughout 
this chapter, such a scqucncing of reforms will likely lead to increased 
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distributional conflicts - and thus increase credibility-thwarting uncertainty. It 
also increases the probability that public sector employees might Jose and 
unemployment rise in the critical early period of reform. There would be 
some hope that the poor would be gaining from opening up, but the poor tend 
to be a weak base of support. Of course, while initiating early on general 
employment-reducing public sector reforms may not be advisable, other com-
plementary reforms do make sense and are desirable as soon as possible: 
removal of job guarantees for graduates (explicit or implicit) to try and break 
the expectation of "good" (but actually "bad") public sector jobs; and deep 
educational reform to create the preconditions for flexible and market-orient-
ed educational institutions. 
The following sequence would seem to make sense for large-but-poor 
states: 
First, partially open up, "easy" fiscal adjustment, continued partial protec-
tion for public employment, and selected public sector reforms (for example, 
education), and design of transfers for both temporary and permanent losers. 
Second, once some growth in employment has started, deep public sector 
reform should be initiated and complemented by selected expansion of non-
employment related public spending, including transfers to losers, and select-
ed public services to marginalized groups in the population. 
Conclusion 
Most Arab countries pursued an employment strategy that worked while the 
oil revenues were booming but collapsed when they fell. Sorne employment 
cycles were unavoidable, given that no one had anticipated the scale of the oil 
cycle (if they did they could have smoothed the use of revenues). But the pat-
tern of growth chosen by most Arab countries (and to some extent by Turkey 
until the 1980s) was a disaster for employment, leaving the characteristic syn-
drome of high unemployment and high public employment, in large, but 
increasingly poor states. Past educational expansion contributed more to frus-
trated expectations of getting "good" public sector jobs than to a dynamic of 
productivity growth that characterized open economies. 
Now the political and social situation is fragile. Governments can choose 
to open up their economies or can struggle to maintain the current fragile 
state. There are political risks to both courses. The poor are the most robust 
potential beneficiaries, but least influential. Unemployment effects in transi-
tion are ambiguous. 
The political necessity and the political risks associated with opening up 
an economy are clear. It is the only way to get on to a labor-demanding path 
and to attract stable capital flows; but there will be some permanent and some 
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temporary losers especially among public sector workers. Employment-
reducing refonns of the public sector are unlikely and probably not advisable 
prior to a growth dynamic taking off, yet failure to refonn could lead opening 
up to end in a blaze of either fiscal crisis or growth-reducing fiscal repression 
of economic and social services. This implies that some gradualism may be 
important, provided the forces of conservatism do not undercut refonn. The 
dynamics between opening up and public sector employment matter; some 
opening up of trade may be necessary to even start on a blissful path. We 
argue for starting with opening up, followed by refonns of the public sector 
and compensation for losers. 
Countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and most recently Jordan, 
have started on this path, but failure to deal with the critical second stage of 
public sector refonn will jeopardize the chances for growth. Those countries 
that have not started refonns face a tougher situation. Algeria, Egypt and 
Syria are confronting a bigger challenge. Currently public sector elites are 
holding on, but this is becoming an ever-more desperate, and ultimately self-
defeating act. 
Notes 
1 See World Bank i 995b. 
2 The working age population grew at over 3 percent per annum in the past thirty 
years, the fastest of any region in the world. See World Bank, i 995e. 
3 The data are available from UNIDO (United Nations lndustrial Development 
Organization). 
4 World Bank, i 995f. 
5 For example, Turkey and Greece: 10 percent; Spain and Portugal: 15 percent. 
6 Organization for Economie Cooperation and Development. 
7 Said, 1995. 
8 Handoussa, 1992. 
9 World Bank i 995c, Zouarri-Bouattour 1994. 
1 O Assaad, 1995. 
11 See also World Bank, i 995b for the case of Jordan. 
12 Said, 1995. 
13 More precisely, this is a cutoff of $30 for average monthly per capita consumption 
in terrns of 1985 purchasing power parity dollars. Wh ile a figure of $30 per month 
is a useful yardstick for international comparisons, most observers of the region 
would probably use a higher cutoff for absolu te poverty. Using a cutoff of $50 per 
month for per capita consumption raises the head cou nt ratio for poverty to 18 per-
cent'for the six countries in 1990, ranging from 7 percent in Algeria, to 24 percent 
in Egypt and 36 percent in Jordan. 
14 van Eeghen, 1995. 
15 Jordan: 6.0 to 8.3 between 1986 and 1992; Morocco: 4.0 to 7.0 between 1985 and 
1991; Tunisia: 7.0 to 7.85 between 1985 and 1990. See van Eeghen, 1995. 
16 Compare, for example, The East Asia Miracle (1993), with Alwyn Young 1993. 
17 Wood, 1994. 
80 lshac Diwan and Michael Walton 
18 See Tan, Hong and Batra, 1995. 
19 See World Bank, l 995g. 
20 Richards, 1995. 
21 Up to 10 percent of GNP in Morocco, 12 percent in Egypt, 18 percent in Jordan, 
22 percent in Yemen, and 30 percent in the West Bank and Gaza. 
22 Pissarides, 1993. 
23 Angrist, 1992. 
24 Seif, 1993. 
25 Issa, 1993. 
26 Bernard, 1991. 
27 Zouari-Bouatour, 1994. 
28 Al-Qudsi et al, 1993. 
29 Richards, 1995 
30 See Assaad, 1994. 
31 van Eeghen, 1995. 
32 See World Bank World Development Report, 1995, chapter 7. 
33 Although the poor tend to be under-represented amongst migrants, who generally 
have some education and resources to move, the indirect effects via tightening the 
labor market, private transfers and second-round spending impacts, undoubtedly 
contributed to poverty reduction 
34 Diwan and Squire, 1993. 
35 This is based on the analysis in Diwan, Yang and Wang, 1995, that uses an aggre-
gation for the Arab countries, and does not include Turkey. 
36 World Bank, l 995f. 
37 Wood, 1994; Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993. 
38 In addition to the dynamic effects of getting on to a productivity and investment 
enhancing growth path emphasized above. 
39 See especially Krueger for the first category of evidence, and Wood for a survey 
of the latter. 
40 See Robbins, Gindling and Robbins, Revenga and Montenegro, Hanson and 
Harrison 
41 See Wood 1995 for a survey and discussion. 
42 See Pissarides, 1995. 
43 See Robbins 1995 for this argument. 
44 World Bank, l 994b. 
45 See Zouari-Bouattour, 1994. 
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3 Alexander Yeats 
Export Prospects of Middle Eastern Countries: 
A Post-Uruguay Round Analysis 
Introduction: The Importance of the Uruguay Round 
Major changes have recently occurred in external markets that can have 
important implications for the export prospects of the Middle-Eastern (ME) 
countries.' The North American Free Tracte Agreement (NAFfA) liberalized 
barriers to the intra-trade of Canada, Mexico and the United States while fur-
ther integration efforts continue in Europe. The Uruguay Round Agreements 
will also have a major impact on international trading conditions. Among the 
Round's achievements are an average 40 percent reduction in industrial coun-
tries' most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs, agreement on a phase-out of the 
Multifiber Arrangements restrictions, nontariff barriers (NTBs) on agricultur-
al products were converted to tariffs and then lowered, "voluntary" export 
restraints (VERs) were abolished, and progress was made toward the liberal-
ization of barriers to tracte in services. 
While many of these developments have positive implications· for ME 
countries, there could be some negative aspects. Regional integration initia-
tives like NAFTA or the European Union (EU) provide member countries 
preferential access to each others markets which may allow them to displace 
non-members' exports. This raises the question of whether a significant 
amount of ME exports may be diverted and in which product sectors could 
this occur? Similarly, the Uruguay Round's reduction of MFN tariffs may 
have negative implications since these cuts will lower (or eliminate) the pref-
erence margins some ME countries receive under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) programs or EU regional schemes.2 The phase-out of the 
Multifiber Arrangement, tariffication of agricultural NTBs, and the liberaliza-
tion of services tracte seemingly have positive implications for the ~iddle­
East if these countries can compete with producers in other regions. To help 
illustrate the implications of such developments, this chapter provides a series 
of Appendix "boxes" which discuss the potential effects on a specific Middle-
East country - Egypt). 
Recognizing that improved export opportunities can make a positive con-
tribution to economic growth in the region, and also help reinforce the peace 
process, this chapter attempts to quantify the effects of the Uruguay Round on 
ME countries' exports, and also to determine how their tracte might be affect-
ed by regional arrangements in Europe and North· America. The magnitude 
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and composition of intra-trade within the Middle East region is analyzed, and 
an attempt is made to generate information relating to future prospects. To 
provide an introduction, trends in the level, composition and direction of ME 
exports are analyzed. Measures such as the "revealed" comparative advan-
tage, trade intensity, and export similarity indices are employed to help assess 
ME export opportunities (and constraints) both within and outside the region. 
Trends in the Level and Composition of Regional Exports 
Any assessment of the importance of extemal developments would be facili-
tate<l by identifying the current major markets for Middle East exports. Table 
1 provides relevant information by showing the direction (value) and share of 
ME exports to different destinations, that is, all Organization for Economie 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, OECD countries in 
Europe, North America and several other regional country groups (Box 1 pro-
vides more detailed information on the direction of Egypt's exports). These 
figures clearly show the current importance of OECD markets for all ME 
exports; yet, three different trade patterns exist. First, countries like Cyprus, 
Iran, Libya, Syria and Turkey are primarily dependent on OECD European 
markets and they may be negatively affected by integration efforts like the 
extension of the EU. On the other hand, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have a larger share of exports destined for North 
America and Japan so these countries seemingly would be more concerned 
with the effects of NAFTA on their trade. Third, several ME countries rel y on 
non-OECD markets. Over 60 percent of Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Oman 's ex ports go to developing countries, most of which are in the region 
or in Asia.) 
Table 1 compares the direction of ME countries' exports with that for all 
developing countries combined (see the memo item). Overall, little difference 
is observed between the two groups' trade shares (64 percent of ME exports 
are destined to OECD markets as opposed to 63 percent for all developing 
countries combined). However, the Middle East does have a greater depen-
dence on OECD Europe and Japan (49.7 versus 31.5 percent) while the share 
of exports going to OECD North America is 16 points below average. For the 
region as a whole, these data accent the potential importance of changes in 
European market access conditions. 
Table 1: The Geographic Destination of Middle East Countries' Exports 1 ~ 
"'=' 0 
ofwhich: of which: 
;::\. 
"tl 
World OECD North Other è:l 
Exporting Country (Year) ($million) Markets Europe America Japan Others Countries Europe Asia Americas {3 
(Percent of total Exports) "' '"' .... "" 
Bahrain (91) 3,578.0 16.4 2.4 2.5 11.2 0.3 83.6 3.2 81.0 1.9 ~ 
Cyprus (91) 975.2 67.1 63.3 1.6 0.4 1.8 32.9 -- 18.3 2.8 S:: 
Egypt (90) 2.582.0 58.1 41.2 8.1 3.1 5.7 41.9 14.7 17.8 0.3 ~ 
1 ran, Islamic Rep. of(9 I) 15.762.3 68.1 50.0 1.9 16.1 0.1 31.9 3.4 16.9 6.5 "' 
lsracl(9 I) 11,890.8 78.7 39.8 31.0 6.1 1.8 21.3 0.9 9.8 2.4 gi 
"" Jordan(91) 878.9 5.5 3.1 0.4 1.8 0.2 94.5 3.8 67.8 0.4 .... "' 
Kuwait (90) 8,148.6 51.1 24.0 7.0 19.1 1.0 42.9 0.5 33.3 2.0 3 
Lchanon (86) 517.0 31.6 22.9 8.3 0.2 0.2 68.4 4.6 60.3 1.0 ~ 
Lihyan A rab Jamahiriya (87) 8,502.7 84.5 84.5 16.3 4.5 10.1 2.2 
;:: 
-- -- -- ;:: .... 
Oman (89) 3,932.9 39.8 2.0 2.8 34.6 0.4 60.2 -- 52.9 3.8 :::!. 
"' Qatar (91) 3,176.7 73.7 18.0 5.9 49.7 0.1 26.3 -- 22.8 2.2 "" 
Saudi Arabia (91) 44,062.0 62.0 21.1 24.2 15.8 0.9 38.0 0.7 27.9 2.7 
Syria (91) 3,295.0 61.4 60.0 1.4 -- -- 38.6 13.5 19.8 
Turkey (91) 13,603.0 65.9 57.9 6.1 1.9 -- 34.1 6.6 12.2 
United Arab Emirates (88) 11.873.0 64.2 10.9 6.0 46.4 0.9 35.8 1.0 24.5 5.8 
Ali MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES 132,777.6 63.2 33.6 13.2 15.7 0.7 36.4 2.6 24.2 2.9 
MEMO ITEM: 
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 708,949.0 63.1 23.7 29.5 7.8 2.1 36.9 3.1 24.1 3.9 
Source: Statistics compiled.from UN Cmiference on Trnde and Deve/opment(UNCTAD}, Handbook tif International Trade and Development Stati.wics, 1993 or 
direct/y from rhe United Nations Statistical Offù:e Series D Trade Tapes. 1 Oo '.J 
Table 2; The Product Composition of Middle East Countries' Global Exports 1 Oo Oo 
Product Group as a Percentage of Total Exports 
Select Commodity Groups 
Total Ores Textiles Transport 
Exports Ali Agricultural and Ali and and 
Exporting Country (Year) ($million) Foods Materials Fuels Metals Manufactures Clothing Chemicals Machinery 
Bahrain (90) 3,415.2 0.6 -- 76.9 11.0 11.4 -- 0.5 2.0 
Cyprus (89) 793.0 37.7 0.9 1.8 0.7 59.0 29.5 7.6 4.7 
Egypt (90) 2,582.0 9.3 6.2 46.9 4.0 32.4 35.4 3.3 3.3 
Iran, lslamic Rep. (90) 14,409.4 2.5 0.9 92.5 0.3 3.7 -- -- 0.1 
Israel (91) 11,890.8 7.6 2.6 0.6 1.6 87.5 7.6 14.0 27.3 
Jordan (91) 878.9 16.0 0.5 -- 37.9 45.7 3.7 29.6 1.3 
Kuwait (89) 11,476.5 1.1 0.4 84.I 0.5 13.7 0.7 1.0 2.4 
Lebanon (89) 410.0 3.0 27.5 0.2 55.8 13.0 -- 0.5 0.4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (87) 8,502.7 -- -- 97.8 -- 2.1 -- 1.9 
Oman (89) 3,932.9 2.2 -- 88.9 1.4 5.7 0.3 0.2 5.4 
Qatar (89) 2,609.7 -- -- 70.0 -- 17.4 -- 13.0 0.4 
Saudi Arabia (90) 44,062.0 0.5 0.3 89.7 0.6 8.1 -- 4.4 1.7 
Syria (90) 4,061.6 11.6 3.8 40.5 1.4 42.6 -- 10.8 0.2 
Turkey (90) 12,959.3 22.4 3.0 2.3 4.3 67.9 39.0 5.9 8.2 
United Arab Emirates (88) 11,873.0 1.9 0.1 84.5 1.4 11.5 -- 0.7 4.3 
ALL MIDDLE EAST 133,857.0 4.5 1.1 68.7 1.8 23.1 5.4 4.5 4.7 ;:i.. 
~ 
MEMO ITEM: ~ 
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 708,947.0 11.6 3.1 26.1 4.2 54.0 13.I 4.2 19.8 ;:: 
~ .., 
Source: United Nations Series D Trade Tapes. Import statistics as reported (c.i.f) by the OECD count~ies. Pmduc/ Kmups are defined asfollows: Allfoods and 
~ 
feeds (S/TC O+/ +22+4); AKricu/tural mate rials (2-22-27-28); minera/fuels (3}; ores minerais and nonferrous metals (27+28+68); ail manufactures (5 to 8 less ::::. 
68): yarns. textiles and clothinK (26+65+84); chemica/s (5); transport and machinery (7). <;;' 
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Table 2 provides information on the product composition of each Middle 
East country's exports as well as that for the region as a whole. Minerai fuels 
are by far the larges! product group accounting for approximately 68 percent 
of all regional ex ports. This is more than two and one half times higher than 
energy products' share in the exports of all developing countries combined 
(see the memo item). The value of fuel exports ($82.3 billion) is about $53 
billion higher than the second larges! product group (manufactures - which 
accounts for 24 percent of regional exports). Severa! countries, including Iran, 
Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have developed only a limited 
capacity for ex ports of manufactures and are almost totally dependent on min-
erai fuels which account for at least 80 percent of their exports. This export 
concentration of some ME countries in fuels is an obvious factor limiting the 
opportunities fro developing mutually beneficial intra-regional trade. 
Table 2 shows that the ex ports of Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, and to a less-
er extent those of Jordan and Syria are more heavily concentrated in manu-
factures than other middle-Eastern countries (68 percent of Turkey's ex ports 
are manufactured goods and the share of these goods in Israel 's ex ports is 8 8 
percent). Countries not specializing in energy products probably hold the key 
to increased regional trade opportunities since they can accommodate oil 
exports from other ME countries.4 Increased opportunities for intra-regional 
trade may also occur in foodstuffs, the third larges! ME export group ( 12 per-
cent of total exports), with Cyprus, Jordan, Syria and Turkey being important 
net food importers. 
The data in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that some ME countries 
may not be strongly affected by changes in foreign trade barriers (particular-
ly those in the OECD). Agricultural raw materials, fuels, ores and nonferrous 
metals generally are imported duty free, or face relatively low OECD tariffs 
and nontariff barriers. These items account for about 70 percent of all region-
al exports and over 90 percent of the exports of Iran, Libya, Oman and Saudi 
Arabia. The exporters of manufactured and food products (Cyprus, Israel, 
Jordan, Syria and Turkey) have the potential to be more affected by develop-
ments relating to the Uruguay Round, European integration or NAFTA. 
The fact that OECD markets constitute the most important outlets for ME 
ex ports (see Table 1) raises the question of how the relative importance of indi-
vidual countries differs in this exchange. The top half of Table 3 shows the 
value, share, and growth rates for individual regional country's total exports to 
the OECD markets for selected years from 1970 to 1992, while the lower half 
excludes fuels. The relative importance of ME countries changes markedly 
depending on whether petroleum is included or not. Israel and Turkey are by 
far the larges! regional non-oil exporters, accounting for over $20 billion, or 
Table 3: The Share of Individual Countries in Total and Non-Oil Exports to the OECD, 1 'O 0 
Selected Years from 1970 to 1992 
Value of Regional Exports Io the OECD (US$million) Share of Regional Exports to the OECD( % ) Growth Rate 
Product Group/Exporter 1970 1980 1986 1992 1970 1980 1986 1992 1970-92 1980-92 
ALLGOODS 11.2075 157,36).6 60,229 0 107,192.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 li -3 
Bahrain 1539 799.3 558.1 651.7 1.4 0.5 0.9 0.6 7 -2 
Cyprus 983 451.4 3.44.6 583.8 0.9 03 0.6 0.5 8 2 
Egypt 333.0 4,470.9 2,237.3 3,898.3 3.0 2.8 3.7 3.6 12 -1 
Iran, lslamic Rep.of 2.131.3 10,781.0 5,637.0 10,925.9 19.0 6.9 9.4 10.2 8 --
Israel 579.0 4,049.4 5,937.2 10,022.6 5.2 2.6 9.9 9.4 14 8 
Jordan 2.0 90.0 214.8 172.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 22 6 
Kuwait 1.750 7 9,899.0 4,067.6 2,510.4 15.6 6.3 6.8 2.3 2 -li 
Lebanon 100.1 164.3 158.2 2055 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.2 3 2 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 2,469.1 19,7953 6,070.6 9,801.7 22.0 12.6 10.1 9.1 6 -6 
Oman 457.7 2,810.6 1,828.0 2,359.4 4.1 1.8 3.0 2.2 8 -1 
Qatar 393.8 4,546.0 1,645.9 2,329.8 35 2.9 2.7 2.2 8 -5 
Saudi Arabia 2,005.9 77 ,827.4 19,171.7 37,520.2 17.9 49.5 31.8 35.0 14 -6 
Syri;i 133.5 1,439.6 523.7 2.103.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 2.0 13 3 
Turkey 493.4 1,903.9 4,586.6 10,673.6 4.4 1.2 7.6 10.0 15 15 
United Arab Emirates 105.8 18,335.4 7,2475 13.433.7 0.9 11.7 12.0 12.5 25 -2 
NON-ENERGY GOODS 1,804.1 9,927.2 14,577.9 28,763.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 13 9 
Bahrain 10.1 li 1.9 267.8 383.8 0.6 1.1 1.8 1.3 18 li 
Cyprus 98.3 439.0 344.6 582.1 5.4 4.4 2.4 2.0 8 2 
Egypt 187.4 747.3 759.3 1,469.2 10.4 7.5 5.2 5.1 10 6 
lran,lslamic Rep.of 248.9 878.9 760.4 1,406.0 13.8 8.9 5.2 4.9 8 4 
Israel 553.6 3,916.7 5,856.1 9,917.4 30.7 39.5 4-0.2 34.5 14 8 
Jordan 2.0 90.0 188.7 172.3 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.4 22 6 
Kuwait 12.8 110.8 125.2 115.6 0.1 0.9 u 0.6 li --
Lebanon 60.6 1643 158.2 205.2 3.4 1.7 1.1 0.7 6 2 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 85 138.0 129.4 186.0 05 1.4 0.9 0.6 15 3 ;:r,. 
Oman 30.3 7.1.3 151.7 283.0 1.7 0.7 1.0 LO li 12 ~ 
Qatar 2.4 21.5 51.1 118.9 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 19 15 Èi 
Saudi Arabia 19.3 695.5 1,293.7 1,998.3 1.1 7.0 8.9 6.9 23 9 ::s 
Syria 61.5 110.7 113.9 263.7 3.4 1.1 0.8 0.9 7 7 ~ 
Turkey 487.1 1,886.9 4,035.6 10.454.8 27.0 19.0 27.7 36.3 15 15 
..... 
United Arab Emirates 21.4 542.3 342.4 1,2074 1.2 5.5 2.3 4.2 20 7 ~ 
~ 
Source: OECD counrries import statistics as reponed in the UN COMTRADE: Data Base <;;' 
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70 percent of ME shipments to the OECD. These countries' free trade area 
(FIA) agreements with the EU are certainly a factor accounting for their per-
formance - Israel also has FIA agreements with the European free trade areas 
(EFIAs) and the United States. However, once petroleum products are exclud-
ed the relative importance of individual countries changes dramatically -
Saudi Arabia al one accounts for 36 percent of ail regional exports to the OECD 
markets, while Iran and the UAE add a further 23 percent. Table 3 also shows 
that the shares of some energy exporting countries have experienced sizable 
changes since the early I 970s. Saudi Arabia's share increased by about 15 per-
centage points (to over one-third of the region's total exports) while Iran and 
Libya's shares fell by 13 and 15 points, respectively. 
What non-energy products are regional countries exporting to the OECD 
markets, and how has the composition of these exports changed? Table 4 lists 
the 30 largest non-oil products ME countries currently export. The table also 
shows the shares of these goods for selected years back to 1970. One three-
digit SITC item (nonfur clothing) now accounts for over one-fifth of ail 1992 
ex ports. This product has also had one of the highest growth rates over the last 
decade. The Uruguay Round achieved major liberalization in the trade of tex-
tiles and clothing products (see further below) which could further increase 
ME export opportunities provided that these products are cost competitive. 
Other products in Table 4 that previously faced relatively high European and 
North American trade barriers which were lowered in the Round include: 
fresh and preserved fruit and vegetables, and textile fabrics. 
An interesting point relating to Table 4 is that one-third of the products 
listed actually experienced declining market shares over the full 1970-1992 
period - a development which is, in part, associated with the major expansion 
of clothing exports. Cotton experienced the largest overall reduction (a fall of 
about 16 percentage points), but the shares of other agricultural products like 
fresh fruit and nuts, fresh vegetables, tobacco, and dried fruit also experienced 
important reductions. There is evidence (Laird and Yeats, 1990) that rising 
protection in European markets (and subsidized OECD agricultural exports) 
was an important constraint to the growth of agricultural exports. 
There are at least three reasons why one should attempt to identify 
"dynamic" (fastest growing) exports from amongst those that presently may 
not constitute a large share of ME exports. First, if current above average 
growth rates continue for an extended period, the affected items may become 
an important part of a country's export earnings. Second, it could be 
important to determine if the dynamic products have different production 
characteristics than traditional exports. If they are (say) significantly more 
capital intensive, one would want to determine the reason and whether export 
Table 4: Middle Eastern Countries' Thirty Largest Three-Digit Non-Energy Product 1 \() N 
Exports to OECD Countries, 1992 
Value or Exports ($ million) Percent of Total Ex ports ( % ) 
Description (SITC) 1970 1980 1986 1992 1970 1980 1986 1942 
Clothing not of Pur (841) 43.5 413.4 1,620.9 6.064.9 4.2 2.4 l LI 12.I 
Pearls and Precious Stones (667) 139.2 1.174.0 1.771.6 2.817.7 7.7 11.8 12.2 9.8 
Presh Fruit and Nuts (051) 258.8 904.9 919.2 1.231.3 14.3 9.1 6.3 4.3 
Organic Chemicals (512) 6.3 205.6 736.J LI03.3 0.3 2.1 5.0 3.8 
Hoor Coverings (657) 125.5 676.5 474.3 856.4 7.0 6.8 3.3 3.0 
Telecommunications Equipment (724) 5.7 58.3 136.4 839.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 2.9 
Gold and Silver Jewelry (897) 1.4 123.7 278.9 582.1 0.1 1.2 1.9 2.0 
Alummum (684) 0.4 148.6 442.5 568.1 1.5 3.0 2.0 
Fruit Preserved (053) 38.2 178.4 2W6 554.2 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Textile Yarn and Thread (651) 44.5 344.9 499.4 552.4 2.5 3.5 3.4 1.9 
Scientifa Instruments (861) 3.4 57.6 141.1 531.3 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.8 
Plastic Materials (581) 3.3 48.1 357.7 526.3 0.2 0.5 2.5 1.8 
Non-Electric Machinery (719) 6.5 89.0 161.8 499.6 0.4 0.9 LI 1.7 
Non-Electric Power Machinery (711) 13.I 276.7 324.0 498.4 0.7 2.8 2.2 1.7 
Fresh Vegetables (054) 63.5 232.8 220.1 467.6 3.5 2.3 1.5 1.6 
Office Machi11ery (714) 2.4 33.2 143.7 439.4 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.5 
Tobacco Unmanufactured ( 121) 74.6 204.8 314.1 431.7 4.1 2.1 2.2 1.5 
Electncal Machines ( 729) 4.7 98.5 272.9 358.5 0.3 1.0 1.9 1.2 
Dried Fruit (052) 35.1 195.2 183.6 345.7 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.2 
Textile Products. nes (656) 0.7 W2 113.0 333.0 0.6 0.8 1.2 
Manufactured Fertilizers (561) 16.6 122.2 283.2 315.6 0.9 1.2 1.9 1.1 
Woven Textiles Non -Cotton (653) 7.4 21.4 41.4 302.7 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.1 
Crude Vegetable Materials (292) 30.7 209.5 218.4 301.9 1.7 2.1 1.5 1.0 
Cotton Fabrics Woven (652) 13.2 54.7 126.8 267.2 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 
Other Crude Minerais (276) 21.5 166.6 202.8 246.3 1.2 1.7 1.4 0.9 ~ 
Cotton (263) 292.3 565.6 461.8 241.3 16.2 5.7 3.2 0.8 ~ 
Electric Power Machinery (722) 2.1 39.5 77.0 239.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 ~ 
Electrical Distributing Machinery (723) 0.1 5.9 32.6 236.9 -- 0.1 0.2 0.8 ;:s ;::,.. 
Rubber Articles. nes (629) 10.1 52.5 76.4 215.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 ~ .... 
Road Motor Vehicles and Parts (732) 1.5 22.2 46.3 204.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 ;<:: 
TOTAL OF ABOVE PRODUCTS 1,266.4 6,783.4 10,937.6 22,172.0 70.2 68.3 75.0 77.1 ~ 
<::;' 
So11rce: United Nations Seri es D. Tmde Tapes. The above statisrics exclude aircraft and special rransacrions recorded in S!TC 931. 
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opportunities exist in other related goods. Third, there is an obvious interest 
in ensuring that foreign trade barriers are not imposed on these items, or that 
existing restrictions are removed. Table 5 lists the 30 fastes! growing three-
digit exports from the region over the period 1986-92 ( 1988-92 growth rates 
are also shown) and identifies the major ME supplier along with its regional 
trade share. Table 6 provides similar information for Egypt's dynamic and 
declining products. 
Two-thirds of the ME dynamic products listed in Table 5 are manufactured 
goods. Severa! of these items require locally available natural resource-based 
production inputs ( that is, manufactures such as cernent and products; clay 
and refractory materials), and many of these items are above average in labor 
intensity in comparison to ail manufactured goods. This raises the question of 
whether other similar types of exports cou Id be developed on the basis of fur-
ther processing of domestically-available natural resources'7 Petroleum-based 
chemical and plastic industries may be one such suitable sector for further 
export development given the availability of crude petroleum in many ME 
countries.' The fact that these plants require sizable capital investments could 
make multi-country regional investment in jointly owned plants to process 
and refine petroleum an attractive option. 
It is somewhat surprising that two of the fastes! growing products over 
1986-1992 (barley and rice) are foodstuffs - although barley exports fell 
sharply from 1988 levels. Wheat meal, unmilled wheat, and milk and cream 
also recorded growth rates that are well above average." The fact that one-
sixth of the dynamic products are foodstuffs. coupled with the Uruguay 
Round's tariffication and reduction of nontariff barriers on agricultural trade, 
provide solid grounds to focus attention on the possibility to further develop 
agricultural export opportunities. Increased agricultural exports should 
assume special importance for Egypt, and several other ME countries, since, 
inter alia, this cou Id alleviate the situation of the rural poor. 7 Specifically, stud-
ies by the International Labor Office (ILO) show that developing countries 
may use (on average) up to 30 limes as much labor per unit of agricultural out-
put as some developed countries. The ILO studies also conclude that the link-
age and multiplier employment creation effects in the agricultural sector of 
developing countries arc among the larges! (with textiles) of ail industry 
groups. These findings imply that an expansion of agricultural exports could 
make a significant contribution to alleviating the basic social and employment 
situation in developing countries (Lydall, 1985 ). 
One troubling aspect associated with Table 5 is that two countries (Turkey 
and Israel) are the major su pp li ers for most of the ME dynamic products. In 
only 9 of the 30 products do other countrics register a presence - often with 
Table 5: Dynamic Products in Middle East Countries' Exports to OECD Markets 1 ~ 
OECD lmports ($000) Growth Rate 
Product(STTC) Major 1992 Supplies (share) 1986 1988 1992 1988-92 1986-92 
Barley Unmilled(043) Cyprus( 100) 18.6 5,633.7 1,534.9 -28 109 
Ricc(042) Egypt(88) 115.1 3,235.8 6,062.3 17 94 
Cernent and Bulding Products(661) Turkey(89) 7,708.2 42,472.8 150,721.8 37 64 
Lead(685) Lebanon(48), lsrae1(27) 90.8 1,678.2 1,397.2 -4 58 
Clay and Refractory Products(662) Turkey(88) 4,740.4 13,263.9 62,029.4 47 54 
Domestic Electrical Equipment(725) Turkey(83) 5,905.6 82,513.6 73,264.5 -3 52 
Leather(61 I) Saudi Arabia( 66) 2,734.8 11,502.2 30,354.7 26 49 
Plumbing and Heating Equipment(812) Turkey(85) 8,451.1 21,736.I 73,978.8 36 44 
Wire Products( 693) Turkey(86) 4,320.8 8,359.0 34,496.7 43 41 
Woven Textiles Non-Çotton(653) Turkey(74 ), lsrae1(2 I) 41,421.2 162,818.0 302,697.6 17 39 
Electrical Distributing Machines(723) Turkey(86) 32,646.4 20,717.2 236,913.0 84 39 
Natural Abrasives(275) lsrael(60), Turkey(39) 4,920.7 26,550.6 34,625.0 7 38 
Silk(261) Turkey( 100) 105.0 1,464.3 718.5 -16 38 
Special Textile Products(655) lsrael(61), Turkey(36) 11,315.8 29,013.7 75,066.7 27 37 
Leather Manufactures( 612) Turkey(75) 982.8 3,495.4 6,571.2 18 37 
Wood in the Rough(242) Turkey(94) 1,057.0 580.5 6,721.1 84 36 
Telecommunictions Equipment(724) lsrael(54), Turkey(26) 136,379.9 353,722.6 839,290.7 24 35 
Iron and Steel Castings(679) Turkey(84) 1,211.2 3,203.I 7,469.3 24 35 
Zoo Animais and Pets(94 I) Turkey(48), Egypt(33) 766.5 2,421.2 4,726.3 18 35 
Radioactive Materials(515) lsrael(92) 237.5 570.5 1,393.8 25 34 
Wood Shaped(243) Turkey(93) 1,687.5 1,729.2 9,767.5 54 34 
Iron and Steel Wire(677) Turkey(87) 327.7 5,418.0 1,882.4 -23 34 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages( 111) Cyprus(35), Turkey(32) 1,189.8 3,770.I 6,283.1 14 32 
Wheat Meal or Flour(046) Turkey(38), Lebanon(34) 143.3 498.9 677.9 8 30 
Road Motor Vehicles and Parts(732) Turkey(70), Israel( 13) 46,253.0 91,420.I 204,645.4 22 29 ~ 
Base Meial Household Equipment(697) Turkey(83) 11,753.0 20,578.0 50,718.4 25 28 [ 
Wheat Unmilled(041) Saudi Arabia(96) 3,652.2 61,955.2 15,850.5 -29 28 ;:s 
Soaps and Cleansing Preparations(554) lsrael(58), Turkey(32) 2,789.4 2,907.I 12,012.1 43 28 ~ Milk and Crearn(022) lsrael(50), Saudi Arabi a( 1 3) 416.5 400.I 1,454.3 38 27 .., 
Iron and Steel Forms(672) Turkey(80), Egypt(9) 17,784.6 149,733.8 73,519.7 -16 27 ~ 
tl 
Source: U11ited Natio11.1· Serie.1· D Trade Tapes. fo be i11cluded i11 the above tahulatio11.1· OECD import.1· of the product had Io total at least $500.000 i11 1992. ~ 
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either Turkey or Israel. This suggests that the recent rapid growth of ex ports 
from the region has been highly concentrated, and that most countries are not 
participating in the associated benefits. Egypt appears as a primary supplier 
for only three dynamic products (rice, zoo animais and pets, and iron and steel 
forms) while Iran, Syria and the smaller regional countries fail to appear on 
the Iist for any product. 
Table 6 shows the dynamic products in Egypt's exports over 1980-82 to 
1990-92 along with those products where exports declined. (Box 3 provides 
information on Egypt's largest export products for comparison). For the most 
part, Egypt's dynamic products differ from those of the region as only cernent, 
leather manufactures, and plumbing equipment also appear on the Iist of ME 
fast growing exports. However, a common point is that manufactured goods 
also are predominant in Egypt's fastest growing ex ports ( 15 out of 21 dynam-
ic products are manufactures). Four of Egypt's manufactures ex ports: iron and 
steel shapes; glassware; miscellaneous chemicals; and plastic articles main-
tained a 50 percent compound annual growth rate over the decade. 
Five food products (fresh meat and fish, cereal preparations, cheese and 
miscellaneous food are among Egypt's fastest growing exports and the total 
trade in these items surpassed $42 million annually in 1990-92. Given the 
major trade barriers these products face in OECD markets Egypt's exports 
were directed almost exclusively to other developing countries. For example, 
over 94 percent of Egypt's 1992 ex ports of fresh meat (SITC 011) went to 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar while over 50 percent of the ex ports of cere-
al preparations went to Russia and Saudi Arabia. Russia received about one-
third of Egypt's exports of miscellaneous food preparation (SITC 099) while 
about 28 percent of these shipments went to Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Italy was the major destination for Egypt's fresh fish ex ports (SITC 031) 
absorbing 65 percent of total shipments. 
Eleven of Egypt's "declining" products recorded negative growth rates 
with crude and refined petroleum accounting for almost half of this groups' 
total exports. The decline is largely the result of weakness in crude petroleum 
prices which fell by about 50 percent on average over the 1980-82 to 1990-92 
period. The fall in cotton exports, which accounted for 6 percent of the declin-
ing products' ex ports, can be attributed to the increased utilization of cotton 
by the local textile and garment industry and the fact that Egyptian cotton 
became Jess competitively priced over the period. 
Trends in Intra-Regional Trade 
A major problem one faces in trying to analyze trends in intra-regional trade 
is that some countries have gaps in their import and export statistics reported 
96 Alexander Yeats 
to the United Nations. Egypt, Turkey, Israel and several other countries are 
exceptions since they provided the UN with complete trade data from the 
early l 960s to 1992. Conversely, Lebanon and Iran have not reported trade 
data to the United Nations since 1977 and 1988 is the most recent year for 
which Bahrain's data are available. Major gaps in data (missing years) exist 
in Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE's trade statistics. As such, partner 
country statistics must be used to derive estimates of intra-regional trade 
trends.8 This procedure is employed in the preparation of Table 7 which shows 
the value and share of each country's 1970, 1980 and 1990 intra-regional 
trade along with compound annual growth rates. The notes to Table 7 provide 
information on how these data were derived. 
Intra-regional exports are estimated to have been $8.3 billion in 1990 -
down by approximately 45 percent from their value of a decade earlier. The 
overall decline is largely due to a sharp decline in intra-regional shipments of 
crude oil for refining, lower petroleum prices and the importance of energy 
products in regional intra-trade (see Table 8). Five countries, namely, Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the UAE account for the bulk of this 
exchange, that is, over 60 percent of intra-trade. In contrast, Bahrain, Israel, 
Lebanon and Qatar have a combined share of about 8 percent. Egypt's share 
of intra-regional exports is under 5 percent, with petroleum exports to Israel 
accounting for a large portion of this exchange. Box 4 · provides det<;1ils on 
Egypt's largest three-digit SITC regional exports. 
How important is intra-regional trade in the total exports of these ME 
countries? Taking the statistics in Table 7 as a share of the total export values 
for ME countries gi ven in Table 1 shows intra-trade accounts for only about 
7 to 8 percent of all exports. These figures may appear low at first, but a key 
point is that ME countries as a group only absorb about 3 to 4 percent of glob-
al exports. As such, ME countries have a higher than average propensity to 
trade with each other. For several countries, the intra-regional trade shares are 
considerably higher than the group's average. Between 13 to 16 percent of all 
Egypt and Turkey's exports are destined to the region as do over 50 percent 
of all Cyprus' exports (mai ni y to Turkey). 
What products are of primary importance in intra-regional trade? Table 8 
shows the 20 largest three-digit SITC products traded along with the estimat-
ed value and share of this exchange. Although their shares have been very 
volatile - due mainly to price changes - crude and refined petroleum products 
accounted for approximately one-third of intra-regional trade in 1990 - down 
from their 80 percent share in 1980. The petroleum price changes and their 
impact on product shares conceal to some extent the impressive growth that 
has occurred in the intra- regional exports of fruit, vegetables and live animais 
( that is, items which are now three of the five largest export products). 
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Table 6: Dynamic and Declining Products in Egypt's 
Exports: 1980-82 to 1990-92 
1980-82 Average' Exports 1990-92 Average Exports Compound 
Growth Rate 
Description(STTC) Value ($000) Share or Total Value ($000) Share or Total 
DYNAMIC PRODUCTS 
Iron and Steel Shapes (673) 181 32,573 1.2 68.l 
G lassware ( 665) 52 6,768 0.2 62.7 
Chemicals, nes (599) 203 21,185 0.8 59.2 
Articles of Plastic (893) 125 7,860 0.3 51.4 
Plumbing and Lighting 
Equipment (812) 167 9,453 0.3 49.7 
Meat Fresh and Frozen ( 0 l l) 226 12,504 0.4 49.4 
Cereal Preparations (048) 100 4,220 0.l 45.5 
Rubber Articles (629) 59 2,491 0.l 45.3 
Iron and Steel Tubes (678) 286 10,546 0.4 43.4 
Stone, Sand and Grave! (273) 130 3,857 O.l 40.3 
Leather Manufactures (612) 206 5,892 0.2 39.9 
Cheese and Curd ( 024) 150 3,863 O.l 38.4 
Food Preparations, nes (099) 484 10,897 0.4 36.5 
Manufactured Fertilizers (561) 1,165 25,544 0.9 36.2 
Structures and Parts ( 691) 252 4,973 0.2 34.7 
Inorganic Chemicals (514) 58 989 0.0 32.7 
Furniture ( 821) 2,702 0.1 40,974 1.5 31.2 
Meta! Manufactures, nes (698) 581 8,600 0.3 30.9 
Wood Manufactures, nes (632) 268 3,686 0.1 30.0 
Fresh Fish ( 031) 870 ] ] ,478 0.4 29.4 
Cement/Bui!dingProds. ( 66 ! ) 310 3,534 0.1 27.6 
DECLINING PRODUCTS 
Live Animais (011) 21,347 0.7 17,256 0.6 -2.1 
Petroleum Products (332) 264,736 8.6 212,159 7.5 -2.2 
Oil Seeds and Nuts (221) 7,787 0.3 5,832 0.2 -2.8 
Essential Oils (551) 10,982 0.4 7,928 0.3 -3.2 
Preserved Fruit (053) 6,795 0.2 3,720 0.1 -5.8 
Sugar and Honey (061) 18,370 0.6 9,751 0.3 -6. l 
Crude Petroleum (331) 1,746,086 56.7 818,362 29.1 -7.3 
Tobacco Manufactures (122) 2,498 O.! 923 -9.5 
Cotton (263) 431,453 14.0 130,811 4.6 -11.2 
Crude Fertilizers (271) 2,349 O.! 513 -14.1 
Non-Ferrous Meta! Scrap (284) 25,368 0.8 586 -31.4 

















United Arab Emirates 
Table 7: The Share of lndividual Countries in Total Intra-Regional 
Exports, Selected Years from 1970 to 1992 
Value of Intra-Regioilal Export~ (US$ million) Share of Ali Intra-Regional Exports (%) 
1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 
3.399.9 16.708.7 8.879.I 100.0 100.0 100.0 
242.2 3.808.5 231.7 7.1 22.8 2.6 
109.1 551.7 94.4 3.2 3.3 1.1 
34.0 269.0 387.4 1.0 1.6 4.4 
2.454.8 851.3 734.6 72.2 5.1 8.3 
30.3 69.1 128.1 0.9 0.4 1.4 
29.8 419.4 208.6 0.0 2.5 2.3 
49.1 1.402.1 139.8 1.4 8.4 1.6 
222.0 742.2 263.1 6.5 4.4 3.0 
7.3 783.1 636.1 0.2 4.7 7.2 
0.1 3.748.3 279.3 -- 22.4 3.1 
18.5 116.7 260.3 0.5 0.7 2.9 
143.9 3.264.3 1.609.2 4.2 19.5 18.1 
2.4 103.2 866.4 0.1 0.6 9.8 
47.8 493.3 1.923.8 1.4 3.0 21.7 
8.6 75.5 116.3 0.3 0.5 12.6 




















J 990- Countries failinR Io report tmde swtistics for 1990 include: Bahrain; Iran; Lebanon; Qatar and the UAE. ReRional partner country statistics for Iran. 
Leba11011 wl(/ the UAE were employed Io estimate these countries exports. The above wbulations will. therefore, not include these nations' intra-trade. Al.rn, 1988 
mule statistics were used in the above for Bah min and 1991 dota for Qator. Partner country statistics were used to estimate Saudi Arabi a '.v exports to the reRion. 
/11 1990 Crprus did 1wt report exports Io Turkey. 
1980 - Countries foilillR Io report tmde data for 1980 indude: Iran. Lebarum. Qatar and the UAE. Partner country data were used Io estimate Iran and 
Lebwum 's exports. The above tabu!otiom employ 1979 tmde statistics for Qatar and the UAE. 
1970 - Partner country data were used Io estinwte UAE exports. The above tabulations are based on 1974 trade data for Saudi Arabia and Syria, 1972 data 
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Characteristics of Regional Trade 
Severa) statistical indices can provide useful insights concerning internation-
al trade trends. One such measure - the "trade intensity" index has been used 
to determine whether the value of trade between two countries is greater or 
smaller than what would be expected on the basis of their importance in world 
trade. For example, Table 1 showed that approximately 40 percent of Egypt's 
exports go to the European Union. Is this above or below what would be pro-
jected on the basis of the two partner's relative size in global trade? Is Egypt's 
trade with other regional countries, about 14 percent of total exports, higher 
or lower than might be expected? Identification of bilateral combinations 
where trade is well below expected levels may often help focus attempts to 
identify and remove important trade barriers. 
Table 9 shows 1992 "trade intensity" indices between selected individual 
ME countries (for which UN data were available) and various trading part-
ners. The index may range between zero and infinity and has a relatively sim-
ple interpretation.' Values below unity indicate that the trade between two 
countries is lower than expected, while values above unity indicate it is rela-
tively larger. A point to note is that, on average, ME countries absorb about 3 
to 4 percent of global exports. Therefore, any country that had a higher share 
of total exports going to the middle-East could be thought of as having an 
above average tendency to trade with the region. 
Table 9 suggests that most regional trade flows are not consistently lower 
than what should be expected, while the exchange with Europe is larger in the 
case of Cypnis, Libya and Turkey. For example, Table 9 indicates that the 
share of Egypt's exports to the region are about four times larger than what 
might be expected while the trade intensity indices for Syria, Oman and 
Jordan are even higher. Where does intra-regional trade originale and where 
does it go? As previously noted (see Table 7) this question is not easily 
answered since there are major gaps in some ME countries' official trade sta-
tistics. However, employing partner country trade data will allow one to pro-
duce some estimates. '0 Of course, this approach does not work in situations 
where a partner country has not reported its data - as in the case of Iran-
Lebanon, UAE, and other countries. 
Table 10 relies on the available information to construct a 1990 matrix of 
the origins and destinations of regional intra-trade. As previously indicated, 
Turkey plays a key role in this exchange. It accounts for 22 percent of all 
exports td the region and also serves as the destination of 26 percent of all 
other regional countries' exports. These figures understate Turkey's impor-
tance somewhat since, for political reasons, Cyprus is not reporting exports to 
Turkey in its official statistics. Saudi Arabia and the UAE combined account 
Table 8: Middle Eastern Countries' Twenty Largest Three-Digit Intra-Regional Exports, 
1970, 1980 and 1990 
Value of Exports($000) Percent of Total Ex ports ( % ) 
Description(SITC) 1970 1980 1990 1970 1980 1990 
Crude Petroleum (331) 31,684 2.051.579 1.886.796 0.93 12.28 21.25 
Petroleum Products (332) 29,051 963,226 424.976 0.86 5.76 4.79 
Fresh Fruit and Nuts (051) 20.727 48.472 331,344 0.61 0.29 3.73 
Fresh Vegetables (054) 18.887 46.829 288.776 0.56 0.28 3.25 
Live Animais (001) 32,845 19.021 283.055 0.96 0.11 3.19 
Plastic Materials (581 ) 1,867 7.352 279.824 0.06 0.04 3.15 
Iron and Steel Shapes (673) 3,239 64,125 255.721 1.09 1.38 2.88 
Aluminum (684) 1.605 16.789 143.153 0.05 0.10 1.61 
Non-Fur Clothing (841) 8.274 92.921 137,907 0.24 0.56 1.55 
Articles uf Paper (642) 902 7,133 95.222 0.03 0.04 1.07 
Fixed Vegetable Oils (421) 2.563 1.411 93.289 0.08 0.01 0.05 
Electrical Distributing Machinery (723) 1.562 7.778 85.611 0.05 0.05 0.96 
Textile Yarn and Thread (651) 4.283 543 84.181 0.13 0.95 
Machines Non-Electric. nes (719) 12.039 39.853 83,418 0.35 0.24 0.94 
Road Motor Vehicles (732) 34,194 149,107 82.060 1.01 0.89 0.92 
Natural Gas (341) 934 88.500 81.831 0.03 0.53 0.92 
Gold. Silverware and Jewelry (897) 2.608 26.234 79.358 0.08 0.16 0.89 
Copper (682) 207 1.954 72.775 0.01 0.01 0.82 
Soaps and Cleaning Preparations (554) 1,441 10.985 70.879 0.04 0.07 0.80 
Medicinal Products (541) 3,198 3,526 69 .. 672 0.06 0.02 0.78 
Source: United Nations Series D Trade Tapes. Data are based on import statistics of the re11iona/ co1mtries. Information on Iran, Bahrain and Lebanon '.ç imports 
are mi.uù111 from the 1990 data. The 1980 statistics do not include lebtmon and Iran white UAE data are not included in the 1970 rotais. See the notes to Table 7 
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Table 9: "Trade Intensity" Indices for Selected 
Middle Eastern Countries'1990 Exports 
Partner Country 
Ali OECD European North Middle East 
Exporter Countries Union America Japan Region 
Cyprus 0.90 1.44 0.10 0.07 4.52 
Egypt 0.71 0.92 0.49 0.51 4.19 
Israel 1.07 0.85 1.66 1.38 0.31 
Jordan 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.40 6.00 
Libya 1.21 2.04 1.32 
Oman 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.40 17.27 
Saudi Arabia 0.36 1.40 
Syria 0.63 1.00 0.05 0.01 5.84 
Turkey 0.93 1.29 0.44 0.35 4.07 
Source: Computedfrom trade data extractedfrom United Nations Series D Trade Tapes. 
for about one-third of intra-regional exports and about 28 percent of ail 
imports. Saudi Arabian exports to Turkey (mostly crude oil) constitute the sin-
gle largest bilateral trade tlow (about three quarters of a billion dollars) fol-
lowed by UAE's exports to Oman and Libya's ex ports to Turkey which, com-
bined, are over one billion dollars. 
What are the factors that limit further trading opportunities among ME 
countries? Trade barriers are clearly an important factor as an UNCTAD 
( 1987) study showed that average tariffs in Syria, Turkey and Libya ranged 
between 27 to 34 percent and actually reached 1 OO percent in Iran. In addition, 
many of the ME countries trade regimes were ridden by nontariff barriers. 
Over 70 percent (by value) of Turkey's imports encountered some forrn of 
nontariff measure while this ratio was 99 percent in the case of Iran. In addi-
tion, there is also evidence that transport links within the region can be an 
important constraint to increased trade as most established liner conference 
routes follow a North-South pattern. Another factor that may limit opportuni-
ties for intra-trade relates to the fact that the trade profiles of some ME coun-
tries are so similar, and this applies particularly to the oil exporting countries. 
The "revealed" comparative advantage (RCA) index can provide some 
rough indication as to where opportunities for expanded intra-trade may exist. 
Countries with different revealed comparative advantage profiles should have 
more opportunities to trade than those whose RCA indices are similar. The 
revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of country i for product j is measured 
by the item's share in the country's exports relative toits share in world trade. 11 
The index (RCAij) has a simple interpretation. If it takes a value of Jess than 
unity (which indicates that the share of product j in i's exports is Jess than the 
Table 10. The Origin and Destination of Middle Eastern Countries' 1990 Intra-Regional Trade 
1 
.._ 
(Values in $000) 2 
Destination of Exports 
Saudi 
Exporter Bahrain Cyprus Egypt Iran Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Oman Qatar Arabia Syria Turkey UAE 
Bahrain 254 1.38 108 0 11,088 9,792 12 0 5,995 6.530 107,036 2 4,932 65,857 
Cyprus 2,645 19,113 188 4,011 4,447 4,865 13,050 6,861 2,598 2.764 22,315 1,158 9,186 10,715 
Egypl 1,520 11,160 -- 4,139 167,652 15,728 11,396 9,228 43,550 14,521 4 .. 192 76,579 11,682 16,069 0 
Iran 7,316 2,571 0 -- 0 2,508 10,937 na 2,778 55 14.23:'5 178 32,579 492,399 169,073 
Israel 0 33,286 6,366 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88,438 0 
Jordan 8,529 769 15,992 1,359 0 -- 16,646 13,303 6,286 1,224 6.375 70,482 12,670 22,755 32,300 
Kuwait 8,220 129 5,459 3,133 0 10,984 2,574 -- 4,082 1.520 74,142 426 1,145 28,062 
Lebanon 11,311 9,725 14,563 na 0 16,619 17,558 -- 19,962 354 10.903 85,332 16,802 6,284 53,605 
Libya 0 1,442 78,645 13,823 0 791 27 11,241 0 20 370 9,827 506,589 13,310 
Oman 4,177 178 583 17,423 0 199 944 525 122 4.331 33,578 13 21 213,574 
Qatar 6,664 0 49 40,414 0 5,454 19,258 259 0 12,972 -- 61,842 99 445 122,308 
Saudi Arabia 67,550 12,360 76,340 na 0 119,901 160,838 88,155 4,649 58,153 10.903 -- 32,829 723,628 414,777 
Syria 6,247 6,515 47,671 13,582 0 24,487 12,377 266, 135 15,998 574 29. 706 270,463 -- 113,588 58,984 
Turkey 3,532 154,841 160,104 495,483 45,504 80,870 92,208 50,666 220,541 4,545 6.115 338,427 194,494 -- 75,426 




Value ($mil!.) 211.7 103.9 387.4 734.6 128.1 208.7 139.8 263.0 636.1 275.7 269.8 1,770.1 866.3 1,922.8 1,116.4 
Percent(%) 2.3 1.2 4.3 8.1 1.4 2.3 1.5 2.9 7.0 3.1 3.0 19.6 9.6 21.3 12.4 
lm ports 
:i:.. Value ($mil!.) 178.3 234.0 424.0 589.7 217.2 297.5 400.4 455.1 325.9 685.4 171.1 1,302.0 316.8 2,178.0 1,258.0 
[ Percent(%) 2.0 2.6 4.7 6.5 2.4 3.3 4.4 5.0 3.6 7.6 1.9 14.4 3.5 24.1 13.9 
Source: Computedfrom trade data extractedfrom United Nations Series D Trade Tapes. 
::s 
~ 
Country Notes: Qatar - Regional exports as reported by Qatar for 1991 since no data are available for 1990. ... 
Bahmin - Regional exports reportedfor 1988 which is the last year available. ~ 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, UAE and Iran - Reported 1990 imports by Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, plus 1988 imports ~ 
by Bahrain and 1991 imports of Qatar. Exports ofCyprus to Turkey are based on Turkey'.î reported importsfrom Cyprus. 
t;S 
Table 11: Middle Eastern Countries Revealed Comparative Advantage lî in Broad Product Groups~ 1970, 1980, 1992 
::i 
"'O 
RCA Indices for Processd Products Clarified by Major SITC Groups ~ 
Foods Be verges Animal Manufactures Machinery 
{l 
"' & & Cru de Refined & by & Mise. <"') ~ 
Exporter Year Feeds Tobacco Materials Fuels Vegetable Oil Chemicals Material Transport Manufactures ~ 
Bahrain 1970 0.00 0.01 0.00 27.93 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.03 0.03 ~ 
1980 0.02 0.00 0.00 11.72 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.08 0.25 ~ 
1992 0.01 0.02 0.08 18.43 0.07 0.54 1.21 0.17 0.53 "' 
Cyprus 1970 6.80 18.12 0.04 0.01 2.53 0.11 1.49 0.23 0.82 
gi 
"' 1980 3.20 3.22 0.06 0.42 0.41 0.20 0.51 1.19 2.17 ~
1992 2.41 7.22 0.26 1.70 1.25 0.68 0.65 0.30 2.68 ~ 
Egypt 1970 3.23 0.38 0.21 0.13 0.55 0.72 2.22 0.13 1.07 ~ i:: 
1980 2.20 0.38 0.31 4.57 0.11 0.25 1.69 0.25 0.50 ;:: .... 
1992 1.07 0.10 0.00 9.06 0.00 0.62 1.75 0.34 0.87 :::!. "' "' Iran 1970 2.26 0.01 0.00 16.19 0.00 0.12 1.22 0.04 0.09 
1980 1.42 0.02 0.00 9.22 0.00 0.17 1.04 0.02 0.06 
1992 6.62 0.02 0.08 11.04 0.00 0.11 2.58 0.09 0.15 
Israel 1970 5.61 0.29 0.38 1.05 0.08 1.09 1.74 0.19 1.14 
1980 4.17 0.19 0.21 0.51 0.01 1.26 1.95 0.30 1.05 
1992 2.62 0.11 0.25 0.44 0.01 1.32 2.10 0.49 0.88 
Jordan 1970 1.42 5.85 0.05 19.39 0.01 0.76 0.11 0.26 0.22 
1980 2.66 2.80 0.27 0.07 0.12 1.85 1.37 0.59 l.00 
1987 0.15 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.95 0.85 0.37 0.47 
Lebanon 1970 2.99 0.04 0.15 0.76 0.29 0.08 1.13 0.35 2.96 
1 
....... 
1980 2.15 0.19 0.03 0.02 0.53 1.11 1.46 0.43 2.23 ~ 
1992 2.90 3.73 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.32 1.38 0.30 2.54 




RCA Indices for Processd Products Clarified by Major SITC Groups 
Foods Beverges Animal Manufactures Machinery 
& & Crude Refined & by & Mise. 
Exporter Year Feeds Tobacco Materials Fuels Vegetabls Oil Chemicals Mate rial Transport Manufactures 
Libya 1970 0.61 0.18 0.00 7.94 0.00 0.09 0.38 1.35 0.62 
1980 0.13 0.00 0.00 11.75 0.00 0.85 0.01 0.07 0.02 
1992 0.01 0.00 0.01 26.94 0.00 1.34 0.25 0.06 0.01 
Oman 1970 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 3.18 0.06 0.03 
1980 0.34 0.06 0.00 2.71 0.00 0.02 0.08 1.84 0.58 
1992 0.25 0.00 0.00 13.59 0.00 0.18 0.37 0.64 1.29 
Qatar 1970 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.44 4.81 0.31 0.74 0.76 
1980 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.03 0.00 2.58 2.09 0.18 0.10 
1992 0.01 0.00 0.05 15.89 0.20 3.02 0.25 0.07 0.63 
Saudi Arabia 1970 0.32 0.00 0.00 25.14 0.00 0.48 0.01 0.20 0.07 
1980 0.27 0.01 0.01 JO.li 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.51 0.14 
1992 0.15 0.00 0.16 19.59 0.01 2.26 0.23 0.23 0.17 
Syria 1970 9.81 0.02 0.06 0.64 0.01 0.18 1.41 0.11 2.71 
1980 2.01 0.00 0.10 JO.OO 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.16 0.69 
1992 2.32 0.01 0.03 22.10 0.00 0.06 0.45 0.06 1.17 
Turkey 1970 19.47 0.87 0.26 0.40 1.18 0.86 1.36 0.14 0.57 ~ 
1980 17.51 0.52 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.30 2.01 0.11 1.06 [ 
1992 5.10 0.10 0.38 0.70 0.24 0.31 1.44 0.24 2.57 ;3 
~ 
UAE 1970 0.23 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.82 0.17 2.76 0.29 0.21 ..., 
1980 0.85 0.06 0.00 2.65 0.12 0.30 2.08 0.37 0.61 ~ 
Cl 
1992 0.57 3.28 0.38 10.27 0.06 0.57 1.01 0.39 1.20 1:;" 
Source: Author's calculationsfrom United Nations Series D COMTRADE Statistics. 
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corresponding world tracte share) this implies that the country has a revealed 
comparative disadvantage in the product. Similarly, if the index exceeds unity, 
then the country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage in the item. 
Table 11 reports the RCA indices for Egypt and other regional countries of prod-
ucts classified in 9 broad product groups. In order to determine how RCA pat-
terns were changing separate indices were calculated for 1970, 1980 and 1992. 
Table 11 reveals that Egypt has a strong comparative advantage in the pro-
duction and export of refined petroleum products (RCA = 9.06 - that is, the 
share of these goods in Egypt's exports is nine times their share in world 
tracte) and in manufactured goods classified in SITC 6 ("Manufactures 
Classified by Material). The latter are generally composed of relatively labor-
intensive products that use materials like leather, fibers, wood, or paper as 
production inputs. Egypt also registers a RCA slightly above unity in 
processed foods. However, the sharp decline in the index over the period 
1970-1990 suggests that comparative advantage in this area is being lost. As 
expected, Egypt's RCA index is low for the highly capital-intensive machin-
ery and transport group (SITC 7) and is actually zero for processed crude 
materials (in SITC 2) and animal and vegetable oils (SITC 4). The latter is 
somewhat surprising since in 1992 Egypt exported some $5.4 million in raw 
flax, $2 million in oilseeds, and $600 thousand in bovine hides - ail items that 
could have been further processed. Tracte barrier escalation in OECD markets 
is often cited as an important factor constraining the domestic processing of 
these types of primary commodities in Egypt and other developing countries. 12 
Of the 14 regional countries, 10 show a strong revealed comparative 
advantage for the refined petroleum products group (those not having a com-
parative advantage in this sector are Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey). 
Severa) countries have an RCA index over 15 for energy products (Bahrain, 
Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Syria) while the index is over 9 for ail other 
countries except Cyprus. An important point to note is that most of these 
petroleum exporting countries have a very limited comparative advantage 
outside this one sector. For example, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia only have 
RCAs above unity in refined fuels and chemicals (many of the latter utilize 
crude petroleum inputs). The potential for increased intra-regional tracte 
appears to be limited by the narrow range of products these countries can pro-
duce under intemationally-competitive conditions. 
Opportunities for increased intra-regional tracte appear greatest between 
the "energy exporters" and countries like Turkey, Israel and Lebanon that 
have relatively high RCAs in various types of manufactured goods and 
processed foodstuffs (note that Syria and Iran also have strong RCAs for 
foods). 
Table 12: Average Pre-Uruguay Round Tariffs and Nontariff Measures Facing 1 
..._ 
<:::::> 
Middle East Exports to the European Union, Japan and the United States °' 
European Union Japan United States 
Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods 
1992 Value of Export~ ($million) 39,604.9 12,015.5 27,986.5 1,698.2 18,167.7 5,975.0 
Bahrain 172.9 148.1 304.1 63.2 71.2 68.9 
Cyprus 433.2 431.7 2.1 2.1 11.7 11.7 
Egypt 2,893.4 923.9 91.0 33.9 465.6 223.2 
Iran 6,649.1 537.9 2,604.5 82.6 0.8 0.8 
Israel 3,731.3 3,671.8 694.6 694.6 3,902J 3.880.6 
Jordan 88.2 88.2 24.1 24.1 18.6 18.6 
Le ban on 96.8 96.5 2.2 2.2 28.5 28.5 
Libya 7,021.0 152.2 0.7 0.7 
Oman 165.7 165.7 1,962.4 5.1 207.3 97.2 
Qatar 55.8 24.2 2,175.5 9.6 75.9 71.5 
Saudi Arabia 11,150.4 1,063.5 10,181.1 303.5 11,285.7 183.2 
Syria 1.225.1 144.8 8.5 8.5 45.8 12.4 
Turkey 4,208.4 4,018.1 202.2 202.2 1,183.4 1,155.4 
UAE 1,713.7 549 0 9,733.3 265.9 871.0 222.9 
Average Tariff ( % ) 0.4 1.2 3.0 0.5 1.1 2.7 
Bahrain 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.0 6.9 4.5 
Cyprus 3.9 4.0 9.9 9.9 7.9 7.9 
Egypt 0.6 1.3 2.0 0.7 4.6 8.9 
Iran 0.1 0.4 3.3 0.4 2.0 2.0 
Israel 2.0 2.0 OJ 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Jordan 0.2 0.2 1.1 1.1 3.7 3.7 
::i:. Lebanon 3.0 3.0 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 ~ 
Libya 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 .. .. >< 
Oman 0.9 2.4 3.6 0.6 1.5 7.5 ::::. ;:s 
Qatar 0.1 0.3 3.5 0.0 2.0 3.4 ~ 
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.2 3.1 0.0 0.6 2.8 ... 
Syria 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 4.0 ~ 
Turkey 0.5 0.4 2.5 2.6 6.3 8.3 ::::. 
UAE 0.4 2.6 3.0 0.0 2.5 9.6 
1;i 
Table 12: Continued 
European Union Japan United States 
Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods Ali Products Ali Non-Oil Goods 
NTB Coverage Ratio(%) :l.4 10.5 0.2 2.0 6.2 11.0 
Bahrain OJ 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cyprus 16.2 16.5 6.4 6.4 0.7 0.7 
Egypt 13.2 31.1 0.0 0.0 17.6 36.2 
Iran 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Israel 5.9 6.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.6 
Jordan 1.2 1.2 14.9 14.9 1.2 1.2 
Le ban on 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Libya 0.0 OO OO 0.0 
Oman 2.8 7.6 0.1 11.9 0.0 0.0 
Qatar 0.2 1.0 1.4 76.5 0.0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 0.9 7.2 0.0 0.0 5.8 39.0 
Syria 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Turkey 13.5 14.2 6.7 7.3 24.4 32.4 
UAE 0.1 0.6 0.0 OO I0.4 47.2 
Note: For the EU, Japan and the United States combined the avemKe tmde weiKhted tan[{ 011 ail o.ports is 1.4 percent, white the tarrif 011 ail non-oil wwds is Iwo 
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OECD Trade Barriers: Effects of the Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round (UR) marks the eighth lime since 1947 that General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) members negotiated a reduction of 
trade barriers in a multilateral framework and, potentialty, it could have 
important implications for ME exports. 13 Unlike previous negotiations, the 
Uruguay Round (UR) focused on a far broader range of trade-related issues 
(see Finger and Olechowski, 1987). Its accomplishments included: (i) reduc-
tions in tariffs and nontariff measures (NTMs), including in the previously 
excludt:d agricultural sectors and (largely excluded) textiles and clothing; (ii) 
extension of multilateral rules to trade in services, trade-related inteltectual 
property rights, and trade-related investment measures; (iii) refonn of some 
GATT rules such as those on subsidies, countervailing dulies, antidumping 
actions, and safeguards; and (iv) institutional refonns relating to dispute set-
tlement and the functioning of the GATT system. 
Middle Eastern countries have tended to view the UR negotiations on tar-
iffs and NTMs with a certain degree of apprehension. Israel, for example, has 
duty free access to the US, EU and EFTA markets as a result of previously 
negotiated FTAs. Similarly, Turkey and Lebanon have established FTAs that 
provide for duty free access for most goods exported to Europe. Countries like 
Egypt, Cyprus, Iran and Jordan receive important OECD trade preferences on 
some products under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that altow 
them to be imported under zero dulies or at tariffs below MFN rates. The 
reduction in MFN tariffs wilt reduce regional countries' preference margins 
and may cause some of their exports to be displaced. A key question is whether 
the overalt ME gains from the Round wilt exceed, or fait short of, expected 
tosses. 
The Round's Impact on Tariffs 
Table 12 shows the 1992 value of exports and average pre-UR tariff rates fac-
ing regional exporters in the EU, Japan and United States both in total and for 
ait non-oil exports. The tariffs shown in the table are "applied" dulies in that 
they reflect the average of the MFN, GSP or FTA tariff actualty paid by the 
exporter. Finalty, the lower third of the table shows the share ( that is, coverage 
ratio) of each regional country's exports that encounter nontariff measures. 14 
The general impression one gets from Table 12 is that average pre-Uruguay 
tariffs facing middle-Eastern countries were generalty iow in Europe and 
Japan (with one or two exceptions) and higher in the United States. In the EU, 
duties on ait non-oil goods average about 1.2 percent although they reach 4 
percent for non-oil e~ports from Cyprus. Factors accounting for the relatively 
Export Prospects of Middle Eastern Countries 109 
Table 13: The Estimated Effects of the 
Uruguay Round on MFN Tariff Barriers 
Tariff Rate Tariff Change 
Pre- Post- Absolute Percentage 
Product Group Uruguay Uruguay Reduction Redue lion 
ALL INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS' 6.4 4.0 -2.4 38 
Industrial Tropical Products 4.2 1.9 -2.3 55 
Natural Resource Products 53.2 2.0 -1.2 38 
Manufactures of:' 
Leather 6.7 5.4 -1.3 19 
Rubber 5.3 3.4 -1.9 36 
Wood 5.0 2.1 -2.9 58 
Paper 4.8 1.6 -3.2 67 
Textiles & Clothing 15.2 11.4 -3.8 25 
Metals 5.4 2.6 -2.8 52 
Chemicals 6.7 3.0 -3.7 55 
Minerais 4.7 2.9 -1.8 38 
Food & Agricultural Products' 
Cocoa Products 4.5 2.5 -2.0 44 
Tobacco 17.3 11.2 -6.1 35 
Coffee, Tea and Sugar 9.4 6.4 -3.0 32 
Fruits and Vegetables 8.6 5.6 -3.0 35 
Oilseeds, Fats and Oils 1.7 1.1 -0.6 35 
Grains 6.6 4.5 -2.1 32 
Dairy Products 15.8 11.9 -3.9 25 
Spices. Flowers and Plants 2.2 1.1 -1.l 50 
ALL NON- ENERGY ITEMS' 6.5 3.9 -2.6 40 
1 Defined by GAIT to include eleven i11dustriul categories !fish und products: v.<111d. pu/p, puper 
und fumiture; textiles und clothing; leather. rubber, footweur, travel goods; metals; chemicals 
und photographie supplies; transport equipment; non-electric muchinery; electric muchinery; 
minerai products und precious meta/s; munufuctured article n.e.s. ), nonugricultural tropical 
products (pluiting products. rubber und tropical wood, jute und hurd fibers), und natural 
resource based products. The lutter include: fish und fish products; fore.Hl)' und forestl)' prod-
ucts; und non-ferrous metals und minerais. Tarif! information/rom GAIT( 1993) Table 14. 
2 Bused on GAIT ( 1993) Table 15 und Appendix Table 5. The tariffs shown ubove ure uverages 
for the semi-manufactures und manufactures components of the GAIT processing chuins. 
Agricultural products ure defined by GAIT to include tell ugricultural cutegories lfruit und veg-
etables; coffee. teu. cocou. sugur. und so fort/1: grains; animais und products; oilseeds, futs und 
oils; eut flowers, plants. vegetable materiu/s; beverages und spirits; dail)' products; tobucco; 
other ugricultural products) plus ugricultural tropical products (tropical beverages; spices und 
plu/lis; certain oilseeds und oils; tropical mots. rice und tobucco; tropical fruits und nuts). 
'The reported perce11tage tar(ff reducti1111 for these products is given in GAIT ( 1993) Table 20. 
Pre-Uruguay Round tariffs were estimuted usi11g the World Bank - UNCTAD SMART Dutubuse. 
These statistics. plus the percentuge reductions reported by GAIT were used to derive the post -
Uruguay Round rate. 
'Computed using 1992 OECD coulllr\' trade weights. 
110 Alexander Yeats 
low overall rates facing the middle-East include the extension of GSP treat-
ment for many ME products and the EU-Israel and EU-Turkey Free Trade 
Agreement. 15 
Conversely, the relatively high tariffs that are found in the United States are 
the result of two factors: the exclusion of OPEC members from the US GSP 
scheme, and the fact that GSP preferences are not extended to textiles, cloth-
ing and footwear. Box 5 gives more detailed information on the tariffs facing 
Egypt's exports. 
For the most part, the regional NTM trade coverage ratios that are shown 
in Table 12 are also low with one or two exceptions. More than 30 percent of 
Egypt's non-oil exports to the European Community (EC) and US encounter 
NTMs, but the product sectors affected differ in the two markets. In the EU, 
Egypt faces major import restrictions on foodstuffs while most of the US bar-
riers are in the textile and clothing sector. 
How did the Uruguay affect tariff barriers facing ME ex ports? The Round's 
accomplishments can be summarized as follows; 
i) Manufactured goods: A 40 percent eut in industrial countries' tariffs on 
manufactures with an increase in bindings (legal maximum rates) from 94 to 98 
percent of ail imports. GATT data indicate tariffs will be lowered by approxi-
mately 2.4 percentage points to 4.0 percent. Lower than average cuts occur in 
sectors of major importance to developing countries such as textiles, clothing, 
footwear and transport equipment. Reductions will take place in five equal 
annual stages beginning with the entry into force of the World Trade 
Organization (January 1, 1995). 
ii) Industrial tropical products: These are goods like jute, hemp, sisal, trop-
ical wood and rubber. A 57 percent reduction in tariffs will result. Tariffs should 
decline from 4.2 to 1.9 percent. 
iii) Natural Resource Based Products: Preliminary information suggests a 
38 percent eut for these products. Larger than average reductions will occur for 
some minerai and metal products with lower than average reductions for fish. 
Tariffs on natural resource based manufactures should decline from 3.2 to 2.0 
percent - a 40 percent reduction. 
Table 13 provides more detailed estimates of the impact of the Uruguay 
Round on average OECD tariffs. One of the most disappointing results of the 
UR, in as far as most developing countries are concerned, were the far small-
er than average reductions on leather manufactures, textiles and clothing ( 19 
and 25 percent, respectively). In addition, while the Round did make some 
progress in reducing the extent of tariff escalation, this issue will likely 
remain a (post-Uruguay) point of contention between developing and devel-
oped countries. 
Table 14: Estimated Effects of the Uruguay Round Tariff Cuts on Middle Eastern Countries' Exports 
1992 Exports to ($ million) Projected UR Trade Effects (%) 
Overall Export 
Change ($ million) 
Exporting Country EU Japan USA EU Japan USA 
Bahrain 172.9 304.1 71.2 1.12 0.42 7.42 8.5 
Cyprus 422.2 2.1 11.7 0.21 -1.74 4.54 1.4 
Egypt 2,893.4 91.0 465.6 0.30 1.42 2.41 21.2 
Iran 6,649.1 2,604.5 0.8 0.02 2.73 0.49 72.4 
Israel 3,731.3 694.6 3,903.3 -0.14 -0.81 -0.16 -17.1 
Jordan 88.2 24.1 18.6 -0.55 0.76 2.30 0.1 
Le ban on 96.8 2.2 28.5 7.92 -0.11 -0.16 7.6 
Libya 7,021.0 0.7 0.0 -0.13 -1.14 0.00 -9.1 
Oman 165.7 1,962.4 207.3 0.88 3.04 0.93 63.0 
Qatar 55.8 2,175.5 75.9 -- 2.94 1.30 64.9 
Saudi Arabia 11,150.4 10,181.1 11,285.7 -0.08 2.40 0.46 287.3 
Syria 1,225.1 8.5 45.8 -0.20 0.12 0.33 -2.3 
Turkey 4,208.4 202.2 1,183.4 -0.08 0.98 3.06 34.8 
UAE 1,713.7 9,733.3 871.0 0.95 2.46 1.56 269.3 
ALL MIDDLE EAST 39,594.0 27,986.3 18,168.8· 0.02 2.42 0.64 802.2 
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Empirical Evidence on the Round's Effects 
In recognition of developing countries' need for technical assistance in the UR 
negotiations, UNCTAD and the World Bank initiated a joint project to help 
them evaluate various trade liberalization proposais. This project (named 
SMART- Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade) developed 
a desk-top system that allows a country to analyze the level, structure and 
restrictive effects of trade barriers on its exports. 16 SMART includes, with its 
other elements, a simulation mode! that projects the change in a country's 
exports following a change in foreign trade barriers (see Laird and Yeats, 1990). 
SMART projections are made at the tariff line level (US and EC tariff sched-
ules identify over 8,000 tariff line products) and these estimates can be summed 
up to more aggregate groups. SMART accounts for trade creation (the substi-
tution of foreign goods for domestic production) and trade diversion (the sub-
stitution of one foreign supplier for another) as a result of preference erosion 
(see Box 6 for information on how Egypt's preferences will be affected). 
Before proceeding, it should be noted that there are UR effects that SMART 
does not account for. These include a (potentially important) stimulus to mer-
chandise trade from the UR liberalization in services trade, and the stimulus 
resulting from strengthened rules on how trade is conducted. There is also ample 
evidence that a lowering of trade barriers in developing countries will increase 
their ability to compete in foreign export markets (see Nash and Thomas, 1990). 
Such factors are omitted because of problems in their quantification and not 
because of the assumption that they are unimportant. In addition, there are major 
problems in projecting the impact of the Round's elimination of NTMs - par-
ticularly in the agricultural, textile and clothing sectors where information on 
relative production costs in individual developing countries are required. 
Finally, it should be noted that the SMART projections are "short-term" esti-
mates of trade changes and do not allow for efficiency gains associated with 
larger export volumes or the addition of new production capacity. 
With the above qualifications, Table 14 summarizes SMART projections of 
the UR effects on regional country exports to the EC, Japan and the US mar-
kets." These estimates are expressed as percentage changes from a 1992 trade 
base and in overall dollar terms (see the right-most column of the table). These 
data suggest the UR liberalization of these major OECD markets' trade barriers 
cou Id increase ail regional countries' ex ports by $800 million - an annual 
change of Jess than one percent. This is the estimated net effect of: (i) trade lass-
es on products receiving preferences, and (ii) gains of products facing MFN 
duties that were lowered. However, Israel, Syria and Libya are projected to 
experience overall lasses from the Round due to the erosion of their prefer-
ences. 
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Severa) specific points should be noted regarding these projections. First, 
they admittedly understate regional countries' tracte gains since they do not 
account for the UR liberalization of barriers in countries like Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and EFfA members. If the same import response occurs 
in these markets as that projected for the EC, Japan and United States, region-
al country gains could be approximately $1 OO million higher. Second, the pro-
jections do not full y incorporate the effects of the erosion of intra-OECD pref-
erences (they do, however, account for reductions in EFfA's preferences in the 
EC). Sorne regional countries may achieve tracte gains by displacing this 
exchange. Finally, the projections do not incorporate any estimates of the tracte 
effects of the removal of MFA and other nontariff measures. For some region-
al countries, the impact of the NTM removal may be negative. 
Elements of the Negotiations on Nontariff Barriers 
The UR made important progress in liberalizing nonnative measures - espe-
cially in agriculture, textiles and clothing. Basically, what was achieved can 
be summarized as follows, 
Agriculture. NTM restrictions are subject to "tariffication" with subse-
quent cuts by industrial countries of 36 percent ovcr 6 years with a minimum 
reductions of 15 percent on ail tariff lines. There are a few exceptions and, in 
these cases, 4 percent of domestic consumption in the 1986-88 period is a 
minimum access guarantee that must increase by 0.8 percent annually to 8 
percent over the implementation period. Market access for agricultural prod-
ucts will involve the elimination of quantitative restrictions and other govern-
ment interventions. Reductions of 36 percent were also negotiated in bud-
getary outlays on export subsidies and in quantities of subsidized exports. 
Textiles and Clothing. The MFA will be phased out. Products accounting 
for not Jess than 16 percent of the total 1990 vol urne of imports covered by 
the MFA are to be integrated into GATI in 1994 upon entry into force of the 
World Tracte Organization. After the third year of the phase-out period, at least 
an additional 17 percent of the total 1990 import volumes are to be integrat-
ed, followed by at least an additional 18 percent after the seventh year, ahd the 
remainder ( 49 percent) at the end of the ten-year period. Each phase-out must 
encompass products (chosen by the restricting country) from four groups -
tops and yams, fabrics, made-up textiles, and clothing. 
Other Sectors. Elimination of "voluntary" export restraints (VERs). 
According to the World Bank-SMART Database, the US and EC each have 
VERs on over 400 tariff Iine products which cover such major sectors as met-
als, transport equipment, footwear and domestic utensils. 
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Table 12 documents the importance of industrial countries pre-Uruguay 
NTMs by showing the share of regional countries' exports that encounter 
these measures - both in total and for ail non-oil products. 18 Overall, about 10 
percent of ail regional countries' non fuel exports encountered NTMs with 
Egypt and Cyprus' coverage ratios the highest (32 and 16 percent, respective-
ly) due to the relatively large share of temperate zone agricultural products, 
textiles and clothing in their exports. 19 (Box 8 provides more detailed infor-
mation on specific Egyptian èxports that encounter NTBs). Within manufac-
tures, the coverage of textiles and clothing is particularly high - over 40 per-
cent of ME clothing (SITC 84) exports face these measures, as do 38 percent 
of textile (SITC 65) products. 
As a result of the UR NTM concessions, the profile of protection facing 
regional countries' exports has been altered substantially. Post-Uruguay 
Round NTM coverage ratios should fall from their current 10 percent level to 
between 1 to 2 percent. 20 The average'decline for Egypt will be dramatic - the 
ratio will fall from 32 to approximately 2 percent. Essentially, this is due to 
the fact that ail NTBs formerly applied to Egyptian and other regional coun-
tries' agricultural products, textiles, clothing and ferrous metals have been 
removed. As a result, Low and Yeats (1994) estimate the share of ail devel-
oping countries ex ports facing NTMs fell from 18 percent be fore the Uruguay 
Round to about 3 percent after. 21 
Possible Effects of the Round's NTB Liberalization 
The Uruguay Round's elimination of NTMs applied under the Multifiber 
Arrangement is clearly a positive development for developing countries as a 
whole, yet there may be negative implications for individual exporters. Under 
the MFA, and its predecessor the Short-Term-Textile Arrangement (STA), 
developing countries were allocated quotas for their textile and clothing 
exports to industrial countries. When the MFA quotas are phased out, textile 
and clothing trade will be subject to intense international competition and the 
displacement of many established suppliers could occur. Stated differently, 
some regional countries may be uncompetitive in this new international envi-
ronment and could find their exports displaced by more efficient producers 
whose trade is now restrained by the MFA. As such, some ME countries may 
have to give a high priority to restructuring their industries, reducing costs, 
and improving quality to compete in a post-Uruguay Round world. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Overall, the exports of ME countries are anticipated to increase by approxi-
mately $800 to $900 million as a result of the Uruguay Round tariffs cuts. 
Export Prospects of Middle Eastern Countries 115 
This represents an annual expansion of Jess than one percent of regional 
exports. The projected overall gains are small due to the erosion of tariff pref-
erences ME countries receive in OECD markets which offset the positive 
effects of reduced MFN tariffs on non-preference receiving products. Also, 
the major ME export product (petroleum) generally faces zero or very low tar-
iffs so this item's tracte could not be affected by the Uruguay Round reduc-
tions. Egypt's projected gains (about $20 million - which is Jess than one half 
of a percent of total exports) are largely concentrated in agricultural exports 
to the EU and manufactures exports to the US. Israel is projected to experi-
ence net tracte losses from the Round due to the erosion of its FfA preferences 
in the EU and US. 
The Uruguay Round made major progress in removing nontariff measures 
facing ME exporters - especially in agriculture, textiles and clothing. As a 
result, the average OECD NTM coverage ratio for ME exports will fall from 
its current 10 percent level to between l to 2 percent. The decline in the cov-
erage ratio for Egypt is dramatic. Prior to the Round, 32 percent of Egypt'.s 
exports to the OECD faced NTMs - this share will go down to about 2 per-
cent following the removal of the MFA and agricultural restrictions. 
Although the liberalization of NTMs is clearly a positive development 
from the viewpoint of ail developing countries, some may experience nega-
tive effects. With the removal of the MFA, international tracte in textiles and 
clothing will be subject to increasing international competition. ME countries 
will need to adopt major cost cutting and efficiency increasing measures to 
remain viable exporters. Similarly, net food importing countries could be 
adversely affected by higher international food prices which are expected to 
result from the Uruguay Round Agreements. While there is a considerable 
uncertainty about the extent of price increases, there is a clear priority for net 
food importing countries to adopt reform measures aimed at stimulating 
domestic production. A key element in these reforms is the adoption of incen-
tives to increase domestic food production. 
This chapter also examined the prospects for increased intra-regional 
tracte. The most important constraints to this exchange are the similarities in 
revealed comparative advantage and export profiles of many ME countries, 
as well as the high levels of tariff and nontariff measure protection that exist 
in some markets. The most favorable prospects for increased intra-regional 
tracte appear to be between countries like Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, 
which are net energy importers, and the rest of the region. 
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Notes 
In this study countries included in the definition of the Middle-East region include: 
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq is, however, 
excluded from much of the current analysis due to the United Nations embargo 
and its effects on this country's trade. There is, however, no general agreement as 
to which countries should be included or excluded in the region. See Fisher 1993 
for a review and analysis of some of the alternative country definitions that have 
been employed. 
2 Under its free trade area arrangements with the United States, the European Union, 
and European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Israel had virtually duty free access 
to these markets. The Uruguay Round's average 40 percent reduction in MFN tar-
iffs will erode lsrael's FTA preferences and may result in significant trade diver-
sion. Yeats 1994 estimates that between 5 to 8 percent of lsrael's textile and cloth-
ing exports to the United States may be displaced due to preference erosion. 
3 About 60 percent of Oman's 1991 exports went to three regional markets, name-
ly, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. One-fifth of Jordan's exports went to India, 
while China accounted for an additional 5 percent. Bahrain's official trade statis-
tics did not specify the destination of roughly 40 percent of its total exports, but 
these shipments do not appear to have gone to OECD countries. Official trade data 
for Lebanon are not available and UNCTAD estimates (upon which Table 1 is 
based) do not specify individual markets for Lebanon's exports. 
4 Based on 1990 trade flow information Cyprus, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel and Turkey 
were ail net importers of petroleum products in SITC 3. Of these countries net 
imports of $1.2 billion Israel accounted for 28 percent of the total and Turkey for 
21 percent. 
5 In 1992, OECD countries imported $1.2 billion of fresh fruit and nuts from the 
region and close to $400 million of fresh vegetables. There may be additional 
opportunities for further processing of these goods (freezing, canning, drying, and 
so forth) that could increase their value added content and also have important job 
creating effects. Since food processing normally increases the usable life of a prod-
uct further processing could also be an important factor reducing food spoilage. 
Other major crude material exports that may be suitable for further regional pro-
cessing include unmanufactured tobacco ($432 million, undressed hides and skins 
($112 million), raw cotton ($200 million), oilseeds ($60 million) and crude min-
erais such as natural asphalt, clays, borates and mica ($241 million). 
6 These agricultural product exports have varied destinations. Turkey receives ail of 
the region's barley exports and over half the shipments of unmilled wheat. Over 
40 percent of the region's rice exports go to Switzerland while more than two-
thirds of the wheat meal exports go to the European Union. 
7 For example, Beissner and Hemmer 1981 note that "As clearly shown by many 
empirical studies the problem of absolute poverty in the developing countries is 
primarily a rural problem. Selective measures against absolute poverty must there-
fore focus on agricultural production. Not only must the production of food for 
domestic consumption be increased, but it should be examined how far an expan-
sion of export-oriented agricultural production could contribute to improved living 
conditions in rural areas. There would, however, be no point in this if large eco-
nomic regions like the European Community apply protectionist measures against 
the outside world." 
8 For example, Lebanon did not report its exports to the region in 1990. This 
Export Prospects of Middle Eastern Countries 117 
exchange was estimated using reported imports from Lebanon by partners such as 
Egypt, Turkey, Cyprus, and so forth. Two problems should be noted with n:gard to 
this approach. First, imports are normally valued on a c.i.f. basis while exports are 
reported f.o.b.As such, the partner country data will overstate true exports by the 
margin of transport and insurance costs. Second, if some partner countries did not 
report data (like Lebanon-Iran in 1990) these bilateral flows would have to be 
excluded from these estimates of intra-regional tracte. See the notes to Table 7 for 
details on how the regional tracte data were estimated. These procedures did pro-
duce several interesting anomalies. For example, in 1990 Saudi Arabia reported no 
exports to the region yet regional countries reported about $1.4 billion in imports 
from Saudi Arabia. 
9 The "tracte intensity" index is defined as the share of one country's exports doing 
to a partner divided by the share of world exports going to the partner. That is, 
( 1) Tlij=[xij/Xith·[xwjXwtl 
where xij and xwt are tl'ie value orits exports and world exports to j, Xit is i's 
total exports and Xwt are total world exports. An index of more (Jess) than unity 
indicates a bilateral tracte flow that is larger (smaller) than would be expected 
given the partner country's importance in world tracte. 
IO Import statistics are normally reported on a cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.) basis 
while exports are typically reported in terms of free-on-board (f.o.b.) values. As 
such, partner country import statistics would tend to overestimate the value of 
(rnissing) export statistics. The IMF often employs an adjustment factor of IO per-
cent to express import data to the same basis as export statistics. 
11 That is, if xij is the value of country i's exports of j, and Xtj is the country's total 
exports i's revealed comparative advantage index is: 
RCAij = (xij/Xtj) ~ (Xiw/Xtw) where the w subscripts refer to world totals. 
12 Numerous stud1es show that OECD countries tariffs typically have a common 
structure Balassa 1968, Helleiner and Welwood 1978, Yeats 1987. Zero, or very 
low tariffs, are normally applied to raw material imports and these dulies increase 
or "escalate" as the commodity experiences further processing. 
13 The previous negotiations and their completion dates were: Geneva ( 1947), 
Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), Geneva (1961), Kennedy (1967) 
and Tokyo Round ( 1979). Subject to confirmation by govemments, the Uruguay 
Round Agreement will enter into force on July 1, 1995. Its market access offers 
will be phased in over periods as long as ten years. Certain additional issues, 
including the relationship between tracte and the environment, labor standards, and 
competition policy, are under discussion and may be incorporated in a future work 
program for the World Tracte Organization. 
14 The following types of nontariff measures are included in the NTM tracte cover-
age ratio: variable import levies and other special charges, ail quotas and quanti-
tative restrictions on imports, anti-dumping and countervailing dulies, "voluntary" 
export restraints, minimum import price regulations, prohibitions, surcharges, tar-
iff quotas, and ail MFA restrictions. 
15 One potential problem relating to the statistics in Table 12 is that ceilings are 
applied to some products receiving GSP treatment. Once these ceilings are exceed-
ed additional imports are taxed at the MFN rate. Due to the Jack of required infor-
mation Table 12 assumes that ail tracte occurred within the pre-established GSP 
limits. If this is not the case Table 12 could understate the importance of applied 
tariffs. 
16 SMART shows tariff line level information on tracte barriers a country faces in 
about 40 major markets. The system also indicates: (i) unit values of competing 
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exports, (ii) the level and type of tariffs (MFN, GSP, Lome Convention, CBI, EC 
Regional Preferences) that are applied, and (iii) information on nontariff measures 
facing the product. SMART provides procedures for aggregating tariff line statis-
tics to broad aggregates like; foodstuffs, agricultural raw materials, or manufac-
tures. See Laird and Yeats 1991, Erzan and Yeats 1992, Safadi and Yeats 1993, or 
World Bank 1992 for illustrative applications. 
17 These projections are based on an across-the-board reduction of MFN tariffs of 
approximately 40 percent except in the case of agriculture, textiles and clothing. 
In agriculture, estimates of NTMs nominal equivalents were drawn from Laird and 
Yeats 1991 and these measures were reduced by 36 percent. The simulations for 
textiles and clothing are based on a 20 percent reduction of nominal equivalents 
published in World Bank 1992 and Laird and Yeats 1991 over the 10 year phase 
out period specified in the draft agreement. 
18 Coverage ratios show the percentage of tracte in a product group that encounter 
NTMs. The measure has shortcomings (see Laird and Yeats, 1991 ). No tracte, for 
example, may occur under restrictive NTMs - this would cause the index to take 
zero or low values. The index issensitive to the types of NTMs included in its com-
putation. The coverage ratios in Table 6 were computed for the following mea-
sures: surcharges, variable levies, quantitative restrictions (including prohibitions, 
quotas, non-automatic licensing, "voluntary" export restrictions, and restraints 
under the MFA and similar textile arrangements and state monopolies), price con-
trol measures (including minimum, reference or basic import price systems, price 
surveillance and voluntary export price restraints, additional customs formalities 
and other entry control measures, and local content regulations. 
19 Laird and Yeats 1991 surveyed published estimates of ad valorem equivalents of 
OECD countries' nontariff measures. Their findings indicate EC protection for 
grains is between 1 OO to 150 percent depending on the level of world prices while 
nominal rates of 200 to 350 percent occur for dairy products. Even higher ad val-
orem equivalents occur in Japan - between 200 to 350 percent for rice, beef and 
sugar. Japanese NTM protection for wheat and barley exceeds 400 percent. 
20 These estimates hold regional countries' exports constant. The value of pre-UR 
NTM covered tracte in the textile, clothing and agricultural sectors is determined 
by multiplying the coverage ratio times total tracte in the group, and then subtract-
ing the result from total NTM covered tracte. These new NTM covered tracte val-
ues are divided by actual total pre-UR tracte values to estimate the post-UR ratios. 
The resulting coverage ratios are upward biased since they do not account for the 
lncrease in ME countries' exports that will result from the liberalization. 
21 Given the Round's accomplishments regarding NTMs, what remains to be done if 
a further post-UR liberalization is attempted? Analysis of the Bank's NTM data 
shows that antidumping and countervailing duties (which may be far more widely 
used in a post-UR world), followed by QRs should be the most important remain-
ing restrictions. These are mostly concentrated in chemicals (SITC 5) and miscel-
laneous manufactures (SITC 8). In short, the focus of post-Uruguay initiatives on 
NTMs would shift markedly in terms of the types of measures applied, the sectors 
affected, and the overall importance of these restrictions. 
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Appendix 
BoxA.1 
The Geographic Destination of Egyptian Exports: 
1965to1992 
While Table l provides information on the current destination of Egypt's exports one 
would also want to know how the relative importance of different markets has changed. If an 
important shift occurred more attention should be given to changes in access conditions for mar-
kets that were gaining in relative importance and less to those which were declining. 
Destination of Egyptian Exports 
Ali OECD OECD North Ali Non- Eastern Middle 
Year World Europe America Japan OECD Europe East 
Value of exports in terms of US $ millions 
1965-67 591,695 160,360 125,896 16,106 17,904 431,335 267,758 17,834 
1970-72 792,066 162,302 123,127,4 9,062 29,990 629,793 448,612 36,713 
1975-77 1,543,977 485,549 12,171 31,958 41,336 1,058,970 760,255 102,368 
1980-82 3, 132,778 1,821,143 1,538,343 180,159 102,559 1,311,634 343, 701 502,836 
1985-87 2,029,883 970,913 830,608 86,116 53,570 1,058,428 447,741 293,746 
1990-92 3,108,179 1,634,028 1,297,845 269,469 65,399 1,474,150 340,888 611,774 
Share of Total Egyptian Exports 
1965-67 100.0 27.1 21.2 2.7 3.0 72.9 45.2 3.0 
1970-72 100.0 20.5 15.5 1.1 3.8 79.5 56.6 4.6 
1975-77 100.0 31.4 26.7 2.1 2.7 68.5 49.2 6.6 
1980-82 100.0 58.1 49.1 5.8 3.3 41.9 10.9 16.1 
1985-87 100.0 47.8 40.9 4.2 2.7 52.2 22.1 14.5 
1990-92 100.0 52.6 41.8 8.7 2.1 47.4 11.0 19.7 
The above statistics show the share of Egypt's exports destined for OECD and other mar-
kets for select intervals over the periods 1965-67 to 1990-92. Two key trends are apparent. 
First, the growing relative importance of OECD markets is clear as the share of exports going 
to these destinations roughly doubled. Within the OECD, Europe was the dominant market, 
absorbing 42 percent of Egypt's exports. Second, the above statistics show a major decline in 
exports destined for Eastern Europe - a development that was accelerated by the-break up of 
the former Soviet Union (in 1970-72 the FSU received 37 percent of Egypt's exports). Another 
noteworthy point concems the rapid increase in Egypt's exports to other ME countries as this 
share increased more than six-fold between the periods 1965-67 and 1990-92.* 
The importance of European markets for Egyptian trade prospects is clear. Thus, develop-
ments relating to the formation of the EU, further regional integration arrangements (particu-
larly with Eastern Europe), or the impact of the Uruguay Round on European trade barriers 
should receive priority attention. Since North America receives less than 10 percent ofEgypt's 
total exports, it is unlikely that NAFTA will have important direct implications for Egypt. 
However, the indirect effects could be important if countries which are displaced in North 
America attempt to shift these exports to Europe thereby increasing competitive pressures on 
Egypt. 
*ln 1992, 40 perce/If of Egypt's expons to the regio11 wellt to Israel and 30 perce/If wellt to 
Saudi Arabia. Crude petroleum accou11tedfor about 95 perce/If of the shipme/lts to Israel. About 
40 percent of Egypt's expons to Saudi Arabia were live animais, freshfruit, a11dfresh vegeta-
bles. 
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BoxA.2 
Secular Changes in the Composition of 
Egyptian Exports: 1965 to 1992 
Historically, major changes have occurred in the commodity structure of Egypt's exports 
with a key factor being the increase in the importance of petroleum and petroleum-based prod-
ucts. * In addition, the volatility in international prices of energy goods has been a major fac-
tor causing the sizable year-to-year changes of petroleum and other groups' shares in total 
exports. For example, in 1980-82 minerai fuels accounted for about 65 percent of total exports, 
but by the early l 990s the share had fallen to about 44 percent. According to UNCTAD ( 1992, 
Table 2.7) crude petroleum prices fell by approximately 40 percent over the decade. 
Product Group as a Percentage of Total Egyptian Exports 
ofwhich: 
Total Agricul- Ores & Non-
Ex ports Ali tu rai Ferrous Ali 
Year ($million) Foods Material Fuels Metals Mfgs. Textiles Clothing 
1965-67 591,695 16.7 54.5 5.4 1.6 21.6 16.1 0.4 
1970-72 792,066 18.2 48.5 4.1 0.4 28.7 17.9 1.8 
1975-77 1,543,977 18.6 32.1 20.0 1.5 27.7 15.3 3.4 
1980-82 3,132,778 7.1 15.1 65.0 3.5 9.2 6.7 0.6 
1985-87 2,029,883 8.0 13.0 51.2 6.0 21.8 16.7 1.3 
1990-92 3,108,179 9.5 4.7 43.8 6.4 35.5 15.6 5.2 
Note: 1992 Major Export Items in Each Group and Share ofGroup Total 
(i) Foods - Fresh Vegetables (SITC 054) - 28%; Rice (SITC 042) - 17%; 
(ii) Agricultural Materials - Cotton (SITC 263) - 56%; Crude Vegetable Material 
(SITC 292) - 30% 
(iii)Fuels - Crude Petroleum (SITC 331) - 87% 
(iv) Ores and Nonferrous Metals -Aluminum (SITC 684) - 90% 
(v) Manufactures - Textile Yarn (SITC 651) - 23%; Clothing (SITC 841) - 15% 
The relative importance of agricultural raw materials in Egypt's expons has also 
changed - the share of these goods fell from about 55 percent in the mid- l 960s to under 5 
percent today. Cotton was the major product accounting for this decline as the value of cot-
ton exports in 1992 ($53 million) was about six times lower than in 1965 ($337 million). 
Part of the decline is accounted for by further local processing of domestically produced cot-
ton into yams, textiles and clothing, although the international price competitiveness of 
Egyptian cotton has also declined. 
Increased aluminum exports account for almost ail of the change in the ores, minerais 
and nonferrous metals group. The share of manufactures in Egypt's exports increased by 
approximately 14 percentage points over the period with textile yam, clothing, iron and steel 
pi'bducts, and manufactured fertilizers accounting for much of the increase. 
Although 'the share of food products in Egypt's total exports declined by about 7 per-
centage points (to 9.5 percent), several items within this sector (cereal preparations, fresh 
meat, fresh fish) recorded growth rates that were among the highest for any three-digit SITC 
protluct group (see Table 6). Since increased agricultural production and exports could help 
alleviate rural poverty, special attention should focus on the removal of foreign trade barri-
erS facing these goods. 
* Egypt has departed from established UN practices and does not inc/ude petroleum pro-
duced and exported by foreign firms in its official trade statistics. Exclusion of these ship-
ments causes Egypt's annual exports to be under-reported by some $1 to $1.5 billion. 
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Egypt's Largest Three-Digit Global Exports: 1970-72, 
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As was the case with ail regional countries as a group, major changes have occurred in 
the structure of Egyptian exports over the last two decades. The following statistics based 
on 1970-72, 1980- 82 and 1990-92 ex ports (three year averages were used to reduce the 
importance of any irregularities that might occur in a single year), show how the shares of 
major three-digit SITC export products have changed. Altogether, the 20 items listed below 
currently account for approximately 85 percent ofEgypt's total exports and have made upas 
much as 95 percent in 1980-82. An important point to note is that these data understate the 
true importance ofpetroleum (by about $1 to $1.5 billion) due to EgypCs unusual practice of 
not reporting oil produced and exported by foreign firms in its official export statistics. 
Value of Exports ($000) Percent of Total Exports ( % ) 
Description (SITC) 1970-72 1980-82 1990-92 1970-72 1980-82 1990-92 
Crude Petroleum (331) 29,267 1,750,025 1,111,555 3.7 55.9 35.8 
Textile Yam and Thread ( 651) 88,106 159,023 317,069 11.1 5.1 10.2 
Petroleum Products (332) 2,527 284,602 190,409 0.3 9.1 6.1 
Aluminum (684) 227 90,397 185,127 2.9 6.0 
Nonfur Clothing (841) 14,094 19,415 160.855 1.8 0.6 5.2 
Cotton (263) 376,354 446,766 107,443 47.5 14.3 3.5 
Cotton Fabrics (652) 40,881 36,334 88,505 5.2 1.2 2.8 
Fresh Vegetables (054) 25,605 57,158 80,340 3.2 1.8 2.6 
Fresh Fruit and Nuts Dry (051) 16,715 52,179 56,163 2.1 1.7 1.8 
Natural Gas (341) 4 0 45,764 0.0 1.5 
Fumiture (821) 6,296 2,669 41,035 0.8 0.1 1.3 
Rice (042) 61,887 29,811 38,806 78 1.0 1.2 
Textile Products, nes (656) 6,208 7,658 36,682 0.8 0.2 1.2 
Perfumes and Cosmetics (553) 4,247 4,591 28,414 0.5 0.1 0.9 
Crude Vegetable Materials (292) 2,438 11,140 27,730 0.3 0.4 0.9 
Floor Coverings (657) 5,044 6,192 27,647 0.6 0.2 0.9 
Iron and Steel Shapes ( 67 3) 225 121 25,219 0.8 
Chemicals, nes (599) 182 266 22,535 0.7 
Manufactured Fertilizers (561) 1,786 838 21,546 0.2 0.7 
Medicinal Products (541) 2,051 6,298 20,519 0.3 0.2 0.7 
TOTAL OF ALL ABOVE ITEMS 684,144 2,%5,483 2,633,263 86.2 94.8 84.8 
Perhaps the two most striking statistics relate to crude petroleum (irrespective of the 
under-reporting problem) and cotton. Petroleum's share in total exports rose almost ten-fold 
between 1970-72 and 1990-92 and now accounts for almost 36 percent of ail ex ports ( 41. 9 
percent if refined petroleum products are also included). It is worth noting that crude petro-
leum generally faces no, or very limited, OECD trade barriers so a large share of Egyptian 
ex ports would not be affected by either OECD integration efforts or the Uruguay Round.* 
However, the textile and clothing products that are among Egypt's major exports will cer-
tainly be affected by the multi-fiber arrangement (MFA) phase-out. Whether this is a posi-
tive or negative development will depend on Egypt's ability to compete on even tenns with 
other developing countries. 
* With the exception of those products for which Egypt does not receive important GSP preferences 
and to which high MFN tariffs are applied. ln North America, textiles, clothing andfootwear prod-
ucts do not receive either GSP or Caribbean Basin Initiative preferences so the potential for a siz-
able NAFTA-induced displacement may exist. However, Safadi and Yeats ( 1994) and Primo Braga, 
Safadi and Yeats ( 1994) show that Mexico appears to have importalll supply constraints that 
should limit its capacity Io displace third country exports to the United States. 
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BoxA.4 
Egypt's Largest Three-Digit Regional Exports: 1970-72, 
1980-82 and 1990-92 
What is Egypt exporting to the region and how has the product composition of this 
exchange been changing? The following tabulations show that crude petroleum accounts for 
over 50 percent of Egypt's intra-regional exports - up from approximately 2 percent in the 
early l 970s (the share of petroleum may be even higher given Egypt's practice of not includ-
ing foreign company exports in official trade data). Approximately 97 percent of the petrole-
um exports go to Israel, with small amounts destined for Turkey and the UAE. Foodstuffs play 
an important role in Egypt's intra-regional trade as these products comprise four of Egypt's 
eight larges! three-digit ex ports. ln 1992, 55 percent of Egypt's total intra-regional food ex ports 
went to Saudi Arabia, 12 percent to Libya and 15 percent to Syria and Lebanon combined. 
Value or Exports ($000) Percent or Total Exports ( % ) 
Description (SITC) 1970-72 1980-82 1990-92 1970-72 1980-82 1990-92 
Crude Petroleum (331) 705 395,830 268,777 l.9 78.7 53.5 
Fresh Vegetables (054) l,611 16,518 36,282 4.4 3.3 7.2 
Rice (042) 7,778 5,048 24,864 21.2 l.O 4.9 
Textile Yarn (651) 2,487 l,146 19,061 6.8 0.2 3.8 
Fresh Fruit and Nuts (051) 774 16,051 14,581 2.1 3.2 2.9 
Aluminum (684) 0 7,012 14,401 0.0 l.4 2.9 
Live Ani mals (00 l) 1,550 21,155 14,259 4.2 4.0 2.8 
Nonfur Clothing (841) 323 677 13,837 0.9 0.1 2.8 
Medicinal Products (541) 721 4,443 11,140 2.0 0.9 2.2 
Iron and Steel Shapes (673) 27 121 9,957 0.1 2.0 
Cotton Fabrics (652) 3,373 4,443 9,643 9.2 0.9 l.9 
Chemicals, nes (599) 5 70 6,877 1.4 
Footwear (821) 10 256 6,208 O.l l.2 
Natural Gas (341) 4 0 5,970 0.0 l.2 
Petroleum Products (332) 325 0 5,100 0.9 0.0 l.O 
Furniture (821) 288 649 5,046 0.8 0.1 l.O 
Cereal Preparations (048) 84 113 4,796 0.2 l.O 
Base Meta! Household Equip. (697) 67 142 4,583 0.2 0.9 
Glassware (665) 11 l 4,576 0.9 
Meta! Manufactures (698) 151 121 4,520 0.4 0.9 
Severa! of the products listed above (textile yarn, nonfur clothing, cotton fabrics and 
footwear) are normally manufactured by labor intensive production processes so their appear-
ance is something of a surprise. The direction of this ex change conforms to what would be pre-
dicted by factor proportions theory as over 50 percent of the shipments of these products go to 
Saudi Arabia and Libya - both relatively high income and high wage cost countries. 
ln terms of total intra-regional exports Israel is currently the larges! single destination 
receiving 41 percent of Egypt's exports, followed by Saudi Arabia (28 percent) and Syria (5 
percent). These shares, however, are highly affected by oil exports. When petroleum is exclud-
ed, Saudi Arabia emerges as the larges! destination receiving 48 percent of Egypt's exports fol-
lowed by Libya with 14 percent. In contras!, Israel only receives under 3 percent of non-ener-
gy goods exported by Egypt. 
ln 1990, the exports of Egypt to Iraq were only $31 million. Thus, the Gulf war has not 
had a major impact on the structure of intra-regional exports. Four two-digit SlTC products: 
plastics (SITC 58); iron and steel (SITC 67); metal manufactures (SITC 69); and plumbing 
equipment (SlTC 81) accounted for over two-thirds of Egypt's exports to Iraq. 
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Box A.5 
Average Applied Tariffs on Products Egypt Exports 
to OECD Markets 
Do tariffs on Egyptian exports to the OECD discriminate in any important way against 
particular industries or sectors? Table 12 suggested that the overall level of import dulies was 
low in the EU and Japan (in the one to two percent range) while US dulies were higher since 
this country does not extend GSP_treatment to textiles, clothing and footwear. Are there spe-
cific sectors where Egypt's exports encounter significantly higher import tariffs? The statis-
tics provided below show average "applied" (in the sense that they are the average of the 
GSP or MFN duty actually levied) tariffs on Egypt's exports of broad product groups. 
Average Applied Tariff ( % ) 
1992 OECD Imports 
Product Group (SITC No.) from Egypt ($million) EU Japan USA 
Ali Items (0 to 9) 3,898.3 0.6 2.0 4.6 
Ali Foods and Feeds (0+1+22+4) 158.0 12.0 21.2 0.6 
Food and Live Animais (0) 153.3 12.2 7.6 0.6 
Beverages and Tobacco ( 1) 0.7 5.6 90.0 1.9 
Animal and Vegetable Oils (4) 0.1 0.4 
Agricultural Materials (2-22-27-28) 73.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Ores & Nonferrous Metals (27+28+68) 180.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Minerai Fuels (3) 2,429.1 0.0 3.2 0.5 
Manufactures (5 to 8-68) 1,020.l 0.0 3.0 8.8 
Chemicals (5) 81.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles (65) 304.3 0.0 4.9 8.3 
Transport & Machinery (7) 252.1 OO 0.0 0.0 
Clothing (84) 241.9 0.0 11.0 17.4 
Miscellaneous Manufactures (89) 25.l 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD SMART Data Base 
The tariff averages show different patterns of protection exist in Japan and the EU asop-
posed to the United States. Exclusion of textiles and clothing from the United States GSP 
scheme accounts for the relatively high tariffs (8.8 and 17.4 percent) on these goods, but out-
side these two sectors import dulies average under two percent. ln contras!, in the EU and 
Japan the highest dulies are applied to agricultural products ( clothing in Japan is an excep-
tion) with tariffs of 90 percent facing Egypt's beverage and tobacco exports to Japan (most-
ly cured tobacco leaf). 
Tariff "peaks" are also evident. The highest tariffs in the EU are 35 percent. The are 
levied on various pastry products exported from Egypt while several jam and fruit preserve 
products face tariffs between 27 to 30 percent. ln the United States, the highest dulies Egypt 
faces range between 33 and 35 percent on clothing products like sweaters and cotton under-
shirts. 
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BoxA.6 
The Impact of Preference Erosion on 
Major Egyptian Exports 
In 1989 Egypt exported 1,209 different tariff line level products to the EU (EU customs 
schedules distinguish between some 8,700 individual tariffline items). A zero MFN duty was 
applied to 120 of these products and the remainder ( 1,089) were affected by a positive tariff. 
However, the GSP accorded Egypt tariff preferences on 765 of these lines, i.e, on 70 percent 
of ail lines with MFN tariffs and on 63 percent of ail lines exported, which allowed exporters 
from Egypt to pay no duties or charges below the prevailing rate.* As a result of this prefer-
ential access, Egyptian exporters enjoyed a competitive edge over those in countries which 





Egypt's Exports: Number of Tariff Line Level Products 
Zero MFN Duty Lines With Nonzero Lines Receiving Total Lines 
Lines MFN Dulies GSP Treatment Exported 
120 1,089 765 1,209 
20 74 48 94 
79 306 137 385 
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD SMART Database 
The above tabulations show the extent to which Egyptian products receive preferential 
market access in the EU, Japan and US. Egypt receives preferential access on 65 percent of 
(non-zero MFN) line items exported to Japan and on 45 percent of the shipments to the 
United States. The relatively low US figure is due to the exclusion of textiles and clothing 
from this country's GSP scheme. 
The following statistics give another perspective on the GSP by showing the share (in 
terms of values) of total EU, Japan and US imports that are covered by these preferential tar-
iffs. About 15 percent of EU's imports from Egypt receive GSP treatment while the corre-
sponding US and Japanese shares are about 4 percent. Japan's largest imports from Egypt are 
raw conon and crude petroleum - products which are imported under zero MFN duties. 
Share of Egypt's Exports Under Different Tariff Regimes 
Import Market Zero MFN Under Zero Nonzero Nonzero 
Tariffs GSPRates GSPRates MFN Rates 
European Union 58.3 14.4 0.2 27.1 
Japan 40.8 3.7 0.1 55.4 
United States 12.0 3.9 0.0 84.1 
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD SMART Database 
The Uruguay Round made substantial reductions in OECD countries' MFN tariffs -
about 40 percent on average (see Table 13). These cuts will reduce the margins of preference 
that Egypt's exports formerly received - the margins would be completely eliminated if the 
MFN rate were eut to zero. As a result of this reduction (or elimination) of preferences, some 
of Egypt's exports could be displaced by other countries that formerly faced MFN duties. 
How large this displacement will be depends on the ability of Egyptian exporters to offset 
these competitive losses. Jt should be noted, however, that Egypt would experience positive 
export gains on those items where it faced MFN tariffs that were eut in the Round. (See Box 
7 for estimates of the size of these positive and negative effects). 
* There is a complication in that ceilings or quotas may be applied to products receiving GSP 
treatment in OECD markets. Once these quotas are exceeded, further imports are taxed at 
the prevailing MFN tarif! rate. 
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Table 14 suggested that the Uruguay Round tariff cuts should produce only minor gains 
for Egypt - probably about $20 million in increased exports to the EU, Japan and US com-
bined. The possibility exists that this aggregate figure may conceal important differences in 
the effects on various product sectors. The statistics provided below examine this possibility 
by showing the projected gains and losses for major product groups exported to the EU and 
United States. 
Projected 
1992 Imports Trade Change Percent Change 
Product Group (SITC No.) ($000) Value($ 000) (%) 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Ali Items (Ü to 9) 2.893.427.0 8,680.3 0.30 
Ail Foods and Feeds (0+1+22+4) 111.294.4 8.224 7 7.39 
Agricultural Materials (2-22-27-28) 26.549.4 2.7 0.01 
Ores & Nonferrous Metals (27+28+68) 126.555 1 -189.8 -0.15 
Minerai Fuels (3) 1.969.5 -1.6 -0.08 
Manufactures (5 to 8-68) 649, 156.4 644.3 0.10 
Textiles (65) 168.934 9 -270.3 -0.16 
Clothing (84) 83.064 3 -91.4 -0.11 
UNITED STATES 
Ali Items (0 to 9) 465,598.3 11.2209 2.41 
Ali Foods and Feeds (0+1+22+4) 6.230 3 16.2 0.26 
Agricultural Materials (2-22-27-28) 6.210 0 -7.5 -0.12 
Ores & Nonferrous Metals (27+28+68) 312.7 -1.2 -0.37 
Minerai Fuels (3) 242.4 0.8 (U4 
Manufactures (5 to 8-68) 191,698.0 11.2126 5 84 
Textiles (65) 42.493. l 871.1 2.05 
Clothing (84) 122.6785 4.8581 3.96 
Source: World Bank-UNCTAD SMART Datahase. 
ln the European Union, the Uruguay Round tariff cuts on food products should lead to 
an increase in Egypt's exports by about $8 million which represents about 7 percent growth. 
Small net gains are also projected for the manufactures sector as a whole in spite of losses 
associated with the erosion of preferences on textiles and clothing. 
In the United States. Egypt's projected trade gains are concentrated in the manufactures 
sector with over 50 percent of the increase accounted for by increased textile and clothing 
exports. Outside manufactures. very small positive or negative changes are projected. The 
decline for agricultural materials is almost entirely associated with the erosion of GSP pref-
erences for several combed or carded wool products. Erosion of preferences for refined cop-
per products accounts for the slight decline within the ores and nonferrous metals group. 
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BoxA.8 
Nontariff Measures Facing Egypt's Major Exports 
Compared to the situation facing developing countries in total, Egypt's exports do not 
appear to be more affected by OECD nontariff measures. As shown below, 17.6 percent of 
ail shipments to the US face NTMs, while the coverage ratio is about 4 points lower in the 
EU. No NTMs have been reported on Egypt's exports to Japan. Elsewhere, it was found that 
about 18 percent of ail developing countries' ex ports to the OECD encounter nontariff mea-
sures (Low and Yeats, 1994). 
1992 lmports from Egypt Egypt's NTM C overage 
($million) Ratios(%) 
Product Group* EU Japan USA EU Japan USA 
Ali Items 2,893.4 91.0 465.6 13.2 0.0 17.6 
Ali Foods and Feeds 114.6 0.4 6.2 19.6 0.0 0.0 
Food and Live Animais 111.3 0.4 5.9 19.8 0.0 0.0 
Beverages and Tobacco 0.2 0.3 47.4 0.0 0.0 
Animal and Vegetable Oils 0.0 0.0 
Agricultural Materials 26.5 21.9 6.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 
Ores & Nonferrous Metals 126.6 2.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Minerai Fuels 1,969.5 57.0 242.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Manufactures 649.2 9.1 191.7 69.5 0.0 40.2 
Chemicals 72.0 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles 168.9 2.5 42.5 98.6 0.0 87.0 
Transport & Machinery 245.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Clothing 83.1 O.J 122.7 95.5 0.0 34.3 
Miscellaneous Manufactures 6.9 0.4 14.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
*See Box 6 for the SITC numbers of the product groups. 
Coverage ratios well above the average affect Egypt's textile and clothing exports to the 
EU and US, and foodstuffs exported to the EU. European MFA restrictions are applied to 
almost ail of Egypt's textile and clothing exports with quotas on cotton yarns primarily 
responsible for the 98 percent coverage ratio for SITC 65. 
Foodstuffs exported to the EU also have relatively high NTM coverage ratios due to the 
application of two or three different types of measures. For example, Egypt's exports of cane 
molasses (its larges! food export with over $9 million traded) face variable import levies 
while globe artichokes and fresh oranges encounter reference import prices. Tariff quotas are 
applied to most EU bovine meat imports while quotas are applied to coffee and coffee-based 
food preparation. 
The tariffication of agriculturai NTBs (and reduction in associated levels of protection) 
could lead to increases in world prices of previously subsidized agricultural products, includ-
ing cereals, meat, dairy products and sugar. Price increases should occur because of the 
increased international demand for agricultural products associated with a lowering of 
OECD trade barriers and the new Uruguay Round regulations regarding subsidies. These 
changes would benefit developing countries which are important exporters of these products. 
Sorne studies have concluded that prices of some previously subsidized products could rise 
by 4 to 10 percent in total when the full effects of the Round are felt. 
A number of developing countries which are net food importers have expressed concem 
about possible higher food prices. Provided that these higher prices are passed on to farmers 
there will be an offsetting increase in domestic production. Nevertheless, if world food prices 
do rise, those countries that remain net importers of food will incur higher costs. Probably 
the best way to counter such a development is through the adoption of efficiency and cost 
cutting reforms to help stimulate domestic agricultural production. 
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The Uruguay Round and Trade in 
Financial Services in the Arab Countries* 
Introduction 
Rapid advances m information and telecommunication technology are 
expanding the boundaries of tradability in services - the fastest growing com-
ponent of both trade and foreign direct investment. Until recently, it was com-
mon to view the services sector as a collection of mainly non-tradeable activ-
ities with low productivity growth potential. This conventional view of ser-
vices is fast changing; the development of certain services activities is 
increasingly being regarded not as a consequence of common growth but as 
one of its preconditions. Trade in commercial services has grown faster than 
trade in merchandise over the past decàde. 1 Commercial services encompass 
transport, travel, insurance and financial services among others. Services now 
account for close to one-quarter of world trade. The internationalization of 
services will likely lead to the next stage of economic globalization. 2 
Liberalization of trade in services provides for important new opportunities 
and at the same time brings new challenges for developing countries and for 
the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well. 
This chapter discusses the prospects for trade liberalization in services, 
specifically in financial services, for developing countries in general and Arab 
countries in particular. It is worth noting at the outset that assessing the impact 
of liberalization of trade in financial services is a difficult task. Meaningful 
data on flows of financial services by category and by trading partners are not 
available. Cross-country comparisons regarding the costs of providing the ser-
vice do not exist.' Apart from the OECD data set for 1984-85, which was pub-
lished in 1990 in restricted distribution,' other publications such as those of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) do not provide adequate data for empiri-
cal analysis of trade in financial services. Moreover, the analytical literature 
does not sufficiently cover the special economic characteristics of financial 
services that take place over time, that is, banking; or those between agents, 
such as retailing and wholesale.; Accordingly, this chapter adopts a cautious 
approach in its assessment of the prospects of freeing trade in financial 
* T/Je authors 1.-islt to thank Sübidev Tof?an, Bernard Hoekman and the participants of the ERF 
Coriference 011 Trade Liberalization in Istanbul. Turkey for he/pful comments. The first author 
wis/Jes al.w to tilank John Whalleyfor useful disrnssions and Rania Sherif and Mohamed El-Baz 
for excellem research assistance. T/Je u.rnal disclaimers applv. 
130 Mahmoud Mohieldin and Jackline Wahba 
services in selected Arab countries. 
The chapter is organized in seven sections. The following section discuss-
es the achievements of the Uruguay Round in the area of trade in services. The 
next section highlights the characteristics of trade in services, including trade 
in banking services, regulation and protection of services, and the different 
kinds of barriers to trade in financial services. Tuen, the chapter discusses 
financial liberalization and the issue of appropriate sequencing, and then com-
pares the commitments undertaken in the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and those that are found in regional agreements with respect 
to liberalization in the services sector. The next section highlights the distinc-
tive characteristics of the structure of the banking system and its regulation in 
selected Arab countries. The final section offers some concluding remarks. 
The Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round (UR) was the eighth time in which contracting parties 
(now Member countries following the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization on 1 January 1995) negotiated on a multilateral basis the reduc-
tion of tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade. The UR was the most 
comprehensive and hence complex round of multilateral trade negotiations 
(MTNs) ever undertaken. It was entrusted with a comprehensive agenda 
which aimed, among other things, to deal with shortcomings of the General 
Agree.ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which were underrnining the institu-
tion's systemic integrity. The UR was in addition unique from the viewpoint 
of developing countries. More than ever developing countries engaged active-
ly as their interests in the UR's outcome heightened. At stake were issues that 
concerned: (i) the extension of trade liberalization in traditional areas as well 
as in areas not yet covered by the GATT; (ii) bringing trade that has moved 
outside the multilateral framework back into the GATT; (iii) bringing disci-
pline to the trade-related aspects of intellectual property; (iv) enhancing the 
provisions concerning trade-related investment measures; (v) providing a 
framework of principles, rules and disciplines on trade in services; (vi) 
improving the rules and dispute seulement system of the GATT; and (vii) the 
creation of a World Trade Organisation, and doing so as a single undertaking.6 
The inclusion of trade in services and trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs) under the umbrella of the WTO has brought a vast new sphere of 
economic activity within the purview of the multilateral trading system. 
While services exports accounted for some 17 percent of world trade in 1980, 
the share had risen to over 22 percent in 1993. Annual average growth in ser-
vices trade was approximately 8 percent from 1980 to 1993, compared to 
some 4 percent for merchandise trade. Moreover, it is important to note that 
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the preferred choice for delivery of many services is through commercial 
presence of a supplier in the jurisdiction of consumers. And foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in services industries has been the most dynamic component 
of international FDI flows (Safadi, 1997). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the General Agreement on Tracte in Services 
(GATS) is the most comprehensive attempt to negotiate services liberalization 
based on reciprocity, the Agreement is a cautious one. It provides signatories 
with ample scope to condition their multilateral commitments. The GATS 
rests on the concept of the most-favored nation (MFN) treatment. MFN is a 
general obligation, though its application is subject to a negative list approach 
to the extent that countries may invoke exemptions to MFN for specific indus-
tries and for a limited time. Market access and national treatment are, howev-
er, specific obligations in the sense that they apply only to identified services 
activities listed by each country in its schedule of commitments at the level of 
each mode of supply and subject to the limitations made explicit in the offer;7 
in other words, a conditional positive list approach has been adopted in defin-
ing the coverage of the commitments. 
If one examines the commitments of developing countries (LDCs) with 
respect to tracte in services in the Uruguay Round, it seems clear that the 
majority of these countries did not use the GATS negotiations as a vehicle to 
promote further liberalization of their services industries. This is not a sur-
prising finding to the extent that the GATS results entait mainly a standstill 
promise in terms of protectionist policies, that is, a commitment not to intro-
duce new distortions in the services sector. Nonetheless, LDCs covered fewer 
services in their commitments than did industrial countries. Tourism and trav-
el-related services were the only activities in which a substantial number of 
developing countries made commitments. By late 1994, seventy eight devel-
oping countries had offered commitments in services, indicating their support 
for multilateral discipline for services.8 
Table 1 breaks down the number of commitments in services activities by 
region. North America was the region most committed to liberalization of ser-
vices activities, followed by Western Europe. The MENA region stands out as 
the one which offered the lowest number of commitments compared to other 
regions ( 106). As a percentage of maximum possible services commitments, 
the only other region which offered less than the MENA region was Africa. 
Thus, it is evident that the countries in the MENA region remain the least con-
vinced of the necessity to subject their service providers to the rigors of inter-
national competition. 
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Table 1. Commitments on Market Access for Services 
Country Number of commitments Services commitments 
Group' in services as share of maximum 
possible ( % ) 
High-income countries 2423 53.8 
Developing countries 2159 17.2 
North America 193 59.9 
Latin America 738 15.3 
Western Europe 2002 59.2 
Central Europe 351 43.6 
Africa 396 9.8 
Middle East 106 16.5 
Asia 796 26.0 
Source: GATT 199.J. reprinted in World Bank ( 1995). 
Trade in Services 
Two particular features of services activities that distinguish them from pro-
duction and trade in goods should be noted at the outset. First, production and 
consumption of a service may occur simultaneously, since no possibility 
exists of storing certain services produced now for consumption later. In such 
cases, a transaction requires that the consumer and the supplier of the service 
must be in one location. For other services, arms-length supply is not possi-
ble since the service is not transportable. This implies that if a government 
grants market access rights to foreign suppliers in relation to non-storable or 
non-transportable services, it may have to accept either that foreign enterpris-
es can establish a commercial presence in its territory, or that the service sup-
pliers in question may enter its territory on a temporary basis. Traditional 
banking and insurance services can, in principle, be supplied at a1ms-length 
since loans could be secured by mail or phone and insurance policies are often 
so purchased (Bhagwati, 1987). The second distinguishing feature of services 
activities is that they tend to be subject to a greater degree of regulatory super-
vision than are physical goods. In part, this reflects concerns about consumer 
protection, or in case of financial services, prudential issues. 
International trade is traditionally seen as an activity involving the move-
ment of goods across borders. However, a quarter of world trade flows, rep-
resenting some $600 billion annually, is now accounted for by services such 
as banking, insurance and telecommunications (Watkins, 1992). These 
exports have become increasingly significant to the OECD economies where 
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the services sector now accounts on average for half of national income (70 
percent in the United States). This is nota surprising result in view of the fact 
that services industries rely heavily on infonnation technology which is a high 
capital, high skill industry. In addition, OECD countries have been exhibiting 
the highest total factor productivity (TFP) in the services sector. For example, 
TFP in transportation and communication in OECD countries rose 2.4 percent 
on an annual basis during the period 1979-93, three times faster than the 0.8 
percent overall TFP growth rate during the same period (World Bank, 1995). 
In summary, the export advantage in many services as revealed by existing 
patterns of trade in services, seems to lie substantially with the OECD coun-
tries. 
Services account for nearly 20 percent of total exports of goods and ser-
vices from OECD countries to developing countries, but only 7 percent of 
total trade flows in the opposite direction. Because LDCs are net importers of 
services, they have not offered wholehearted support to the GATS. 
Developing countries fear that many of their own services industries are 
insufficiently developed to withstand foreign competition. 
Trade in Banking Services 
The most used estimates of trade in services, in general, are derived from the 
IMF's reports on Balance of Payment (BOP). The reports use trade in invisi-
bles to refer to transactions that relate neither to goods nor to capital flows. 
Remaining services, which appear in one miscellaneous category, cover a 
wide range of financial and non-financial transactions such as insurance, com-
missions, advertising, and so forth. Clearly, separating financial services on a 
functional basis using the BOP reports is not possible. w A direct measure of 
the value of each financial service traded internationally is required. As sug-
gested by Whalley (1995), this measure should include ail fees and charges 
received by domestic banks from non-residents and has to adequately cover 
the value of financial intennediation. lt is worth noting that the treatment of 
financial services within an economy requires the same suggested improve-
ment which should be reflected in the national accounts. 
The methodology developed by Whalley (1995) to estimate international 
trade in banking services in three developed countries can in principle be 
replicated to derive similar statistics for the Arab countries, Turkey and Iran. 
Because the BOP estimates do not distinguish between the different compo-
nents of receipts and paymants related to banking services, Whalley con-
structed estimates for international trade in banking provided by domestic and 
foreign intennediaries: 
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The method used involves applying estimates of the spread between 
deposit and lending rates both for US, UK, and Canadian banks anc! 
banks in their largest partner countries to corresponding data on assets 
and liabilities of both domestic banks with non-residents, and with 
non-resident banks with residents. These yield an estimate of the value 
of interrnediation services provided by domestic banks to both depos-
itors and borrowers abroad, and by non-resident banks to domestic 
depositors and borrowers. The combined financial intermediation 
charge is apportioned between the parties to calculate the internation-
ally traded component. (Whalley, 1995, p. 29) 
Whalley's results, which assume that the costs are borne equally by depos-
itors and borrowers are summarized in Table 2 below. Unfortunately, most of 
the data required for this straightforward exercise are not available for any 
country in the MENA region. 
Table 2: Estimates of International Trade in Financial 
Intermediation Services, US, UK, and Canada in 1984 
(billions of US dollars) 
Estimate of exports of banking services 
Estimate of imports of banking services 
Source: Whalley (1995). 










As has been stated earlier, regulation applies more pervasively to services than 
to goods' trade. Since fraud and sub-standard output may be difficult or impos-
sible to detect and prevent before the damage is done, governments feel oblig-
ed to control supply ex ante rather than output on an ex post basis. Another 
consideration is that some services sectors, such as banking, have economy-
wide effects, such that regulation erring on the side of caution is considered 
necessary to avoid the widespread damage that would be caused by specific 
sectoral failures. What this regulatory difference between services and goods 
implies is that, while local establishment by a foreign entity to provide a ser-
vice will permit the fulfillment of local regulatory criteria, sale of such services 
from a base abroad will not. (Bhagwati, 1987). 
Services industries are heavily protected by investment regulations. Such 
regulations are especially extensive in LDCs where governments regard the 
development of indigenous financial services industries as vital for both social 
and economic reasons. Hesitant LDCs regard some services activities, such as 
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banking, as part of their infrastructure which they must control for political 
reasons. The structure of LDCs' banking sector illustrates some of the factors 
that underline state intervention. In the majority of LDCs, there are two sub-
markets where the banking sector operates: a well diversified modern sector 
integrated with insurance and other operations, and a relatively underdevel-
oped rural sector. The latter, which serves the vast majority of agricultural pro-
ducers, has limited access to capital and operates with lower returns because 
of income differentials between rural and urban sectors. Countries have sever-
al devices for protecting domestic suppliers of services from foreign competi-
tion. These include, inter alia, visa requirements, investment regulations and 
restrictions on the ability to repatriate earnings. 
A feature common to many services activities is that they are used as inter-
mediate inputs. For example, banking and insurance services translate to high-
er costs of providing the service. This not only impedes the development of 
efficient banking and insurance sectors and their ability to compete in the 
international market, but in addition, it hinders export opportunities of goods. 
The effects of protecting intermediate services are similar to those that result 
from raising the cost of intermediate inputs used in goods production. In some 
instances, such as in the present example of banking and insurance services, 
protective policies not only deny access to cheaper credit, but in addition, they 
deny exporters access to the entire vector of services that modern internation-
al banks can provide so as to facilitate international commerce. Therefore, the 
protection of intermediate services generates direct and indirect costs both of 
which have not been presumably properly assessed by LDCs (Bhagwati, 
1987). 
There is a wide variety of policy instruments that can be used to restrict 
access to markets. Five broad categories of policy instruments can be distin-
guished as impediments to trade in services: 
i) measures that are quantity-based (that is, those that explicitly restrict the 
volume or value of transactions); 
ii) those that are price-based; 
iii) those that require physical or commercial presence in a market; 
iv) those relating to standards, certification requirements and industry-
specific regulations, and 
v) measures relating to government procurement practices and subsidization. 
Quantitative restrictions and standards are the most important access 
restrictions in the services context. Although import tariffs rarely impede trade 
in services, price controls are common. These involve either price-setting by 
government agencies and/or price monitoring and approval procedures. 
Examples of services activities that are subject to price contrais in many 
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countries include financial services. 
Sapir (1985) argues that many modern services activities embody technol-
ogy. The acquisition of these services is equivalent to technological transfer. 
Therefore, import of certain services leads to capital accumulation which will 
have a wholly beneficial effect on the development and future patterns of 
trade. The newly industrialized countries ail have small positive patterns of 
trade, but they have been successful in accumulating human and physical cap-
ital. 
Barriers to Trade in Financial Services 
Barriers to trade in financial services have existed for many years, but in recent 
years they have experienced significant growth. Such barriers are measures 
that accord different treatment to competing domestic and foreign suppliers of 
the same financial service.'' In the selected sample of countries in the Middle 
East, these barriers include one or more of the following: 12 
l. Discrimination against services supplied to the domestic consumers by for-
eign-based firms. 
2. Limitations on the establishment of branches for foreign financial firms. 
3. Various restrictions on the activities of foreign firms in the domestic mar-
kets, and so forth, restriction on the number of branches and their location 
and constraints on the transfer of profits. 
4. Certain restrictions on the number of foreign staff and their movement in 
the host country. 
These restrictions have existed for a long time and were introduced histor-
ically for different reasons. Exploring the underlying reasons will help us bet-
ter understand the position of the sampled countries in respect of their hesita-
tion to liberalize trade in services all the while providing some policy initia-
tives that would help to alleviate any possible negative effects of the removal 
of these barriers. These reasons can be grouped under six main categories: 
1) OECD countries enjoy a comparative advantage over LDCs in the ser-
vices sector. Recent regression estimates show that countries with relatively 
abundant human capital have a comparative advantage in insurance and other 
financial services. 13 One response may be to protect the financial service indus-
try in LDCs. However, this response is based on a static understanding of com-
parative advantage. Accumulation of physical and human capital would help a 
developing country to gain a comparative advantage over time in certain finan-
cial services. 
2) We argue that even if a developing country manages to accurnulate 
physical and human capital, this would not be necessarily reflected in sub-
stantial gains in the international financial industry in which reputation has an 
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important role to play. Hence, efficient new entrants in the market of interna-
tional financial services will not be able to compete with well-established 
firms, especially when customers are not adequately equipped to differentiate 
between the products supplied by the new and old firms through the study of 
their characteristics and attributes. So, if a developing country manages to 
improve its comparative advantage in financial services, a developed country 
would still be in a superior position owing to both its comparative and com-
petitive advantages. This enforces the argument for protection or at least 
according a developing country a differential treatment in the competition 
game. 
3) The previous two issues indicate that the infant industry argument may 
be a relevant one for the financial services industry in LDCs; they in addition 
help explain why the majority of LDCs were reluctant to offer more GATS 
commitments as they feared for the very survival of their domestic financial 
services industry. Their fear is justified by the fact that the intemationally trad-
ed financial services are based on sophisticated technology and are capital-
intensive, in both human and physical terms. 14 
4) The financial repression school views the sector as a source of cheap 
funding for the public sector and the state budget deficit in LDCs. This school 
believes that allowing foreign firms to enter the domestic market would jeop-
ardize the stability of such funding and raise its costs. 
5) The experience of LDCs with foreign banks, before and after indepen-
dence, has not overall been very satisfactory. Foreign banks have been regard-
ed as institutions that more often than not concentrate their activities in short 
term credits which are usually directed towards financing tracte and a few ser-
vices. They are also accused of cream skimming. 15 
6) In addition, LDCs had other reasons for erecting barriers to tracte in 
financial services such as controlling key sectors of the economy as a way of 
ensuring their independence and national security; employment policy that 
favors the employment of nationals, and so forth. 16 
Financial Liberalization 
Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and reaching a WTO deal on 
freer tracte in financial services, 17 LDCs are now encouraged to liberalize their 
financial restrictions that discriminate between domestic and foreign 
providers. Technological innovations, especially in information technology, 
together with liberalization are contributing to rapid movement of capital 
across borders in pursuit of the best available returns, and that these flows are 
increasingly independent of tracte in goods. According to Peter Drucker, "cap-
ital movements unconnected to tracte - and indeed largely independent of 
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it - greatly exceed trade finance." He cites two sets of figures to support this 
conclusion: first, the London Eurodollar market, where the world's financial 
institutions borrow from and !end to each other, turns over of world trade; sec-
ond, foreign exchange transactions, in which one currency is traded against 
another, run to 35 trillion dollars a year - twelve times global trade in goods 
and services (Kakabadse, 1987). 
No single event accounts for the outburst of capital flows, but the speed of 
change is such that the politics and economics of deregulation in capital mar-
kets have received Jess attention than they deserve. Deregulation in one finan-
cial market inevitably leads to some deregulation in another if the latter is to 
remain attractive to investors. Simultaneously, protectionist measures that dis-
criminate against foreign suppliers are exacting heavy tolls on the domestic 
economy: this denies the economy access to new technologies and it limits the 
development of financial instruments. More efficient markets are being 
demanded by users as technology continues to decrease the economic distance 
among nations. 
Although different countries may have different political reasons to move 
to deregulate their domestic markets, they ail share the desire to stimulate 
competition and to attract more international financial business. Overall, the 
pronounced deregulatory drive reflects the intense competition between dif-
ferent financial centers and also the inability or unwillingness of governments 
and central banks to resist the changes that the accelerating pace of interna-
tional capital flows is forcing upon them. As far as the banks are concerned, 
these changes are apparently quite timely because they coincide with the trend 
towards investment banking. Commercial banking (converting deposits into 
loans) is now Jess important than investment banking (the business of raising 
fonds for customers by underwriting and dealing in securities). For many cap-
ital users, securities finance is cheaper and more flexible than loans. With tight 
govemment monetary policies limiting the expansion of banks in the foresee-
able future, entry into securities has become for many banks the only option to 
grow. However, the commitment and costs of setting up competitive securities 
operations in the world 's major markets are daunting. 
Successful banks will need the widest possible geographical reach, an abil-
ity to deal in ail the big financial markets, a strong dealing team in securities 
backed by top-class research and technology, and a wide range of institutional 
and corporate contacts. International banking is going through a fondamental 
process of change. Traditionally, it was the jealously guarded flagship of each 
sovereign state but now it is under pressure to become a single and highly 
competitive world market with a much wider choice to borrowers and 
investors. Corporate strategy, once a luxury the banks could do without, is now 
a condition of survival (Kakabadse, 1987, pp. 29-43). 
Trade in Financial Services in Arab Countries 139 
Sequencing of Financial Liberalization 
It has been argued that "the main objectives of external and internai financial 
liberalization are the integration of the domestic financial market with the inter-
national market in order to improve the role of the financial markets in the allo-
cation of resources."18 However, judging from the liberalization experience in 
Latin American countries, it is argued that if the domestic financial sector suf-
fers from financial repression and noncompetitive structure, then the external 
financial liberalization should take place after internai financial liberalization. 
Despite the fact that the literature on the issue of sequencing is still incon-
clusive, 19 there is nonetheless a wide agreement, based again on the Latin 
American experience, that the domestic financial sector should be liberalized 
after the reform of the domestic real sector. It is also widely accepted that con-
trais on capital movements should be maintained until the domestic financial 
sector and the external trade sector are liberalized and until the stabilization 
program is implemented.20 
Figure 1: Sequencing of Economie Liberalization 
W Trade 
f":l Capital account 
~ liberalization 
L:J Iiberalization 
1:1 Domestic real 
L:J sector liberalization 
Sequence of Iiberalization 
Source: Mohieldin ( 1994), p. 40. 
The capital account should be the last in the liberalization sequence as 
shown in Figure 1. Severa! reasons have been put forward in support of this 
recommendation: 
1. It is argued that capital markets adjust faster to changes in incentives than 
goods and labor markets and hence need a shorter period to respond to lib-
eralization measures. 21 
2. If the liberalization of the domestic financial sector is undertaken before 
that of the trade sector, this would result in a higher allocating of credit to 
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the tradable sector owing to the existence of trade barriers.22 
3. If capital contrais are removed before the full liberalization of the domes-
tic financial sector, then capital flight would be inevitable.23 
4. Furiher to the previous point, capital flows into an economy that lacks an 
efficient and a liberalized financial system may be inefficiently allocated. 24 
5. If the capital account is liberalized before the externat trade sector, then 
capital inflows into the economy may result in an exchange rate apprecia-
tion. This, in turn, would undennine the competitiveness of tradable goods 
and add more difficulties to trade liberalization attempts. 25 
6. If the inflow of capital precede fiscal discipline, this may lead to further 
complication of the budget deficit problem. 26 
It should be said that the sequencing of liberalization outlined above should 
not be considered immutable. The initial economic condition, political envi-
ronment and credibility of government have important contributions to 
sequencing decisions as well as the extent of success or failure of financial 
opening. 
Regional Integration Agreements21 
Considerable interest has been generated in recent years by the dynamism dri-
ving regional integration agreements and the tessons this may provide for other 
countries contemplating such initiatives. The formation of the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) 
and the South American common market fonned by Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay (MERCOSUR), the continuous widening and deepen-
ing of the European Community, major developments in the Asia-Pacific 
Economie Cooperation Forum (APEC), preparatory work on a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and a New Trans-Atlantic Agenda, and the range 
of initiatives elsewhere ail provide evidence that the fever of regional trading 
arrangements has taken hold. It is worth noting that back in 1990, regional 
trading arrangements affected approximately 40 percent of international trade 
flows on a global scale, up from 30 percent during the 1960s. 
The expansion of regional trading arrangements has generated its own 
competitive momentum. In a world in which national barriers are becoming so 
many self-inflicted wounds - a sure way of being isolated from increasingly 
global investment and production decisions - ail countries are facing irre-
sistible pressures to keep pace with market liberalization. Countries enter into 
free trade relations only to find others joining the race for fear of losing out on 
investment, technology and market access. And the time has corne for coun-
tries in the MENA region to revisit this option. 
For those familiar with the history of regional initiatives in the MENA 
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region, the above propos1t10n may raise more doubts than excitement. 
However, it would be erroneous to judge the chances of success of any new 
arrangement (or the injection of new life into existing ones) by the failures of 
the past. The underlying premise is whether or not the current policy environ-
ment in the region is different from the one that characterized earlier experi-
ments. 
First, a cursory examination of the trade instruments still "in vogue" in the 
MENA countries reveals the presence of a multitude of trade-inhibiting mea-
sures, be they at the borders (of the tariff and non-tariff barriers kind) or 
increasingly within each countries' borders.28 Such a picture emerges even 
where account has been taken of the trade preferences countries in the region 
accord each other through a multitude of minilateral and plurilateral agree-
ments. True, many countries in the region have started to shift direction, 
though the pace of implementation and the strengths of reforms vary signifi-
cantly across countries. However, and as of this day, much remains to be done 
in order to end up with trade and payments regimes that will further promote 
the openness of markets to regional competition, and eventually to global 
competition. 
Second, intra-regional infrastructure including the institutional kind that 
should facilitate intra-regional trade remains either absent or at best non-
responsive. For example, the lnter-Arab lnvestment Guarantee Corporation 
(IAIGC) - which was set up in 1974 and started activities in 1975, provides 
guarantees against non-commercial risks for Arab investors, including guaran-
tees for trade credits, and loans to promote investments within Arab countries. 
ln 1993, the value of guarantee contracts signed by IAIGC amounted to US$ 
14.4 million for investment contracts and (a mere) US$ 47 million for export 
credit contracts. Another pan-Arab institution, the Arab Trade Financing 
Program (A1FP) was set up in 1989 with the o~jective of promoting inter-Arab 
trade through rediscounting of trade financing instruments from member coun-
tries covering pre-and post-shipment finance, loans and lines of credit, and 
guarantees accepted if issued by IAIGC. Between 1991 and 1993, A1FP 
approved 94 applications for lines of credit totaling US$ 263 million. 
The third and last aspect to consider in this respect is whether or not the 
economies in the region have become more interdependent in trade, finance, 
or production over the last two or three decades. If the answer is yes, this 
would be a positive factor favoring further integration efforts. Growing inter-
dependence might manifest itself in numerous ways, including increasing 
intra-industry trade, a rising share of intra-regional trade in total imports or 
exports, or by increased trade in components that will be assembled in the 
importing country. Whether the comparative advantage of MENA countries 
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has evolved along complementary (or competing) lines would also be a con-
sideration, as would persistent regional trade imbalances (a negative factor). 
Space limitations do not allow a comprehensive analysis of ail these factors. 
Suffice it to say that in 1995, intra-regional trade in the region accounted for 7 
percent of the total trade, and that share has remained more or Jess constant, at 
least during the last decade. However, this apparently low level of intra-region-
al trade should be put in perspective as the countries in the region absorba total 
of 4 percent of global ex ports; in other words, MENA countries trade amongst 
themselves twice as much as they trade with the rest of the world. 
Moreover, MENA countries continue to exhibit divergent interests as each 
one of them finds itself at a very different stage of economic development than 
the other. Development disparities amongst MENA countries remain much 
wider than among any other group of countries that have attempted to integrate 
their economies. In 1993, per capita incarnes in the region ranged from a low 
US$ 660 in Egypt to a high of US$ 21,430 for the UAE, a difference of over 
32 fold. In contras!, the larges! difference in the European Union in the same 
year was between Greece and Denmark: the tïrst recorded a per capita incarne 
of US$ 7,390 while the second achieved a high of US$ 26,730, a difference of 
only 3.6 fold. By the same token, the divergence in incarnes under NAFfA 
between Mexico and the United states is only sevenfold. 
While the above may lead one to question the merits of new regional ini-
tiatives in MENA, the analysis that follows will show that such pessimism may 
not after ail be warranted. 
First, it is no revelation to state that in the past, regional trading arrange-
ments had set themselves an ambitious scope. What is Jess known is perhaps 
the fact that the emphasis was on using regional integration arrangements to 
advance the goals of import substitution industrialization. The anti-export bias 
inherent in such a development strategy, however, tended to choke off oppor-
tunities for specialization, and hence retarded economic development and the 
opportunities to expand the export base of countries in the region in line with 
their comparative advantage. Fortunately, more and more countries in the 
MENA region are in the process of abandoning such policies. 
Second, it is worth noting that much of the excitement surrounding the new 
regional trading initiatives around the globe retlects expectations about North-
South arrangements,~'' and countries in the MENA region are no exception as 
evidenced by the large number of countries that are negotiating FfAs with the 
EU. Although these agreements may implicitly increase trade barriers against 
non-members (and so forth, factories that outsource inputs in the regional mar-
ket may be forced to redirect their purchases in order to qualify as local pro-
ducers), the concerned countries in the MENA region have demonstrated their 
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willingness to pay this premium for the "insurance effect" of an FfA with a 
large country. Moreover, the potential investment-diversion effects of such an 
agreement generate an additional incentive for countries that are interested in 
attracting large transnational corporations. The FfAs with the EU, which 
should be concluded by 20 IO, would provide for free circulation of manufac-
tured products, progressive liberalization of trade in agricultural products, lib-
eralization of the right of establishment for companies, provision of trans-bor-
der services, and free movement of capital. There would be largely identical 
rules of origin among the different parties, mutual recognition of standards, a 
high level of protection of intellectual property rights and provisions concern-
ing rules of competition. What is important to note in this respect is the poten-
tial role of the EU in new initiatives in the MENA region. Specifically, to the 
extent that the MENA countries that have concluded an FfA with the EU 
extend (at the very least) the same preferences they have granted to the EU to 
other regional partners, this would go a long way in promoting both opportu-
nities for intra-industry trade among MENA countries through the rationaliza-
tion of economic activities, as well as external and internai investment flows 
to the region. 
Third, while unilateral liberalization by each of the MENA countries, at 
whatever speed and sectoral composition, is to be preferred to preferential lib-
eralization, from a political perspective it might be easier to pursue such liber-
alization as part of coordinated efforts in the MENA region. Coordinated lib-
eralization within MENA, coupled with an FfA with an industrialized country, 
could be politically useful as it serves to Iock-in the liberalization in each of 
the countries since reversai will compromise the FfA with the industrialized 
country. 
Fourth, the emerging regional arrangements are distinctive, and in many 
instances have been labeled as "new" because they have included for the first 
time ever ambitious liberalization agendas that cover not only trade in goods, 
but also trade in services, foreign direct investment, intellectual property rights 
and many other "market access" issues broadly defined. While regional trade 
liberalization requires the removal of border barriers to promote intra-region-
al trade, it has been increasingly recognized that the development of regional 
production systems requires deeper forms of integration of national regulatory 
systems and policies. Many countries in the MENA region have embraced, 
mainly on a unilateral basis, a reform strategy that addresses most if not ail of 
these sectors, and their commitment to stay the course appears unrelenting. 
The fifth and last point that gives rise to optimism has to do with changed 
attitudes in the region. MENA countries have accumulated a wealth of infor-
mation and knowledge, not only in respect of the reasons that have led their 
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integration attempts to falter, but equally importantly, they have assimilated 
the lessons of experiences of other countries that have successfully integrated. 
Thus, MENA countries are more aware today than ever before of the need to 
focus their initiatives on a small, modest core of issues initially, and gradually 
moving to more ambitious goals as confidence builds up. MENA countries 
have in addition learned the value of cooperation amongst themselves, and the 
benefits of good citizenry, be that in their own backyard or increasingly on a 
global scale. 
The above projects hope that new initiatives in the region have the poten-
tial of being more influential and successful than earlier attempts. In part, this 
simply reflects the potential role of the EU in these new initiatives. Still, struc-
tural changes and progress in unilateral liberalization reinforce such a conclu-
sion. Nevertheless, a word of caution: like previous attempts at regional inte-
gration in the area, they can easily become instruments for trade diversion 
favoring special interests at the expense of society at large. From this perspec-
tive, they may end up having more in common with their forerunners than one 
would wish. 
GATS and Regional Integration Agreements 
Should countries in the MENA region decide to further their integration 
attempt, the experiences of other regions, for example, the EU, NAFfA, and 
the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economie Relations Agreement (CER) may 
offer some useful lessons. Six criteria for comparison between regional agree-
ments and the GATS have been used (Hoekman and Sauvé, 1994 ):)0 
l. the modalities and instruments that are used to liberalize access to service 
markets, 
2. sectoral coverage, 
3. disciplines regarding government practices in areas such as subsidization 
and public procurement, 
4. enforcement/dispute seulement procedures, 
5. rules of origin, and 
6. safeguard provisions. 
Whether regional liberalization of services should be viewed as a comple-
ment or substitute to multilateral liberalization depends on whether regional 
agreements effectively lead to significant liberalization and if such arrange-
ments go substantially beyond what is already feasible in the multilateral con-
text. Given the outcome of the GATS, a review of regional trade agreements 
among OECD countries that cover the services sector suggests that regional 
and multilateral agreements display a fairly strong degree of complementari-
ty. One important reason for this is the fact that regional agreements appear to 
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have been useful laboratories in which to experiment with ever more 
sophisticated rules and disciplines covering services, investment and govem-
ment procurement. There has been a substantial amount of cross-fertilization 
between the regional agreements and the GATS. The decision to launch the 
GATS negotiation was heavily influenced by the EU program and the 
NAFTA. The progress that was made in the multilateral discussions was in 
part driven by the existence of regional liberalization agreements (Hoekman 
and Sauvé, 1994). 
An important effect of the regional liberalization of services markets is to 
enhance the competitiveness of firms - whether producers of goods or ser-
vices - located within the region. The costs of intra-regional exchange are 
reduced as services providers are induced to specialize and differentiate their 
products. The main issue then from a policy perspective is what the econom-
ic impact of regional liberalization of service markets will be, which in tum 
depends importantly on the extent of such liberalization. 
The consideration of services in the trade policy context has revealed that 
standard political economy arguments apply as much to services as to goods, 
and are helpful in understanding why a regional approach to liberalization of 
service markets has been pursued. There is a need for reciprocal liberalization 
in order to satisfy political constraints: export interests must balance those 
groups that oppose the liberalization of domestic markets. 
As Hoekman and Sauvé (1994) argue "the non-storability and intangibili-
ty of services create incentives to go regional." Because services tend to be 
non-storable, services transactions often require that the supplier of the ser-
vice and the consumers internet. Not only will a physical presence often be 
necessary, but such establishment will be subject to regulatory regimes inso-
far as govemments attempt to offset the quality uncertainty that is associated 
with the intangible nature of many services. For liberalization to be effective, 
some harmonization of regulatory regimes and agreement to recognize the 
standards and regulations of partner countries may well be needed. To the 
extent that this is feasible, it will be more easily achieved in a bilateral or 
regional setting. 
This raises an important question: does the regulatory environment in 
which the banking systems operate in the selected countries satisfy the 
requirements for the liberalization of trade in financial services under the 
GATS or even under regional arrangements? We summarize these require-
ments in the context of a liberalized banking system with a competitive struc-
ture and an adequate prudential regulation. We provide below a profile of the 
banking systems in the selected countries. It is worth noting that our efforts are 
limited by the dearth of information on some of the issues under consideration. 
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The Arab Banking Systems: Structure, Regulation and 
Performance 
During the last two decades some Arab banks managed to adapt to the changes 
in the political climate, economic conditions and advances in technology. 
However, the Arab banking sector remains non-competitive owing to heavy 
intervention by both govemments and influential political groups in the func-
tioning of the Arab central banks and the operations of the banking units. If we 
use nominal interest rate spread as a proxy for competition in the banking sec-
tors of the selected countries, we find that Arab banking markets do suffer 
from Jack of competition and inefficiency in financial intermediation (Table 3). 
Table 3. Nominal Interest Rate Spread in Arab Countries 
1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 
Egypt 5.0 4.0 4.0 5.3 6.6 
Bahrain 2.5 
Kuwait 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.4 1.8 
Jordan 6.75 5.75 
Le ban on 4.52 4.05 15.36 22.32 21.25 12.97 
Tunisia 4.1 4.0 4.28 3.86 
Morocco 1.0 0.5 -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
UK 2.58 -1.34 0.54 1.07 2.49 1.48 2.16 
Korea 1.2 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: /MF. International Financial Statistics Yearbook ( 1994). 
The problems that plague the banking sector in the Arab countries can be 
attributed to several factors such as: 
1. The structure of the banking system in Arab countries which is typically 
dominated by a few inefficient state-owned banks. 
2. Heavy financial repression in the form of govemment intervention in set-
ting interest rates and allocation of credit, in addition to imposing high 
required reserves and liquidity ratios. 
3. Lack of central bank independence. 
4. The prevailing of unfavorable economic conditions such as high inflation 
rates and vulnerability to extemal shocks. 
Table 4 shows the structure, regulation and performance of the banking 
systems in the Arab countries. It is clear from the entries in the different cells 
that the selected countries are not completely ready to face up to the chal-
lenges of competition in the international financial market. Financial opening 
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means that Arab banks have to deal with critical issues such as mergers and 
acquisition, improving the quality of services provided, cost reduction, and so 
forth. Banks in the Arab countries will find themselves forced to diversify 
their revenue sources, improve their capital adequacy requirements up to the 
international standards,31 and to solve the problems of non-performing loans 
and excess liquidity.32 Effective liberalization requires harmonization of regu-
latory practices among trading partners. Thus, it is clear that to capture the 
opportunities offered by freeing tracte in financial services, Arab countries will 
need to adapt their regulatory environments and develop supportive physical 
and human infrastructure. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although the integration of financial services into the world trading system has 
been considered one of the most important achievements of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, this however made today's trading environment a vastly 
complicated one for several reasons: first, the financial services sector is the 
largest and the most sophisticated amongst the sectors on which negotiations 
are still taking place. Second, liberalizing tracte in financial services through 
the reduction or elimination of barriers to tracte is a major undertaking in as far 
as the majority of LDCs are concerned, and that includes the majority if not ail 
of the Arab countries. Liberalization of financial services requires detailed 
negotiations of within-border laws and regulations. 
Due to Jack of data we cannot determine whether the GATS provides sig-
nificant and substantive liberalization of tracte in financial services. However, 
given the structure, regulation and recent performance of the banking sector in 
the Arab countries, we argue that they do not meet the prerequisites of suc-
cessful financial liberalization, and major steps are required to improve their 
competitiveness. Internai reform of the domestic banking system and external 
financial liberalization are complementary processes and should be undertak-
en with the right sequencing, taking into account the initial economic and 
structural conditions of the financial sector and the economy as a whole. 
We argue that allowing foreign banks to enter the domestic market is not 
enough to weaken the monopolistic structure or to improve the efficiency in 
financial intermediation as incumbent banks may squeeze out the new entrants 
or collude with them. The experience of Egypt after approximately two 
decades of opening its financial market to foreign banks is a case in point. 
The progress in negotiations in tracte in financial services has not been 
accompanied by a concomitant improvement regarding the regulatory frame-
work. We argue that the establishment of an appropriate international regula-
tory framework for tracte in banking services has become a necessary condi-
tion for a stable and sustainable growth of the international financial market. 




The banking system consists of 10 linsti-
tutions at the end of 1993. There are 44 
commercial banks, including 4 state 
owned banks which dominate the bank-
ing system; 33 business and investment 
banks including 22 branches of foreign 
banks and 21 specialized banks; and 3 
non-registered banks. Commercial banks 
account for 81 percent, 90 percent, 75 
percent of total assets, deposits and loans 
respectively. 
Regulation 
- In accordance with financial reform 
measures, that started with freeing inter-
est rates in January 1991, a new law no. 
37 of 1992 was promulgated. 
- This law raised the authorized and paid-
up capital to $29 million and $14.5 mil-
lion respectively. 
- The law also allowed foreigners to hold 
shares in banks and permitted foreign 
banks to deal in domestic currency. 
According to this law the Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) was granted further reg-
ulatory powers. The collapse of BCCI in 
1991 made such increase of the powers 
of the CBF, justifiable. 
- A deposit insurance scheme was estab-
lished according to the same law. 
- Ali banks were asked to adhere to the 
Basle standards on risk-weighted capital 
adequacy. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The banking structure still suffers from 
the domination of public sector banks 
which will continue to be the major play-
ers in the banking sectors. 
-The problem ofnon-performing loans is 
still awaiting a solution. 
The banking system has an excess liquid-
ity problem that reveals inefficiency in 
the intermediation process. 
- Foreign banks may find some profit 
opportunities from the privatization 





















Table 4: Continued (1) 
Structure 
The banking system consists of 80 banks. 
70 percent of total assets are held by the 
biggest 15 banks. 
Regulation 
- Banque du Liban, which survived the 
Civil War, regulates the banking system. 
- The National Assembly may intervene 
in the central banking operations, for 
example, in 1991 it refused to pass a law 
that would have liquidated small banks 
that cannot meet the minimum capital 
suggested by Banque du Liban. 
- 10 percent of local currency deposits 
must be placed with the Central Bank, 
interest-free and a further 3 percent must 
be used for a compulsory purchase of 
law-rate-treasury bills. 
Performance and Prospects 
- Before the start of Civil War in 1975 
Beirut was the unrivaled banking center 
of the Middle East. Lebanon after the 
ending of hostilities in 1991 had the aspi-
rations to regain its former position in the 
region and to compete with the business 
centers already established in Bahrain, 
Dubaï and Cairn. 
- Many banks are under-capitalized 
because their equity was denominated in 
Lebanese Lira. However, banks had to 
meet a capital adequacy ratio of 6 percent 
in 1993 and 8 percent in 1995 in accor-






























Table 4: Continued (2) 
Structure 
The Jordanian banking system consists 
of 8 commercial banks, 6 investrnent 
banks, 5· branches and 2 representative 
offices of foreign banks and an lslamic 
bank, in addition to specialized credit 
institutions for housing, agriculture and 
industry. 
Eight Jordanian banks had 31 branches in 
the West Bank and Gaza. Severa) banks 
have applied for opening and/or re-open-




- The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ}, reg-
ulates the banking system. The main aim 
of CBJ in the early l 990s was to curb the 
growth of liquidity using loans to 
deposits ceilings. 
- To attract foreign exchange, especially 
in from workers' remittances, foreign 
banks are now allowed to offer foreign 
currency investment portfolios for non-
residents. 
- lnterest rates have been liberalized. 
Foreign currency transfers are free from 
restrictions since February 1995. 
Performance and Prospects 
- Four cases of bank failure had disturbed 
the financial sector in Jordan, in the late 
I 980s; Petra Bank was unable to provide 
the required reserves on its foreign cur-
rency deposits to the CBJ; the Jordan 
Gulf Bank suffered a serious liquidity 
problem; malpractice of the Mashreq 
Bank forced its closure; the lslamic 
lnvestment House was liquidated 
because of quality problems of its portfo-
lio and divergence from the terms of its 
license. The four cases were met with 
firm decisions from the CBJ which 
restored confidence in the banking sys-
tem. 
- Constrained by size of the economy, the 
Jordanian banking system will remain 
relatively small. The peace process may 
not necessarily widen the scope of the 
banking sector as it has two contradicting 
effects. Business opportunities may 
increase in accordance with cooperation 
agreements but Palestinian entrepreneurs 
who play a crucial role in the Jordanian 
financial system may choose to invest in 


















Table 4: Continued (3) 
Structure 
The financial system in Bahrain is recog-
nized at the international level as an off-
shore banking center. The offshore mar-
ket was established as a result of oil 
euphoria. There are 18 commercial banks 
including 5 local ones. The two local 
banks account for 60 percent of local 
as sets. 
There are also 22 investment banks of 
which there 6 locally incorporated insti-
tutions. The offshore market, which can 
be divided into locally incorporated and 
subsidiaries of banks as at the end of 
1993. At the peak in 1984 there were 74 
offshore banks. 
Regulation 
- The Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA), 
which replaced the old currency board in 
1973, acts as a Central Bank and regu-
lates the commercial, investment and off-
shore markets. The BMA, for historical 
reasons, is influenced by the Bank of 
England, and thus its deposit insurance 
scheme is modeled on that run by the lat-
ter. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The Bahraini financial system, being 
based on offshore business, has been vul-
nerable to international financial 
changes; for example the National Bank 
of Bahrain has been negatively affected 
by the bond market crash of 1994. 
However, the performance of most of the 
local banks was sound as they issued 
healthy dividends. Despite the rise of 
Dubai as a competing center, it is appar-
ent that Bahrain will continue to be a 
favored base for banks seeking syndicat-





























Table 4: Continued (4) 
Structure 
There are 19 locally incorporated com-
mercial banks and 28 branches of foreign 
banks. 
Despite the existence of 2 investment 
banks, in practice it is hard to discrimi-
nate between investment and commercial 
banking in the UAE. ln terms of market 
share, five banks dominate the UAE 
banking scene. 
Regulation 
-The Central Bank of the UAE, which is 
a federal body, regulates the banking sys-
tem. 
- A few incidents have raised serious 
questions regarding the quality of regula-
tion of the banking system in the UAE, 
for example, the closure of the BCCI and 
the failure of Niscorp. The case of the 
BCCI revealed that the banking system 
was subject to political influence that had 
overridden the regulatory framework. 
-The Central Banks must conform to 
Basle guidelines. 
Performance and Prospects 
- lt i s hard to assess the performance of 
banks in the UAE as many banks do not 
operate according to the usual commer-
cial criteria; some banks receive subsi-
dies in a form of cheap deposits from 























Table 4: Continued (5) 
Structure 
The Saudi banking system comprises 12 
commercial banks, which are owned, 
wholly, or at least majority, by Saudi 
interests. There are also state develop-
ment banks that extend subsidized loans, 
and so forth, to infrastructure and agri-
culture. Since 1988 the banking market 
has been closed to newcomers and no 
single license for operation was offered. 
Before 1976 foreign banks were allowed 
to operate in Saudi Arabia, but after that 
year they had to be put under majority 
local ownership through joint ventures. 
Regulation 
- The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), established in 1952, is the 
Central Bank. Although SAMA is grant-
ed considerable power over the banking 
units sometimes it can be paralyzed from 
performing its functions due to political 
pressure and civil groupings. For exam-
ple one of the major commercial banks 
did not issue its financial annual accounts 
for two years, fearing that this would 
reveal the huge credit granted to influen-
tial persons without sufficient collateral. 
The bank became troubled with nonper-
forming loans beyond its provision and 
SAMA was not able force a solution to 
this problem. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The banking system grew rapidly dur-
ing the I 980s and early 1 990s but start-
ed to shrink afterwards as a reflection of 
the general economic decline. However, 
with 1 S percent retum on average equity 
in 1993, the Saudi banks appear as the 


























Table 4: Continued (6) 
Structure 
With assets of $26.3 billion the Kuwaiti 
banking system is the third largest in the 
GCC. ln the late l 970s and during l 980s 
the banking system in Kuwait was com-
parable to that of Saudi Arabia, but after 
the Al-Manakh crash the economy was 
thrown into deep recession that had neg-
ative effects on the growth of the banking 
system. When some signs of recovery 
started to appear the banking system was 
hit by the Iraqi invasion. There are 6 
commercial banks, 2 specialized banks 
and an lslamic bank. Foreign banks are 
not allowed to have branches or even 
representative offices. Ail commercial 
banks are wholly owned by Kuwaiti 
interests, that is, government or royal 
family. However, in order to attract for-
eign expertise, a law was passes in 1994, 
to allow foreign investors to hold up to 
40 percent of local banks. 
Regulation 
- Ail operating banks, except the Kuwait 
Finance House are regulated by the 
Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK). The 
CBK has been effective in applying a 
standard array of regulatory measures to 
monitor and control the banking system. 
Because of resistance of influential bank 
share holders, the CBK could not enforce 
the scheme of bank mergers that aimed to 
strengthen the banking system after the 
troubles of Al-Manakh financial crisis. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The heyday of the banking system was 
before the financial crisis of 1982. Until 
the implementation of debt settlement 
scheme (DSS) ail banks, except one, 
were technically insolvent and dependent 
on CBK subsidies. The DSS replaces bad 
Joan portfolios with government bonds. 
By implementing the DSS, balance 
sheets of the banks were cleared out and 
the introduction of a disclosure standard 
improved the transparency of these 
banks. Nevertheless, the reduction of 
government bonds in bank portfolios is 
conditional on the government ability to 
recover the debts it took over from banks, 






















Table 4: Continued (7) 
Structure 
The banking system comprises 1 2 com-
merial banks, 8 development banks and 8 
offshore banks and a merchant bank. 
There is not any significant problem fac-
ing the establishment of branches of for-
eign banks. 
The biggest bank in Tunisia is double the 
size of its nearest rivais in terms of 
assets. 
Regulation 
- The Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT), 
which is granted some degree of inde-
pendence, regulates the banking units. 
- The CBT is competent but there are 
complaints of its excessive intervention 
in the banking operations. Despite the 
adoption of some Iiberalization measures 
in 1992, there were more than 1 OO cate-
gories of credit subject to direct control 
of the CBT. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The prospects of the Tunisian banking 
sector are Iimited by the size of its econ-
omy that despite intense efforts to devel-
op remains a marginal one in the region. 
Hence, it is believed that the Tunisian 
banking market will continue to be a 
niche one in the Middle East. 
- lt is argued that the country is 'over-
banked' and considering the develop-
ment of an offshore market in Morocco, 
the validity of a Tunisian offshore to 

























Table 4: Continued (8) 
Structure 
Since the early l 960s the banking system 
has been divided into three main parts: 2 
state owned banks, other commercial 
banks owned jointly by local and foreign 
interests and 4 state-owned specialized 
banks. 
Regulation 
- Bank Al-Maghreb, the Central Bank 
does not control exclusively the banking 
system or monetary policy. Regulation of 
credit institutions, control and disciplin-
ing, which are normally undertaken by a 
central bank are divided in Morocco 
between three separate bodies, which 
rai ses the issue of coordination problems. 
A new law was passed in 1993 to stan-
dardize the legal framework and to sup-
port deregulation measures undertaken 
by the government. Although the law 
covers ail credit institutions, the three 
main development banks are exempted. 
The Central Bank in 1991 lifted credit 
ceilings and allowed some freedom for 
banks to set interest rates. In 1993 banks 
were asked to adopt the Basle standards. 
Source: Based on Cunningham, A. (1995), pp. 27-49; pp. 73-112; 121-135; and pp. 155-171. 
Performance and Prospects 
- The recent creation of an offshore cen-
ter in Tangier and the privatization of 
government shares started to bring a sig-
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Notes 
1 See World Bank (1995), pp. 43-55. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Whalley (1995), pp. 2-3. 
4 Moshirian (1994), p. 327. 
5 Whalley, op. cit., p. 4. 
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6 See Safadi and Laird ( 1996) for a comprehensive analysis of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements and their impact on developing countries. 
7 Article 1 of the GATS defines trade in services in terms of four modes of supply. 
The first mode involves the cross-border supply of a service from one jurisdiction 
to another. The second mode of supply requires the movement of consumers to the 
jurisdiction of suppliers. The third mode of supply is through commercial presence 
of supplier in the jurisdiction of consumers. The is the investment mode which 
caused so much difficulty in the early stages of the services negotiations. Many 
developing countries argued that commitments on services transactions under this 
mode of supply were tantamount to a surrogate obligation on FDI, and they 
expressed unwillingness to ties their investment regimes in this manner. Finally, 
the fourth mode of supply entails the movement of natural persons from one juris-
diction to another. 
8 World Bank, op. cit., p. 55. 
9 The regional classification in the table corresponds to that of the GATT Secretariat. 
10 On this issue see Appendix (A) in Whalley ( 1995 ). 
Il Schultz (1993), p. 215. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Sapir and Winter ( 1994), p. 283. 
14 Schultz (1993), p. 218. 
15 See for ex ample Germidis and Mi chalet ( 1984 ). 
16 Schultz (1993), p. 216. 
17 The deal was reached on June 29th 1995. 
18 Blejer and Sagari ( 1988), p. 20. 
19 Williamson (1993), p. 25. 
20 Ibid., Greenaway and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 257, Gibson and Tsakalotos ( 1994), 
p. 591, Hanson (1994), p. 337. 
21 Greenaway and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 258. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Edwards ( 1990), p. 2. 
24 Williamson, op. cit., p. 26. 
25 Greenaway and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 257-258. 
26 Williamson, op. cit., p. 26. 
27 This section draws from Safadi ( 1996). 
28 Once, trade policy was about regulating commercial relations between national 
economies. Now it is being extended beyond countries' borders and into an ever 
increasing number of areas that have traditionally been considered to belong sole-
ly in the domestic policy domain: standards and regulations, investment policy, 
competition policy, tabor policy and environment policy. 
29 The potential of North-South agreements to expand Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade 
(for example, trade based on differences in relative factor endowments) is significant. 
30 See Appendix ( 1) for further details. 
31 Arab countries except Saudi Arabia have been classified as high risk countries 
considering their capital adequacy standards. 
32 Arab Banking and Finance (1994). pp. 9-10. 
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Four freedoms: goods, ser-
vices, capital, labor. 
Non-discrimination: ail 
modes of supply liberal-
ized. Mutual recognition 
of diplomas and certifica-
tion of professional service 
providers. 
Harmonization of pruden-
tial and safety regulations. 
lmplicit right of non-estab-
lishment. 
No exemption to general 
nondiscrimination require-




National treatment, 'reverse' -
MFN, freedom of mode of sup-
ply, including right of non-estab-
lishment (no local presence). No 
grandfathering. Allows for 
exemptions to national treatment, 
MFN and local presence. No dis-
ciplines on non-discriminatory 
QRs., but ail such measures to be 
listed. Ratcheting provision for 
unilateral liberalization. Aboli-
tion of residency requirements 
for professions. Generic blueprint 
for use by service providers seek-
ing recognition agreements. 
Work programs on standards har-
monization (land transport and 
telecoms). Accession clause. 
CER 
National treatment and market 
access. Freedom of mode of sup-
ply, but right of establishment 
remains subject to national 
investment laws. Righi of non-
establishment. No residency 
requirements for professionals. 
Common labor market. MFN for 
excluded sectors. 
Encouragement of recognition 




Ali modes of supply covered in 
principle. Transparency, MFN, 
and dispute seulement as basic 
general right of non-establish-
ment. 
Encouragement of recognition 
agreements. No general disci-
plines on non-discriminatory 
QRs., but these prohibited under 


























Ali services covered. 
Sector-specific directives 
and regulations. Common 
EC policy for transport. 
State aid subject to restric-
tions and monitoring. 
Government procurement 
of services, including con-
struction, covered. 
Appendix 1: Continued (1) 
NAFT A CER 
Negative list approach to cover- Negative list approach to cover-
age. Universal coverage, except age. Annexes for exceptions to 
for air services subject to bilateral national treatment and market 
air agreements. Annexes on: reser- access obligations. No indefinite 
valions of existing non-conform- exclusions. A number of 
ing investment and cross-border reserved services were removed 
services measures at federal and from reservation lists in 1992 
state/provincial levels; 'unbound' review of the Agreement. 
reservations in sensitive sectors; 
acti vities reserved for the state; 
exceptions to MFN; and existing 
non-discriminatory QRs. Separate 
chapters on telecommunications 
(access to and use of public net-
works and services); financial ser-
vices; temporary entry of business 
people. Timetables for the liberal-
ization of land transport and spe-
cially air services. 
Govemment procurement of ser-
vices and construction covered. 
Positive list for entity coverage; 
negative list approach for services 
coverage. No disciplines on subsi-
dies for services. 
Export subsidies for services 
prohibited. Government pro-
curement of services and other 
subsidies exempted from nation-
al treatment obligation. 
GATS 
Positive list of scheduled sectors. 
Most air transport services exclud-
ed via an annex (indefinite). Other 
annexes deal with telecommunica-
tion (access to and use of public 
networks and services); financial 
services (complemented by an 
understanding of commitments on 
financial services); movement of 
natural persons. 
No disciplines for Government. 
procurement or subsidies. MFN 
obligation for subsidies. Subsidy 
disciplines to be negotiated in 
future. Services and construction 
procedures. under discussion in 





























5) Rules of 
origin 
EC law has direct effect: 
supersedes national law. 
Enforcement by private 
parties and the EC 
Commission. 
Supranational court of jus-
tice. No service specific 
procedures. 
Incorporation in an EC 
Member Sales and head-
quarters or principal place 
of business in the EC. 
Appendix 1: Continued (2) 
NAFfA 
Generic procedures apply to ail 
covered areas under the 
Agreement. Binding dispute set-
tlement available to determine 
whether relation in response to 
non-implementation of a panel 
finding is 'manifestly excessive'. 
Regime for investor-state arbitra-
tion for enforcement of obliga-
tions under the investment chap-
ter. Retaliation between goods 
and services allowed, with the 
exception of financial services. 
National or incorporation for 
investment; substantial business 
activity within any NAFfA coun-
try for cross-border trade in ser-
vices. 
CER 
Informai and non-binding proce-
dures. Only consultation 
required. 
Nationality or residency for nat-
ural persons; incorporation for 
legal persons. 
GATS 
General procedures under the 
WTO. Consultation followed by 
panel. Strict time limits imposed 
for the various stages of the dis-
pute seulement process. Non-
implementation of panel findings 
may result in authorization of 
retaliatory measures. 
Nationality or residency for nat-
ural persons; incorporation under 
law of a Member State and sub-
stantive business operations in a 
Member; or control - ownership 
by nationals of a Member. 
Ownership requires more than 50 
percent of assets; control requires 


























6) Safeguards Only one service specific 
provision relating to the 
common transport policy. 
General balance of pay-
ments and public health 
and safety provisions. 
Appendix 1: Continued (3) 
NAFfA 
No service-specific safeguards, 
other than periodic review of bus 
and truck liberalization with 
scope for modification of phase-
in schedule. Emergency protec-
tion for goods only. General bal-
ance of payments and public 
health and safety provisions. 
CER 
Currently no safeguard measures 
for goods or services. A GATT-
type Article XIX safeguard pro-
vision applied during the transi-
tional period, which has now 
expired. 
Source: Hoekman and Sauvé ( 1994), Table (4). pp. 45-4/i. 
GATS 
Provides for services-specific 
measures to safeguard the bal-
ance of payments and to protect 
service industries injured by 
import competition. However, 
specific rules on the latter to be 
negotiated. Also provides for 
modification of commitments, 

























5 Hans LOfgren, Sherman Robinson and David Nygaard 
Tiger or Turtle? 
Exploring Alternative Futures for Egypt to 2020* 
Introduction 
In the I 980s and early I 990s, the Egyptian economy suffered from slow 
growth in both GDP and productivity, declining real wages, growing unem-
ployment, and falling household incarnes. This discouraging performance 
was combined with chronic macroeconomic imbalances that were manifested 
in large budget deficits and high inflation rates. The simultaneous occurrence 
of a foreign exchange crisis and high levels of food imports in the late I 980s 
suggested that the country's food security was at risk. Over the last few years, 
the situation has improved in important respects, primarily as a result of a pro-
gram for macroeconomic stabilization: the current account is in surplus, infla-
tion has declined, and the budget deficit has been brought under contrai. 
However, economy-wide growth is still low and incarnes are stagnant; Egypt 
has yet to emerge as a Middle East tiger. As Egypt approaches the turn of the 
millennium, the key challenges facing economic policymakers include raising 
real incarnes and reducing unemployment given manageable internai and 
external macro imbalances. 
Egypt's success in meeting these challenges will clearly depend on a wide 
range of factors. This chapter focuses on three critical areas: productivity 
growth, investment and foreign trade, and agricultural water scarcity. In order 
to simulate the effects of alternative scenarios over the period 1990 to 2020, 
a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) mode) of the Egyptian 
economy was developed. The different scenarios were defined drawing on 
Egyptian and South Korean data, the latter were used as proxy for successful 
East Asian economies that provide some indication of potential achievement. 
The next section presents the mode) structure and the data base, followed by 
a definition of the alternative scenarios and an analyzation of the results. The 
chapter then concludes with a brief discussion of the main findings. 
The CGE Model: Structure and Data Sources 
Our dynamic CGE mode) of Egypt, called AGRO-CGE, starts from the static 
Egyptian Land-Water (ELW) mode) of Robinson and Gehlhar ( 1995). These 
* The autlwrs would like Io tlwnk Monica Scata.Ha for research assistance. and Natasha 
M11khe1jee. Farha Gha1111w11 and Marcelle Thomas for editorial comments. 
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models are in the tradition of trade-focused CGE models of developing coun-
tries described in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson ( 1982). Both the ELW and 
AGRO-CGE models draw on earlier models of Egypt, including Lôfgren 
(1995a; 1995b).
1 
Among the distinguishing features of the ELW model is an 
activity-analysis representation of agricultural resource (water and land), 
technology, and supply-demand constraints. Compared to earlier CGE mod-
els ofEgypt, the representation of the agricultural sector in the ELW model is 
relatively detailed.
2 
The AGRO-CGE model extends the ELW model in a number of ways: ( 1) 
the data base is now updated from 1986/87 to 1989/90 and disaggregated to 
match the detailed treatment of the agricultural sector; (2) the treatment of the 
agricultural sector has been disaggregated to capture seasonality in land use 
and links between crop and livestock activities; and (3) the model is now 
dynamic (using a multi-period recursive fonnulation). Conceptually, the 
model can be divided into two modules: a static, within-period, module, the 
core one-period CGE model, and a dynamic, between-period, module where 
parameters and exogenous variables of the core CGE model are updated over 
time. Appendix 1 presents a simplified version of the equations of the static 
module, with a focus on the activity-analysis features of the model. The dis-
cussion here uses no equations. 
The Static Module 
Table 1 shows the disaggregation of factors, institutions, and activities in the 
model. The treatment of institutions is quite aggregate. Among the factors, 
labor and capital are used by ail sectors, while water, summer-land, and win-
ter-land are used only by agricultural crop activities. Given the long-run 
nature of the analysis, it is assumed that ail factors are sectorally mobile. For 
capital, the model solves endogenously for the intersectoral allocation that 
equates the rentai rate across sectors and fully employs the aggregate capital 
stock. In the labor market, however, we allow for unemployment. The labor 
supply fonction is assumed to be infinitely elastic at the 1990 real wage until 
aggregate employment reaches 95 percent of the labor force (a 5 percent 
unemployment rate), at which point the supply curve becomes vertical. For 
water and the two land types, a similar dual regime is specified. If there is 
excess supply, the price is zero. When the resource is scarce, a flexible price 
adjusts to clear the market.3 Like capital rent, the water price is unifonn across 
ail sectors. However, for land and labor, the price (the rent or the wage) is dif-
ferentiated across the demanding sectors on the basis of fixed ratios (calcu-
lated from base-year data). This is a reflection of real-world phenomena that 
are not modeled explicitly. Proportional variations in each of these 
Alternative Futures for Egypt to 2020 169 
differentiated sectoral prices clear the markets when the relevant demand-sup-
ply balances are binding. 
The mode! includes 22 activities and 22 commodities, with 13 agricultur-
al sectors in both. This relatively fine disaggregation of agricultural com-
modities and activities is unique to CGE models of Egypt. The crop activities 
are differentiated according to period of land occupation into winter crops, 
summer crops, and perennial crops. With a few important exceptions, there is 
a one-to-one mapping between activities and commodities. The exceptions 
are the two berseem (clover) activities, which produce the same commodity 
(berseem), and a crop fodder commodity which is also the second output 
(byproduct) of five crop activities: maize, rice, wheat, other summer crops, 
and other winter crops. Among the commodities, ail except berseem, (raw) 
cotton, crop fodder, and government labor services have both exports and 
imports. 
Table 1: Disaggregation of Factors, Institutions, and Activities 
Set 
Institutions 
Factors of production 
Activities (22 sectors) 
Crop Agriculture (12) 












Short Berseem, Long Berseem, Wheat, 
Winter Vegetables, Other 
Winter Crops 
Sommer crops 
Cotton, Maize, Rice, Summer 
Vegetables, Other Summer Crops 
Perennial crops 
Fruit. Sugarcane 
Livestock, Oil (Crude Oil and Natural 
Gas), Food Processing, Cotton 
Ginning, Textiles, Other Industry, 
Electricity, Construction, 
Government Labor Services, Other Services 
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The production technologies are summarized in Figure 1. Producers are 
assumed to maximize profits given their technology, specified by a nested 
CES (Constant Elasticity of Supply) value-added function, and fixed 
(Leontief) intei:mediate input coefficients. The arguments of the value-added 
functions are labor, capital and, for the crop sectors, a land/water aggregate. 
The latter is made up of land and water in fixed proportions. Thus, for crops, 
substitutability is possible between land, capital and the land/water aggregate 
on the level of the value-added functions; there is no substitutability between 
land and water. Two major agronomie area constraints are captured: the area 
of short berseem is constrained to equal the cotton area, and the cotton area 
is limited to one third of the land not covered by perennial crops. For the oil 
activity (crude oil and natural gas), it would be erroneous to assume that out-
put levels and factor use can vary in response to profitability considerations 
in a manner which parallels other sectors. Instead, the quantities of output 
and factor use for the oil activity are fixed at the 1990 level. In the absence 
of a more detailed treatment of this activity, its behavioral rules and sustain-
able productive capacity (most importantly determined by the levels of 
petroleum and gas reserves), such an assumption is an appropriate simplifi-
cation of a more complex reality. Finally, the output of the activity for 
government labor services is in effect fixed; the government, the sole deman-
der, demands a fixed quantity of the non-traded commodity produced by this 
activity. 
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There is one exception to the assumption of fixed intermediate input coef-
ficients: the intermediate (feed) input coefficients of the livestock activity are 
flexible in the context of livestock producer minimization of feed costs sub-
ject to a limited degree of substitutability between different feeds (given by a 
CES fonction) and a fixed aggregate feed requirement per unit of the livestock 
activity. The livestock sector is treated differently given the crucial impor-
tance of links between crop and livestock activities in Egypt's agriculture, as 
crop activities supply the livestock activity with the bulk of its intermediate 
feed inputs. 
Domestic factor incomes are split among the domestic institutions (gov-
emment, enterprises, and households) in fixed shares. The fact that, if water 
is scarce, its income (like land incomes) accrues to the household. This is 
compatible with the assumption that proprietary rights to water have been 
assigned to the current users.4 In addition to factor incomes, govemment rev-
enue consists of transfers from the rest of the world (fixed in foreign curren-
cy) and taxes, direct taxes from households and enterprises, indirect taxes 
from domestic activities, and import tariffs. All taxes are ad valorem. 
Transfers from the govemment and aggregate govemment consumption are 
fixed shares of nominal GDP. After having paid for a fixed quantity of labor, 
the govemment consumes remaining commodities in fixed value shares. 
Enterprise income (from factors and govemment transfers) is distributed to 
households after subtracting taxes, savings, and transfers to the rest of the 
world (fixed in foreign currency). In addition to factor income and payments 
from enterprises, households receive transfers (labor remittances) from the 
rest of the world (fixed in foreign currency). Total household income is used 
to pay taxes, save (according to an exogenous saving propensity), and con-
sume. Sectoral consumption demand is determined by a linear expenditure 
system, expressed in per-capita form. 
The rest of the world supplies imports and demands exports. Import prices 
are exogenous in foreign currency (an infinite price-elasticity of supply). 
Exports are demanded according to constant-elasticity demand curves, the 
price-elasticities of which are high but less than infinite. The treatment of oil 
exports deviates from this pattern: Egypt, being a small supplier of this high-
ly homogeneous commodity, is facing an infinitely elastic demand at the 
exogenous world price. The Armington assumption is used to model the 
choice between imports and domestic output, which are assumed to be imper-
fect substitutes. More specifically, to the extent that a commodity is import-
ed, all domestic demands, household and govemment consumption, invest-
ment demand, and intermediate demands, are for the same composite com-
modity, with the mix between imports and domestic output determined by the 
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assumption that domestic demanders minimize cost subject to imperfect sub-
stitutability, captured by a CES aggregation fonction. Similarly, the allocation 
of domestic output between exports and domestic sales is determined on the 
assumption that domestic producers maximize profits subject to imperfect 
transformability between these two alternatives, expressed by a constant-elas-
ticity-of-transformation (CET) fonction. These assumptions, imperfect substi-
tutability and transformability, grant the domestic price system a certain 
degree of independence from international prices and dampen export and 
import responses to changes in the producer environment. Domestic prices of 
domestic outputs and composite commodities are all flexible, performing the 
task of clearing relevant markets in a competitive setting where both suppli-
ers and demanders are price-takers. 
The macro system constraints (or macro closures) determine the manner 
in which the accounts for the government, the rest of the world, and savings-
investment are brought into balance. Government savings are fixed; the gov-
ernment adjusts the direct tax rates of enterprises and households proportion-
ally to generate the desired savings level. Foreign savings are also fixed (but 
in foreign currency), leaving the task of generating balance for the rest-of-the-
world account (that is, equality between Egypt's foreign currency earnings 
and outlays) to a flexible real exchange rate. On the spending side of the sav-
ings-investment balance, aggregate investment is a fixed share of real GDP. 
On the savings side, the enterprise savings rate is assumed to be flexible, vary-
ing to generate a level of total savings needed to finance aggregate invest-
ment.5 
The primary data sources for the disaggregated mode) SAM (a 56x56 
matrix) are: CAPMAS' SAM and input-output tables for 1989/90 (CAPMAS 
1995; 1994); USAID and Ministry of Agriculture data on agricultural crops 
(USAID 1992); and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) data on agri-
cultural trade. Compared to the CAPMAS' SAM, the disaggregated mode) 
SAM is rearranged and has a more aggregate representation of non-agricul-
tural sectors (9 sectors instead of 14), but provides a considerably more 
detailed view of agriculture ( 13 sectors instead of 2). A macro version of the 
mode) SAM, identical to the disaggregated SAM except for the aggregated 
depiction of activities and commodities, is shown in Table 2. A variety of 
sources were used for estimates of elasticities for the Annington, CET, CES 
(production), LES (household consumption), and export-demand fonctions 
(the values used are given in Table A2. I in the Appendix). Sectoral wage and 
land rent differentials were derived from CAPMAS (1993) and USAID 
( 1992). On the basis of SAM data, and independent estimates of the capital 
stock (fEbn 113.3) and depreciation (fEbn4.48), rates of depreciation 
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( 4.0 percent) and net profitability (36.5 percent) were calculated (World Bank 
1994, Annex B, Table 42; CAPMAS 1995, p. 75). Sectoral capital stocks were 
derived on the assumption of equal sectoral depreciation and gross profit 
rates. 
The Dynamic Module 
The within-period, static mode) is solved for 1990 (the base year), 1993, 
1995, and every five years thereafter until 2020. Between the static-model 
solutions, selected parameters are updated in the dynamic (between-period) 
module, either using lagged endogenous variables (from solutions in previous 
periods) or exogenously (on the basis of trends). Parameters for the capital 
stock and consumer demand equations are changed endogenously. The capi-
tal stock is updated given previous investment and depreciation, extrapolating 
for the inter-period years. Simulated per-capita incomes and budget shares 
enter the fonctions for updating the parameters of the LES consumer demand 
fonctions.
6 
The parameters for population, labor force, and total factor pro-
ductivity by activity are updated exogenously. 
Approach to Model Solution 
CGE models are typically formulated and solved as systems of simultaneous 
equations exclusively made up of strict equalities. To permit the inclusion of 
inequality constraints for resources generating the desired dual-price regime, 
the ELW mode) was solved as an optimization problem, maximizing an objec-
tive fonction, subject to a set of constraints, made up of a mixture of strict 
equalities and inequalities. The AGRO-CGE mode) deals with this phenome-
non in a different manner: it is formulated as a mixed complementarity prob-
lem (MCP), consisting of a set of simultaneous equations (once again a mix 
of strict equalities and inequalities), but without an objective fonction. The 
inequalities, which are linked to bounded (price) variables, apply to labor, 
land and water. The GAMS modeling software is used both to generate the 
disaggregated SAM and to implement the model. The mode) is solved with 
PATH and MILES, two solvers for mixed complementarity problems.7 
Simulations 
The mode) is used to simulate the Egyptian economy for the period 1990-2020. 
The simulations are divided into three categories exploring, respectively, the 
effects on economic performance of alternative scenarios for productivity 
growth and investment rates, foreign tracte and agricultural water supplies. 
The basic assumptions for the dynamic (30-year) simulations are presented 




Act Comm. Factors Institutions Savings Taxes/Subsidies/Tariff 
1. 2. 3a. 3b. 3c. 4a. 4b. 4c. 4d. 5 6a. 6b. 6c. 6d. 
1. Activity 106.6 14.5 
2. Commodity 52.8 54.2 4.9 24.7 
3. Factors g: 
3a. Labor 17.9 7.2 8.3 ;:s 
3b. Capital 39.8 
..., 
3e. Land 8.0 ~ Oti 
4. Institutions ~ .:s 
4a. Households 33.5 19.8 8.0 4.6 -1.2 1.0 ~ 4b. Enterprises 19.8 1.4 ~ 
4c. Govemment 0.0 2.0 4.3 -1.9 4.2 2.9 ~ 
t:l 
4b. Rest of World 27.2 2.5 ;:s 
~ 
5. Savings 10.4 11.3 -0.9 3.9 <;:, ~ 
;:;-
6.Taxes/Subs/Tariffs ..., <;:, 
6a. lnd.Taxes 4.3 
;:s 
t:l 
6b. Subsidies -1.9 5-
6c. Dir. Taxes 1.1 3.1 " 6d. Tariffs 2.9 t:l ~ 5.: 
7. Total 121.0 136.6 33.5 39.8 8.0 65.7 21.4 11.5 29.7 24.7 4.3 -1.9 4.2 2.9 ~ 
Ot) 
Note: On/y column totals are shown; for each account, the row total is identicql to the column total. 1 t:l t:l a. 
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in Table 3. The values for transfers from the rest of the world and the 
current-account deficit for 1993 and onward reflect a judgement about what 
is considered reasonable and sustainable in light of recent improvements in 
Egypt's current account balance.
8 
They imply that Egypt's trade deficit 
remains unchanged in absolute real terms but, as the economy grows, will 
decline relative to the overall size of the economy. The annual growth rate for 
export demand is at the level of Egypt's export growth for the period 1983-
1994 (World Bank 1995, pp. 256-257). Future changes in the supply of two 
key agricultural resources, land and water, are difficult to predict. With regard 
to land, reclamation of Jess fertile lands and the transfer of older, more fertile 
lands to non-agricultural uses represent two opposing forces. For water, 
opposing forces are also at work: increased efficiency and improved exploita-
tion may raise the supply while growing demands from upstream Nile coun-
tries and non-agricultural sectors domestically may force the agricultural sec-
tor to manage with less.
9 
Here, it is assumed that water availability declines 
gradually between 1990 and 2020, reaching a supply in 2020 that is 20 per-
cent Jess than in 1990. 1° For agricultural land, there is no supply change: in 
"efficiency" units, land reclamation is assumed to equal Joss of lands to non-
agricultural uses. 
Scenarios for Productivity Growth and lnvestment 
The specific assumptions underlying the three scenarios that are simulated are 
presented in Table 4. On the pessimistic side, the "Turtle" extrapolates the rel-
atively dilatory economic performance of the l 980s and early l 990s, a peri-
od characterized by unfavorable external conditions and stagnant domestic 
policies. The more optimistic "Tiger" scenario postulates a decisive break 
from the past, incorporating investment rates and productivity growth, but not 
export growth, typical of successful East Asian economies. The third scenario, 
labeled the "Urban Tiger", explores the consequences of low agricultural pro-
ductivity growth in a setting with high aggregate investment rates and rapid 
productivity growth for the rest of the economy. 
Table 5 shows selected results for these three scenarios, compared with 
data for 1990 when relevant. 11 The message of the Turtle scenario is strong: 
extrapolation on the basis of the investment and productivity performance of 
the l 980s produces a very discouraging outcome. Per-capita GDP and house-
hold consumption decline and an unsustainable level of unemployment 
emerges in the labor market. In face of a growing budget share for foodstuffs, 
the food trade deficit increases. 
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Table 3: General Assomptions for Simulations 1990-2020 
1990 
Item value 
Population size (mn.) 56.3 
Labor force (mn.) 15.5 
Labor force participation (%) 27 .5 
Export demand 
Transfers from RoW to 9.3 
household ( 1990 fEbn) 
Transfers from RoW to 2.0 
govemment (1990 fEbn) 
Current-Account Deficit 3.9 
(1990 fEbn) 
Current Govemment Savings -0.9 
(1990 fEbn) 
Agricultural land (mn. feddans) 6.1 
Agricultural water supply (bn m3) 32.9 
1993-2020 
projection 
+ 1.65% per year 
+2.62% per year 
graduai increase to 
37.2% in 2020 






graduai decline to 80% 
of base supply in 2020 
Sources: World Bank ( 1994b, p. 210) and United Nations projections. 
Note: ln 2020, the size of the population and the /abor force are 92.0 and 33.6 million, respec-
tive/y. Water quantities are measured in terms of consumptive use (a/ter deducting /osses in the 
distribution system). For/990, it is assumed that water supply very marginal/y exceeded 
recorded water use. 32. 9 bn m·' (World Bank J 993a, p. 24 ). 
Table 4: Assomptions for Alternative Prodoctivity and 
Investment Scenarios 
Item Turtle Tiger Urban Tiger 
lnvestment share of GDP (%) 20.2 25.0 25.0 
Factor Productivity Growth 
(%/year) 0.32 2.5 Agriculture: 0.32 
Oth. sectors: 2.50 
Incremental Capital-Output Ratio 4.8 4.0 4.0 
Sources: World Bank ( 1993c, pp. 42 and 56; 1993b, p. 45; 1994a, Annex B, Table 42); authors' 
ca/culations. 
Note: For 1990 the investment share implicit in CAPMAS' SAM, 21.6 percent, is used. A slightly 
Lower value is used for la ter periods in the Turtle scenario in light of an observed dec/ine in the 
GDP investment share in the early 1990s. 
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In reality, one would expect that the dramatic increase in unemployment 
for the Turtle scenario would be tempered by a decline in real wages. To test 
the sensitivity ofthese results to the current assumption of a downwardly rigid 
real wage, the Turtle scenario was repeated with a flexible market-clearing 
wage at the 1990 unemployment rate throughout the period 1990-2020. The 
general trend was similar. The main difference is that the increase in unem-
ployment was replaced by a decline in real wages, by 3.2 percent per year, sig-
naling a dramatically different impact on income distribution. With a steady 
unemployment rate and declining wages, output growth was stronger, GDP at 
factor cost grew by 1.5 percent per year, and the small fall in household con-
sumption was replaced by a minor increase (the index for household per capi-
ta income ended up at 104.7 in 2020, from a base of 100 in 1990). 
Nevertheless, the overall results are quite insensitive to the assumption about 
the labor market. 
The outcome for the Tiger scenario dramatically illustrates the impact of 
achieving higher levels of investment and productivity growth over a 30-year 
period. GDP per capita grows at more than 3 percent a year, per-capita real 
household consumption is almost doubled, and the unemployment rate now 
declines slightly. The trade deficit, which is fixed in foreign currency, repre-
sents 16 percent of GDP in 1990 but, as GDP grows rapidly, it falls to 6 per-
cent in 2020. Disaggregating the trade deficit, by the year 2020 there is an 
increase in the food deficit and a shift to a surplus in non-food items, a high-
ly plausible tendency for a land- and water-constrained economy. While the 
real exchange rate appreciates for the slow-growth Turtle scenario, it now 
depreciates. This reflects the fact that, with relatively rapid growth in output 
and demand (including import demand), depreciation is needed to encourage 
exports and discourage imports up to the point of generating the fixed aggre-
gate trade deficit. 
The GDP share of agriculture declines strongly for the Tiger scenario and, 
to a lesser extent, also for the Turtle scenario, as growth in agriculture is much 
lower than growth in the rest of the economy. This trend, typical of growing 
economies, reflects the inverse relationship between growing income and the 
share spent on food, as well as the constraining impact on agriculture in Egypt 
of fixed or declining levels of scarce, sector-specific resources. Another struc-
tural change shown in Table 5 that is particularly strong for the Tiger scenario 
revolves around Egypt's economic relationship with the outside world: in the 
context of a liberal trading environment and a declining trade deficit (as share 
of GDP), the shares of export and import in GDP, which were substantial 
already in 1990, expand dramatically. 
Table 5: Results for Alternative Productivity and Investment Scenarios 
2020 Value or 1990-2020 Growth Rate: 
Value: 1990 Turtle Tiger Urban Tiger 
GDP per capila al market prices (% growlh/year) 
Household per capila consumplion(index 1990 = 1 OO) 
Unemploymenl (%) 
Imporls (% of Nominal GDP) 
Exporls (% of Nominal GDP) 
Trade deficil (% of Nominal GDP) 
Total 
Food & agriculture 
Other 
Exchange rate (;Œ/$: index 1990 = 1 OO) 
Wheal self-sufficiency rate (%) 
Food self-sufficiency rate (%) 































Note: Units are indicated in the first column. "1990" column refers to base year values: a dash (---) indicates 
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The third scenario, the "Urban Tiger", was formulated to gauge the impor-
tance of the agricultural sector in the (Tiger) context of rapid growth and a 
diminishing agricultural share in GDP. It differs from the basic Tiger scenario 
in that, for the agricultural sectors, the optimistic assumption of annual total 
factor producti vity growth at a rate of 2.5 percent is replaced by the Turtle rate 
of 0.32 percent (Table 4). Compared to the Tiger scenario, performance dete-
riorates (Table 5), aggregate growth is significantly lower, agricultural growth 
falls by more than 50 percent. and unemployment in 2020 is much higher than 
in 1990. In the food and agricultural area, Egypt is becoming more heavily 
reliant on the outside world; in particular, there is a dramatic fall in the rate of 
wheat self-sufficiency which probably would be considered unacceptable to 
Egyptian policymakers. The overall implication is that the performance of the 
agricultural sector will remain crucial also in the next century, even if non-
agricultural growth is fairly rapid. Hence, it is important to nurture support-
ing activities (such as agricultural res,earch and extension services) while pre-
serving existing agricultural resources from environmental degradation and 
other sources of productivity losses. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Foreign Trade 
The above scenarios assumed that import tariff rates remained at the levels of 
1990 whereas export demand grows at an an nuai rate of 6 percent. 
12 
We will 
here assess the effects of tariff cuts and more successful penetration of export 
markets in the context of the Tiger scenario. For tariff cuts, the first scenario 
assumes the removal of ail agricultural tariffs, and the second the removal of 
tariffs across ail sectors. ln both cases, the relevant tariff rates are set at zero 
starting from 1993. For export demand, we test the impact of doubling the 
annual grbwth rate to 12 percent, close to South Korea's record for the period 
1973-1993 (World Bank 1995, pp. 396-397). 
Table 6 shows the results for these three scenarios compared to the basic 
Tiger scenario and 1990 data. For both tariff cuts scenarios, the aggregate 
impact is positive but very minor: the indicators for per-capita GDP growth, 
household consumption, and unemployment ail show some small improve-
ment. The positive effects are slightly stronger for the scenario with full tariff 
removal. In reality, tariff cuts may boost productivity growth by increasing the 
exposure of domestic producers to international competition; however, such 
potential effects are not captured in the current model. Given the closure rule 
for the government account, the tariff cuts lead to a shortfall in government 
revenue that is compensated by an increase in direct tax rates. Compared to 
the basic Tiger scenario, the direct tax rates are 8 percent higher for the agri-
cultural tariff eut and 72 percent higher for the economy-wide tariff cut. 13 For 
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both scenarios, there is some additional depreciation, strengthening the com-
petitiveness of tradables sufficiently to generate the same trade deficit as with 
tariff protection, but in a less distortionary fashion. 
For the third scenario, with more rapid growth in export demand, the 
repercussions are quite strong. By 2020, the economy has reached "full" 
f 14 employment, an unemployment rate o 5 percent, as opposed to 19 percent 
for the basic Tiger scenario, an achievement that marginally boosts aggregate 
growth. To validate the initial trade deficit (fixed in foreign currency), the 
exchange rate appreciates strongly compared to the other Tiger scenarios; this 
has a strong positive impact on real household consumption. Thus, this sce-
nario demonstrates that strong export performance can have a decisive impact 
on real household welfare and on the economy's ability to absorb marginal 
labor. 
Table 6: Results for Alternative Foreign Trade Scenarios 
2020 value or 1990-2020 growth rate 
Agricultural Ali Rapid 
Tarilîs Tariffs Export demand 
Value; 1990 Tiger Removed Removed Growth 
GDP per capita at market prices 
(% growth/Year) 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.5 
Household per capita consumption 
(Index 1990=1000) 100.0 194.0 194.4 194.6 288.8 
Unemployment (%) 20.0 18.5 17.7 15.5 5.0 
lmports (%of Nominal GDP) 34.7 55.0 56.2 59.3 36.9 
Exports (%of Nominal GDP) 18.5 49.0 50.1 53.0 34.1 
Trade deficit (%of Nominal GDP) 
Total 16.3 6.0 6.1 6.4 2.8 
Food & agriculture 10.2 11.8 12.2 12.7 10.3 
Other 6.1 -5.7 -6.1 -6.3 -7.6 
Exchange rate 
(fFJ$; inddex 1990=100) 100.0 127.9 131.0 135.3 83.0 
Wheat self-sufficiency rate (%) 44.6 40.8 38.5 39.7 10.8 
Food self-sufficiency rate(%) 79.3 76.0 75.8 76.5 78.3 
GDP at factor cost (% growth/year) 
Total 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.4 
Agriculture 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 
Non-Agriculture 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.8 
Share of agriculture in real 
GDP at factor cost (%) 29.1 17.4 17.3 17.1 18.3 
Note: See Table 5 for explanations. 
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In the Egyptian environment, water is not priced and the right to use water 
is associated with land ownership. In our mooel, the simulated value of the 
land/water aggregate arises from its marginal productivity in proouction and 
incorporates both the value of the raw land and the water right associated with 
land ownership. It is assumed that both land and water are allocated efficient-
ly across the different crops. The mooel simulations can be use to allocate the 
total value of the land/water aggregate between raw land and water, a value 
which is unobservable in Egypt since there are not separate and liberalized 
markets for raw land and water. 
Figure 2 shows the water share of the total value of the land/water aggre-
gate for three of the above scenarios: Turtle, Tiger, and Urban Tiger. The 
results indicate that over time, as water becomes relatively scarce, its value to 
farmers will exceed that of raw land. The differences in the water shares 
across the scenarios and over time reflects the extent to which agricultural 
commodity demands are directed toward water-intensive crops, in its tum a 
reflection of economic interactions, both domestically and with the outside 
world. The fact that, water-intensive crops (for example ri ce) tend to have rel-
atively low income-elasticities of demand lowers the value share for water, 
other things being equal. 
Figure 2: Share of Total Value of Land/Water Aggregate 
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Sensitivity Analysis: Water Supply and Productivity Growth 
In the long run, there is considerable uncertainty about Egypt's future agri-
cultural water supplies. In the basic Tiger scenario, the assumption of a simul-
taneous 2.5 percent productivity growth in output per unit of both land and 
water may be excessively optimistic. While the Green Revolution has led to 
increases in land yields of this magnitude, they have often been associated 
with an increase in water use per land unit. 
Table 7: Results for Tiger Scenarios with Different Cuts 
in Water Supply 
2020value or 1990-2020 growth rate: 
Value: 
1990 Tiger-0 Tiger-20 Tiger-40 Tiger-60 
Water supply eut(%) 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 
GDP per capita at market 
prices (%growth/year) 3.19 3.10 2.93 2.61 
Household per capita 
consumption (index 1990= 100) 100.0 199.6 194.0 182.5 164.3 
Unemployment (%) 20.0 15.0 18.5 24.0 34.4 
lmports (%of Nominal GDP) 34.7 54.5 55.0 59.8 63.5 
Exports (%of Nominal GDP) 18.5 48.5 49.0 53.4 56.4 
Trade deficit (% of Nominal GDP) 
Total 16.3 6.0 6.0 6.5 7.1 
Food & agriculture 10.2 10.4 11.8 15.8 19.5 
Other 6.1 -4.4 -5.7 -9.4 -12.4 
Exchange rate 
(ff/$: index 1990=100) 100.0 132.3 127.9 128.2 124.3 
Wheat self-sufficiency rate(%) 44.6 32.7 40.8 47.8 32.6 
Food self-sufficiency rate(%) 79.3 77.0 76.0 69.6 65.8 
GDP at factor cost (% growth/year) 
Total 5.16 5.09 4.99 4.75 
Agriculture 3.52 3.33 2.91 2.01 
Non-Agriculture 5.65 5.61 5.56 5.43 
Share of agriculture in real) 
GDP at factor cost (%) 29.l 18.0 17.4 15.8 13.0 
Note: See Table 5 for explanations. 
To explore the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions about 
water use, we ran a series of variations on the Tiger scenario. We reduced agri-
cultural water supplies in steps of 10 percent, with declines ranging from 0 to 
60 percent and taking place gradually between 1990 and 2020. (The.basic 
Tiger scenario specified a 20 percent decline.) These experiments can be seen 
as simulating the impact of smaller water supplies or, alternatively, they can 
be interpreted as exploring the impact of lower productivity growth for water 
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relative to other factors, including land. For example, a 50 percent decrease in 
the water supply (or in water productivity) in 30 years corresponds to an annu-
al productivity decline of 2.28 percent. The same outcome could be achieved 
by reducing water productivity growth from 2.5 percent to 0.22 percent per 
year; that is, to a growth rate below the Turtle level. 15 
The results of these sensitivity simulations are summarized in Table 7 and 
Figures 3 and 4. Cuts up to 20 percent do not impose severe constraints on the 
economy. It is apparently not too difficult to marginally change the crop mix 
to make better use of water, especially given that the water constraint was not 
binding in the base year. For larger cuts, the effects are more severe. Never-
the-less, the changes in most economy-wide indicators, GDP growth, house-
hold consumption, and trade, are manageable even for a 60 percent eut in 
water availability (or, from a different perspective, an annual decline in water 
supplies by 0.5 percent with no change in water productivity). The major 
exception is unemployment: in 2020, it encompasses 34 percent of the labor 
force (as opposed to 19 percent for the basic Tiger), illustrating the high sen-
sitivity of labor absorption to marginal changes in growth. 
Figure 3: Factor Unemployment Rates with Reduced Water 
Supplies, Tiger Scenario 
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Within the agricultural sector, the changes are more drastic. Compared to 
the basic Tiger, agricultural growth shrinks considerably, reaching merely 2 
percent per year, when a 60 percent water eut is imposed. In response to water 
ruts, agricultural capital and labor intensities increase along with increased 
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relative agricultural prices. 
16 
In 1990, the real share in agricultural value-
added of the land/water aggregate was 38 percent. By 2020, this share ranges 
from 26 percent for no water eut to 21 percent for a 60 percent eut. As shown 
in Figure 3, a growing share of summer land is left uncultivated and, starting 
between 40 percent and 50 percent cuts, winter land also is taken out of pro-
duction. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 4, the water share in aggregate water 
and land incarnes climbs from zero to 1 OO percent. As land retums decline, it 
would become easier to convert agricultural land to non-agricultural uses. 
Reduced water supplies bring about significant changes in the cropping pat-
tern; in this environment, cotton, fruit and vegetables are relatively competi-
tive whereas other crops, including rice, virtually disappear. Given their lower 
water requirements, winter crops, including wheat, are favored since they 
make more productive use of the remaining scarce water. (See Table A2.4 for 
details.) 
Figure 4: Share of Land/Water Income with Reduced Water 
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Conclusions 
In 1960, Egypt's per capita income was 60 percent above South Korea's. 
Thirty years later, it reached merely 11 percent of the South Korean level 
(Mason 1984, p. 8; World Bank 1992, p. 219). The exceptional South Korean 
performance and the relatively lackluster Egyptian growth reflect differences 
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over the long run in investment levels, choice of development strategy, poli-
cy management, and other considerations. This chapter considers alternative 
future scenarios for Egypt from 1990 to 2020, also a period of 30 years, using 
a dynamic CGE mode) with a detailed treatment of the agricultural sector. In 
terms of method, the mode), expressed as a mixed-complementarity problem, 
formulates agricultural resource constraints in a fashion that is innovative in 
the context of CGE models, permitting not only full utilization with flexible 
prices but also excess supplies with a zero price. In ail scenarios, we assume 
that Egypt's economy will be market-oriented and competitive; that there will 
be mechanisms in place for achieving an efficient allocation of water in agri-
culture; and that growth will occur in an environment of general macroeco-
nomic balance. As indicated by its title, this chapter should be seen as 
exploratory: the mode) needs to be more closely adapted to Egypt's econom-
ic structure; better data is needed; and the empirical foundations for the alter-
native scenarios may be strengthened.
17 
We consider two broad scenarios: the "Turtle," which extrapolates on the 
basis of the productivity growth and investment levels characteristic of 
Egypt's recent past; and the "Tiger," which combines key aspects of success-
ful East Asian economic performance (using Korean data as a proxy) with 
Egyptian resource constraints and production structure. The results for the 
Turtle scenario are grim. Per-capita income remains roughly the sam.e in 2020 
as 30 years earlier. As the country's labor force grows dramatically, the labor 
market moves toward a crisis, with some unsustainable combination of 
increasing unemployment and falling real wages. On the other hand, the 
"Tiger" scenarios, which assume that Egypt achieves rates of investment and 
productivity growth typical of South Korea and other high-performance East 
Asian economies, are more encouraging. When combined with rapid growth 
in export demand, per-capita household income almost triples, while full 
employment is also achieved. 
Sensitivity analysis of the results for the Tiger scenario suggests that 
export-demand growth and balanced rapid productivity growth (not excluding 
agriculture) are of crucial importance. While having a positive effect, the 
removal of distorting import tariffs is alone of minor importance. Increasing 
water scarcity (due to water culs or lower water productivity growth) have a 
strong negative impact on agricultural performance and labor absorption with-
out, however, significantly reducing growth in aggregate output and income. 
The unemployment rate is the aggregate indicator that is most sensitive to 
changes in economic performance, assuming downward rigidity of real wages. 
The broader policy implications from this analysis are clear: Egypt should 
attach top priority to measures that promise to raise balanced long-run 
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productivity growth (covering both agriculture and other sectors); encourage 
high investment rates; and seek foreign trade agreements that give access to 
export markets while lowering import tariffs in retum. The gains from 
increased exports far outweigh the costs of
1 
structural adjustments required 
from opening domestic markets. In searching for a successful Egyptian devel-
opment strategy, it is potentially fruitful to leam from South Korea and other 
successful East Asian economies.
18 
Notes 
For surveys of earlier CGE models of Egypt, see El-Laithy (1994) and Lôfgren 
(l 994b). 
2 Dethier (1985) is an early agriculture-focused CGE model of Egypt. Hazell et al. 
( 1995) use a detailed, partial-equilibrium, programming model of the Egyptian 
agricultural sector, extended in Lôfgren (l 995b) for anal y sis of water policy. 
Lofgren ( I 995a) is a CGE model adapted to the structure of Egypt's economy. The 
representation of agriculture in the AGRO-CGE model is in the tradition of Hazell 
et al., although Jess detailed. 
3 Compared to labor, the difference is that, for these agriculture-specific resources, 
the supply curve is horizontal at a price of zero whenever demand is Jess than the 
fixed quantity supplied 
4 For a survey of issues related to water markets in LDCs, see Rosegrant and 
Binswanger (1994). 
5 Savings from the other sources, govemment, households, and the rest of the world, 
are not free to equilibrate aggregate savings-investment. Govemment and rest-of-
the-world savings are exogenous while household savings are a fixed share of 
income. 
6 More specifically, simulated values for per-capita consumption, commodity 
prices, and real per-capita income enter the relationships from which the LES para-
meters are derived. The Frisch parameter is adjusted on the basis of changes in 
simulated per-capita income, drawin§ on a function estimated by Lluch, Powell 
and Williams ( 1977, p. 248): F=-36X "where F =Frisch parameter, X= per-capi-
ta income. 
7 For GAMS, see Brooke et al. (1988). Rutherford (1995) provides more informa-
tion on PATH and MILES. 
8 The current account was in deficit between 1974 and 1990, when it moved into 
surplus. Since 1992, the surpluses have declined gradually from a high of $2.8bn. 
(EIU 1995, pp. 3 and 9). We simply assume a zero deficit throughout the period 
1993-2020. 
9 For a discussion of the different factors involved, see Abu-Zeid ( 1993) and World 
Bank (l 993a, pp. 23-29). The basic scenarios of this chapter have been formulat-
ed in the spirit of Richards (1995): Egypt's agriculture is or is about to become 
supply-constrained for water as total supply is unlikely to increase significantly at 
the same time as non-agricultural water demands are likely to grow. 
IO The impact of declines in water supplies are indistinguishable from the impact of 
lower rates of productivity growth for water. The sensitivity of the results to alter-
native cuts in agricultural water supply (or productivity) is analyzed later. 
11 Tables A2. l-3 in Appendix 2 present cropping patterns and resource prices for the 
different scenarios. 
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12 For import tariffs, aggregate figures in CAPMAS' SAM implied higher rates for 
individual commodities than suggested by available disaggregated information 
(American Embassy 1992, p. 41 ). Drawing on this information, this inconsistency 
was overcome by assuming a uniform low tariff for staple crops (primarily grains, 
set at 8 percent), and a uniform high tariff for other crops (primarily vegetables and 
fruits, calibrated to 77 percent). The results presented in the chapter do not seem 
to be sensitive to the specific levels of these two uniform rates. 
13 For example, in 2020 for the Tiger scenario, household and enterprise direct tax 
rates are, respectively, 1.8 percent and 15.5 percent. For the scenario with an econ-
omy-wide tariff eut, the coriesponding rates are 3.1 percent and 26.7 percent. 
14 However, the improvement in the average real wage is quite small, indicating that 
the labor-market bottleneck constrains aggregate growth only to a minor extent. 
15 The corresponding annual rates of decline are 0.35 percent for a 10 percent eut, 
0.74 percent for a 20 percent eut, 1.18 percent for a 30 percent eut, 1.69 percent 
for a 40 percent eut, and 3.01 percent for a 60 percent eut. 
16 The ease with which this takes place is determined by the elasticity of substitution 
between factors in the agricultural value-added functions, here a value of 0.4 is 
used. The fact that substitutability between water and land is zero may lead to a 
negative bias for these scenarios. 
17 In terms of the model structure, it may be desirable to strengthen the hydrological 
aspects, and explore means of making the mix between water and land price-
responsive (while still permitting a dual market regime for both water and land). 
It would be of interest to incorporate stylized facts reflecting the impact of eco-
nomic openness on productivity growth along the lines in Lewis et al. (1995). 
18 For recent research assessing the relevance of East Asian industrial policy to 
Egypt, see Said et al. (1995). 
19 See Rutherford (1995) for a description of MCP algorithms, their application to 
CGE mod-els, and their implementation in the GAMS language. 
20 For other choices of numeraire, relative solution prices will equal relative shadow 
prices. 
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Appendix 1: The Egyptian AGRO-CGE Model 
The Egyptian model is an economy-wide, computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model that disaggregates the agricultural sector and provides special 
treatment of land and water. The AGRO-CGE model combines an activity-
analysis representation of agricultural resource (land and water) technology with 
a neoclassical representation elsewhere. lnequality constraints impose upper 
limits on the use of agricultural resources. White the activity-analysis specifica-
tion of agricultural technology in this version is simple, the model is capable of 
replicating or being linked to more elaborate agricultural sector models. 
Table A 1.1 provides a listing of the equations of a simplified version of the 
AGRO-CGE model. The simplified model in Table A.1.1 focuses on produc-
tion technology and ignores international trade, income distribution, and 
macro aggregates such as savings, investment, the balance of trade, and the 
government deficit. Equations 1 to 5 give the production structure, following 
the nesting in Figure 1. Equations 6 to 13 define cost prices and the various 
first-order conditions for profit maximization. Equations 14 and 15 map fac-
tor income to product demand, white equations 16 to 20 provide market-clear-
ing conditions. Finally, equations 21 to 26 bring together a number of rev-
enue-expenditure identities arising from the homogeneity of the various 
underlying fonctions. These identities are implied by the other equations and 
are hence not independent equations. The simple model has ( l 3+i + i+j + 5) 
endogenous variables and, assuming ait constraints are binding, ( l 3+i + i+j + 
6) equations. The model, however, satisfies Walras' Law and therefore has 
only ( l 3+i + i+j + 5) independent equations. 
Except for the land/water aggregate (LND), the model has a standard neo-
classical specification. The CES fonctions for real value added yield well-
behaved first-order conditions for profit maximization ( equations 10 + 12), 
conditions which will generally yield a solution with ait factor prices strictly 
positive. The land/water aggregate, however, is a linear fonction of water and 
land (H20 and FED), with separate suppl y constraints ( equations 17 and 18). 
The full model has two land types, corresponding to summer and winter crop-
ping. Given that there are multiple agricultural sectors with quite different 
water and land coefficients, it is certainly possible to have both constraints 
binding. If either the water or land constraint is especially binding, however, it 
is also possible that the constraint on the other will not be binding. For exam-
ple, the water constraint might be so binding that it is impossible to find a crop 
mix that utilizes ait the land; the land constraint equation would then be satis-
fied as a strict inequality. If the land or water constraint is not binding (equa-
tions 17 and 18), the corresponding market price of land or water cvl"' and 
WH
20 
in equation 9) should be zero in equilibrium. The solution prices in the 
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CGE model display the same kind of complementary slackness as the shadow 
price system in an agricultural sector mathematical programming model. 
A neoclassical CGE simulation model will generally have a unique solu-
tion that satisfies ail the non-linear first-order conditions with ail prices strict-
ly positive and ail constraints satisfied as equalities. No maximand is needed, 
since the model includes explicit supply and demand equations for ail goods 
and factors. In the LW-CGE model, the first-order conditions for the land and 
water constraints are summarized in the linear cost fonctions in equation 9. 
There is a problem, however, in that there is an infinite number of solutions 
that satisfy the cost fonction (equation 9) and the two inequality constraints 
(equations 17 and 18). Without an explicit maximand, there is nothing in the 
cost equations that prevents the model economy from operating within the 
production possibility frontier for agriculture. In the usual CGE simulation 
model, this possibility is eliminated by expressing the resource constraints as 
strict equalities. 
Given the inequalities for the land and water constraints, there are two 
approaches that can be used to solve the model. First, the model can be seen 
as a nonlinear mixed complementarity problem (MCP) in which the land and 
water prices, WFw and Wffl0 , are "complementary" to the land and water sup-
ply-demand inequalities. Complementarity simply means that the product of 
the non-negative price times the corresponding excess-supply inequality must 
equal zero, as noted earlier. Imposing the two complementary slackness con-
ditions explicitly guarantees that the model operates on the production possi-
bility frontier while also satisfying the market equilibrium pricing equations. 
Recently developed MCP sol vers work well on this particular modeJ. 19 This is 
the approach we have used in this chapter. 
The second approach to solving the AGRO-CGE model is to introduce an 
explicit maximand and treat the model as a nonlinear programming problem. 
Since the CGE model is designed to simulate the operation of a market econ-
omy, it is important to specify a maximand that generates a solution that can 
be seen as simulating a market outcome. However, we explicitly specify in 
equation 9 that the price of the land/water aggregate must equal the cost of the 
water and land used, a condition that is true in a competitive equilibrium in 
which there are no excess profits. In general, any solution that is on the pro-
duction possibility frontier and satisfies equation 9 with non-negative prices 
can be seen as a market outcome. Factor wages would equal marginal revenue 
products for land and water in ail agricultural sectors, a condition which char-
acterizes a profit-maximizing market equilibrium. 
Given that the AGRO-CGE model has a single consumer, the obvious 
choice of maximand is consumer welfare. In a competitive economy with no 
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distortions, maximizing consumer welfare will generate a profit-maximizing 
and utility-maximizing market equilibrium, and is equivalent to maximizing 
the sum of consumers' and producers' surplus in the economy. In addition, the 
various supply-demand balance constraints will then have shadow prices that 
measure the welfare gains from relaxing the constraints. If there are distor-
tions in the market price system, for example from sectoral tariffs, taxes, and 
subsidies, the mode! will generate a market solution and any differences 
between the simulated market prices and the shadow prices, given the maxi-
mand, measure the welfare costs associated with the distortions. 
In this mode!, we have chosen as numeraire (Equation 13) the cost of liv-
ing index associated with the utility function that underlies the expenditure 
functions (Equation 15). In this case, the variable Y, which measures aggre-
gate income and expenditure, is a direct measure of utility. Given the 
numeraire, it corresponds to expenditure in the indirect utility function. 
Changes in Y are a direct measure of "equivalent variation," which is a stan-
dard measure of welfare change. In addition, for this choice of maximand, if 
there are no distortions in the mode! economy, the shadow prices associated 
with the supply-demand balance equations should exactly equal the endoge-
nous market-clearing prices at the simulated market equilibrium.
20 
While the AGRO-CGE mode! solves for market rentai rates for land and 
water (FED and H20) at the bottom of the production nest, it is not necessary 
to interpret these rates as occurring in an actual market. In fact, Egypt does 
not charge for water use, so there is currently no market for water. However, 
we do assume that, at the next level, the solution rentai rate for the land/water 
aggregate does reflect a market valuation. In effect, we are assuming that, 
when a farrner uses land to grow a particular crop, he is entitled to the need-
ed water, and the market return to his land reflects that entitlement. 
The mode! separately prices land and water and so decomposes the rentai 
value of the land/water aggregate into components reflecting pure land rent 
and the value of the water entitlement. The mode! solution generates infor-
mation about the counter-factual "what if' question: If Egypt were to institute 
a market for water, what would be the market-clearing price? 
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Table Al.1: Equations of a Simplified AGRO-CGE Model 
Production 
X, = LIN, (V.INT,) Linear production fonction. 
2 V, = CES, (K.. L.. LND,) CES value added fonction. 
3 x, = LIN,; (/NT,) Intermediate inputs. 
4 FED, =LIN, (LND,) Land input. 
5 H20, =LIN, (LND,) Water input. 
Prices and Factor Demand 
6 (1- r,') • P,' = LIN.(P/' p,INT) Output cost price. 
7 P,"" = LIN,(P,; j) Intermediate input cost price. 
8 p.v =CES, (W', W', W,!M)) Value added cost price. 
9 W,LND =LIN, (w'ED, W"o) Land/water cost price. 
10 W,LND =~Pv 
fJLND, ' 
Demand for land/water. 
Il w• =~Pv ()K, , Demand for capital. 
12 w' =~Pv 
()L, ' 
Demand for labor. 
13 p =r;(P,'/• Numeraire cost of living index. 
lncome and Final Demand 
14 y = L,(P.' •V,+ t.' •P.' •X.) Aggregate income. 
15 P,' • C, =B.• y Consumption demand. 
Supply-Demand Balances 
16 x. = C. + L;X,, Prouct supply-demand. 
17 FED ~LFED. Land supply-demand. 
18 H20 ~LH20, Water supply-demand. 
19 [ =LL. 
i 
Labor supply-demand. 
20 K =L K. Capital supply-demand. 
ldentities 
21 ( 1- t.') • P.'• X. = P,v • V, + p,''" •/NT, Sales/income. 
22 P,v •V, = W • • K. + W' • L. + W:LN° • LND, Value-added/ factor payments. 
23 p,''" •/NT, = LP', •X,, Intermediate input expenditure. 
I 
24 w,LN° • LND, = w'ED • FED. + w"'° • H20. Land/ water payments. 
25 L P.'• C. =Y Income I expenditure. 
26 r = w • • K + w' • f + L w,LN° • LND. + Income I factor payments. 
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Variables and Parameters 
Variables 
X. Output 
V, Real value added 
/NT, Aggregare inrermediare input use 
K. Capital input 
L, Labor input 
LND, Aggregare land/water input 
X,. Inrermediare input from secror j ro secror i 
FED, Land subfacror input into land/ water aggregare 
H20, Water subfacror input into land/ water aggregare 
P.' Output market price 
P.v Value added price 
PitfT Aggregare inremediare input price 
w' Rentai rare of capital 
W Wage of /abor 
W,u.rv Rentai rate of sectoral land/ water aggregate 
Ww Rentai rare of land subfacror 
W"" Price of water subfacror 
Y Aggregare income 
C. Conrnmption demand 
Parameters 
t,x Indirect ta.x rate (or subsidy, ifnegative) 
}, Consumption expenditure shares 
FED Aggregare supply of land subfacror 
H20 Aggregme supp/y of water wbfactor 
L Aggregare supply of labor 
K Aggregare supply of capital 
Notation 
LIN Linear function 
CES Constant e/asricity ofsubstitutionfuncrion 
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Appendix 2: Supplementary Tables 
Table A2.1: Elasticity Values Used in Model 
Sector LES Annington CET CES Export demand 
Berseem 0.80 
Cotton 0.58 0.60 0.40 
Fruit l.26 0.30 0.80 0.40 
Maize 0.29 8.00 0.50 0.40 
Other summer crops 0.29 0.30 l.50 0.40 
Other winter crops 0.29 0.30 l.50 0.40 
Rice 0.29 6.00 0.50 0.40 
Sugar Cane 2.00 0.40 
Sumrner vegetables l.26 0.30 0.80 0.40 
Winter vegetables l.26 0.30 0.80 0.40 
Wheat 0.29 8.00 0.40 
Livostock l.26 0.30 l.50 0.40 
Oil l.26 2.00 2.00 
Food Processing 0.87 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Cotton Ginning 0.29 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Textiles l.07 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Other lndustry 1.07 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Electricity l.26 0.33 l.50 0.40 
Construction l.29 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Services l.26 0.33 2.00 0.60 
Note: For a brie/ survey of elasticities of CGE models. LO/gren ( J994a). 
Abbreviations: 
















Armington = Elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods in CES 
aggregation function; 
CET = Elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic'sales in CET function; 
CES = Elasticity of factor substitution in CES value-addedfunctions. 
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Table A2.2: Cropping Patterns and Resource Prices for 
Alternative Productivity and Investment Scenarios 
Value for the year 2020: 
Value 
1990 Thrtle Tiger Urban Tiger 
SummerLand •••• Percent composition •••• 
Cotton 16.5 22.7 27.8 26.2 
Fruit 12.6 16.0 13.5 18.0 
Maize 39.3 16.0 23.2 13.5 
Other Crops 2.7 3.9 2.8 4.6 
Rice 17.2 10.2 7.6 7.9 
Sugar Cane 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.4 
Vegetables 7.3 7.4 7.1 10.7 
Excess Supply 0.0 20.5 15.1 15.7 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
WinterLand 
Long Berseem 25.0 26.8 24.2 29.6 
Short Berseem 16.5 22.7 27.8 26.2 
Fruit 12.6 16.0 13.5 18.0 
Other Crops 7.6 9.4 6.3 10.3 
Sugar Cane 4.4 3.3 3.0 3.4 
Vegetables 3.1 3.0 2.8 3.9 
Wheat 30.8 18.9 22.4 8.6 
Excess Supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Resource rents/prices •••• 1989/90 !E ••••• 
Summer land (fE/feddan) 701 0 0 0 
Winter land (Œ/feddan) 628 343 1624 1671 
Water (fE/'000m1) 0 359 1287 712 
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Table A2.3: Cropping Patterns and Resource Prices for 
Tiger Scenarios with Alternative Foreign Trade Assomptions 
Value for the year 2020: 
Value Agricultural Ali tariffs Rapid Export 
1990 Tiger tariffs removed Growth 
removed 
SummerLand ----- Percent composition -----
Cotton 16.5 27.8 27.9 27.9 25.7 
Fruit 12.6 13.5 13.5 13.3 19.6 
Maize 39.3 23.2 22.8 23.0 14.4 
Other Crops 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 3.6 
Rice 17.2 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.0 
Sugar Cane 4.4 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.3 
Vegetables 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.3 12.3 
Excess Supply 0.0 15.1 15.2 15.2 14.1 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Winter Land 
Long Berseem 25.0 24.2 25.3 24.7 34.2 
Short Berseem 16.5 27.8 27.9 27.9 25.7 
Fruit 12.6 13.5 13.5 13.3 19.6 
Other Crops 7.6 6.3 6.2 6.2 7.2 
Sugar Cane 4.4 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.3 
Vegetables 3.1 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.3 
Wheat 30.8 22.4 21.2 22.0 6.0 
Excess Supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Resource rents/prices ----- 1989/90EE -----
Summer land 
(f:E/feddan) 701 0 0 0 0 
Winter land 
(f:E/feddan) 628 1624 1588 1563 3354 
Water (f:E/'000m3) 0 1287 1206 1242 882 
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Table A2.4: Cropping Patterns and Resource Prices for 
Tiger Scenarios with Alternative Water Cuts 
Value for the year 2020: 
Value 
1990 Tiger-0 Tiger-20 Tiger-40 Tiger-60 
SummerLand ----- Percent composition -----
Cotton 16.5 27.l 27.8 28.1 18.5 
Fruit 12.6 13.9 13.5 13.2 10.9 
Maize 39.3 29.3 23.2 3.7 0.3 
Other Crops 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.3 1.9 
Rice 17.2 14.l 7.6 2.2 0.3 
Sugar Cane 4.4 4.9 3.0 2.4 1.6 
Vegetables 7.3 8.4 7.1 5.7 4.4 
Excess Supply 0.0 0.0 15.1 42.4 61.9 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Winter Land 
Long Berseem 25.0 25.4 24.2 21.3 18.8 
Short Berseem 16.5 27.1 27.8 28.1 18.5 
Fruit 12.6 13.9 13.5 13.2 10.9 
Other Crops 7.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.6 
Sugar Cane 4.4 4.9 3.0 2.4 1.6 
Vegetables 3.1 3.5 2.8 2.4 1.9 
Wheat 30.8 18.9 22.4 26.3 15.3 
Excess Supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.4 
Total Supply 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Resource rents/prices ----- 1989/90 !E -----
Summer land 
(fE/feddan) 701 4056 0 0 0 
Winter land (fE feddan) 628 3602 1624 418 0 
Water (fE/OOOm') 0 0 1287 2071 3090 
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Export Policies and Export Performance: 
The Case of Turkey· 
Introduction 
A remarkable transformation in prevailing views about the role of trade in 
economic development has occurred throughout the developing world during 
the last two decades. This sweeping change is not just a result of a drive to 
avoid the bottlenecks arising from foreign exchange shortages, but also and 
·perhaps more importantly, to achieve higher and more sustainable growth. 
Thus, discussions on trade and trade policies have become often debated 
issues in the recent literature on diverse topics as stabilization and growth. 
Export promotion schemes, exchange rate policies and domestic demand poli-
cies have become central issues in the analysis of export policies. 
Turkey's experience provides a good case study. Over the last three 
decades the Turkish economy has experienced many changes in its foreign 
trade policies, export performance and growth. Turkey was one of the first 
countries that had gone through a foreign debt crisis at the end of the 1970s. 
The debt crisis promoted the adoption of an adjustment program whose cen-
tral feature included the change of orientation of the economy, from inward to 
outward. More recently, Turkey has experienced a post-liberalization crisis in 
early 1994, which pre-dated the Mexican crisis of a similar nature at end-
1994. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to make a comparative evaluation 
of export policies pursued in Turkey during the period from the late l 970s to 
the mid- l 990s. In this context, the effects of exchange rate policies, different 
export promotion schemes and domestic demand policies are discussed and 
analyzed. The different policy regimes that were adopted are scrutinized with 
the help of an export supply fonction. The main objective is to analyze empir-
ically to what extent are these policies different in terms of their long and 
short-run effects. 
The next section takes stock of the theoretical arguments and empirical 
findings on the relationship between export expansion and growth, and tack-
les the issue of whether free trade or policy intervention is the optimum poli-
cy stance for export growth and welfare maximization. 
*My thanks to Hanaa Kheir-El-Din and to Fatih Ozatay for their comments on the first draft of 
this chapter. The usua/ dise/aimer applies. 
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The chapter then provides a summary evaluation of the policies and 
macroeconomic developments in Turkey from the early 1970s to the mid-
1990s with a view of assessing export policies within the context of the over-
all Turkish macroeconomic environment. It next evaluates different export 
policies on the basis of an export supply equation estimated with quarterly 
data from the fourth quarter of 1977 to the second quarter of 1995. Estimation 
results indicate that in the short term real exchange rate, excess demand, fixed 
capital investment and export subsidies contribute significantly to the expla-
nation of export supply with economically meaningful parameters. In the long 
term estimation, however, export subsidies tum out to have a negative effect 
on long term export supply while the parameters of the remaining variables 
have the same meaningful signs as in the short term estimation. The short and 
long term estimation results imply that export subsidies make a positive effect 
in the initial growth of exports when the subsidies exceed a certain threshold 
value, but they do not contribute and/or their contribution tums negative in the 
long term. The chapter then concludes. 
Exports, Growth and Export Promotion 
The Re/ationship Between Exports and Growth 
The relationship between export expansion and sustainable and faster growth 
is based on several arguments. First, it can be shown that plants of minimum 
efficient size can be established and production technologies with indivisibil-
ities can be introduced. A second argument is that export expansion allows for 
the exploitation of scale economies in general since the world market is very 
much larger than the domestic market. 
A third argument states that since the export industries face keen compe-
tition from the rest of the world, they have to use up to date technologies and 
employ highly skilled workers, the latter perhaps being partly trained by the 
producers/exporters themselves. Dynamic spill-over effects and the diffusion 
of technology across other sectors are other arguments that support the posi-
tive relationship between export growth and economic growth. "In many 
cases and particularly in small countries, exports may constitute the only rea-
sonably efficient means of shifting the sectoral composition of output away 
from traditional primary activities and thus deriving dynamic benefits from 
industrialization" (Helleiner, 1990, p.888). 
The above-listed factors combine to induce faster total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth in the export industries. This in turn would lead to a realloca-
tion of resources from the relatively inefficient non-traded sectors to the more 
efficient export sectors. Higher growth of export demand, at least potentially, 
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as compared to domestic demand, and higher overall TFP growth would result 
in a higher overall rate of economic growth. 
There are, however, some qualifications to the above results. First, exports 
refer more specifically to manufacturing exports. "An important distinction 
between a success story such as South Korea and a failure such as Honduras 
is that the former has grown through exporting manufactured goods to the 
developed countries, whereas the latter has remained backward while export-
ing primary goods such as bananas and coffee" (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1993, 
p. 163). 
Second, some manufacturing activities are known to contribute more to 
growth than others, in terms of generating scale economies, learning effects, 
technology adoption, and even income distribution. Thus, while the exports of 
some industries might bring about higher overall growth rates, exports of 
some others might not produce significant growth rates. 
Third, the Solow-type neoclassical growth model does not provide a 
framework that can be used to show export growth contributing to overall 
economic growth. In this model, only the level of output can be raised by 
exports since the long run growth rate is determined by the exogenously given 
technological change. The recent endogenous growth models provide mecha-
nisms through which higher export growth leads to the acceleration of eco-
nomic growth, as explained by Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
(1991 a and 1991 b ), Gross man and Helpman (1991) and others. However, 
these models address the more general issue of the relationship between 
growth on the one hand and trade and openness on the other. 
It is important to note that empirical studies on the relationship between 
export growth and economic growth have not resolved the issue. Indeed, they 
have added more fuel to the debate. In the early studies of Michael y ( 1977) 
and Balassa ( 1978), simple rank correlations were used to show that there was 
a significant positive relationship between export growth and growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP). The work by Feder (1983) was based on two neo-
classical production fonctions, one for the non-export sector and the other for 
the export sector. Feder reiterated the findings of Michaely and Balassa and 
found that the marginal productivit!es of both labor and capital were higher in 
the export sector than in the non-export sector. 
Gray and Singer ( 1988) and Kohli and Singh ( 1989) found that although 
export growth has a significant effect on GDP growth when world demand is 
strong, the effect becomes insignificant when world demand is low. Thus, 
export growth may not at ail limes cause GDP growth. Jung and Marshall 
( 1985), after testing for Granger causality, conclude that although in some 
countries exports cause growth, evidence in support of this type of causality 
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is not as strong as was previously thought. Hutchinson and Singh (1987) 
found that in only Jess than one-third of the sample countries investigated, 
Granger-type export growth causes GDP growth. 
Levine and Renelt (1992) examined the sensitivity of several variables 
that enter the "endogenous growth" equations. Of their results, two are impor-
tant. First, they have shown that all the results that specify the share of exports 
in GDP can be reproduced, almost identically when either the share of total 
tracte or imports are used. Thus, studies that use export variables should not 
be interpreted as studying the relationship between growth and exports per se, 
but rather as investigating the relationship between growth and tracte defined 
more broadly. And second, a large variety of tracte policy measures are not 
robustly correlated with growth when the estimated equation includes the 
investment share (Levine and Renelt, 1992). 
Greenaway and Sapsford ( 1994) noted that while th ose studies that use 
cross-section data tend to find significant positive relationships between 
exports and growth, those that employ time series data are inconclusive. 
Based on the time series estimation of a modified production function for 
nineteen countries which implemented tracte liberalization policies, 
Greenaway and Sapsford found little support for the effect of exports on 
growth, and no support for the effect of tracte liberalization on exports. 
Sengupta ( 1994) found a substantial externality effect associated with the 
export sector on the rest of the economy in Korea. The Korean externality 
effect is indeed the highest within a group of six countries. Sengupta and 
Es pana ( 1994) tested whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between export growth and overall growth in Korea. They explained that such 
a relationship exists in Korea since the two series are cointegrated. They also 
found a considerable scale effect in manufacturing production stimulated by 
ex ports. 
Whatever the arguments in the theoretical and empirical studies, the suc-
cess of such countries as South Korea and Taiwan provides concrete examples 
in favor of a positive relationship between rapid export expansion and higher 
economic growth. For the large majority of the developing countries, export-
led growth has therefore become a dominant strategy in the process of devel-
opment. The debt crisis of the early 1980s and the conditionalities of the mul-
tilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund that followed have also encouraged the pursuit of such strategy. 
Free Trade and Export Promotion Policies 
The pursuit of export-led export strategy requires the adoption of certain poli-
cies. There is a general agreement that a stable macroeconomic environment 
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with minimum uncertainty and a realistic and stable real exchange rate are 
necessary conditions for long terrn export growth. However, beyond this point 
and on the most appropriate trade strategy, considerable controversy arises. 
One can distinguish two schools of thoughts. One school believes that sus-
tainable export expansion is best achieved through the adoption of a free trade 
strategy, which involves de-control, liberalization and no policy intervention 
in the foreign trade markets and, indeed, in all the markets. Their reasoning is 
based on the premise that perfect competition ensures efficient allocation of 
resources and eliminates factors that deter export expansion. Liberalization of 
imports, for instance, is considered as a process that eliminates the anti-export 
bias that is inherently present in import quotas and tariffs. 
The other school calls for the adoption of interventionist policies in pro-
moting exports. This school has received a new shot in the arm with the 
advent of the "new" trade theory and "strategic" trade policy. Its arguments 
rest on the following two basic observations: ( 1) perfect competition does not 
exist in the international markets, and (2) the export industries are dominated 
by increasing returns to scale - rather than constant returns to scale, external-
ities and leaming by doing. 
Brander and Spencer ( 1985) showed that in a duopolistic situation with 
Cournot behavior and no retaliation by rivais, export subsidies lead to a high-
er welfare level when compared with a policy of no intervention. Krugman 
(1986) and Helpman and Krugman (1989), among others, have also shown 
that given the above characteristics of the export markets, specific export sub-
sidies may induce higher market shares and raise the growth rate and the wel-
fare level of the exporting country. 
In spite of the optimality of policy interventions in theory under certain 
circumstances, there are cautionary statements about the adoption of strategic 
trade policy in the real economy. For example, Baldwin ( 1992), Krugman 
(1993) and McCulloch (1993) all have argued that (i) the appropriate strate-
gic policy is highly sensitive to details of market structure that govemments 
may not get right, (ii) the pay-off of such a policy may not be large, and (iii) 
as a result of political economy considerations on the part of the govemments, 
tools of policy interventions such as export promotion schemes might become 
instruments in the allocation of rents to the politically favored or strong 
groups. 
Krugman ( 1993) therefore favors what he calls "the broad argument" for 
free trade "to which many economists implicitly subscribe, is essentially 
political: free trade is a pretty good if not perfect policy, while an effort to 
deviate from it in a sophisticated way will probably end up doing more harm 
than good (Krugman, 1993, p. 364)." McCulloch (1993, p. 371) concludes 
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with a similar sentiment: "The theoretical suboptimality of free tracte is the 
product of science; the belief in the practical suboptimality of most interven-
tion retlects an appreciation of what lies beyond the narrow limits of that sci-
ence." 
The strategic tracte policy approach has nevertheless shown that there need 
not be a one-to-one relationship between outward-orientation and free tracte. 
Actually, as pointed out by Helleiner ( 1990), the case of Korea has already 
made it clear that outward orientation may be accompanied by substantial 
interventions in the export markets. There is by now a wide agreement that for 
export growth in developing countries, in addition to the stability of the 
macroeconomic environment and the real exchange rate, government support 
may be required for some time, especially at the time of entry into the world 
export markets. In this sense, as illustrated by the example of Korea, export 
promotion may take the fonn of import controls, regulated capital markets 
and targeted/selective direct subsidies. 
Export promotion schemes have of course been in effect long before the 
strategic tracte policy arguments were promulgated, and they have been eval-
uated in some studies. In an assessment of these schemes for eight Latin 
American Countries, Nogués ( 1990) found that only in Brazil export subsidies 
were effective in increasing and diversifying exports. The performance of 
Argentina was the worst, since, among other factors, the real exchange rate 
showed large fluctuations and overvaluations. Nogués reviews other studies 
and mentioned, in addition to Brazil, Korea and Turkey among the successfol 
export subsidizers. He cited Caballero and Corbo ( 1988), who used data from 
seven developing countries to emphasize that export response is not only a 
fonction of current export incentives, but also a fonction of the stability of 
these incentives. 
On the other hand, Rodrik ( 1993) criticized the appeals to political econ-
omy arguments for non-intervention. Instead, he emphasized the role of other 
elements such as "state capability", "state autonomy" and "policy coherence" 
in helping to understand the effectiveness of economic policies in general and 
export subsidies in particular. In tenns of the implementation of the latter, 
Rodrik examined two successfol countries, Korea and Brazil, two failures, 
Kenya and Bolivia, and two intennediate cases, Turkey and India. The evi-
dence from the case studies led Rodrik to conclude that "policies work best 
when autonomy and coherence are both present; they fail when neither is" 
(Rodrik, 1993, p. 8). 
Referring to the available econometric evidence from Korea, Rodrik 
(1993, p. 12) stated that exports were highly sensitive to subsidies: Jung and 
Lee ( 1986) estimated that a 1 percent increase in export subsidies eventually 
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led to more than a 2 percent increase in export supply. They found that the 
elasticity of export supply with respect to the real exchange rate was smaller 
than this value. Rodrik noted however that without certain institutional inno-
vations, such as the practice of setting and monitoring export targets, export 
incentives would not have been as effective. In the case of Brazil, the other 
successful subsidizer, Rodrik considers the BEFIEX program as a crucial one 
among the various promotion schemes, in that it entailed long term export 
commitments on the part of the exporters. 
Rodrik has categorized Turkey as an intermediate case in terms of the 
effectiveness and success of export promotion policies. This was based on the 
premise that (i) the Turkish state is not considered to be an autonomous one, 
since it is open to the influences of the organized private interests, but (ii) 
export promotion policies were coherent and the leadership declared their 
commitment to export growth, at least until the mid-1980s. Uygur (1993) 
explains the factors that created uncertainty in export policies after this date. 
Again in line with the categorization of Rodrik, the export supply of Turkey 
was found to be significantly responsive by Uygur to export promotion 
schemes particularly in the early 1980s, but not after the mid-1980s. 
The Macroeconomic Environment and Export Policies since 
the 1970s' 
The Macroeconomic Environment Since the 1970s 
For two decades, from the early 1960s to the end of the 1970s, Turkey fol-
lowed an import substitution industrialization and development strategy. This 
strategy, formulated and implemented through five-year plans and annual pro-
grams, was justified on the grounds that the two-gap mode] was relevant for 
Turkey. Insufficiency of domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings 
were considered to be the two factors that limited investments and conse-
quently the rate of growth of output. A significant rise in foreign exchange 
earnings was thought to be difficult due to fixed exchange rates and, more 
importantly, due to the low income elasticity ofTurkey's exports. Import sub-
stitution was therefore considered to be the easiest way to escape from the for-
eign exchange constraint. 
Foreign exchange shortages started to occur in the late 1960s, mainly 
because the inward-looking industrialization strategy had resulted in a sus-
tained increase in the demand for imported capital goods and imported raw 
materials. In August 1970, a stabilization package was put into effect which 
included a devaluation and improvement in export promotion measures. In 
response, there was a considerable rise in export earnings and workers 
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remittances. Together with a large rise in exports until 1974, the sectoral 
composition of exports also changed. 
By the mid-1970s, the inward-looking industrialization process had 
reached its most difficult phase and, simultaneously, the economy was expe-
riencing a variety of internai and extemal shocks. The oil shock of 1973-74 
raised Turkey's import bill dramatically. On the other hand, the upward trend 
in remittances was reversed from 1975 onwards and exports stagnated. These 
developments called for an assessment and reshaping of the policies but that 
was not done in a vigorous manner. Devaluations were made but they did not 
stop the real appreciation of the Turkish Lira. In the mean time, inflation shift-
ed from single to double digit rates. 
Crisis in the Late 1970s and the 1980 Adjustment Program 
In 1977, tracte and current account deficits reached an all time high. External 
debt increased sharply together with a jump in the share of short term debt. 
Foreign exchange shortages were translated into higher black market activity. 
In 1979, GDP growth was negative for the first time in decades. Inflation 
accelerated and, from an average rate of about 20 percent in the mid-1970s, it 
reached 71 percent in 1979. At the end of the 1970s, Turkey was in a full 
fledged economic and social crisis. 
January 1980 witnessed the beginning of the reversai of the earlier poli-
cies and, from then on, a series of changes and measures were introduced 
under a stabilization and liberalization program. The program was supported 
by multilateral organizations including the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the OECD and the World Bank and also by bilateral creditors, espe-
cially the major OECD countries. 
The first objective of the program was to reduce the rate of inflation while 
not causing a major slowdown in the growth of output. The second aim was 
to promote exports through continuous adjustments of the exchange rate and 
export incentives, and subsequently, to liberalize imports. The third objective 
was financial liberalization, which, it was hoped, would increase private sav-
ings and investments. The fourth, longer term, aim was to liberalize foreign 
capital movements and to take measures towards making the Turkish Lira 
convertible. A final major aim of the program was to reduce the role of the 
public sector in the economy by both reducing the size of the central govern-
ment and by privatizing public enterprises. 
The 1980 adjustment program included the simultaneous implementation 
of stabilization and liberalization policies. As far as the sequencing of liberal-
ization was concemed, the program addressed first the product market, then 
foreign tracte and domestic financial markets, and finally, foreign capital 
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transactions. As regards the speed of the liberalization policies, gradualism 
was their characteristic. 
The stabilization program first sought to correct the misalignment in 
prices and to eliminate the disequilibria in certain markets. To this effect, 
multiple exchange rates were eliminated and, with a large devaluation reach-
ing 100 percent, a uniforrn rate was established. Govemment-controlled 
prices were likewise increased sharply. The result was a three digit wholesale 
price index inflation at 107 .2 percent in 1980. In addition to the price adjust-
ments, domestic demand was reduced and import bottlenecks arising from the 
balance of payments crisis were eliminated with support from the multilater-
al organizations including the IMF, the OECD and the World Bank. 
In May 1981 the Central Bank was authorized to make daily adjustments 
in the exchange rate. The commercial banks were allowed to fix their own 
rates within a narrow band around the official rate. With continuous adjust-
ments, the lira depreciated in real terms and the real effective exchange rate 
(REER) increased considerably until 1986-87 as can be seen in Table 1. 2 The 
margin between the official and market exchange rates was eliminated in mid-
l 980s. Changes in the direction of domestic financial liberalization started in 
July 1980 when the ceilings on the deposit and credit interest rates were abol-
ished. In December 1983, residents were allowed to open foreign exchange 
deposits with the commercial banks. 
Outward orientation in the early 1980s was pursued more in terms of 
export promotion. Import liberalization was more graduai and cautious for 
fear of balance of payments problems. The major change in this direction 
started in December 1983 by the removal of quantitative restrictions on a 
large proportion of import items and by reductions in tariff rates. The overall 
tariff plus surcharge rates were lowered again in 1989 and 1990. These 
changes, accompanied by a substantial decline in the real exchange rate, 
resulted in a jump in imports and a large trade deficit of over US$ 10 billion 
in 1990. 
Together with the liberalization of the current account, changes were made 
in the direction of capital account liberalization in 1984, when some restric-
tions on foreign exchange transactions were relaxed. However, major changes 
in this area had to wait until August 1989 before being introduced. Since then, 
Turkish nationals have been perrnitted to purchase foreign securities abroad 
and foreigners can buy Turkish securities; Turkish Banks can extend foreign 
currency credits to foreign trade companies; Turkish nationals are no longer 
required to obtain government permission to borrow abroad; and foreigners 
can open Turkish lira accounts convertible into foreign exchange. 
These changes made it easier for Turkish corporations to borrow abroad 




1981-3 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Inflation Rate 31.4 50.3 43.2 29.6 32.0 70.5 63.9 52.3 55.4 62.I 58.4 120.7 88.5 
Exchange Rate 
US$,% Change 45.7 62.1 40.9 30.5 26.7 67.3 47.4 23.4 57.9 65.2 59.5 170.4 54.0 
Effective, % Change 37.8 55.9 41.1 46.4 37.6 67.7 44.0 32.I 55.5 70.5 54.7 173.5 62.9 
REER, 1990= 100 107.7 124.8 122.2 130.3 129.8 128.7 118.1 100.0 94.9 96.I 90.I 121.1 104.9 
Real Wage 1990= 100 79.8 67.1 64.0 61.9 66.4 62.5 79.9 100.0 134.4 136.3 139.6 106.3 90.9 
Investment/GNP 19.8 19.5 20.2 22.9 24.7 26.2 22.5 22.6 23.5 22.8 25.3 24.3 23.4 
Private 11.1 1 1.2 10.8 12.4 14.7 17.3 15.0 15.7 16.1 15.5 18.4 19.0 19.6 
Public 8.7 8.3 9.4 10.5 10.0 8.9 7.5 7.0 7.4 7.3 6.9 5.3 3.8 
Savings/GNP 19.9 19.8 21.6 24.1 23.9 27.2 22.I 22.0 21.2 20.9 21.8 23.0 n.a 
Private 13.2 13.7 13.9 16.0 17.3 20.4 17.4 18.6 20.6 21.9 24.5 24.8 n.a 
Public 6.7 6.1 7.7 8.1 6.6 6.8 4.7 3.4 0.6 -0.9 -2.8 -1.8 n.a 
Foreign Deficit/GNP -2.2 -2.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.8 1.1 -0.2 -3.1 -2.1 -2.0 -5.0 1.5 -3.5 
Exports/GDP 12.5 16.1 16.3 13.8 15.6 19.2 16.7 13.3 13.7 14.3 13.5 21.3 20.3 
Imports/GDP 15.4 19.2 18.5 15.8 17.8 18.0 18.4 17.6 16.4 17.3 19.I 20.3 25.0 
Notes and Sources:/.) Figures for the 1981-3 period are the simple arithmetic averagesfor these three years. 
2.) Inflation: Rates are computedfrom the wholesale price index (with 1987= 100) of the State Jnstitute of Statistics (SIS). 
3.) Exchange Rates: Percentage changes are obtainedfrom annua/ average exchange rates. The effective exchange rate is defined as the basket comprised of 
Dollars and D. Marks, with weights 0.5 for each. ln defining the REER, consumers price index for Turkey and wholesale price indices for the USA and German y 
t?:I are used. Date are from the Central Bank ofTurkey, Monthly and Quarter/y Bulletins and /MF, International Financial Statistics. 
;::i 
4.) Real fü1ge: Hour/y manufacturing wage rate (including side payments) dejlated by the consumer price index. Data are from the SIS. ~ 
5.) lnvestment, Savings, Foreign Deficit, Exports and Jmports: lnvestment refers Io gross fixed investment, foreign deficit is defined as the sum net exports (X - ;:s 
M) and net factor income from abroad (GNP - GDP). Data are from the SIS, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics and State Planning Organization, Main Economie .s: 
Jndicators. ()Q ;: .... 
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and for foreign capital to exploit arbitrage opportunities arising from interest 
rate differentials. The real appreciation of the Turkish Lira from 1989 
onwards was partly a consequence of the speculative capital inflows. In an 
environment of high and rising public sector deficits, these were not appro-
priate and desired developments; but the policy makers thought differently. 
The real appreciation of the Lira was considered as an opportunity in the fight 
against inflation. 
Although the fight against inflation was given top priority in the l 980s, 
and although it fell to an average of 36.2 percent in terms of wholesale prices 
during the 1981-86 period with the help of restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies, the overall inflation record of this decade was rather poor and dete-
riorated from 1987 onwards, as can be observed in Table 1. The importance 
of 1987 is that it was an election year when expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies were implemented owing to electoral considerations. Higher inflation 
rates were recorded despite a considerable decline in the real exchange rate 
from 1989 onwards. The view that the basic cause of this outcome was the 
growing deficits of the public sector has generally been accepted. 
After experiencing a negative growth rate in 1980, GDP growth averaged 
5.2 percent during the 1981-1986 period. However, this growth was not 
investment-led. Utilization of the existing capacity at higher rates accounted 
for a considerable proportion. Yet, the sustainability of outward-orientation 
and liberalization processes critically depended on investment growth. The 
adjustment program relied on the assumption that financial liberalization 
would stimulate private savings and that larger fonds would be available for 
fixed investments. Neither aspect materialized to the extent desired. 3 The 
growth rate was pushed up to a peak of 9.5 percent by expansionary policies 
in 1987. Between 1988 and 1991 the growth rate fluctuated widely and aver-
aged a relatively low 3.2 percent. 
Export growth until 1987 was one of the best achievements of the 1980 
adjustment program. Supported by exchange rate policies and export promo-
tion schemes, exports more than tripled, and t~e share of manufacturing 
increased from about 36 percent to about 79 percent'between 1980 and 1987. 
Export growth slowed considerably after 1987-88, in response to policies that 
raised domestic demand and lowered the real exchange rate, which also coin-
cided with the poor performance of other macroeconomic variables. 
The years 1989 and 1990 were crucial ones in many respects. First, fol-
lowing restrictive policies in 1988, policies tumed expansionary once again in 
1989 to gain electoral support. Second, as mentioned above, the Turkish Lira 
appreciated in real terms in 1989 and 1990, reaching a total of about 30 per-
cent in these two years. Third, with more freedom in tracte union bargaining 
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power and more concem about incarne inequality, real (consumption) wages 
in the manufacturing industry increased sharply in 1989 and 1990. These 
changes, which can be seen in Table I, resulted in an upswing in demand and, 
combined with the growing public sector deficits, high inflation continued 
into the I 990s. 
The 1994 Crisis and the Adjustment Program Once Again 
As was pointed out above, economic policies became expansionist at the close 
of the I 980s. Political economy considerations were important in the shaping 
of such policies. The party in power, which implemented the January 1980 
adjustment program, was loosing its electoral support. To regain popularity, 
the stabilization aspects of the 1980 program were left aside. Wamings were 
made at times that given the degree of openness of the economy, expansion-
ist policies would have severe current account repercussions. However, there 
was a belief that the liberalized markets would solve the problem and that the 
public and trade deficits were sustainable.• 
Expansionist policies did not produce the desired results, and the ruling 
party lost the general election at the end of 1991. A coalition govemment was 
formed which continued populist policies. During 1992 and 1993, public sec-
tor deficits continued to increase and Turkey was in a high interest rate-
repressed exchange rate trap. The experience of several countries showed that 
this trap was not sustainable and stability was at stake. It can be seen in Table 
1 that the share of exports in GDP declined to the levels of the early I 980s. 
There was also a long-term effect. Resources were driven away from the trad-
able sectors to the non-tradable ones. 
Given the limits in domestic borrowing and the drive to create downward 
pressure on interest rates, the govemment turned to foreign borrowing to 
finance both the public and current account deficits. However, starting in 
Autumn 1993, foreign creditors wamed that they would not finance Turkey's 
deficits at the same pace and scale, as they looked unsustainable. lt was evi-
dent that a crisis was brewing but the govemment declared that corrective 
measures will be taken after the municipal elections to be held in March 1994. 
However, the crisis did not wait until after the elections. 
From November 1993 onwards, there was a rush to buy foreign exchange. 
Tuen came the reduction in the credit rating ofTurkey by the international rat-
ing institutions. To cairn the panic and keep the exchange rate within certain 
limits, the Central Bank intervened in the foreign exchange market by selling 
its foreign reserves, and raised the official dollar exchange rate by 13.6 per-
cent in one day in mid-January 1994. That did not stop the demand for for-
eign exchange, and the Central Bank continued selling its reserves. From 
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November 1993 to end-March 1994 the sale of foreign exchange reserves 
amounted to almost $ 7 billion, leaving the reserves at about $ 3.3 billion. 
Concomitantly, the demand for treasury bills was dwindling at the going inter-
est rates indicating Jack of trust in the government. 
Finally, some measures were drafted and a stabilization program was 
announced on April 5, 1994. Nevertheless, and despite the signing of a stand-
by agreement with the IMF, turbulence in the financial markets continued. 
The govemment was unable to borrow in the domestic market. Borrowing 
resumed at end-May 1994 when the three-month bills could be issued at an 
annual compound interest rate of 406 percent. This implied phenomenal real 
rates, at well over 1 OO percent. 
The crisis reached the real sector with some delay and created major loss-
es. In 1994, the decline in manufacturing output was nearly 8 percent. 
Wholesale price inflation reached an all time record of 120. 7 percent. 
Following the prediction of the Dombusch mode), there was overshooting in 
the exchange rate which increased by over 170 percent, as can be observed in 
Table I. One year later in mid-1995, stability was established; inflation was 
down to two digit figures, though still in the range of 70-80 percent, and 
growth resumed. 
An important element in the stabilization program of April 1994, as was the 
case in the earlier 1980 program, was the reduction of domestic demand. 
Coupled with the higher real exchange rate, lower demand was expected to lead 
to higher exports, offsetting part of the negative growth effect. Hence, the 
importance of exports was realized, but at the time of another crisis. A further 
and more important dimension was the inability of the govemment to borrow 
from abroad between 1994 and until mid-1995. Thus, foreign exchange eamings 
in general and export activities in particular became crucial variables and export 
policies found a central place once again in another stabilization program. 
Export Policies Since the l 970s 
The above account identifies important aspects that are particular to the 
Turkish export policies since the l 970s. These policies have not been part of 
a longer term plan, or a policy framework that sought to achieve higher 
growth by export expansion as was the case for example in Korea, Taiwan and 
Brazil. Export policies in Turkey aim and serve rather short term needs for 
foreign exchange. 
Exchange Rate and Domestic Demand Policies 
Export policies, including export promotion schemes, were in full use even in 
the heyday of import substitution strategy in Turkey. The central feature of the 
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1970 adjustment program, which was implemented in a fixed exchange rate 
regime, was a devaluation. This devaluation was accompanied by improve-
ments in export promotion measures. The tax rebate system, which dates back 
to 1963, was made simpler, and two funds were established to support the 
export credit scheme and the availability of foreign exchange was increased 
for manufacturing exporters. These measures were necessary in order to over-
come the balance of payments difficulties and to meet the foreign exchange 
needs of the import substitution growth strategy. 
The adjustment program of 1980 sought and declared outward-orientation 
and export-based growth strategy right from the very beginning. In line with 
this objective, and given the need for foreign exchange, the program inhibit-
ed domestic demand and used the exchange rate exclusively to promote 
exports during the 1980-84 period. Between 1985 and 1988, the exchange rate 
was almost neutral regarding export promotion, as can be seen in Table 1. But 
there was confusion in export promotion schemes. While some schemes were 
improved in 1985 and 1986, it was announced in the meantime that the sub-
sidy element in some other schemes would be phased out. Uncertainty sur-
rounded export policies in the second half of the l 980s. 
After 1988, not only expansionary policies were pursued, but the Turkish 
Lira appreciated considerably in real tenns, when the exchange rate was used 
as an anchor against inflation. Expansionary policies and real appreciation of 
the Lira lasted until the 1994 crisis when domestic demand was eut substan-
tially, public and foreign deficits were reduced and the Lira depreciated in real 
tenns. As in the earlier cases, exports responded strongly to these changes. 
It should be noted, however, that the real appreciation of the Lira in 1994 
was due to the jump, or overshooting of the exchange rate, in the first half of 
the year. Otherwise, from the mid-1994 onwards, the exchange rate began to 
be used as a nominal anchor in the fight against inflation. It was agreed with 
the IMF that the exchange rate basket, fonned of one dollar and one and a half 
of Deutsch Marks, was to be raised by a certain rate each month. Initially, this 
policy was perceived to be a temporary one that would last until the end of 
1994. Yet, the nominal anchor policy continued in 1995 and the real exchange 
rate declined considerably. This resulted in a sharp rise in imports and a slow-
down in the growth of exports. 
Export Promotion Schemes 
Ali export incentives in Turkey are linked to the issuance of an export incen-
tive certificate,5 which grants automatic entitlement to the full range of incen-
tives. The incentive schemes were too fragmented even for the exporters, but 
they have been made more compact and reduced to manageable numbers in 
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the recent years. Important incentive schemes include the following: 
The Tax Rebate Scheme. This scheme, which was introduced as early as in 
1963 and was abolished at the beginning of 1989, allowed exporters to be 
refunded for the indirect taxes paid during the process of production. The 
rebate rates were largely determined according to the rate of indirect taxes 
paid in stages of production, but there were also other considerations such as 
the value-added content of the product. The rates differed across commodity 
groups and were altered each year. The maximum rate was 15 percent in 
January 1980 and was raised to 20 percent in May 1981. 
In addition to the basic rebate rates, there were additional rebates for large 
ex porters which varied between 6 percent and 10 percent until April 1984. 
The additional rates were used to channel exports through the foreign tracte 
companies. The rebate rates were almost halved in late 1984, when it was also 
announced that the system would be eliminated at the end of 1988, mainly 
because it was abused by the so-called fictitious exports6 and had a large bur-
den on the budget. 
Table 2 contains data on exports eligible for rebates and on ex-post tax 
rebate payments as a proportion of the value of exports. Column (2) of the 
table indicates that during 1980-88 over two thirds of the manufacturing 
exports were eligible for tax rebates. Column (3) shows that in the same peri-
od about 90 percent of the exports eligible for tax rebates originated from the 
same sector. The industries that benefited most from the rebates were iron and 
steel, transportation equipment and machinery. Rebates as a proportion of 
exports reached a peak in 1984 and they declined thereafter. Note that, even 
though the tax rebate system was abolished at the beginning of 1989, pay-
ments to exporters continued after that date in smaller amounts, due to accru-
als from the previous periods. 
Payment of Cash Premiums. At the time when the tax rebate rates were 
reduced in 1984, plans were made to compensate at least for part of the reduc-
tion. In December 1984 an extra-budgetary fund, Resource Utilization and 
Support Fund (RUSF), was established to provide low cost fonds for exports 
and investments. However, RUSF was used to make cash premium payments 
to exports at rates ranging between 2 percent and 4 percent of the value of 
exports. The RUSF scheme was short-lived. After the premium rates were 
lowered in March 1986, the scheme was abolished at the end of that year. 
Premium payments from RUSF are given in Table 3. 
Another extra-budgetary fund that was utilized for the payment of cash 
premiums to exports was Support and Price Stability Fund (SPSF), which was 
established in January 1980. Premium payments from the SPSF to iron and 
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steel exporters started in 1984. But general export promotion with the SPSF 
scheme started in December 1986. The government decided to end this 
scheme effective from 1993. Due to accruals, however, payments continued 
after this date. Unlike the RUSF system, the SPSF system was selective and 
the payments were made on the basis of a comparison between domestic costs 
and foreign prices. The sectoral distribution of the SPSF premiums is very 
much similar to the sectoral distribution of the tax rebates and around 90 per-
cent of the SPSF premiums went to manufacturing. Premium payments to 
exports from the SPSF are given in Table 3. 
There are two other fund related cash premium schemes. The first is a 
Table 2: Exports Eligible for Rebates and Rebates as a 
Proportion of Exports 
Exports Eligible for Rebates Rebates/Manufactures 
Total Manufactures (1)/(2) Total Manufactures 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1979 32.5 82.9 87.8 4.4 11.0 
1980 24.8 61.2 88.7 2.2 5.6 
1981 32.8 63.9 94.8 4.7 9.1 
1982 44.0 71.6 97.0 9.2 15.1 
1983 51.4 76.4 94.9 11.4 17.4 
1984 60.7 80.8 96.0 12.6 17.0 
1985 54.6 70.3 96.9 6.9 8.7 
1986 55.1 66.5 86.2 5.6 6.6 
1987 58.6 65.7 88.7 5.0 5.7 
1988 47.0 51.6 84.2 4.0 5.2 
1989 21.0 19.5 72.7 1.6 2.0 
1990 1.0 1.1 86.8 0.1 0.1 
1991 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1992 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1993 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1994 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sources: Milanovic (1986), Çelebi (1991), and Uygur (1991). 
transportation subsidy scheme applied to exports transported on ships. The 
source of payment for the transportation subsidy is again the SPSF. This sub-
sidy is higher when transport is made with ships sailing under the Turkish 
flag. The SPSF payments in Table 3 cover transportation subsidies as well. 
The second is an energy subsidy scheme that was established to offset part of 
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the higher electricity price in Turkey. This scheme started in 1992 and the pay-
ments, which are negligibly small, are made from the Encouragement Fund 
(EF). The energy subsidy payments from the EF are also presented in Table 3. 
It is evident from Tables 2 and 3 that the direct subsidy schemes have been 
used in a decreasing manner. One reason for this is that particularly since 
1990, premium payments from the SPSF have become strained due to bud-
getary constraints. Another and perhaps more important reason is the prohibi-
tion of direct premium payments in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade's Subsidies Code, of which Turkey is a signatory. Export promotion in 
recent years has been implemented increasingly through indirect measures 
such as tax exemptions and subsidized export credits. 


















Table 3: Direct Payments from Funds as Proportion 
of Exports ( % ) 
SPSF Premium RUSF Premium EF Premium Total Premium Manufactured Premium 
(1) (2) (3) 1+2+3 (5) 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 
0.2 1.1 0.0 1.3 1.5 
0.2 2.9 0.0 3.1 4.1 
1.7 0.9 0.0 2.6 3.0 
2.0 0.1 0.0 2.1 2.4 
3.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 3.5 
3.7 0.0 0.0 3.7 4.3 
3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 3.9 
2.7 0.0 0.0 2.7 3.0 
2.4 0.0 0.2 2.6 2.8 
2.0 0.0 0.1 2.0 2.2 
Notes: I) SPSF premium includes transportation subsidies. 2) ln the computation of the manu-
facturing premiums given in column (5), the share of manufacturing in total is assumed to be 
equal to this industry's share in tax rebates. which ranged between 85 percent in 1979 and 95 
percent during 1988-90. For 1991-94, the average of which is 92 percent during 1980-88. As 
explained elswhere, the share manufacturing in export credits is a/so around 90 percent. 
Sources: Until 1990, Central Bank and Uygur ( 1991 ). A/ter 1991, column ( I ), 
Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade; column (3). Ars/an ( 1994). 
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then have been supplied in different forms and from three different sources, 
namely the Central Bank, the commercial banks and the Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank). Until the end of 1980, the Central Bank supplied more than 50 
percent of export credits through the commercial banks. Between 1980 and 
1983, Central Bank credits increased but commercial bank credits expanded 
much faster. During 1984, subsidy rates were lowered considerably, the matu-
rities of the credits were shortened and credits of the Central Bank fell to a 
fraction of what they were in the earlier years. Commercial banks were not 
able to make up for the decline and total export credits decreased in 1984 and 
1985, even in nominal terms. 
The subsidized export credit scheme was terminated in January 1985, but 
was reintroduced after almost two years in November 1986 when it became 
apparent that there was a fall in exports of that year. Export credits in the sec-
ond hal f of the l 980s differed from th ose in the early years of the l 980s in 
two respects. Firstly, they overwhelmingly became short-term credits after 
1986, with maturities ranging from one month to six months. Secondly, there 
were no direct subsidy payments after 1986, whereas significant subsidies 
were paid to credit receivers in the early l 980s. 
After its establishment in August 1987, the Eximbank began to extend part 
of the preferential credits to ex porters. On its part, the Central Bank channeled 
most of its export rediscount fonds to Eximbank from 1988 onwards. 
Eximbank extended only pre-shipment export credits until 1990. These are 
Turkish Lira denominated credits disbursed through the intermediation of the 
commercial banks and still constitute the bulk of Eximbank credits. In 1993, 
for instance, the share of these credits out of total flow was 79.9 percent. 
During the 1994 crisis, Eximbank credits denominated in foreign exchange 
increased substantially and reached almost 45 percent of the bank's credit 
flow. The share of Eximbank in total export credits has not been significant. 
It increased during the 1994 crisis, but even then it was about 7 .2 percent. 
Thus, in the recent years exporters have depended on commercial bank cred-
its to a large extent. 
The subsidy value of export credits can be taken as the difference between 
the effective rate of interest charged on non-preferential short term commer-
cial credits and the lower rate of effective interest on export credits. In Turkey, 
the difference between these two rates has stemmed from three factors. First, 
the base rate for the export credits had at limes been lower than that for the 
general short term credits. Second, while short term non-preferential credits 
have required the payment of certain taxes and surcharges, such as the trans-
actions tax and contributions to fonds and stamp duties, export credits have 
been exempt from these. Third, export credits received additional subsidies 
Export Policies and Performance: Turkey 217 
between 1980 and 1983. 
From the beginning of 1980 and until the termination of export credits at 
the beginning of 1985, the difference between the base rates for short term 
credits and export credits varied between IO and 15 percentage points. When 
tax exemptions and subsidy payments were accounted for, the difference 
between the resulting effective interest rates reached as high as 27 .1 percent-
age points in 1981 7 but declined in the subsequent periods, as can be seen in 
column (3) of Table 4. During 1985 and 1986, the only subsidy elements were 
the exemptions from taxes and surcharges. Starting in 1988, the rate of subsidy 
increased somewhat primarily because of the lower cost Eximbank credits. 
Table 4 provides a clear and informative picture of govemments' views in 
respect of foreign exchange earnings and export policies. In the Iate I 970s and 
the early I 980s, there was a balance of payments crisis and ex ports were pro-
moted by both larger credits and higher subsidies on these credits. In the mid-
I 980s, foreign exchange shortages w~re not felt as before and exporters were 
faced with lower incentives. Sorne months before and during the 1994 crisis, 
foreign exchange became crucial due to supply falling short of demand. 
Consequently, the volume of subsidized export credits expanded substantial-
Iy and there was a significant rise in subsidy rates. 
Foreign Exchange Allocations and Duty Free lmports. Foreign exchange 
allocations to exporters for imports at the official exchange rate have been in 
practice sin ce 1968. U ntil the end of 1983, allocations could not exceed 60 
percent of the free-on-board (FOB) value of pledged exports. In December 
1983, this rate was reduced to 40 percent but raised again to 50 percent in 
1985 and to 80 percent in 1986. The latter rate was still effective at the end of 
1995. The allocation scheme was valuable especially when there were foreign 
exchange. shortages and when the market exchange rate carried a premium 
over the official exchange rate. This premium, which constituted a subsidy to 
exporters, stopped being significant after 1983, as the official exchange rate 
approached the market rate. 
The duty free importation of raw materials and intermediate goods used 
by ex porters started in 1980 and has operated on the same basis as the foreign 
exchange allocations. Once the latter has been granted, the exporters obtain 
the right for duty free importation up to the amount allocated. The subsidy 
element of this scheme is equivalent to the tariffs and surcharges not paid by 
the exporters who qualify. Subsidies, as a proportion of exports, that resulted 
from foreign exchange allocations and duty-free imports are provided in 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. These subsidies are computed as follows: 
First, the effective tariff plus surcharge rate that the exporter is exempt from 




















Table 4: Export Credits, Interest Diff erentials and the 
Subsidy Element of Export Credits 
Export Credits, Year-End, BTL 
Effective Interest 
Subsidy Element of Export Credits 
Central Bank Commercial Banks Rate Differential Total Manufactures 
(%) (%) (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S) 
24 16 13.1 5.2 11.2 
48 43 21.3 6.0 12.4 
113 94 26.7 7.1 10.8 
101 379 20.8 7.3 9.7 
182 547 18.5 7.1 8.9 
34 561 15.8 3.7 4.3 
7 718 7.1 1.4 1.6 
4 1,691 7.6 3.1 3.9 
55 2,142 6.9 2.2 2.5 
343 3,050 11.2 3.1 3.7 
590 5,727 15.5 5.7 6.6 
229 9,628 10.4 4.6 5.3 
0 20,068 11.9 6.4 7.6 
0 39,459 12.3 7.7 8.5 
0 75,741 12.2 8.7 9.7 
0 1,670,141 24.2 12.5 13.4 
Notes: /) Commercial Bank 's credits include credits of Eximbank. 2) The effective interest rate 
dijferential in column (3) is the dijference beMeen the effective rates on general non-preferen-
tial credits and export credits. While the former includes tax and surcharge payments. 
the latter are exempt/rom the se costs, provided the exporter has an incentive certificate. 3) ln the 
computation of the subsidy elements in columns (4) and (5).jirsl the stocks of export credits were 
converted to flows by multiplying the former with the following turnover ratios: 0.8 for 1979-83, 
1.2 for 1984. 1.3 for 1985, 1.4 for 1986, 1.5 for 1987, 1.6 for 1988, 1.7 for 1989, 1.8 for 1990-
91, /. 9 for 1992-93 and 2 for 1994. The se values rejlect the shortened maturities of export cred-
its. and indeed of ail credits. in Turkey. Credit flows so obtained were then multiplied by interest 
dijferentials in column ( 3 ). 4) On the basis of available information, the share of manufacturing 
in total export credits were taken as follows: 75 percent in 1979-81,80 percent in 1982-83, 85 
percent in 1984-85, 90 percent in 1986-90 and 92 percent in 1991-94. 5) On/y those exporters 
with an incentive certificate are entitled to subsidized credits. On the other hand. exports with 
incentive certificates constitute, on average. about 85 percent of total. Thus. 85 percent of export 
credits are taken as subsidized credits. 
Sources: Central Bank and Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. 
by comparing the official and market exchange rates. It should be noted that 
the market rate exceeded the official rate considerably before 1980 by a mar-
gin that reached 50 percent. The official and market rates converged in the 
early l 980s and the difference between the two became negligible after 1983. 
In the early days of the 1994 crisis, particularly during the first quarter of 
that year, the two rates diverged again, raising the premium on the exchange 
rate. The subsidy value of duty-free imports and exchange rate premia are 
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determined by the amount of foreign exchange allocation given in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 5. 
Table 5: Subsidy from Foreign Exchange 
Allocations and Duty Free lmports 
Foreign Exchange Allocations (M US$) Rate ofSubsidy (%) 
Total Manufactures Total Manufactures 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1979 135 122 6.6 7.1 
1980 172 170 1.9 5.3 
1981 395 338 2.8 4.9 
1982 542 530 2.8 4.5 
1983 873 859 4.1 6.3 
1984 1,256 786 3.2 2.7 
1985 1,819 1,452 4.7 5.0 
1986 2,614 1,670 8.5 7.6 
1987 2,586 1,880 7.0 6.4 
1988 3,058 2,205 6.8 6.4 
1989 3,409 3,064 5.7 6.1 
1990 3,244 3,182 6.0 6.8 
1991 3,486 3,207 6.9 7.9 
1992 3,848 3,540 7.1 7.7 
1993 4,562 4,197 8.1 8.8 
1994 6,171 5,677 7.3 7.8 
Notes: 1) Data for the share of manufacturing inforeign exchange a/locations were not ami/-
able after 1990. This share is assumed to be 90 percent during 199/-94. 
Sources: Co/umns ( 1) and (2); 1980-84, Mi/anovic ( 1986), 1985-89, Çe/ebi ( 199/, pp. 80-81 ), 
1990-94, Undersecretary of Foreign Trade. Effective tax rate used in the computation of 
co/umns (3) and (4) is takenfrom the SJS. Market exchange rates used in the computation of 
the /ast two co/umns are from Uygur ( 1991) and Central Bank. 
Allocations for duty free imports increased considerably after 1984 and, 
consequently, there was a similar increase in the subsidy rate of the two 
schemes. In certain years, such as 1984 and 1988, subsidy rates declined sig-
nificantly mainly because of the elimination of the foreign exchange premi-
um on the market exchange rate and lower tariff rates that accompanied 
import liberalization efforts. The latter also affected the distribution of allo-
cations among industries. 
Partial Exemptionfrom Corporate Taxes. This scheme was introduced in 
1980 and the rules were made simpler and more uniform in 1981. According 
to the scheme, industrial firms that export over $ 0.25 million are allowed to 
deduct up to 20 percent of their export revenues from taxable eamings. If 
exports are made through a trading company, one-fourth of the tax allowance 
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is forwarded to that company. Manufacturing and total corporate taxes not 
paid due to this promotion scheme are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Corporate Tax Allowance; 
Total and Manufacturing 
In Billion TL As Percent of Exports 
Manufactures Total Manufactures Total 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1980 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1981 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1982 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1983 n.a n.a n.a n.a 
1984 37 47 2.0 1.8 
1985 63 77 2.0 1.9 
1986 92 130 2.6 2.6 
1987 303 358 4.3 4.1 
1988 715 785 5.5 4.7 
1989 1,138 1,258 5.9 5.1 
1990 1,307 1,452 5.0 4.3 
1991 1,535 1,705 3.5 3.0 
1992 1,621 1,801 1.9 1.8 
1993 2,134 2,371 1.5 1.4 
1994 5,249 5,832 1. 1 1.0 
Sources: 1980-89, Çelebi ( 1991, p.79); 1990-93, Ars/an ( 1994). 1994 is an estimate. 
Apart from the above-mentioned allowances, exporters are also exempt 
from the payment of value-added tax (VAT) and extra-budgetary fund contri-
butions in transactions such as insurance. No attempt is made for the quan-
tification of the subsidy component of these exemptions since they are con-
sidered marginal. 
The subsidy components of the export promotion schemes in the manu-
facturing industry are brought together in Table 7. The table also includes the 
percentage change in REER to facilitate comparison. The table shows that: 
( 1) export promotion efforts in terms of both subsidies and real exchange 
rate changes were substantial in the early years of the 1980s. They reached a 
peak of about 35 percent of the value of exports in 1983. The REER, on the 
other hand, showed jumps in 1980 and 1982. A similar pattern is observed in 
the more recent crisis in 1994. However, export subsidies could not be raised 
in this year as muchas before due to (a) GATT provisions, (b) the scheduled 
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customs union with the European Union, and (c) constraints imposed by large 
budget deficits. 
(2) There was a rather sharp downtum in export promotion in general in 
1984-85, after which the exchange rate policy was either neutral or played a 
negative role. 
(3) The sum of ail the subsidies seems to have stabilized at just over 20 
percent in the late l 980s and early l 990s. 
( 4) The findings of other studies such as Çelebi ( 1991) and Togan ( 1993), 
which cover the period between 1980 and 1990, are in general agreement with 
the data presented in Table 7 and the findings of this study. 
Table 7: Percentage Change in REER and 
Subsidies in Manufacturing 
Total 
REER Change Direct Payments Export Credits Duty Allowances Tax (2+3+4+5) 
Allowances 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1979 -5.3 11.0 11.2 7.1 0.0 
1980 24.1 5.6 12.4 5.3 2.0* 
1981 7.1 9.1 10.8 4.9 2.0* 
1982 12.4 15.1 9.7 4.5 2.0* 
1983 5.8 17.4 8.9 6.3 2.0* 
1984 7.6 17.3 4.3 2.7 2.0 
1985 -2.1 10.2 1.6 5.0 2.0 
1986 6.6 10.7 3.9 7.6 2.6 
1987 -0.4 8.7 2.5 6.4 4.3 
1988 -0.8 7.6 3.7 6.4 5.5 
1989 -18.2 5.5 6.6 6.1 5.9 
1990 -15.3 4.4 5.3 6.8 5.0 
1991 -5.1 3.9 7.6 7.9 3.5 
1992 1.3 3.0 8.5 7.7 1.9 
1993 -6.2 2.8 9.7 8.8 1.5 
1994 34.4 2.2 13.4 7.8 1.1 
Notes:(*) These are assumed values. 
Sources: Tables 1 through 6. 
Export Performance and a Comparative Evaluation of 
Export Policies 


















During the 1980-87 period, both the growth and the change in the composi-
tion of exports were impressive: exports more than tripled, and the share of 
manufacturing in total exports increased from about 36 percent to over 75 
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percent, as can be observed in Table 8. However, the performance of exports 
in the 1988-93 period can be described as one of stagnation or marginal 
growth. 
On the supply side, the strong performance of exports until 1987 was 
achieved through the utilization of excess production capacity in manufactur-
ing which was created largely in the l 970s. Excess capacity was large partic-
ularly in the early l 980s due to reduced domestic demand. 
There has been a considerable rise in the exports of relatively new prod-
ucts, such as basic metals, iron and steel, and chemicals. Yet, in spite of the 
incentives for diversification, textiles, food and iron and steel, which are 
among the most labor-intensive industries, have kept their large share of about 
70 percent in total exports. This reflected the comparative advantage of 
Turkey in labor-intensive industries, and the fact that diversification has not 
been achieved to the extent desired. 
It is explained in Uygur (1991 and 1993) that export growth in the late 
l 980s and early l 990s was constrained by the fact that in addition to expan-
sion of domestic demand, fixed capital investment growth in that period was 
not high. Diversification was also Iimited by the same factor. For the same 
reason, total factor productivity growth was not as high as anticipated. The 
large increase in particularly manufacturing exports in 1994 resulted from 
both a reduction in domestic demand and a considerable rise in the real 
exchange rate. 
Manufacturing exports in dollar terms increased by about 18 times 
between 1980 and 1995, but a large proportion of this rise was recorded dur-
ing the 1981-85 period. The ri se in the quantity of manufacturing exports was 
even more pronounced during this period as can be seen in column (8) of 
Table 8. These high growth rates were comparable with the rates achieved in 
countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand. However, while 
these countries attained sustained growth in manufacturing exports, growth of 
Turkish manufacturing exports could not be sustained for the reasons 
explained above. 
A Comparative Evaluation of Export Policies: Econometric Estimation 
Results 
Ali export policies, but particularly export promotion schemes carry direct 
and indirect costs. The direct cost of a scheme would be equivalent to the sub-
sidy value, which in turn is an income transfer from generally public funds to 
exporters. Indirect costs are more difficult to assess. An important one is the 
increase in public sector spending or foregone revenue which may make the 
public deficit more difficult to control, with attendant inflationary effects. 
Table 8: Exports by Sectors 1 ~ 
"f;:j 
<::::> 




AGRX MINX MANX TOTX AGRX MINX MANX MANX ~ 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ~· "' 1::1 
1977 1,309 127 664 2,100 62.1 6.2 31.8 78.9 ~ 
1980 1,672 191 1,047 2,910 57.5 6.6 35.9 100.0 '"'O <1> 
1981 2,219 193 2,290 4,703 47.2 4.1 48.7 234.6 ~ 
1982 2,141 175 3,429 5,746 37.3 3.1 59.7 377.2 ~ 1::1 
1983 1,881 189 3,658 5,728 32.8 3.3 63.9 425.1 ::s ~ 
<1> 
1984 1,749 240 5,145 7,134 24.5 3.4 72.1 642.4 .. 
1985 1,719 244 5,995 7,958 21.6 3.1 75.3 762.3 ~ 
* 1986 1,886 247 5,324 7,457 25.3 3.3 71.4 742.7 <1> '< 
1987 1,853 272 8,065 10,190 18.2 2.7 79.2 982.4 
1988 2,341 377 8,944 11,662 20.1 3.2 76.7 1,042.8 
1989 2,126 413 9,086 11,625 18.3 3.5 78.2 1,010.1 
1990 2,388 329 10,242 12,959 18.4 2.6 79.0 1,034.9 
1991 2,732 286 10,575 13,593 20.1 2.1 77.2 1,073.2 
1992 2,259 264 12, l 91 14,714 15.4 1.8 82.8 1,266.0 
1993 2,381 238 12,726 15,334 15.5 1.6 82.9 1,328.7 
1994 2,470 272 15,364 18,106 13.6 1.5 84.9 1,772.8 
1995 2,314 406 18,916 21,636 10.7 1.9 87.4 1,820.3 
Notes: 1) Data for 1977-79 are annual averages of these three years. 2) AGRX: Agricultural exports; MINX: Mining exports; MANX: Manufacturing exports; 




Sources: State lnstitute of Statistics. Summary of Monthly Foreign Trade. (..._, 
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In what follows, the relative effects and effectiveness of export policies in 
general and promotion schemes in particular are estimated with the use of 
manufacturing export supply equations. The estimated equations are based on 
the export supply fonction of a representative exporter that aims to maximize 
profits. The derivation of such fonctions can be seen in, for example, Aspe 
and Giavazzi ( 1982) and Funke and Holly ( 1993). The export suppl y fonction 
of an exporter is specified as: 
X= X(I, D, P'/P', S), (1) 
where X1, XP'tPd, Xs > 0 and Xo <O. 
where X is export supply, 1 is gross fixed investment, D is domestic excess 
demand, P' is the price of goods exported, P' is the price of goods sold in the 
domestic market and S is export subsidy. Xi, ... Xo denote partial derivatives. 
It should be noted that adoption of a single suppl y equation, rather than of 
both demand and supply simultaneously, requires the assumption that export 
demand is infinitely elastic. This is true only in the case where it is possible 
to sell any quantity at the existing price. The infinite elasticity assumption can 
be meaningfol if the exporting economy is small in that it does not have a siz-
able share in the international export markets. Considering that the Turkish 
exports do not constitute a significant proportion of world exports, at least at 
the level of aggregation taken here, estimation of a single export suppl y equa-
tion can thus be justified. 
Equation (1) describes ex-ante suppl y and it implies instantaneous adjust-
ment since the time factor is not explicitly accounted for. Yet, there may be 
time lags in the adjustment process due to (i) adjustment costs, (ii) the slug-
gishness of export prices which in tum may reflect menu costs, (iii) informa-
tion lags, and (iv) transportation lags. Thus, a dynamic specification of equa-
tion (1) . may be necessary, incorporating lags of the dependent and the 
explanatory variables. 
Another form of dynamism, in terms of differences of the variables 
involved, may be required due to the time series properties of the variables in 
equation (1 ). It has long been established that the variables in an econometric 
equation should be stationary in the sense that their means should not drift and 
their variances and covariances should not change with time. Yet, most 
macroeconomic variables are non-stationary. These non-stationary variables 
can be made stationary by taking their differences. 
However, when the variables under consideration are differenced, the rela-
tionships that are sought are short-run relationships and the long-run ones are 
lost. To recover this lost information and reflect it in the short run relationship, 
a long-run relationship is also specified and estimated. Such an equilibrium 
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relationship exists if the variables under consideration are "co-integrated". 
Obviously, there may be deviations from the co-integration or long-run rela-
tionship in the short-run, which can be represented by the residuals in this lat-
ter relationship. These residuals are called "the error-correction terrns" and 
they are included in the short run equations if long-run co-integrating relation-
ships exist. Thus, equation ( 1) may, in the end, contain another explanatory 
variable, namely an error-correction terrn, which cornes about as a result of the 
econometric approach followed in the estimation of the export equation. 
Variants of equation ( 1) are estimated by using ex-post quarterly manu-
facturing data which cover the period from 1977-IV to 1995-II. Estimation of 
this equation is not straightforward as it involves several steps. Among these 
steps, there are the long terrn and short terrn estimations of the export supply 
equation. This estimation methodology allows us to answer the following 
questions: (i) What are the time series properties of the variables in equation 
( 1 )? (ii) Are there long-run co-integrating relationships between the variables 
of equation ( 1 )? (iii) What is the short-run dynamic specification of equation 
( 1 )? (iv) What are the policy implications of the short-run and long-run spec-
ifications?. 
Time Series Properties of the Variables of Export Supply Equation 
Given the upward trend in manufacturing exports and the convenience m 
interpreting the coefficients, the variables of equation ( 1) are expressed in log-
arithms. The dependent variable of this equation is: 
LRMANX = Log(Real manufacturing exports). 
Consistent data for manufacturing investment are not yet available partic-
ularly for the I 990s. Thus, non-residential investment is used in estimations: 
LRNHI = Log(Real non-residential investment). 
Non-residential investment includes investment in manufacturing, energy, 
transportation, communications, agriculture and so on. Available information 
shows that manufacturing investment closely follows non-residential invest-
ment. On the other hand, one can argue that non-residential investment is a 
more appropriate variable in explaining aggregate manufacturing exports any 
way, since these exports require a coordinated activity of not only manufac-
turing but also communications, transportation and energy, among others. 
Excess demand in the manufacturing industry is defined as follows: 
LEXDDT = Log (Manufacturing capacity utilization I Percentage of manu-
facturing firrns which report insufficient domestic demand). 
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Capacity utilization per se is not taken as an indicator of excess demand 
since it can be affected by supply factors. Data that relate to the proportion of 
finns which report insufficient domestic demand are obtained from the quar-








Figure 1: Logarithms of Manufacturing Exports 
(LRMANX), Non-residential Investment (LRNHI) 
and Excess Demand (LEXDDT) 
--... LRNHI 
~ LEXDDT6 
Note: To facilitaie comparison with a similar scale, 6 is added ta LEXDDT. 
Figure 1 shows that there is both seasonality and trend in ail three of the 
LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT variables. To see whether LRMANX, 
LRNHI and LEXDDT are stationary, the unit root test of Hylleberg et.al. 
(1990) is used. With this test, which is shortly referred to as the HEGY test, 
one can check for both seasonal unit root and non-seasonal unit root and for 
this reason it. may be preferred to the usual Dickey-Fuller (DF) or the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The HEGY test requires the estimation 
of equations which contain four different transformations of the LRMANX, 
LRNHI and LEXDDT variables. Estimation results of the HEGY equations 
and the definitions of the transfonned variables are given below in Table 9. 
Assume that the four transfonned variables are labeled X 1 (-1 ), X2(- l ), 
X3(-2) and X3(- l ). In the HEGY procedure, the test for non-seasonal unit root 
is carried out on the coefficient of the X 1 (-1) variable. For no unit root, this 
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coefficient should pass the HEGY test, that is it should be Jess than zero. To 
test for seasonal unit root, in addition to the individual tests on the coefficients 
of X2(- l ), X3(-2) and X3(- l ), a joint F-test on the coefficients of the last two 
variables is required. If the coefficient of X2(- l) does not pass the test, there 
is biannual seasonal unit root. If the coefficients of both X3(-2) and X3(- l) 
do not pass the test, which will also imply failure of the joint F-test, then there 
is annual seasonal unit root. If only one of these coefficients fail the individ-
ual test but they pass the joint F-test, then one can reject, though with some 
doubt, the presence of annual seasonal unit root. For a variable not to have a 
unit root at ail, seasonal and non-seasonal, so that it is stationary, it should 
pass ail the individual tests 
Consider first the dependent variable LRMANX. The t-ratio for the coef-
ficient of X 1 LRMX(-1) given in Table 9 does not pass the HEGY test since it 
is lower in absolute terms than the critical values provided by HEGY for no 
trend and no dummy, which are approximately -3.55 for 1 percent and -2.92 
for 5 percent. Thus, there is non-seasonal unit root in the LRMANX data. 'fo 
see if there is seasonal unit root in the same data, first the individual t-tests are 
done. The absolute t-ratio for the coefficient of X2LRMX(- l) barely exceeds 
the 5 percent critical value of HEGY, but is considerably lower than the 1 per-
cent critical value of -2.65. One can therefore suspect the presence of biannu-
al seasonal unit root. 
While the coefficient of X3LRMX(-2) passes the HEGY test, the coeffi-
cient of X3 LRMX(-1) does not, at both 1 percent and 5 percent. To make a 
decision on annual seasonal unit root, the joint significance of the coefficients 
of X3LRMX(-2) and X3LRMX(- l) is tested with the following F-statistic: 
F,., = (RSS(R> - RSS(rn) / r 
RSS(rn /n - k 
where RSS<R> is the residual sum of squares from the restricted equation which 
excludes X3LRMX(-2) and X3LRMX(-l) and RSS<rn is the residual sum of 
squares from the unrestricted equation given in Table 9, r is the number of 
restrictions, 2, and n - k is degrees of freedom. The F-statistic computed is 
8.80 and exceeds the critical value given by Hylleberg et.al. Thus, one can say 
that LRMANX does not contain annual seasonal unit root. Note however that 
the coefficient of X3LRMX(- l) did not pass the test. 
The results for LRNHI are similar to those for LRMANX. The t-ratio for 
the coefficient of X 1 LRNHl(-1) does not pass the HEGY test since it is lower 
in absolute terms than the critical values provided by HEGY for constant, trend 
and dummy, which are approximately -4.25 for 1 percent and -3.60 for 5 per-
cent. There is therefore non-seasonal unit root in the LRNHI data. The absolute 
t-ratio for the coefficient of X2LRNHl(- l) is lower than the 1 percent and 5 
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percent critical values of HEGY, -3.72 and -3.02, implying the presence of 
biannual seasonal unit root. 
While the coefficient of X3LRNHl(-2) does not pass the HEGY test, the 
coefficient of X3LRNHl(-1) barely passes this test at 5 percent; the t-ratio of 
the latter's coefficient is almost equal to the critical value given by HEGY. 
This is reflected in the computed F-statistic which is very close to the critical 
value given by HEGY at 1 percent. Thus, in addition to biannual seasonal unit 
root, there may be annual seasonal unit root in the LRNHI data. 
The excess demand variable LEXDDT does not have a non-seasonal unit 
root at 5 percent, but it does have at 1 percent. This variable does not have a 
biannual seasonal unit root since the absolute t-ratio of the coefficient of 
X2LEXD(-l) exceeds the critical HEGY values for constant and dummy, 
which are -3.69 at 1 percent and -3.00 at 5 percent. Although the F-statistic 
for the joint test of the coefficients of X3LEXD(-2) and X3LEXD(-1) indi-
cates no annual seasonal unit root, the coefficient of the latter variable does 
not pass the individual test. Thus, annual seasonal unit root cannot be com-
pletely ruled out. 
The test results indicate that LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT are not sta-
tionary. More specifically, (i) there is non-seasonal unit root in ail three of 
them, (ii) there is biannual seasonal unit root in the LRMANX and LRNHI 
data, and (iii) one can not rule out the presence of annual seasonal unit root in 
ail three of the variables under consideration. This information should be 
taken into account in the co-integration tests and in differencing the variables 
when making short-term dynamic estimations of equation (1). 
The other two variables of equation (1), relative manufacturing export 
price and manufacturing export subsidy are also expressed in logarithms and 
denoted by LRMAXP and LTOTSU, respectively. 
LRMAXP = Log(Manufacturing Export Price I Domestic Manufacturing 
Wholesale Price) 
LTOTSU = Log(Manufacturing Export Subsidies I Value of Manufacturing 
Exports) 
As can be observed in Figure 2, there is no apparent seasonality in 
LRMAXP and LTOTSU. Hence, the ADF test, rather than the HEGY test, is 
used to test for the stationarity of these two variables. 
Estimation results of the equations that are used to carry out the ADF tests 
are given in Table 10. According to these results, the t-ratios obtained exceed, 
in absolute terms, the critical values of the ADF test at both 1 percent and 5 
percent. (The critical values are approximately -2.60 for no constant and no 
trend and -3.55 for constant and no trend at 1 percent.) Thus, LRMAXP and 
LTOTSU do not contain unit roots and are stationary. 
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Table 9: Unit Root Tests for LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT 
Dependent variable: X4LRMX 
Current sample: 1978:3 to 1995:2 
Durbin's h alternative= -.350819 [.726) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = 1.21780 (.544) 

















Number of observations: 68 
Breusch/Godfrey LM 1 = .178354 [.673) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 4.73028 [.193) 
Augmented Dickey - Fuller= -8.05802 [.000] 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob) 
.140081 2.52146 [.014) 
.004809 -2.15529 [.035) 
.085645 -1.99455 [.051) 
.129196 -3.44791 [.001) 
.131244 -2.00167 [.050) 
.152999 2.39607 [.020) 
114456 -1.23353 [.222) 
XILRMX = LRMANX + LRMANX(-1) + LRMANX(-2) + LRMANX (-3) 
X2LRMX = -(LRMANX - LRMANX(-1) + LRMANX(-2)- LRMANX(-3)) 
X3LRMX = -(LRMANX - LRMANX(-2)) 
X4LRMX= LRMANX - LRMANX(-4) 
LRMANX: Logarithm of real manufacturing ex ports. 
Dependent variable: X4LRNHI 
Current sample: 1979:4 to 1995:2 
Durbin's h alternative= -.159214 [.873) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = 2.26561 [.322) 























Number of observations: 63 
Breusch/Godfrey LMI = 1.13702 [.286) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 2.31347 [.510) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller= -8.48633 [.000] 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob) 
1.48428 3.12766 [.003) 
.0043822 3.03766 [.004] 
.090979 3.46055 [.001) 
.082559 4.32885 [.000] 
.081094 4.19980 [.000] 
.052580 -3.28515 [.002) 
.088158 -2.27249 [.027) 
.108436 -3.47405 [.001) 
.112737 -2.79037 [.007) 
.139572 2.03817 [.047) 
XI LRNHI = LRNHI + LRNHl(-1) + LRNHl(-2) + LRNHl(-3) 
X2LRNHI = -(LRNHI - LRNHl(-1) + LRNHl(-2)- LRNHl(-3)) 
X3LRNHI = -(LRNHI - LRNHl(-2)) 
X4LRNHI = LRNHI - LRNHl(-4) 
LRRNHI: Logarithm of real non-residential investement 
Dependent Variable: X4LEXD 
Current sample: 1979:2 to 1995:2 Number ofobservations: 65 
Durbin's h alternative= -.620164 [.535) Breusch/Godfrey LMI = .417309 [.518) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = .808034 [.668) Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 3.97292 [.264) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM4 = 4.51161 [.341) Augmented Dickey-Fuller = -8.08259(.000) 
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob) 
CONST .076283 .034198 2.23065 [.030) 
DUM4 .055085 .029627 1.85928 [.068) 
XILEXD(-1) -.040022 .011595 -3.45169 [.001) 
X2LEXD(-I) -.492314 .123339 -3.99155 [.000] 
X3LEXD(-2) -.562006 .110219 -5.09900 [.000] 
X3LEXD(-I) -.038078 .132512 -.287354 [.775) 
X4LEXD(-I) .290388 .138159 2.10185 [.040) 
X4LEXD(-3) -.171636 .085990 -1.99599 [.051) 
XILEXD = LEXDDT+ LEXDDT(-1) + LEXDDT(-2) + LEXDDT(-3) 
X2LEXD = -(LEXDDT- LEXDDT(-1) + LEXDDT(-2) - LEXDDT(-3)) 
X3LEXD = -(LEXDDT - LEXDDT(-2)) 
X4LEXD = LEXDDT- LEXDDT(-4) 
LEX DDT: Logarithm of excess demand in manufacturing. 
Note: Estimations were carried out with TSP386. 
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The Long-run Relationship Among the Variables of Expon Supply 
Equation 
Given the time series properties of the variables in the export supply equation, 
the short-run dynamic version of equation (1) can be estimated. However, in 
this estimation, which will require differencing of the variables with unit roots 
so that these variables can be made stationary, only the short-term relationship 
between LRMANX and the explanatory variables can be established. 
Information regarding the nature of the long-term relationship between 
LRMANX and the explanatory variables will be lost. Yet, one can seek for a 
long-term, cointegration relationship among the variables of equation (1). 
Two methods are available in this respect. One is that of Engle and Granger 
(1987) and the other is that of Johansen (1988).8 The Johansen procedure, 
which is basically a Vecor Auto Regression (VAR) methodology, is more 
appropriate here since it is better suited for multivariate analysis. 
Figure 2: Logarithms of Relative Manufacturing Export 










Note: To faci/itate comparison with a simi/ar sca/e, 1 is added to LTOTSU. 
In the search for a cointegration relationship, the following procedure is 
followed: 
1) In the application of the Johansen procedure, variables with unit root 
(LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT ) as well as variables without unit roots, 
LRMAXP and LTOTSU, are included in the VAR system. This may not seem 
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conventional, since m the Johansen procedure cointegration is generally 
sought among the variables with a unit root. LRMAXP and LTOTSU are 
included since their exclusion from the VAR system would imply that prices 
do not play a role in the determination of long-run export supply. 
Economically, this is not plausible. Johansen stated: 
Thus the question of stationarity of individual series can be formulat-
ed in a natural way in terms of parameters in the multivariate system, 
and is a hypothesis that is conveniently checked inside the model 
rather than a question that has to be determined before the analysis 
starts. Thus one can include in the cointegration analysis the variables 
that are considered economically meaningful as long as they are 1(1) 
or 1(0). By including a stationary variable in the vector Xt we add an 
extra cointegrating vector, that is, an extra dimension to the cointe-
grating space. lt is this possibility to have unit vectors as cointegrating 
vectors that forces us to have a definition of 1(1) that allows both 1(1) 
and 1(0) components. (Johansen, 1995, p. 74). 
Table 10: Unit Root Tests for LARMAXP and LTOTSU 
Dependent variable: DlLRMXP 
Current sample: 1978:1to1995:2 
Durbin 's h alternative = -.0962 [.923] 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = -2.12043 [1.00] 







Dependent variable: D 1 LTOTS 
Current sample: 1978:1to1995:2 
Durbin-Watson statistic =2.00215 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = .238411 [.888] 







Number of observations: 70 
Breusch/Godfrey LM 1 = -2.26349 [ 1.00] 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = -1.42984 [ 1.00] 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller = -8.5163 [.000] 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
.061919 -2.85291 [.006] 
.112639 2.35301 [.022] 
Number of observations: 70 
Breusch/Godfrey LMl = .676121 [.411] 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 1.74659 [.627] 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller = -8.783[.000] 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
.134484 -4. 77003 [.000] 
.094476 -4.76771 [.000] 
Note: Estimations were carried out with TSP386. 
Just as pointed out by Johansen, when the two price variables, LRMAXP 
and LTOTSU, are excluded from the VAR system, one is faced with the out-
come that either it is not possible to obtain cointegration vector(s) with a plau-
sible number of lags in the VAR system or, even when such vectors are 
obtained, the parameters are not economically meaningful. 
2) Seasonal unit roots in the LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT variables 
were eliminated by summing each of these three series for four quarters. This 
is done to avoid seasonal interference in the long-term relationship. 
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3) A dummy variable, DU84 l, is added to represent an announcement 
effect. It was declared at the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 that sub-
sidies on exports would be lowered considerably during 1984. Thus, exporters 
rushed to take advantage of the subsidies before they were reduced. It is gen-
erally accepted that part of this rush represented fictitious exports. See for 
example Celasun and Rodrik (1989). 
4) If and when a meaningful cointegration relationship was found, it was 
checked whether the error correction term from this relationship had a signif-
icant coefficient with the expected (negative) sign in the short-terrn equation. 
Only when this condition was met, the cointegration relationship was kept for 
further analysis. 
The results of the Johansen cointegration procedure with 7 lags in the VAR 
system are given in Table 11. ( Similar results were obtained with 6 and 8 
lags.) The table indicates that on the basis of the LR (Likelihood Ratio) tests 
based on both the maximal eigenvalue and the trace of the stochastic matrix, 
4 cointegration vectors can be found between the variables of the export sup-
ply equation. Any one ofthese vectors can be chosen on the basis of the mean-
ingfulness of the parameters. 
On the basis of the signs of the parameters, vectors 1, 2 and 3 should be 
ruled out. In vector 1, the signs of the elasticities of relative export price 
(FLRMAP) and excess demand (FLEXD) are incorrect. In vector 3, the signs 
of the elasticities of relative export price and investment (FLRNHI) are not 
acceptable. In vector 2, not only the sign of the elasticity of excess demand is 
incorrect (positive), but also the magnitudes of the elasticities of ail the vari-
ables are too high to be acceptable. There remains only vector 4, where the 
elasticities of investment, relative export price and excess demand have cor-
rect signs and acceptable magnitudes. In vector 4, however, the sign of the 
elasticity of export subsidy (LTOTSU) is negative, implying that in the long 
run export subsidies lead to a decline in export supply. 
This is an interesting result and on the basis of the cointegration analysis 
we cannot reject the statement that subsidies may reduce manufacturing 
export supply in the long run. The magnitudes of the other elasticities imply 
that in the long run relative export price has the largest effect on export sup-
ply. The elasticity of domestic excess demand is just over unity and a decline 
in excess demand leads to slightly more than a proportional increase in 
exports. Investment has an elasticity close to unity implying that a sustainable 
rise in export supply requires a proportional increase in investment. 
These results, particularly the negative effect of export subsidies on export 
supply require further elaboration. To be able to do such an elaboration, we first 
need to find out the short term influence of the above mentioned explanatory 
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variables on export supply. This can be done by short term dynamic estima-
tion of the export supply equation. Following this estimation, additional tests 
and explanations can be made on the medium term effects of different export 
policies, particularly of subsidies. 
Table 11: Estimation of Long-Teno Manufacturing Exports; Johansen 
Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Trended Case, Trend in DGP) 
Sixty observations from 1980Q3 to 1995Q2. Maximum lag in VAR= 7, chosen r=4. 
List of variables inctuded in the cointegrating vector: FLRMX, FLRNHl, FLEXD, 
FLRMAP, FLTOSU. List ofadditional 1(0) variables included in the VAR: DU84l. 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: .69663 .49335 .42946 .21371 .043586 
i) Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix: 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical V. 90% Critical V. 
r= 0 r=l 71.5674 33.4610 30.9000 
r<=l r=2 40.7966 27.0670 24.7340 
r<=2 r=3 33.6699 20.9670 18.5980 
r<=3 r=4 14.4254 14.0690 12.0710 
r<=4 r=5 2.6739 3.7620 2.6870 
ii) Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical V. 90% Critical V. 
r=O r>=l 163.1331 68.5240 64.8430 
r<=l r>=2 91.5658 47.2100 43.9490 
r<=2 r>=3 50.7692 29.6800 26.7850 
r<=3 r>=4 17.0993 15.4100 13.3250 
r<=4 r=5 2.6739 3.7620 2.6870 
iii) Estimated Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen Estimation (Normalized in Brackets) 
Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 
FLRMX .19780 .052927 -.039372 -.25442 
(-1.0000) (-1.0000) ( - l. 0000) (-1.0000) 
FLRNHI -.52304 -.59566 -.30261 .24729 
(2.6443) (l l.2543) (-7.6858) (.97198) 
FLEXD -.46353 -.67535 -.55676 -.27449 
(2.3435) (12.7600) (-14.1409) (-1.0789) 
FLRMAP .39236 -.70055 -.16521 l.3502 
(-1.9836) ( 13.2359) (-4.1960) (5.3070) 
FLTOSU -.43723 -.23193 -.78818 -.26710 
(2.2105) (4.3821) (-20.0184) (-1.0498) 
iv) Estimated Adjustment Coefficients of Vector 4 (Nonnalized in Brackets) 
FLRMX FLRNHI FLEXD FLRMAP FLTOSU 
.19810 .13831 .092763 -.014573 -.076050 
(.050402) (.035188) (.023601) (-.0037076) (-.019349) 
Notes: As explained in the text, LRMX, FLRNHI and FLEXD are the four quarter sums (al t, I-
l, t-2 and t-3) of LRMANX, LRNHI and LEXDDT, respective/y. The summation is done to elimi-
nate seasona/ity in these variables. ln order not to ejfect the parameter values with this proce-
dure, LRMAXP and LTOTSU were multiplied by four. Thus, FLRMAP = 4*LRMAXP and 
FLTOSU =4*LTOTSU. 
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Short-run Dynamic Estimation of the Export Supply Equation 
In the short tenn dynamic estimation of the export supply equation, the fol-
lowing procedure is followed: 
(i) An error-correction term was added to the export supply equation. This 
tenn is basically the residual of the cointegration vector 4 of Table 11 and is 
defined as follows: 
ERCOEX = FLRMX - .97198*FLRNHI + l.0789*FLEXD 
- 5.3070*FLRMAP + l .0498*FLTOSU 
(ii) In order to eliminate both the non-seasonal and seasonal unit roots in 
the dependent variable LRMANX and the explanatory variables LRNHI and 
LEXDDT, these were differenced by four quarters. 
(iii) The other two explanatory variables, LRMAXP and LTOTSU, did not 
have unit roots. They therefore did not require differencing. Nevertheless, 
estimations were carried out after these variables were differenced one quar-
ter so that comparative evaluations on their estimated parameters can be 
made. Since the dependent variable is differenced, it would not be easy to 
evaluate the parameters of undifferenced LRMAXP and LTOTSU. 
(iv) Severa) diagnostic tests, a total of 14 of them, were used in choosing 
the final short-tenn equation. (v) In line with the "from general to specific" 
modeling approach, several lagged as well as the current values of the 
explanatory variables were initially included in the equation but the insignif-
icant lags were eliminated. 
(v) Alternative lags, ranging from one to four, were tried in choosing the 
most appropriate number of lags for the error correction tenn ERCOEX. 
Estimations with one lag, ERCOEX(-1 ), yielded meaningful and econometri-
cally acceptable results. 
Estimation results and the diagnostic tests of the short tenn error correc-
tion investment equation are given in Table 12. The table contains three dif-
ferent estimations of the same equation; the difference arises from alternative 
treatments of the lagged variables. In the first estimation, the lags of the 
lagged dependent variable, D4LRMAX(- I ), and the relative export price vari-
able, D 1 LRMXP, are not constrained. In the second estimation, the lags of 
these variables are constrained to lie on a polynomial. This polynomial dis-
tributed lag (PDL) or Almon lag estimation was done to avoid multicollinear-
ity between the different lags of D4LRMAX(- l) and D 1 LRMXP. 
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Table 12: Short-Term Estimation of the Manufacturing 
Export Supply Equation 
1. Dependent Variable: D4LRMAX 
Current sample: 1979:2 to 1995:2 
R-squared = .848537 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.09410 
Breusch/Godfrey LMI = .381024 (.537) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 3.05104 (.384) 
Aug Dickey-Fuller =-8.20191 ** (.000) 
Chow test= 1.33960 (.233) 
F-statistic = 24.2765 ** (.000) 















Il. Dependent variable: D4LRMAX 
Current sample: 1979:2 to 1995:2 
R-squared = .847557 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.08949 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2= 1.23029 (.541) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM4= 7.78228 (.100) 
ARCH test= 1.29267 (.256) 
LR het. test (w/Chow) = 6.22667 (.013) 
F-statistic =24.0926 ** (.000) 
Log of likelihood fonction= 57.7639 
Regressor Coefficient 
c -.065601 






Number of observations: 65 
Adjusted R-squared = .813584 
Durbin's h alternative= -.582803 (.560) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = 1.14407 (.564) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM4 = 8.82237 (.066) 
ARCH test = 1.15710 (.282) 
LR het. test (w/Chow)= 11.3653 (.000) 
Jarque-Bera normality test= .747485 (.688) 
Log of likelihood fonction= 57.9735 
Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob] 
.032933 -2.41787 (.019) 
.115410 4.94808 (.000) 
.115584 .90183 (.371) 
.106351 1.44850 (.153) 
.110672 -4.66624 (.000) 
.097855 2.19588 (.033) 
.096835 2.70778 (.009) 
.264286 3.41165(.001) 
.287092 .76114 (.450) 
.094080 -1.69869 (.095) 
.086266 1.88350 (.065) 
.010180 -3.10893 (.003) 
.115815 4.26543 (.000) 
Number of observation: 65 
Adjusted R-squared= .812378 
Breusch/Godfrey LMI= .360236 (.548) 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3= 3.36623 (.339) 
Aug Dickey-Fuller =-8.18439 ** (.000) 
Chow test = 1.02810 (.446) 
Jarque-Bera normality test= .749710 (.687) 
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Table 12: Continued 
DILRMXP .807575 .264930 3.04826 (.004] 
DILRMXP(-1) .483612 .170353 2.83888 (.006] 
DILRMXP(-2) .159650 .295642 .54001 (.591] 
D4LEDDT(-2) -.174716 .093695 -1.86473 (.068] 
DILTOTS(-1) .171792 .086029 2.00000 (.050] 
ERCOEX(-1) -.026173 .010363 -2.52566 (.015] 
DU841 .501594 .115790 4.33192 (.000] 
(*)Note: Coefficients of D4LRMAX(-I) and Dl LRMXP were estimated with a PDL. 






Ill. Dependent variable: D4LRMAX 
Current sample: 1979:2 to 1995:2 
R-squared = .845957 
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.05679 
Breusch/Godfrey LM2 = .563317 (.755] 
Breusch/Godfrey LM4 = 4.63127 (.327] 
ARCH test= .983201 (.321] 
LR het. test (w/Chow) = 11.5541 (.000] 
F-statistic = 44.7181 •• (.000] 








ERCOEX(-1) - -.024578 
DU841 .502940 
Notes: 






Number of observations: 65 
Adjusted R-squared = .827040 
Breusch/Godfrey LMI = .075434 (.784] 
Breusch/Godfrey LM3 = 2.35243 (.503] 
Aug Dickey-Fuller = -8.03970 •• (.000] 
Chow test= 1.75179 (.110] 
White het. test= 33.6007 (.214] 
Jarque-Bera normality test = 1.59854 [.450] 
Log of Likelihood fonction = 57.4246 
Standard Error T-Ratio [Prob] 
.027096 -2.25713 (.028] 
.061023 9.67537 (.000] 
.089919 3.22657 (.002] 
.374926 3.56486 (.001] 
.084606 -2.30397 (.025] 
.076216 2.17855 (.034] 
.007561 -3.25048 (.002] 
.110618 4.54664 (.000] 
LRMANX: Logarithm of real manufacturing exports. 
D4LRMXA(-I) = D4LRMAX(-I )+0-2*D4LRMAX(-2)+0.25*D4LRMAX(-3)-
D4LRMAX(-4)+0.5*D4LRMAX(-5). 
D4LRNHI = LRNHI - LRNHl(-4) 
LRNHI: Logarithm of real non-residential investment. 
D4LEDDT= LEXDDT-LEXDDT(-4) 
LEXDDT: Logarithm of excess demand in manufacturing. 
D 1 LRMXP = LRMAXP-LRMAXP(-1) 
DILMXPA = 0.60*DILRMXP+0.25*DILRMXP(-I )+0./5*DILRMXP(-2); 
LRMAXP: Logarithm of relative manufacturing export price. 
DILTOTS = LTOTSU-LTOTSU(-1} 
LTOTSU: Logarithm of the value of manufacturing export subsidies as a proportion of the 
value manufacturing exports. 
DU84/: Dummy variable that takes the value of I in 1984:/ and 0 at other limes. ln the third 
estimation, instead of the lags of D4LRMAX(- I) and DI LRMXP, their weighted sums, labeled 
D4LRMXA(-I) and DI LMXPA are used. These weighted sums are dejined in Table 12. 
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The results show that (i) ail the parameter estimates have correct signs and 
(ii) the magnitudes of the estimates are smaller than those of the long terrn 
parameters given in Table 11. lt can be stated on the basis of the diagnostic 
tests that there are no econometric problems in the estimations. We can only 
suspect the presence of heteroskedasticity. According to the LR (Likelihood 
Ratio, Chow) test, this problem is present. But according to the LM (Lagrange 
Multiplier, White) test heteroskedasticity is rejected. 
The short terrn price change effect on export supply in the current quarter, 
given by the parameter estimate of DILRMXP, is close to unity but declines 
sharply after the second quarter. Note, however, that since the dependent vari-
able is differenced by four quarters while the price variable is differenced by 
one quarter, the parameter estimate of D 1 LRMXP reflects the effect of quar-
terly price changes on annual export changes. The three quarter effect of price 
change on annual export change is 1.45 in estimation II and 1.34 in estima-
tion III. These results are supportive of the large long terrn price elasticity of 
exports obtained from the cointegration estimation given in Table 11. 
It is worth noting that although the long terrn investment and excess 
demand elasticities of exports are almost equal, the short terrn effect of invest-
ment on exports is higher than that of excess demand. As already mentioned 
in the context of cointegration estimation, the dummy variable DU84 I repre-
sents the effect of an announcement made at the end of 1983 that export sub-
sidies would be lowered considerably during 1984. This resulted in a rush of 
the exporters at the beginning of 1984 to take advantage of the subsidies 
before they were reduced. 
Of particular .interest in these estimations is the short terrn effect of export 
subsidies on ex ports, given the negative long terrn effect of the former on the 
latter. The pârameter of the export subsidy variable is positive in ail three esti-
mations.9 The same parameter is also significant in the last two estimations 
where the problem of multicollinearity is reduced. These results imply that in 
the short run and with one quarter lag, exports respond to higher subsidies 
positively and significantly. 
One important conclusion that cornes out from the long run and short run 
estimation results ·is the following. The cointegration relationship shows that 
export subsidies have a negative effect on export supply in the long terrn. On 
the other hand, dynamic estimations show that export subsidies have a posi-
tive effect on export supply in the short terrn. Can these seemingly conflict-
ing results be reconciled and explained? These results are explained below on 
the basis of economic reasoning. But before that, the export supply equation 
is estimated by rolling regressions to see whether the parameter estimate of 
export subsidies change in time. If, for instance, this parameter declines in 
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time, then it can be stated that. the effect of export subsidies diminishes in 
time. 
In rolling regressions, repeated estimations are carried out with a certain 
window size (number of observations). The window is shifted one step ahead 
at each estimation while keeping its size unchanged. In this way, a sequence 
of parameter estimates and their standard errors are obtained. Here, the third 
equation in Table 12 is estimated with rolling regressions; window size is 
taken to be 46 and the initial estimation started at 1990-1993. Due to space 
considerations, only the graph of the parameter estimates of export subsidies 
is provided in Figure 3. '0 
Figure 3: Coefficient Estimates of Export Subsidy Variable 
DlLTOTS(-1) in Rolling Estimations of Export 










1990Q4 1991Q2 1991Q4 1992Q2 1992Q4 1993Q2 1993Q4 1994Q2 1994Q4 1995Q2 
The figure indicates that the coefficient of D 1 LTOTS(-1) has a negative 
trend and there is a sharp decline starting in 19931. Considering that the win-
dow size is 46, it is evident that this sharp decline is observed when the obser-
vations that reflect the 1981-83 jump in export subsidies are left out. Note that 
there is some rise in the coefficient after 19941 when there was another large 
increase in export subsidies. 
The rolling regression results are not comparable with cointegration esti-
mations. However, it can be reiterated that export subsidies, as promotion 
schemes, raise export supply if and when they exceed a certain threshold and 
this effect diminishes in time. 
The economic explanation of the above results can be made in terms of the 
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arguments of the "irreversibility" or "sunk cost" approach. This approach is 
used in the explanation of investment behavior and can easily be extended to 
the explanation of export behavior. As explained by Pindyck ( 1991) and Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994 ), an investment expenditure is considered to be a sunk 
cost, and therefore irreversible, basically because it is industry specific and 
cannot be used productively by others in a different industry. An irreversible 
investment project has an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the 
cost of investment. This opportunity cost can be high and is highly sensitive 
to uncertainty over the future value of the project. Thus, changing economic 
conditions that affect the perceived risk of the future cash flows can have a 
large negative effect on investment expenditure. This latter effect may be larg-
er than for instance the effect of a change in interest rates. 
Export activity requires not only investment but also, for instance, mar-
keting by which considerable sunk costs can be incurred. Dixit ( 1989) 
explains that such sunk costs combined with exchange rate uncertainty create 
sizable opportunity costs of entering and exiting international markets. 
Uncertainties over future product prices, input costs, exchange rates, future 
regulations and tax policies affect export activity in a manner similar to that 
of investment activity. Thus, "if uncertainty over the economic envîronment 
is high, tax and related incentives may have to be very large to have any sig-
nificant impact on investment" and exports. Pindyck ( 1991, p. 1141 ). 
The implication of the irreversibility argument for the above econometric 
results is clear. In Turkey, uncertainty has ail along surrounded export subsi-
dies themselves. First, governments considered export subsidies as part of 
emergency measures or stabilization programs to raise foreign exchange earn-
ings especially at times when the supply of foreign exchange was not suffi-
cient. In other words, subsidies were not considered as part of a longer term 
plan that aimed at sustainable export growth. 
Second, as subsidies reached high levels during 1980-83, it became evi-
dent as early as in 1984 that these high levels were unsustainable. Large and 
rising budget deficits put a limit both on direct premium payments and fore-
gone tax revenues. There were times in the late I 980s and the early I 990s that 
the realization of the subsidies had to be postponed due to large public sector 
deficits. There were also the GATT provisions that prohibited direct payments 
at the end of the I 980s. The scheduled customs union with the European 
Union, by which the subsidy regulations of the latter would become effective, 
was an additional factor in the perceived unsustainability of export subsidies. 
Uncertainty also characterized government policies in general and domes-
tic (excess) demand and real exchange rate policies in particular. Thus, export 
subsidies had a positive effect on exports in the short term by way of higher 
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utilization of the existing capacity. But this effect was temporary and could 
not last long. A long lasting positive effect could not be observed because of 
the negative effect of uncertainty and risk on long term decisions that, for 
instance, relate to the expansion of productive capacity. 
In terms of the effects and effectiveness of export policies, econometric 
results imply the following. The most effective policy seems to be the real 
exchange rate policy. The effect of this variable is clearly dominant in both 
the short term and the long term. Tuen cornes the domestic (excess) demand 
policy. Export subsidies can be used in expanding export supply in the short 
term but their effect is reversed in the long term. An export policy which heav-
ily depends on export subsidies will fail in the long run. Thus, if a choice has 
to be made between the exchange rate and subsidy policies, the former should 
be preferred as against the latter. 
Conclusions 
Expansion and diversification of exports are generally considered necessary 
for developing countries to achieve higher and sustainable growth. It is there-
fore important to make a comparative evaluation of different export policies 
such as exchange rate policies, domestic demand policies and export promo-
tion schemes. Recently, there has been a concem over the implementation of 
export promotion measures with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization. Since, the "Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures" (SCM) has tightened the disciplines 
on subsidies, which may constrain export promotion schemes. 
In the Turkish context, reduction of domestic demand, increases in the real 
exchange rate and improved and newly-introduced export promotion schemes 
were among the important elements of export policy. These measures were 
implemented with varying degrees of intensity from the mid-1970s to mid-
1990s. Export policy worked well until the mid- l 980s, with impressive per-
formances in terms of both the growth and composition of exports. But these 
could not be sustained. 
The sustainability of the growth and diversification of exports required a 
rise in fixed investment for two reasons. First, the strong performance of 
exports until mid-1980s was achieved, on the supply side, by the existence of 
excess production capacity created largely in the 1970s and not fully utilized 
due to reduced domestic demand. Repressed domestic demand could not be 
maintained for long. And second, gains in competitiveness in the export 
markets was achieved by lower real wages and higher real exchange rates. 
There was not much room left in terms of these variables and technical 
progress was called for. A related requirement for sustainable export growth 
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and diversification was a stable and well managed macroeconomic environ-
ment. Since without such an environment it would be difficult to make long 
term plans to compete in the international markets. 
During the period 1980 to mid- l 990s, there was a fa]] in public sector 
investment. Although the rise in private fixed investment more than compen-
sated for this decline, it was not as much as was anticipated and a consider-
able proportion of this rise went to housing. Thus, it was inevitable that export 
growth and diversification would be constrained from the investment and 
technology sides. Exports, and for that matter investments, were also con-
strained by the deterioration of the macroeconomic environment. In the sec-
ond half of the l 980s and the early l 990s, persistent and large public sector 
deficits, chronic inflation, attempts to reduce inflation by real appreciation of 
the Turkish Lira, expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, considerable 
rises in real wages, electioneering and political economy considerations con-
tributed to an uncertain macroeconomic environment. Under these circum-
stances, export policies themselves became uncertain. 
Dynamic error correction estimations of an export supply equation, car-
ried out with a Turkish data set that covers the period from end-1977 to mid-
1995, show that in the short run real exchange rate is the most significant vari-
able with the largest effect. Fixed investment, domestic demand and export 
subsidies, in descending order, also have significant effects. Hence, in terms 
of the short term effects and effectiveness of different export policies, at the 
top there is real exchange policy, then corne domestic demand and export pro-
motion policies. The cointegration estimation of the same export suppl y equa-
tion reveals that in terms of supply elasticities, the relative export price vari-
able makes the largest effect implying that real exchange rate is the most 
effective policy in the long term as well. Domestic demand policy cornes sec-
ond in terms of long term effectiveness. On the other hand, export subsidies 
have a negative effect on export supply in the long term. 
This may look like a controversial result. However, this is not the case in 
Turkey because of the uncertainties that surround the policies and the macro-
economic environment. On theoretical grounds, this result can be explained 
with reference to the irreversibility approach in investment. Export decisions, 
as is the case with investment decisions, take into account the opportunity cost 
arising from sunk costs which affect the cash flow from exports. This oppor-
tunity cost can be large and is highly sensitive to perceived uncertainty and 
risk. In tum, economic conditions that affect the perceived uncertainty and 
risk can have a large negative effect on both investments and exports. 
Uncertainties over future demand, product prices, input costs, exchange 
rates, regulations, and tax and subsidy policies affect export activity in a 
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manner similar to that of investment activity. Short run and long run estima-
tions carried out in this study with a Turkish data set have shown the follow-
ing. (i) If uncertainty over the economic environment is high, tax and subsidy 
incentives may have to be very large to have any significant impact on 
exports. (ii) When uncertainty and risk become pervasive in an economy, the 
effect of tax and subsidy incentives may tum out to be negative in the long 
run. 
The policy implications of this study are clear. Real exchange rates, 
investment and domestic demand are the long run determinants of exports. 
Uncertainty and risk have important effects on export and investment deci-
sions. Thus, a major cost of political and economic instability may be its 
depressing effect on exports and investments. If the goal of macroeconomic 
policy is to stimulate exports and investments, stability and credibility are cru-
cial determinants, even more important than tax incentives and subsidies. 
More importantly, and in the absence of stability and credibility, uncertainty 
and risk are exacerbated with the result that incentives and subsidies discour-
age exports in the long run rather than encourage them. 
Notes 
1 This section is largely based on Uygur 1991, I993b and 1994. 
2 The exchange rate is expressed as the Turkish Lira equivalent of one unit of for-
eign currency. Following Edwards I 989a, the real effective exchange rate is 
defined in terms of the wholesale price indices for trade partners and consumer 
price index for Turkey. The precise definitions of the effective exchange rate and 
the real effective exchange rate are given at the bottom of Table 1. 
3 Financial liberalization, savings and investment are discussed at length in Uygur 
I993b. 
4 Similar views were expressed later in 1993 when the deficits were even higher. See 
Yenal 1993 and Uygur 1994 on this point. 
5 These certificates were issued by the State Planning Organization until 1992. Since 
then they have been issued by the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. The latter 
was part of the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade until 1995. The two 
were separated at the beginning of that year. 
6 See, for example, Milanovic 1986, p. 12 and Celasun and Rodrik 1989, Chap. 7 on 
fictitious exports. 
7 Yaocy 1984, p.32 and Milanovic 1986, p.29 estimated this same differential to be 
28.1 percent and 29.9 percent respectively. 
8 The Johansen VAR methodology is also explained in detail in Johansen and 
Juselius I 990 and Johansen I 995. 
9 lt should be mentioned that the contemporaneous correlation between the manu-
facturing exports and export subsidies is negative. This is expected, since as 
explained at some length, subsidies were generally raised at times when exports 
declined or stagnated. 
IO Rolling regressions were carried out with MFIT386. 
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7 Mohamad Amerah 
Trade Liberalization and Foreign Investment 
in Jordan 
Introduction 
The severe economic crisis that Jordan had experienced in 1988 prompted the 
implementation of two macroeconomic adjustment programs in cooperation 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. A central 
feature of both programs was the launching of a trade reform package which 
was designed to open up the economy to international trade and subject it to 
the rigor of international competition. This objective gained additional 
momentum in the early l 990s following Jordan's 1993 request to join then the 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) which on 1 January 1995 
became the World Trade Organization (WTO). Tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
were reduced gradually and significant steps were undertaken in the quest to 
dismantle the import substitution policies which have historically character-
ized the underlying economic orientation of the economy. The trade reform 
package was also accompanied by the adoption of other economic reforms in 
various areas that sought to promote the industrial sector and to provide for a 
higher and more sustainable growth path. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of Jordan's attempts to 
reform its trade regime, and the policy choices the country will be facing in 
light of developments in the Middle East peace process as well as in the coun-
try's negotiations for WTO membership. 
Recent Eco~omic Developments 
Historically, Jordan has consistently pursued a relatively liberal economic 
policy, including in the areas of trade and investment. However, the increas-
ing availability of foreign reserves in the l 970s and early l 980s, particu\arly 
from workers remittances and Arab assistance, prompted the Government to 
assume a more assertive rote in economic activities. The Government's regu-
latory intervention was elaborated in ail the spheres and sectors of the econo-
my including exports, imports, counter trade, free zones, investment, and 
employment. The Government was also active in establishing, directly and 
indirectly, new public enterprises and companies that were totally or partially 
government-owned. 
In addition, the Government's efforts at improving public utilities, ser-
vices and infrastructural facilities, together with defense expenditures and 
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subsidizing basic goods have resulted in large deficits. In the mid- I 980s, the 
region witnessed an economic slowdown due to the sharp drop in oil prices 
and revenues. Consequently, official Arab assistance and workers remittances 
started to decline. The Jordanian economy experienced in 1988 and 1989 an 
acute economic crisis with rapidly growing imbalances in the Government 
budget and the balance of payments, and the rising debt and debt-service bur-
den. With dwindling foreign reserves and inability to service external debt, 
the Jordanian Dinar was devalued in 1988 and again in 1989. 
The economic crisis was manifested in the sharp decline in real GDP by 
1.9 percent and 13.5 percent, respectively in 1988 and 1989, which marked 
the worst recession in the recent history of Jordan. At the same time, the 
Government budget experienced an overall deficit (after official grants) of9.0 
percent and 5.8 percent of GDP in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Money and 
quasi-money expanded due to an increase in domestic assets (in 1988) which 
resulted mainly from a rise in Government domestic borrowing. The severe 
imbalance was also reflected in the balance of payments. The tracte deficit in 
1988 accounted for 28.3 percent of GDP and external public debt rose from 
169.4 percent of GDP in 1988 to 228.8 percent in 1989. The overall deficit 
amounted to Jordanian Dinars (JD) 120.3 million in 1988 (Table 1 ). 
Moreover, official reserves sharply declined in 1988 and Jordan was forced to 
depreciate its currency in 1988, 1989 and in 1990. 
The severe economic crisis Ied the country to adopt a medium-term eco-
nomic adjustment program for the period 1989-1993. The program aimed at 
correcting structural imbalances in the economy in both the balance of pay-
ments and Government's budget while maintaining a reasonable growth rate. 
The main elements of the macro-economic package of the program included 
tight monetary policy, the reduction of the budget deficit by generating more 
domestic revenues and constraining expenditures, export promotion, tracte Iib-
eralization, encouragement of private investment, reliance on market forces 
and privatization. The objectives of the program appeared to be reachable in 
the first year. However, the implementation of the program was interrupted in 
1990 in the wake of the Gulf War - which prompted the abrupt return of about 
300,000 Jordanians from Kuwait and the Gulf states, and the cessation of 
Arab assistance to Jordan. 
The relatively stable economic and political environment in the region in 
1991 enabled the economy to achieve a moderate growth rate of 1.8 percent 
in real GDP which was attributed to the improved performance in the con-
struction, tracte and financial services sectors. However, the country had still 
to overcome a severe indebtedness problem and a rising unemployment rate 
which reached 18.8 percent in 1991. In 1992, Jordan adopted an amended 
Table 1: Main Economie lndicators in Jordan 1988-1994 ~ 
(Million JD) ~ 
Indicators 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 t'-o 
5: 
GNP 2175.9 2180.7 2428.8 1634.0 3306.8 3733.4 4117.1 "' ~ GDP 2264.4 2372.1 2668.3 2855.I 3493.0 3882.5 4266.2 
~ Annual Changes in Percent 5· 
Real GDP -1.9 -13.51.0 1.8 16.1 5.8 5.7 ::s 
GDP Deflator 3.1 21.0 11.4 5.2 5.4 5.1 3.9 tl ::s 
Cost of Living Index 6.6 25.6 16.2 8.2 4.0 3.3 3.6 tl.. 
Government Budget ~ 
~ 
Total Revenue 721.3 855.5 938.2 1112.0 1358.7 1406.3 1492.3 r;Q• 
Revenue 544.4 565.4 744.0 828.8 1168.9 1191.5 1270.0 
::s 
;;-
Foreign Grants 155.4 261.7 164.3 225.~ 137.4 163.3 167.3 ~ 
Total Expenditures 925.9 992.6 1032.6 1099.6 1177.7 1336.6 1437.1 "' "' 
Overall Deficit -204.6 -137.1 -94.4 12.4 181.0 69.7 55.2 ~ 
"' In Percent of GDP at Current Prices ::s ... 
Total Revenue 31.9 36.1 35.2 38.9 38.9 36.2 35.0 
;:;· 
Revenue 24.0 23.8 27.9 29.0 33.5 30.7 29.8 ~ 
Foreign Grants 6.9 11.0 6.2 7.9 3.9 4.2 3.9 a tl 
Total Expenditures 40.9 41.8 38.7 38.5 33.7 34.4 33.7 ::s 
Overall Deficit -9.0 -5.8 -3.5 0.4 5.2 1.8 1.3 
Monetary Aggregates 
Money and Quasi Money 2646.7 2971.1 3122.6 3717.5 4193.0 4481.8 4841.5 
Foreign Assets 363.6 682.7 955.8 1694.9 1729.2 1689.6 1904.3 
Domestic Assets 2279.9 2288.4 2166.8 2022.6 2464.8 2792.2 2937.5 
Total Deposits 2346.0 2625.4 2642.6 4022.1 4749.0 4939.4 5391.5 
Exchange Rate 2.692 1.753 1.507 1.469 1.471 1.443 1.433 1 ~ ~ 
IO 
Table 1: Continued 1 
tv 
V, 
(Million JD) c 
Indicators 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Annual Changes in Percent 
Money and Quasi Money 11.4 12.4 5.1 19.1 7.4 6.9 8.0 
Foreign Assets -15.3 87.7 40.1 77.3 2.0 -2.2 12.7 
Domestic Assets 17.2 3.7 -5.3 -6.7 21.8 13.3 5.2 
Total Deposits 9.5 11.9 0.6 52.2 18.1 4.0 9.1 
Real Effective Exchange Rate -12.7 -15.6 -11.2 2.2 -2.3 
Balance of Payments 
Ex ports 381.5 637.6 706.1 770.7 829.3 864.7 995.2 
lm ports 1022.5 1230.0 1725.8 1710.5 2214.0 2453.6 2362.6 
Trade Balance -641.0 -592.4 -1019.7 -939.8 -1384.0 -1588.9 -1367.4 
Workers Remittances 335.7 358.5 331.8 306.3 573.1 720.7 784.3 
Current Account -105.5 -104.9 -272.8 -288.1 -568.7 -435.3 -231.9 
Overall Balance -120.3 -317.8 -317.8 108.1 -409.9 -557.3 -250.2 
Official Reserves 218.5 330.I 370.8 949.1 1001.1 1689.6 1904.2 
Extemal Public Debt 3836.9 5409.4 6052.5 5516.8 5203.1 4803.9 4612.7 
In Percent of GDP 
Trade Balance -28.3 -25.0 -38.2 -32.9 -39.6 -40.9 -32.1 
Current Account -4.7 -4.4 -10.2 -10.1 -16.3 -11.2 -5.4 
1 ~ Extemal Public Debt 169.4 228.8 226.8 193.2 149.0 123.7 108.I 
1 
5" 
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economic adjustment program for the period 1992-1998 and formulated a pol-
icy-oriented development plan for the period 1993-1997. The macroeconom-
ic policies which Jordan adopted in accordance with this adjustment program 
led to positive developments in the main economic indicators. The 
Govemment pursued a strict fiscal policy emphasizing the generation of local 
revenues and the constraining of public expenditures. Real GDP rebounded 
by 16.1 percent in 1992 as a result of buoyant acti vities in the construction, 
manufacturing, transport and communications, and agricultural sectors. 
Since 1992 the Jordanian economy has been achieving significant 
improvements in its economic performance. Real GDP grew by 5.8 percent 
and 5.7 percent in 1993 and 1994, respectively. This was mainly attributed to 
the manufacturing, mining, transport and communications sectors. It is worth 
noting that the level of GDP growth which was achieved in 1994 had exceed-
ed the target set in the five-year plan at 5.6 percent.' The strict fiscal policy 
which led to an overall surplus in 1991-1994, was supported by a tight mon-
etary policy and prudent exchange rate management. Thus, extemal public 
debt declined due to reduction and rescheduling (from 228.8 percent of GDP 
in 1989 to 108.1 percent in 1994 ). Official reserves accelerated and the 
exchange rate of the JD stabilized. In addition, the foreign tracte performance 
improved and for the first time in several years, the tracte deficit in 1994 
shrank. 
Merchandise Trade 
The Jordanian economy has been suffering from a chronic, and increasing 
tracte deficit. This reflected Jordan 's relatively narrow export base and its 
heavy reliance on imported consumer goods and energy products. The econ-
omy 's structural characteristics and its level of development, along with the 
country's political and economic relations with the outside world have, to a 
large extent, determined the sources of imports and destination of exports. 
Merchandise tracte deficits have been financed by remittances of Jordanians 
working abroad, official grants from neighboring Arab-oil exporting coun-
tries, extemal borrowing and a considerable drawdown of foreign exchange 
reserves. 
Jordan's extemal merchandise tracte has been expanding rapidly: exclud-
ing the year 1991, the average annual growth rate of imports and exports was 
about 19.4 percent during the period 1988-1994 (Table 2). While there was a 
substantial decline in foreign tracte due to the Gulf crisis in 1991 and its after-
math, this sector recorded a remarkable recovery in 1992 as tracte grew by 
23.3 percent. This achievement was mainly a result of the notable perfor-
mance of various economic sectors and population growth caused by the 
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Jordanian returnees from the Gulf States. lmports and exports accounted 
respectively, for 93.5 percent and 6.5 percent of the total expansion in foreign 
trade in 1992. However, external trade grew by 10.4 percent and 3.6 percent 
in 1993 and 1994 respectively, due to the slowdown in the growth of imports 
in 1993 and their notable decline in 1994 for reasons which will be discussed 
later. 
Nonetheless, the trade deficits continued to increase as the fall in exports 
was larger than that of imports. Thus, the trade deficit, following its decline 
in 1991 by 7.8 percent, increased sharply by 47.3 percent and 14.7 percent in 
1992 and 1993 respectively; and then it dropped by 13.9 percent to JD 1367.4 
million in 1994 (Table 3). 
Merchandise trade plays a vital role in the Jordanian economy. This is 
reflected in the ratio of external trade to GDP which rose from 59.5 percent in 
1988 to 87 .5 percent in 1990. However, due to the Gulf crisis it dropped to 
80.8 percent in 1991; and stabilized at 81.0 percent during the period 1992-
1993 before declining to 74.0 percent in 1994 owing to the considerable 
decrease in imports. At the same time, per capita share in external trade has 
been on the increase (Table 2). These indicators show the significant openness 
of the Jordanian economy. 
Exports 
Excluding the year 1991, the level of Jordan 's ex ports has been rising. In 
1994, they increased to JD 793.9 million from JD 691.3 million in 1993, a 
growth rate of 14.8 percent (Table 3). This was mainly due to the rise in 
demand for Jordanian consumer goods in the neighboring Arab countries and 
to public and private efforts to promote domestic exports in Iine with the 
objectives of the structural adjustment program. 
Raw materials have always accounted for the bulk of Jordan's domestic 
exports, despite their decline in 1992 and 1993 by 6.5 percent and 13.4 per-
cent, respectively. Their relative importance fell from 65.0 percent of total 
exports in 1991 to 57.4 percent and 45.5 percent in 1992 and 1993, respec-
tively. This was mainly a result of the decrease 'in the exports of phosphates, 
potash and fertilizers owing to the weakening of demand and prices in the 
international market and emerging shipment difficulties from the Aqaba port. 2 
The above notwithstanding, the performance of raw material exports 
improved substantially in 1994 as they grew by 39.1 percent; and their rela-
tive importance rose to 55.1 percent. This was mainly due to the increase in 
the export of phosphates, potash and fertilizers by 2.6 percent, 7.7 percent and 
60.4 percent, respectively,3 as demand in the international market and prices 
picked up in 1994. 
Table 2: Main Indicators of Jordan's External Trade 1988-1994 1 ~ 
~ 
(Million JD) t'"-< 
lndicators 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 s: "' 
Growth Rate (in percent) ê. r.· 
Cl 
Extemal Trade 15.7 30.9 32.5 -1.2 23.3 10.4 3.6 ... ë:;• 
Domestic Exports 30.5 64.4 14.6 -2.2 5.9 9.1 14.8 ;:s 
lm ports 11.7 20.3 40.3 -0.9 29.4 10.8 -3.7 Cl ;:s 
Re-ex ports -15.3 82.5 -9.4 83.5 13.6 -11.3 16.I Cl. 
Percent of GDP ~ 
fi! 
Extemal Trade 59.5 74.3 87.5 80.8 81.0 74.0 -- o;;· 
Domestic Exports 14.3 22.5 22.9 20.9 17.8 18.6 
;:s 
-- ;;-lm ports 45.2 51.8 64.5 59.9 63.2 55.4 -- ~ 
Re-ex ports 2.5 4.3 3.5 6.0 4.5 4.7 "' -- "' 
Per Capita Share (JD) 
§' 
"' ;:s 
Extemal Trade 448.9 567.I 677.1 593.9 708.4 757.4 769.8 
.... 
Ex ports 108.2 171.7 177.3 154.0 157.7 166.5 193.6 
s· 
lmports 340.7 395.4 499.8 439.9 550.7 590.7 576.2 ~ 
Re-ex ports 18.9 33.3 27.2 44.3 48.6 41.8 49.I ~ ;:s 
Sources: Central Bank of Jordan. Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Feh. 1995. (Amman. Jordan): 
Central Bank of Jordan. Annual Reports for 1992 and 1993, (Amman. Jordan). 
~ 
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With the exception of 1994, exports of consumer goods have been on the 
rise since 1988 in both relative and absolute terms even during the Gulf Crisis. 
This has been attributed to the growth and some diversification of manufac-
turing output along with the increasing demand in the Arab neighboring coun-
tries for Jordanian products. These exports grew from JD 200.5 million in 
1991 to JD 356.7 million in 1993 before declining to JD 329.1 million in 
1994, reflecting arise in their relative importance to 51.2 percent in 1993 and 
a drop to 41.5 percent in 1994 (Table 3 ). The main con tri butors to the growth 
in 1991-1993 were pharmaceutical products, detergents and soap, plastic 
products, cloths, diary products and eggs, and fodder. The decline in the over-
all ex ports by 7. 7 percent in 1994 was attributed mainly to the drop in the 
exports of food and live animais, cloths and plastic products by 34.8 percent, 
2.2 percent and 25.3 percent respectively.4 
Exports of capital goods have had a relatively small share in total exports. 
However, after a decline of 42 percent in 1991 they continuously increased to 
record a growth of 36 percent in 1994 (Table 3 ). Machinery and transport 
equipment have constituted the bulk of these exports. lt has to be stated, how-
ever, that despite the efforts to diversify industrial production, there is still a 
high degree of commodity concentration in exports. 
The prevailing economic conditions and political stability in the Arab 
region have play an important part in influencing the destination of Jordan's 
exports. Nevertheless, Arab countries have remained the main markets for 
Jordanian products. Due to the Gulf crisis, the share of Arab countries in total 
exports declined from 42 percent in 1988 to 28.8 percent in 1991, followed by 
a graduai recovery to reach 42.5 percent in 1994 (Table 4 ). Iraq is the main 
export market for Jordanian products, although its share in the total ex ports of 
Jordan dropped from 19.9 percent in 1988 to 7.7 percent in 1992 before 
increasing to 13.3 percent in 1994. At the same lime, the share of Saudi Arabia 
fell sharply from 9.6 percent in 1988 to 1.8 percent in 1991, followed by a 
remarkable recovery to reach 10.4 percent per annum during the period 1992-
1994. 
Imports 
Jordan's structural characteristics, level of development and narrow produc-
tion base have resulted in its heavy dependence on commodity imports, lead-
ing to relatively high ratios of imports to both exports and GDP (Table 2). 
With the exception of 1991, imports in Jordan have been on the increase since 
the mid-l 980s. After a decline of 0.9 percent in 1991, they achieved a remark-
able growth of29.4 percent in 1992 and 10.8 percent in 1993 before decreas-
ing again by 3.7 percent in 1994 (Table 2). The high growth of imports in 
Table 3: Jordan's External Trade by Economie Function 1988-1994 1 !;l l:l 
~ 
"' (Million JD) t--
5.: 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 "' ~ 
Value % Value % ~ l:l 
5· 
Domestic Exports 324.8 100.0 534.1 612.3 598.6 633.8 691.3 793.9 100.0 ;:s 
l:l 
Consumer Goods 79.9 24.6 123.3 173.5 200.5 255.6 356.7 329.l 41.5 ;:s ~ 
Raw Materials 239.3 73.7 388.2 422.8 388.8 363.5 314.6 437.6 55.1 ~ 
Capital Goods 5.6 1.7 13.6 16.0 9.3 14.7 20.0 27.2 3.4 ~ 
Re-exports 56.7 - 103.5 93.8 172.1 195.5 173.4 201.3 - C>Ô. ;:s 
lm ports 1,022.5 100.0 1,230.0 1,725.8 1,710.5 2,214.0 2,453.6 2,362.6 100.0 ;;--
..::: 
Consumer Goods 371.6 36.3 414.3 650.7 728.5 900.5 938.2 785.1 33.2 "' "' Raw Materials 393.7 38.5 523.8 730.1 680.2 789.9 882.6 1,141.7 48.3 §' 
"' Capital Goods 219.5 21.5 262.1 319.5 291.0 509.8 606.5 423.7 18.0 ;:s -
Miscellaneous 37.7 3.7 29.8 16.5 10.8 13.8 26.3 12.1 0.5 ;:;· 
Trade Balance -641.0 - 592.4 -1,019.7 -939.8 -1,384.7 -1,588.9 -1,367.4 ~ a 
l:l 
Sources: - Department of Statütics, Statütical Year Book 1992, (Amman, Jordan), pp. 476-477. ;:s 
- Central Bank of Jordan, Twenty Ninth Annual Report, 1992 (Amman, Jordan), p. 153. 
- Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statütical Bulletin, Feb. 1995 (Amman, Jordan). 
N 
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1992 can be attributed to the general economic recovery following the sudden 
return of Jordanian expatriates and their investments. By contrr-.st, the sharp 
drop in imports in 1994 was a result of the dwindling domestic demand for 
certain industrial products along with the rise in the prices of many com-
modities in the international market. 
Consumer goods have accounted for about 36 percent of total imports per 
annum over the period 1988-1994. With the exception of 1994, they have 
been on the rise since 1988. Their sharp decline by 16.3 percent in 1994 was 
a result of the aforementioned factors. Foodstuff and manufactured consumer 
goods have constituted the bulk of these imports, reflecting the country's 
resource endowments. 
The share of intermediate inputs and raw materials in the total annual 
import bill of Jordan has been about 41 percent. After a drop of 6.8 percent in 
1991, they gradually grew to achieve a remarkable growth of 29. 3 percent in 
1994. Energy products, iron and steel, paper and cardboard, textile yam and 
fabrics have accounted for the highest portion of these imports. 
Imports of capital goods made up about 21 percent of the total annual 
import bill of Jordan during the period 1988-1994. The sharp increase in 
investment in the manufacturing sector reflecting a notable economic recovery 
generated a sizable rise in these imports which grew by 75 percent and 19 per-
cent in 1992 and 1993, respectively (Table 3). However, they decreased by 30 
percent in 1994 as a result of the sharp decline of 70 percent in imports of 
machinery and transport equipment which constitute the bulk of this category. 
The European Community provides about 30 percent of Jordan's total 
imports, while Arab countries' share has been about 20 percent. The United 
States has accounted for the highest portion of Jordan's imports in compari-
son with other non-Arab countries (Table 5). Among Arab countries, Iraq has 
had the highest share of Jordan's imports. Arab countries have been the source 
of energy products and some consumer goods, whereas Western European 
countries, Japan and the United States have been the main source of capital 
and intermediate imports. Other countries such as Turkey, India, Taiwan, 
China and South Korea have mainly provided manufactured consumer goods 
to the Jordanian market. 
Trade Reforms 
Jordan initiated a graduai trade liberalization program in late 1988 and early 
1989 to mitigate the balance of payments crisis of 1988. Although the 
exchange rate system became initially more restrictive in 1989 in an attempt 
to overcome the intensified balance of payments pressures, it was gradually 
liberalized with the improvement in the balance of payments. Trade reform 
Table 4: Destination of Jordan's Domestic Exports 1988-1994 1 ::;3 
~ 
~ 
(Million JD) t°"" 5.: 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
~ 
~ -Value % Value % §" -5· 
Arab Common Market Countries 75.9 23.4 145.2 146.9 81.8 74.0 108.4 147. 1 18.5 ::s 
tl 
Iraq 64.6 19.9 123.9 118.5 55.8 48.8 77.5 105.3 13.3 5-
Other Arab Countries 60.3 18.6 96.1 112.0 90.5 148.4 177.6 189.9 24.0 ;si 
Saudi Arabia 31.3 9.6 47.7 46.8 11.0 70.1 80.1 72.3 9. 1 ~ 
Eastern Europe Countries 23.8 7.3 42.7 24.4 27.8 15.7 32.9 13.7 1.7 oo· ::s 
E.E.C. 25.4 7.8 25.0 22.1 18.5 19. 1 27.9 40.4 5. 1 ~ 
India 55.4 17. 1 94.9 129.1 109.6 96.4 65.9 88.1 11.1 
'<: 
~ .... 
Japan 6.6 2.0 18.2 13.0 10.6 12. 1 9.8 12.6 1.6 ~ 
~ 
Indonesia 11.0 3.4 27.3 30.4 24.2 29.0 37.6 28.0 3.5 ::s -Turkey 8.8 2.7 11 .55 15. 1 13.1 15.3 12.6 10.3 1.3 s· 
South Korea 6.7 2. 1 9.8 7.6 10.0 12. 1 7.5 14.4 1.8 ~ 
Taiwan 7.3 2.2 11.3 13.6 10.7 10.4 10.0 9.9 1.2 g. 
Other 43.6 13.4 51.1 98.1 201.8 201.3 201.7 239.5 30.2 
::s 
Total 324.8 100.0 534.1 612.3 598.6 633.8 691.3 793.9 100.0 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Twenty Ninth Annual Report, 1992 (Amman, Jordan), p. l 56. 











1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Value % Value % 
Arab Common Market Countries 139.6 13.7 250.6 306.4 239.6 363.3 388.9 385.I 16.3 
Iraq 117.3 11.5 212.7 273.2 170.9 295.4 307.0 291.3 12.3 
Other Arab Countries 122.I 11.9 86.9 132.0 99.1 98.7 109.9 138.0 5.8 
E.E.C. 303.3 29.6 365.7 494.1 512.2 650.I 753.8 794.7 33.6 
German y 69.9 6.8 80.8 101.2 133.2 189.7 202.8 184.4 7.8 
United Kingdom 64.8 6.3 74.0 89.4 77.6 108.4 127.9 120.8 5.1 
France 39.6 3.9 72.6 97.9 73.6 78.I 98.5 111.8 4.7 
Eastern Europe Countries 62.2 6.1 55.8 85.3 85.6 129.7 151.9 137.9 5.8 
Other European Countries 46.7 4.6 58.2 59.8 59.2 75.0 81.7 68.6 2.9 
U.S.A. 128.9 12.6 170.8 299.5 178.2 246.2 311.4 232.9 9.9 
Japan 54.1 5.3 45.7 54.3 61.I 132.2 123.4 93.6 4.0 
Turkey 29.0 2.8 28.I 46.1 57.1 97.4 58.4 62.7 2.7 
Taiwan 20.5 2.0 23.I 30.2 40.I 52.7 43.7 39.I 1.7 
China 17.5 1.7 21.9 25.0 29.I 52.1 50.6 62.4 2.6 
South Korea 12.8 1.3 15.3 17.6 24.8 46.7 61.3 58.3 2.5 
lndia 2.8 0.3 8.7 22.1 53.5 31.2 43.5 38.9 1.6 
Other 83.3 8.1 99.7 153.4 2,270.9 238.7 274.9 250.4 10.6 ~ 




Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Twenty Ninth Annual Report, 1992 (Amman, Jordan), p. 156. & 
Central Bank of Jordan. Monthly Statistical Bulletin Feb. 1995 (Amman, Jordan), p. 67. :i.. ;:;i 
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gained momentum in 1990 and 1992 when tariff and non-tariff barriers were 
reduced substantially with the aim of rationalizing the tariff structure, reduc-
ing tariff protection and gradually eliminating non-tariff barriers. This refonn 
was accompanied by reforming investment regulations to attract more foreign 
investments, improving export incentives and initiating institutional refonns 
in various areas to promote the industrial sector and to support the shift 
towards the export-oriented strategy. Nevertheless, despite the progress that 
has been achieved in these fields, the country has not been very successful in 
offsetting the anti-export bias created by the tracte regime and exchange sys-
tem to establish an incentive regime conducive to outward-oriented growth. 5 
Import Policies 
Jordan's import regime was substantially restrictive and characterized by high 
tariff and non-tar\ff barriers in the l 980s. This was a reflection of the import 
substitution strategy and high protection which led to considerable anti-export 
bias. Since late 1988, there has been.a notable change in the direction of tracte 
liberalization through the graduai reduction of tariffs and non-tariff import 
restrictions. 
Tariffs 
Tariff dulies in Jordan have had three objectives: to protect import substitut-
ing industries, to raise government revenues, and to influence domestic sav-
ings and consumption patterns. The main aim of the tariff refonn program that 
was initiated in late 1988 was to structure a more unifonn tariff regime while 
at the same lime ensuring revenue neutrality. Thus, the rates of the lowest tar-
iffs were to be increased and those of the highest reduced; this was also sup-
posed to serve the purpose of diluting the discrimination implied by a more 
differentiated tariff structure. Tariffs on certain consumer and intennediate 
goods have in fact been reduced and increased on luxury imports on several 
occasions since 1990. Although this refonn has resulted in a more unifonn 
tariff regime, it still implies significant distortions as the overall tariff level 
and the degree of tariff differential offered to various products and industries 
have not been reduced as much as planned. In addition, over half of total 
imports still enjoy some fonn of exemptions.6 
Table (6) shows that the manufacturing sector is affected by an average 
tariff rate of 17.9 percent which was higher than that for the agricultural and 
mining sectors in 1993. The tariff rate on consumer goods (24.9 percent) was 
almost triple that on intennediate goods and slightly higher than that on cap-
ital goods. The highest tariff rate was for beverages ( 103. 9 percent), while the 
lowest rate was for petroleum and coal products. Import surcharges ranged 
260 Mohamad Amerah 
between 20.2 percent for wearing apparel and leather products, and 11.3 per-
cent for printing and publishing items. 
The combination of the new tariffs and surcharges have reshaped the 
nominal tariff protection structure. Nominal tariff protection is lower for 
mining (22.2 percent) and agriculture (23.7 percent) than it is for manufac-
turing (34.3 percent). It is also lower for intermediate goods (23.4 percent) 
and capital goods (37.9 percent) than it is for consumer goods (42.7 percent). 
As can be seen in Table 6, nominal tariff protection varies widely among 
manufacturing industries. The lowest rate is for petroleum and coal products 
(16.7 percent) and the highest is for beverages (123.6 percent). This reflects 
the fact that there is considerable variation in the levels of nominal protec-
tion for different industries and commodities. However, it has been reported 
that nominal tariff protection has declined on manufactured goods to about 
21 percent in 1994 due to the reduction of tariff duties on consumer goods.7 
Table 7 presents data on the effective rate of protection (ERP), which takes 
into account import duties on both the inputs and the output. Ali ERPs are 
positive for all sectors and industries. Effective protection for agriculture (5.1 
percent) and for mining (8.5 percent) are very low relative to the significant-
ly higher rate of 40.9 percent for manufacturing. The highest ERP rates are 
enjoyed by beverages (185.0 percent), tobacco (117.2 percent), wooden fur-
niture (97.0 percent), wearing apparel (78.0 percent), plastic products (76.8 
percent) leather products (64.0 percent), and rubber products (57.5 percent) 
industries. By contrast, the lowest rates are for petroleum and coal products 
(0 percent), and printing and publishing (9. l percent) industries. What is 
important to note in this respect is the fact that the higher the effective pro-
tection, the higher the anti-export bias as output is encouraged to be directed 
toward the protected domestic market rather than for exports. In addition, pro-
tection gears investments towards industries with higher protection, i.e. 
towards consumer goods industries, rather than intennediate goods industries. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that manufactured exports are expected 
to benefit from a new World Bank-supported tracte and financial sector adjust-
ment project due for completion in July 1995. This project aims to simplify 
the customs regime, reduce the number of tariffs and produce sound customs 
Jaws. The new system is expected to eut costs and reduce the delays being 
experienced in the importation of raw materials and intennediate goods, 
which, in turn, would enhance the competitiveness of exports.8 
Non-Tarif! Measures 
Prior to 1988, there were several quantitative restrictions affecting imports 
into Jordan. Since late 1988 and in the process of reforming the tracte regime, 
Trade Liberalization and Foreign lnvestment in Jordan 261 
Table 6: Unweighted Average of Tariffs, Surcharges 
and Nominal Tariff Protection in Jordan, 1993 
Industry Tariff Surcharges Nominal 
Protection 
AGRICULTURE 10.5 13.2 23.7 
MINING 9.3 12.9 22.2 
MANUFACTURING 17.9 16.4 34.3 
Processed Food 16.3 15.7 32.0 
Beverages 103.9 19.7 123.6 
Tobacco 49.3 18.6 67.9 
Textiles 14.7 15.8 30.5 
Wearing Apparel 28.8 19.7 48.5 
Leather Products 22.1 20.2 42.3 
Footwear 30.0 20.2 50.2 
Wood &Cork Products 15.7 17.1 32.8 
Wooden Furniture 30.0 20.2 50.2 
Paper Products 13.4 17.9 31.1 
Printing & Publishing 8.7 11.3 20.0 
Industrial Chemicals 7.4 14.0 21.4 
Other Chemical Products 15.2 16.8 32.0 
Petroleum Refineries 11.9 17.8 29.7 
Petroleum & Coal Products 4.1 12.6 16.7 
Rubber Products 12.0 17.0 29.0 
Plastic Products 23.3 17.3 40.6 
Non-Metallic Products 24.6 18.8 43.4 
Non-Electric Products 10.4 14.6 25.0 
Electric Appliances 31.4 18.5 49.9 
Scientific Equipment 14.2 18.4 32.6 
Transport Equipment 57.7 17.1 74.8 
Fabricated Meta! Products 19.9 18.4 38.3 
Basic Meta! Industries 6.7 15.9 22.6 
Other Manufactured Goods 17.l 17.9 35.0 
OVERALL ECONOMY 16.8 16.1 32.9 
CONSUMER GOODS 24.9 17.8 42.7 
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 8.4 15.0 23.4 
CAPITAL GOODS 21.3 16.1 37.9 
Source: The World Bank: Jordan-Consolidating Economie Adjustment and Establishing the 
Base for Sustainable Growth, (Washington D.C., December 30, 1993). p.52. 
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Table 7: Average Nominal Tariff Protection and Effective 
Rate of Protection by Sector and Sub-Sector in Jordan, 1993 
Industry Average Nominal Effective Rate of 
Tariff Protection Protection 
AGRICULTURE 23.7 5.1 
MINING 22.2 8.5 
MANUFACTURING 34.3 40.9 
FOOD BEVERAGES, TOBACCO 41.1 22.5 
Food Manufacturing 32.0 19.4 
Beverages 123.6 185.0 
Tobacco 67.9 117.2 
TEXTILES & LEATHER 36.3 48.6 
Textiles 30.5 32.6 
Wearing Apparel 48.5 78.0 
Leather Products 42.3 64.0 
WOOD & CORK PRODUCTS 33.6 51.4 
Wood & Cork Products 32.8 49.0 
Wooden Furniture & Fixtures 50.2 97.0 
PAPER & PRINTING MATERIAL 28.3 19.8 
Paper Products 31.3 22.3 
Printing & Publishing 20.0 9.1 
CHEMICALS, PETROLEUM, COAL 24.9 24.8 
Industrial Chernicals 21.4 13.8 
Other Chemical Products 31.9 26.3 
Petroleum Refineries 29.4 39.7 
Petroleum & Coal Products 16.7 
Rubber Products 29.0 57.5 
Plastic Products 40.7 76.8 
NON-METALLIC PRODUCTS 43.4 48.5 
METAL PRODUCTS & MACHINERY 40.3 99.4 
Non-Electric Machinery 25.0 14.7 
Electric Appliances 49.9 
Scientific Equipment 32.6 76.6 
Transport Equipment 74.8 
Fabricated Meta) Products 38.4 57.0 
BASIC METAL INDUSTRIES 22.6 18.0 
OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS 35.0 55.6 
OVERALL ECONOMY 33.0 30.3 
CONSUMER GOODS 42.7 
INTERMEDIATE GOODS 23.3 
CAPITAL GOODS 37.9 
Source: The World Bank: Jordan-Consolidating Economie Adjustment & Establishing the Base 
for Sustainable Growth. (Washington D. C.. December 30. 1993). p.54. 
Trade Liberalization and Foreign Investment in Jordan 263 
man y non-tariff barriers have been phased-out. Three types of non-tariff mea-
sures remain in existence: 
(a) Import Bans: There is an outright prohibition on the importation offive 
commodities: tomato paste, fresh milk, certain dairy products, minerai water 
and table sait. The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) will not issue an 
import Iicense for these commodities. In addition, the import of some 11 lux-
ury goods is banned at times for balance of payments purposes.9 
(b) Licensing Requirements: These affect the importation of five major 
categories, namely, fruits and vegetables, certain chemicals, pharmaceutical 
products, many foodstuffs and telecommunication equipment. Actually, ail 
fresh fruits and vegetables cannot be imported without permission from the 
ministry of Agriculture prior to MIT issuing an import Iicense. There are some 
220 chemicals that cannot be imported without permission from the Ministry 
of Interior. The importation of ail pharmaceutical products requires prior 
approval from the Ministry ofHealth. There are some 6 foodstuffs that require 
permission from the Ministry of Supply before an import Iicense can be 
issued by MIT. These include white cheese, barley, animal feeds, meat, fish, 
butter, fresh juice, beans, cows and sheep. Ali telecommunication equipment 
e.g., telephones, facsimile machines, telexes, and so forth, are subject to 
Iicensing requirements from the Ministry of Telecommunications before they 
can be imported. 10 
(c) Government Monopoly: The Government has a monopoly on the 
importation of nine necessary commodities: sugar, wheat, rice, flour, dried 
milk, cigarettes, frozen chicken, lentils and olive oil. Importers of these items 
act as agents for the Ministry of Supply which sets their price and distributes 
them in the country. Sugar, wheat, rice and powdered milk are sold by the 
Government at subsidized prices in order to assist the poor. 
Import Procedures 
Import procedures in Jordan are considered relatively complex and restrictive 
despite the efforts that have been undertaken to simplify them since 1989. 
Importers go through the following customs procedures: 
(a) An import license must be obtained from MIT for imports that exceed 
JD 2000. However, as mentioned earlier, the importation of many products 
require import permits from the concerned authorities prior to MIT issuing an 
import license. 
(b) A bank guarantee is required. The Central Bank of Jordan demands 
cash requirements against import documents. In addition, a foreign exchange 
permit should be acquired from the Central Bank after the import Iicense has 
been obtained. 
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(c) Approval from various departments is required. It has been reported 
that import documents typically require about 50 signatures. 11 Although many 
of the se signatures were introduced as a result of the Gulf Cri sis, the y are still 
required even though the political and economic conditions have improved in 
the region. 
(d) Inspection of imported products is carried out by various departments 
before they can be cleared. This in volves the Ministries oflndustry and Trade, 
Agriculture and Health along with the Customs Department. 
Export Promotion Policies 
Jordan has adopted an export promotion scheme since 1989 with the aim of 
reducing the anti-export bias inherent in its import regime, increasing manu-
factured exports, diversifying economic activity, and attracting more foreign 
investment. The following existing export incentives have been introduced 
and/or improved recently: 12 
(a) Duty Drawback System: This provides rebate of import duties and 
taxes paid on inputs used in exports. However, the system is a complex one 
and has several shortcomings, for example, the exclusion of spare-parts. 
(b) Temporary Admission or Duty Exemption: Even though this system 
has some shortcomings, it works better than the duty drawback system. 
(c) Export Credit Guarantee Corporation: The Government has recently 
established this corporation to improve credit and guarantee procedures for 
ex porters. 
(d) Industrial Estates and Exports Processing Zones: Jordan has two 
industrial zones and two free zones which have been operative for some time 
with the goal of promoting industrialization and the export of manufactured 
goods. 
(e) Jordan Export Development and Commercial Centers Corporation 
(JEDCO): This corporation provides a wide range of services directly to 
exporters and indirectly through the country's various private sector organi-
zations with the aim of export promotion. These include product promotion, 
market information and research, technical assistance for product design and 
development, and process improvement and export development advisory 
services. It also encourages exporters to participate in national, regional and 
international trade fairs. JEDCO is responsible for the management of most of 
the trade protocols and counter trade agreements on behalf of MIT. 
(t) Export Procedures: Although there have been efforts to simplify export 
procedures, they are still considered complex and time consuming. Despite 
the fact that exports are not subject to export taxes and there are no explicit 
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restrictions on exports, exporters must obtain a certificate of origin from 
either the Chamber of Commerce or the Chamber of lndustry prior to acquir-
ing an export license from MIT. The Customs Department might require that 
the exporter must obtain an approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Amman embassy of the foreign country to which the products are being 
exported. If products are being exported to a protocol country, exporters are 
asked to arrange for barter trade through JEDCO. After acquiring all of these 
documents, exporters must go to the Customs Department to obtain several 
approvals. It is reported that export documents often require more than 20 sig-
natures.13 
Foreign Exchange Regime 
The foreign exchange system was liberalized substantially after the balance of 
payments crisis in late 1988. It has moved from a fixed exchange to a dual 
exchange rate system: an official rate and a free market rate. The reform 
included the elimination of several capital control policies and eased foreign 
exchange restrictions. Since late 1988, the JD has depreciated substa:itially in 
response to balance of payments pressures. Although there are still some 
restrictions on invisibles and capital payments, it has been reported that they 
do not hinder foreign investments or the repatriation of foreign capital. The 
following are the main characteristics and foreign exchange arrangements of 
the present foreign exchange and capital control system: 14 
1. The JD is pegged to the SDR. In December 1994, the official buying 
and selling rates quoted by the Central Bank of Jordan were JD 0.697 and JD 
0.699, respectively, per one US dollar. The spread between the official rate 
which is determined by the Central Bank of Jordan and the free market rate 
which i_s largely set by the banking system has been minimal. 
2. After its graduai increase overtime, the amount of foreign exchange that 
could be taken out of the country or transferred abroad by any one resident 
and non-resident annually reached the equi valent of JD 35,000. A fee of 0.10 
percent is levied on exchange permits for invisible payments, except those of 
government departments and other certain institutions. 
3. Jordanian nationals residing in Jordan may open foreign currency 
accounts with licensed banks in Jordan provided that each individual's hold-
ings do not exceed the equivalent of JD 500,000. 
4. Licensed banks and financial companies are authorized to open 
accounts in foreign currencies for nonresidents without any condition; with-
drawals and transfers from these accounts are permitted freely. 
5. Licensed banks and financial companies may extend credit facilities to 
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residents and nonresidents against their foreign currency deposits up to JD 
100,000 without prior approval of the Central Bank. 
6. Premium Development Bonds denominated in JD may be purchased 
with convertible currencies by nonresidents; proceeds from redemption at 
maturity, including interest are transferable to any convertible currency. 
7. At the end of 1992 about 30 foreign exchange houses were allowed to 
resume operations. Presently, there are 25 foreign exchange houses in operation. 
8. lmporters are required to obtain a foreign exchange permit from the 
Central Bank, which is granted automatically when an import Iicense has been 
obtained. A fee of 0.10 percent is levied on exchange permits approved by the 
Central Bank for sales of foreign exchange for the purpose of paying for 
imports, except imports of government departments and certain other 
approved institutions. 
9. lmporters into the free zones and transit tracte are responsible to provide 
foreign currencies to finance such transactions. Their banks are authorized to 
set the percentage of advance import deposit. 
l O. lmports of gold in any form are permitted without the prior approval 
of the Central Bank, while importation of gold for the purpose of craftsman-
ship and re-exports is subject to the prior approval of the Central Bank. 
11. Proceeds from merchandise exports of Jordanian origin must be repa-
triated through authorized banks; proceeds from merchandise re-exports must 
be repatriated within one month of shipment. Exporters are allowed to keep 
10 percent of the proceeds in deposits at local commercial banks or financial 
institutions and to use them to pay for imports of inputs. 
12. Foreign exchange receipts from invisibles must be repatriated through 
an authorized bank. 
13. Exports of gold in any form other than gold that has been increased in 
value due to craftsmanship require the prior approval of the Central Bank 
14. lnward transfers of capital are not restricted, but outward transfers 
require approval and are not normally permitted, except that the Central Bank 
may approve applications made by banks, insurance companies, industrial or 
trading firms, and contractors for permission to transfer funds abroad for 
specified investment or operating purposes. 
15. The transfer of funds for the purpose of investing in Arab countries by 
individual investors is permitted only if mutual treatment or bilateral agree-
ment exists between Jordan and the concerned Arab country, and it is the 
investor's responsibility to provide foreign currency to finance such invest-
ments. 
16. Income resulting from non-resident investments in Jordan may be 
transferred abroad. 
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17. Under the encouragement of lnvestment Law of 1987, profits, dividends 
and interest from approved foreign investments may be remitted, subject to the 
approval of the Ministry of lndustry and Trade in accordance with the guide-
lines of the Central Bank. After two years, repatriation of the capital is permit-
ted with the approval of the Ministry of lndustry and Trade and the Central 
Bank. The lnvestment Committee of the Prime Minister's office may approve 
more liberal provisions, and exchange permits are granted accordingly. 
18. ln accordance with the Foreign Companies Registration Law No. 46 
(1975) foreign companies are permitted to establish branches in Jordan for the 
purpose of conducting business outside the country; such branches may also 
be granted non-resident status for exchange control purposes. 
Foreign Investment Regime 
As part of its strategic drive towards expanding the export sector, Jordan has 
exerted considerable efforts to attract foreign investment. The Encouragement 
of lnvestment Law of 1987 offers various tax and import duty incentives. 
However, Jordan has not yet been successful in attracting foreign investments. 
This may be due in general to the relatively unfavorable climate for foreign 
investment which includes deficiencies, ambiguities and weaknesses in invest-
ment laws, and red tape. Available information shows that foreign-registered 
investment in the country ranged between JD 2.2 million and JD 9.2 million 
annually during 1988-1993 in comparison with a range between JD 36 million 
and JD 233.3 million of domestic capital (Table 8). That is, the share of for-
eign investment in total registered investment fluctuated widely between 1.5 
percent and 10.6 percent per annum. Not only was the registered level of for-
eign investment low, but the average size of projects also was small, ranging 
between JD 19 ,300 and JD 55,000 per project. There is no available informa-
tion on the amount of this committed investment which actually took place. 
Table 9 shows that during the period 1986-89, foreign-registered capital 
accounted for 7.3 percent and 4.5 percent of total registered capital for invest-
ment in the industrial, and trade and services sectors, respectively. These 
ratios increased substantially in 1990 to 16.2 percent and 7.5 percent, respec-
tively, despite the relatively low level of foreign investment. ln the first eight 
months of 1991, however, the shares of foreign capital in these two sectors 
were almost equal. lt appears that foreign investment has been concentrated 
more in the industrial sector in comparison with other sectors. 
Although the above mentioned investment law of 1987 offered attractive 
investment incentives, it still has principle deficiencies including an arbitrary 
differentiation between "approved economical projects" and "economic pro-
jects", inadequate monitoring of tax holidays granted, along with increasing 
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evidence that tax holidays are an ineffective means of investment promotion, 
limited customs duty exemptions which provide limited relief for spare parts 
imports, and it does not include the imports of raw material and con tains sev-
eral highly anti-competitive provisions favoring local procurement. 15 
Therefore, the reform of this law is urgently needed. lt is worth noting that the 
government has exerted serious efforts since 1992 to replace the 1987 invest-
ment law by a new one to tackle these shortcomings. But these efforts have 
not yet produced the aspired results due to various domestic economic, social 
and political reasons. 
Table 8: Number and Value of Foreign Registered 
Investments in Jordan 1988-1993 
(Million JD) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Number of Projects 1974 1840 2393 4145 4556 4409 
Domestic Capital 35.9 41.0 41.3 89.6 160.2 233.3 
Foreign Capital 3.4 2.2 4.9 4.4 2.4 9.2 
Total Capital 39.3 43.2 46.2 94.0 162.6 242.5 
Average Capital 
Per Project (JD) 19,908 23,478 19,306 22,688 35,694 55,001 
Sources: -Ministry of Jndustry and Trade,unpublished information (Amman, Jordan). 
-The World Bank: Jordan - Foreign Direct lnvestment Climate (Washington D.C. 
1992 ). Annex C. 
In addition, foreign investment in Jordan is subject to two other laws: the 
Companies Law of 1989 and the Law Governing Arab and Foreign 
Investment (No. 22 of 1992). Under the Companies Law, foreign investors are 
more restricted in their choice of business than either Jordanian or other 
investors of Arab origin. Foreign enterprises must form a Jordanian company 
if they intend to undertake operations in Jordan. Registration of a branch of a 
foreign corporation is generally permitted only in as far as specific projects of 
limited duration are concerned. The establishment of a full subsidiary of a for-
eign company is not allowed. The Government provides attractive incentives 
for foreign companies to establish regional or representative offices in Jordan, 
and undertake activities outside the country. These offices are considered non-
resident and cannot conduct business activities within the country. 
Although the Law Governing Arab and Foreign Investment (No. 22 of 
1992) does not include specific incentives for foreign investors, it outlines 
general investment guarantees and other protection for foreign investors and 
Table 9: Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Registered Investments in Jordan 
in 1986 - 1989, 1990 and 1991 
(Million JD) 
Sector Total Registered Capital Foreign Capital Domestic Capial % share of Foreign Capital 
in Total Registered Capital 
1986-89 1990 1991' 1986-89 1990 1991' 1986-89 1990 1991' 1986-89 1990 1991' 
lndustry 46.4 16.7 15. 1 3.4 2.7 0.8 43.1 14.0 14.4 7.3 16.2 5.3 
Tracte and 
Services 111.7 29.5 27.8 5.0 2.2 1.5 106.6 27.3 26.2 4.5 7.5 5.4 
Total 158.1 46.2 42.9 8.4 4.9 2.3 149.7 41.3 40.6 5.3 10.6 5.4 
'For thefirst eight months 
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specific sectors in which foreign participation is limited. While this law is an 
improvement over the previous Iaw of 1987, it still contains a number of areas 
of ambiguity and weaknesses both of which greatly reduce its effectiveness. 
Principal deficiencies include the following: 16 
(a) Unequal treatment between Arab and non-Arab foreign investors. 
(b) Ali non-Arab foreign investors are required to seek the approval of the 
Cabinet approval prior to registering a business in Jordan. 
(c) Non-Arab investment in shares of public shareholding companies list-
ed on the Amman Financial market must obtain approval from the Prime 
Minister's office. 
(d) Ambiguity about the definition of sectors where foreign participation 
is permitted in full, and sectors where it is limited to a maximum of 49 per-
cent of the equity. 
(e) Lack of sufficient guarantees to protect non-Jordanian investment. 
(f) Lack of internationally-recognized third party investment disputes res-
olution mechanisms. 
Regional Trade Arrangements: The Triangle 
The Declaration of Principles (DOP) between the PLO and Israel on 
September 13, 1993 and their subsequent agreement on the Protocol on 
Economie Relations on April 29, 1994 have defined the economic and trade 
relationships between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for the five 
year transitional period starting May 13, 1994. Jordan on the other hand has 
concluded a peace agreement with Israel on October 26, 1994, and the two 
parties are still negotiating the terms of an economic agreement. Jordan has 
also concluded an Economie Agreement with the PA on January 1994, and the 
two parties have agreed on a Protocol Trade Agreement on May 4, 1995 to 
direct their trade relations during the Interim Period. 
The basis for future trade relations between Palestine and Israel, and 
between Jordan and Palestine have already been laid out by the aforemen-
tioned agreements. However, Jordan still has not concluded a trade agreement 
with Israel, and the three parties have not yet started negotiations for a trilat-
eral trade agreement among them to regulate and facilitate their intra-trade 
relations. 
The economic protocol between the PLO and Israel establishes a combi-
nation of a free trade area and a customs union between the two entities: there 
are goods that can be traded freely between them and goods that can be 
imported by the Palestinians using Israeli tariff rates and/or Palestinian tariffs. 
Although this protocol includes some policies that allow independent action 
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by the Palestinians, it has other elements which reflect a continuity of Israeli 
policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While Palestinians are allowed to 
import from Jordan, Egypt and other Arab and Islamic countries goods listed 
in the protocol, the Palestinian markets will remain open to Israeli products 
and Israeli tariffs and import policies will be applied to most of Palestinian 
imports. 17 However, Palestinian products, apart from tomatoes, potatoes, eggs, 
poultry, cucumbers and melons, will have free access to the Israeli market. 
Palestinians can levy tariffs on some imported goods, for instance, cars. 
On the whole, and despite some shortcomings, the protocol may be con-
sidered advantageous to the Palestinians as it enhances their trade indepen-
dence. Although Palestinian products are being exposed to Israeli competi-
tion, Palestinians should take advantage of the Israeli market through exports 
provided that Israel does not create administrative barriers to Palestinian 
exports. ln addition, Palestinians should pay particular attention to diversify-
ing both their production base and export markets to promote intra and extra-
regional exports. 
Although Jordan and Palestine aspire for establishing free trade between 
them, the May 1995 Protocol Trade Agreement regulates their trade relations 
during the transitional period by identifying two lists of goods that can be 
traded freely or partially exempted from tariffs. These lists include 61 
Palestinian products and 1 OO Jordanian ones. 18 This is in addition to the goods 
that can be traded subject to tariff duties by both parties. It is important to note 
that the flow of trade between Jordan and Palestine is subject to the Israeli 
approval as Israel still retains contrai over the bridges that connect Jordan and 
Palestine. 
The status of the trade negotiations between Jordan and Israel is as fol-
lows: 
(a) Recognizing the fact that the Israeli economy is far more advanced 
than that of Jordan, Israel has already agreed to the principle of granting 
Jordan a preferential treatment in their future trade relations. But it desires to 
conclude a preferential trade agreement with Jordan with a stated goal of free 
trade within 12 years. 1" However, Jordan cannot make a free trade commit-
ment with Israel for economic and socio-political reasons; in addition, Jordan 
has not signed a free trade agreement with any country. Accordingly, Jordan 
is willing to conclude a preferential trade agreement with Israel first and 
assess its impact on the Jordanian economy after three years. 20 
(b) The two countries have already agreed on the lists of goods that can be 
freely traded or partially exempted from tariffs. 
Due to the close trade interrelationships among Jordan, Palestine and 
Israel as a result of the geo-politics and socio-economic relations among 
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them, there is a need to layout their future trade relations, at least during the 
lnterim Period. The following are the major issues that should be considered 
by the three entities to facilitate future trade cooperation among them through 
a trilateral trade agreement: 
I. Freer trade should be the ultimate objective for their future trade rela-
tions as the establishment of a free zone or customs union among them is not 
economically feasible in the near future. This is due to the need to protect 
domestic production both in Jordan and Palestine against the Israeli competi-
tion, and for social and political factors in the region. 
2. To regulate trade flows among them, tariffs, rather than quantitative 
restrictions should be used. 
3. They should agree on the lists of goods, and their tariffs and legal sta-
tus, that can flow between Jordan and Israel through the West Bank. 
4. If Jordan is going to levy different tariffs on goods imported from 
Palestine and Israel, there should be an agreement on the status of Palestinian 
goods of high Israeli import content when exported to Jordan. 
General Issues related to WTO Accession and Implications 
for Jordan 
As was indicated earlier, Jordan applied in December 1993 for membership in 
the GATT, and following the establishment of the WTO, Jordan is now in the 
process of negotiating its WTO terms of accession. 
a) WTO Accession Negotiations 
The scope and coverage of the WTO is much broader than the GATT 1947. In 
the area of goods, in addition to the GATT 1994, the WTO includes 6 under-
standings on the interpretation of certain provisions of the GATT 1994, and 
12 agreements dealing with matters such as agriculture, sanitary and phy-
tosanitary (SPS) measures, textiles and clothing, trade-related investment 
measures, customs valuation, import licensing procedures, safeguards, and so 
forth. The WTO Agreement also includes a General Agreement on Trade in 
Services and an Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of lntellectual Property 
Rights. 
Pursuant to Article XII of the WTO Agreement, any state or separate cus-
toms territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external com-
mercial relations and of the other matters provided for in the WTO may 
accede to the WTO Agreement on terms to be agreed with the WTO. 
Decisions on accession shall be taken by Ministerial Conference or by the 
General Council. The agreement on the terms of accession must be approved 
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by a two-thirds majority of the members of the WTO. In pursuance of the 
decision of the General Council of 15 November 1995, accession decisions 
are adopted by consensus unless a member requests a ballot. 
As a first step in accession, the countries applying for accession must sub-
mit a memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime which covers goods, ser-
vices, intellectual property, investment measures and so forth. Members of the 
WTO will ask questions in writing and the applicant will respond also in writ-
ing. The countries which had applied for accession to GATT 1947 are expect-
ed to update their Memorandum or to submit supplementary notes. The addi-
tional information should be submitted at the beginning of the activities of the 
Working Party. Members will also ask questions in writing in connection with 
the supplementary information. 
The negotiations for accession to the WTO take place simultaneously in 
two parallel tracks. Firstly, the fact finding phase consists of the multilateral 
examination of the foreign trade regime of the acceding country. This multi-
lateral phase is followed by the negotiations of specific commitments in the 
sectors where full compliance with WTO obligations is not possible from the 
time of accession. Secondly, the negotiations of bilateral market access con-
cessions on goods and services. The Working Party will prepare a draft report 
reflecting the commitments and concessions that have been agreed between 
WTO members and the acceding country in the context of the Working Party. 
The bilateral market access agreements are consolidated by the WTO 
Secretariat into the schedule of the acceding country. The schedules of con-
cessions on goods and services are annexed to the protocol of accession. 
b) Consequences of Accession to the WTO 
Accession to the WTO Agreement entitles the goods and services of members 
to the most favored nation treatment and the national principle treatment. The 
WTO serves as a multilateral forum to implement the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement and to carry out further trade 
negotiations. The WTO monitors the trade policies of the members through 
periodic reviews carried out in the Trade Policy Review Body. The WTO 
Agreement includes an Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes concerning the trade matters covered by the WTO 
Agreement which sets up a Dispute Settlement Body as the jurisdictional 
mechanism to resolve impartially and expeditiously the trade disputes among 
members. In accordance with the single undertaking principle embodied in the 
WTO Agreement, ail WTO members must comply with the provisions of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements. Nevertheless, the WTO Agreement accords 
developing counties and countries with economies in transition reasonable 
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transitional periods to implement certain obligations. Exceptions to those mea-
sures are not applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily or as a disguised restriction 
on international trade. Members may take the measures necessary to protect 
public morals, human, animal or plant life or health, the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources, and so forth. In addition, the WTO Agreement 
gives members flexibility in the implementation of certain obligations if they 
face balance of payment difficulties or other emergency situations as foreseen 
in the respective Multilateral Trade Agreements. In exceptional circumstances, 
a member may request the WTO to waive certain obligations temporarily. 
Waivers are subject to precise conditions. If not adopted by consensus, the 
adoption of the decision conceming a waiver is subject to a high threshold of 
approval. 
Finally, the WTO permits that, at the time of accession, both the acceding 
country and the current members invoke the non-application clause thus 
excluding WTO relations entirely. This is a one time right which must be 
exercised at the time of accession. Prior notice of the intention to invoke this 
provision must be given to the Ministerial Conference or the General Council 
prior to the approval of the agreement on the terms of accession. 
c) Interagency Coordination 
The experience of other countries negotiating accession is that interagency 
coordination is essential to prepare the documentation, respond to the ques-
tionnaires, and participate in the Working Party meetings and in the market 
access negotiations. Participation should include the Ministries of Commerce, 
Industry, Economy, Agriculture, Finance, Planning, Foreign Affairs, Central 
Bank, and so forth, represented preferably at the level of deputy minister or 
vice minister. The leader of the delegation that carries out the accession nego-
tiations in Geneva should be a senior official empowered to carry out negoti-
ations. 
d) Standstill 
Countries applying for accession to the WTO have observer status in the 
WTO. These countries do not have le gal obligations in terms of the WTO and 
are free to change their customs duty rates and other foreign trade policy mea-
sures. Nevertheless, WTO members have repeatedly stated that countries 
negotiating for accession to the WTO should not introduce any measures 
inconsistent with the WTO Agreement. Therefore, since the time of accession 
the acceding country should refrain from introducing new measures inconsis-
tent with the WTO. 
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e) Transparency and Notifications 
The documentation submitted to the Working Party should be comprehensive 
and up to date. The acceding country is not expected to pronounce itself in 
consistency of measures with the WTO Agreement. In order to maximize 
transparency, acceding countries are expected to respond to the questionnaires 
on import licensing procedures, customs valuation, technical barriers to tracte 
and state trading according to a pre-set outline. In addition, acceding countries 
have been invited to submit in draft fonn to the Working Party on Accession 
notifications which WTO members have undertaken to submit with regard to 
matters such as agriculture, SPS, subsidies, anti-dumping, safeguards, rules of 
origin, and so forth. The Working Party will review these draft notifications 
multilaterally. If these draft notifications are not submitted prior to the con-
clusion of the work, the report of the Working Party is likely to establish a pre-
cise time frame for their submission. 
f) Transitional Periods 
A number of WTO Agreements establish transitional periods for members to 
implement certain obligations. WTO members take the position that these 
transitional periods are applicable to the original members of the WTO exclu-
si vely. In their view, the countries negotiating for accession are not entitled to 
these transitional periods as a matter of right. WTO members have stated that 
countries negotiating for accession should implement ail the obligations in 
full from the time of accession. Nevertheless, in certain cases transitional 
periods to comply with WTO obligations in full have been accepted concem-
ing the taxation regime, the elimination of reference price mechanism, and so 
forth. 
Since Jordan considers itself a developing country, it may be allowed more 
time than that accorded to developed nations to implement certain WTO pro-
visions. Once again, it must be stated that the new WTO accession procedures 
do not grant automatic relief to any acceding member: ail the terms of acces-
sion are in principle subject to negotiations. Put differently, only those devel-
oping countries that are already WTO Members have an automatic right to 
existing special and differential treatment; developing countries seeking mem-
bership in the WTO will have to negotiate each and every aspect of their terms 
of accession. For example, Jordan may or may not be allowed to maintain even 
on a temporary basis import restrictions for balance of payments purposes, or 
to delay the effect of tariff concessions to establish a new industry or to expand 
an existing one.21 Jordan is in fact negotiating such derogations. 
Jordan's membership in the WTO will strengthen the country's position in 
international trade through the following:'2 
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1. Jordan would benefit from non-discriminatory trade as it will be grant-
ed the status of most-favored nation, which ensures that no trading partner 
would be able to discriminate against Jordanian products by imposing higher 
trade barriers than are applied to products originating from other WTO mem-
ber countries. 
2. WTO membership will provide Jordan with access to the WTO dispute 
seulement mechanism. 
3. WTO membership would help Jordan in promoting trade Iiberalization 
policies that will support the growth of internationally-competitive domestic 
industries. 
4. Jordan would benefit from the "market friendly" WTO rules as these 
rules promote the non-discriminatory use of tariffs, constrain the use of quan-
titative restrictions, and restrict the use of trade measures that are implement-
ed for balance of payments purposes. Jordan's exports would be positively 
affected by WTO membership as follows: 23 
1. Jordan would benefit from the reductions in member trading partners' 
import barriers. Therefore, Jordan's exports would be able to compete more 
effectively in the domestic markets of these partners, and would have access 
to non-traditional markets. 
2. When trade distortions are reduced world-wide by WTO agreements, 
Jordan would benefit from the increased demand for goods and services in its 
trading partners' markets. 
3. When trade barriers are reduced in compliance with WTO principles, 
foreign competition in Jordan's domestic market would allow a more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Policy Recommendations 
Jordan should intensify its efforts to achieve the ultimate objective of shifting 
from import substitution to an export-oriented development strategy in both 
trade and investment by enhancing domestic producers' competitiveness 
through market forces. Therefore, it has to implement its current trade liber-
alization program faster. This is concurrent with the objective of attaining 
freer trade with its close neighbors, namely Palestine and Israel. In addition, 
further liberalization coïncides with the requirements of the WTO, which 
Jordan is keen to join. 
The aforementioned goals can be achieved by the adoption of various 
interconnected fiscal, monetary and commercial policies, and public sector 
reforms. The following are the major trade and investment policy reforms that 
should be given the highest priority: 
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l. To reduce further ail tariffs on consumer, intermediate and capital goods 
in order to reduce effective protection and to achieve a freer trade system. 
2. To remove ail non-tariff barriers and convert them to tariff-based duties. 
3. To remove ail surcharges in order to have a unified tariff structure. 
4. To eliminate ail tariff exemptions granted to both individual goods and 
institutions. 
5. To grant more export incentives in order to reduce further the anti-
export bias that has resulted from the import substitution strategy. 
6. To overcome the shortcomings of the Duty Drawback and Temporary 
Admission schemes. 
7. To simplify further export and import procedures. 
8. To remove import licensing requirements. 
9. To expedite the process of amending the current Encouragement of 
Investment Law. 
1 O. To reform ail foreign investment related legislations. 
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Part III 
The EU-Mediterranean Partnership 
8 Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov 
Catching Up with Eastern Europe? 
The European Union's Mediterranean Free 
Trade Initiative 
Introduction 
Since the early I 980s, a remarkable shift towards opening up to international 
trade has taken hold in many countries. To a large extent this reflected a 
recognition that trade interventions are often not only inefficient, but also 
ineffective and counterproductive. Governments around the globe are increas-
ingly seeking to create an enabling environment allowing private individuals 
and firms to exploit the nation 's resources more efficiently. Such an environ-
ment includes the provision of public goods such as a stable, business-friend-
ly legal framework that allows contracts to be enforced rapidly and at least 
cost; a regulatory regime that fosters and maintains competition on product 
and factor markets; and the provision of basic education and health services. 
While trade liberalization is a powerful instrument for increasing competition, 
formai trade policies such as the level and dispersion of the tariff represent but 
one aspect of the trade regime. As important are trade institutions: the frame-
work in which policies are determined and the administrative mechanisms 
through which they are implemented and enforced. Traders should operate 
under as little uncertainty as possible regarding the rules that apply, the taxes 
that must be paid, or the time taken up by customs clearance. 
The critical policy challenge facing many of the countries in the MENA 
region is to follow the rest of the world in liberalizing, privatizing and dereg-
ulating markets. The role of the public sector in many MENA countries is still 
pervasive. In some parts of the region it accounts for more than one-half of 
gross domestic product (GDP), and employs over 60 percent of skilled work-
ers (World Bank, 1995a). Trade barriers remain high. Average taxes on trade 
are around 15 percent, more than twice the average in Eastern Europe 
(Appendix Table 1). Para-tariffs of many kinds are prevalent, reducing the 
transparency of the trade regime. 
A basic tenet of economic reform efforts undertaken in the last decade in 
many countries of the region has been that reforms be graduai. Given that 
graduai trade reform has often not been accompanied by actions to signifi-
cantly reduce the role of the state in the economy, reform efforts have had a 
limited impact in terms of effectively increasing competition in product mar-
kets (Hoekman, 1995a). The slower the pace of economic reform and the Jess 
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comprehensive its scope, the larger the gap between MENA's economic per-
formance and that of the rest of the world is likely to become. The implicit 
rationale for gradualism in the region appears to be a perception that a "big 
bang" approach is not feasible politically. 1 What is needed is an institutional 
framework that enhances the credibility of a graduai reform strategy and thus 
ensures the needed supply response. The World Tracte Organization (WTO) 
and the European Union's (EU) offer to establish a Euro-Mediterranean 
Economie Area are particularly relevant in this regard. 
The need for reform is clear: economic performance has been lagging, and 
the incentive regime is steadily falling behind that of comparator countries 
(World Bank, 1995a). The aim of this chapter is to discuss the potential role 
of a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EMA) in helping MENA governments 
implement structural economic reforms. 
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the argu-
ments for and against preferential liberalization in the MENA region, com-
paring the potential costs and benefüs of a multilateral (WTO) approach as 
opposed to a regional integration strategy. The chapter then describes the 
recent tracte performance of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) 
to illustrate the possible impact of opening up the economy to tracte in the con-
text of a free tracte agreement (FfA) with the EU. It then turns to the recent-
ly negotiated EMA between Tunisia and the EU, and analyses the extent to 
which this agreement will help MENA countries catch up with the CEECs. 
The analysis highlights the need to pursue significant supporting and comple-
mentary actions. Key issues in this connection are the regulatory regimes 
applying to inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the services sector, the 
magnitude of tariffs applied to the rest of the world (tracte diversion), the 
extent of privatization, and the imposition of hard budget constraints on state-
owned enterprises. Most of these aspects are not subject to disciplines under 
the EMA. The chapter then concludes. 
Why Go Regional? 
Governments seeking to liberalize their tracte and investment regimes can 
choose among a variety of approaches. These include unilateral action, mul-
tilateral Iiberalization based on reciprocity, and preferential (regional) liberal-
ization. For a small country - one that cannot influence its terms of tracte for 
most commodities - economic theory has established that a unilateral 
approach to freeing tracte is welfare superior to the other options. In the con-
text of multilateral negotiations, if other countries reciprocate, this will 
increase the welfare gains from unilateral liberalization efforts. However, 
given the small country assumption - which applies to the countries in the 
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region - there are few if any gains to be expected from making Iiberalization 
conditional upon reciprocity by trading partners. Preferential liberalization 
through the negotiation of an FfA will also be an inferior strategy since the 
world market is always larger than a regional one. By not discriminating 
across potential trading partners, domestic firms and consumers will be 
allowed to buy goods and services from least cost suppliers, wherever they are 
located. By discriminating in favor of specific countries, the possibility of 
trade diversion arises from the substitution of inefficient regional suppliers at 
the expense of efficient suppliers in third countries on account of the tariff 
preference. This may be offset by trade creation which cornes from a shift 
away from high-cost domestically produced goods to lower-cost imports from 
regional partner countries. The point, however, is that through unilateral lib-
eralization losses from trade diversion do not occur, and the net gains are 
therefore greater. 
The case against regional (preferential) trade agreements is particularly 
strong in the context of small countries that already have duty free access to 
a large partner country market while simultaneously maintaining tariffs on 
imports originating from this partner country. This is the case for the MENA 
countries which were granted duty-free access to EU markets for industrial 
(non-agricultural) goods under Cooperation Agreements negotiated in the 
I 970s. In such cases, as argued by Panagariya ( 1995), MENA countries that 
enter into an FTA with the EU will Jose the tariff revenue presently collected 
on imports of EU origin. The EU accounts for 48 percent of total imports by 
all MENA countries, a share that will increase after the implementation of free 
trade with Europe. The revenue Joss is therefore substantial. The static bene-
fits arising from improved resource allocation are unlikely to offset this Joss 
(Panagariya, 1995). Of course, dynamic benefits (induced growth effects dri-
ven by increased factor accumulation) may well ensure that longer term 
returns are positive. Again, the important consideration is that these benefits 
can in principle also be obtained through unilateral liberalization and without 
the losses associated with trade diversion. 
Although these are powerful logical arguments in favor of nondiscrimina-
tory liberalization, many countries nonetheless pursue preferential trade 
agreements. What explains this? More importantly, what are the necessary 
conditions for regional integration to be welfare enhancing for the countries 
involved?2 Possible economic explanations or motivations for regional inte-
gration are manifold. Five will be mentioned here. But before doing so, it is 
worth noting that the decision to go regional may be driven by foreign policy 
and political considerations. Possible economic losses (inefficiencies) may 
thus be accepted as the price for attaining non-economic objectives. This 
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aspect of regional integration is undoubtedly important in practice. However, 
from an economic perspective, what matters is that policy-makers (and vot-
ers) have enough information to allow them to judge whether non-economic 
benefits compensate for potential economic losses. 
Credibility and dynamic gains: In some cases a regional integration agree-
ment (RIA) may offer a stronger mechanism for locking in (anchoring) eco-
nomic reforms than the WTO. In part this may be because the RIA addresses 
policy areas that are not covered by the WTO at all, or where WTO disciplines 
are weak. For example, investment or factor market policies are not addressed 
by the WTO. WTO disciplines pertaining to the services sector are also rela-
tively weak. 3 Thus, unilateral reforms in these areas may be anchored through 
an RIA in ways that are not available in the WTO. Even in the area of tracte 
policies, the traditional domain of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tracte 
(GATT)/WTO, disciplines may be weaker than under an RIA Credibility 
under the WTO arises in large part from the binding of tariffs. The most that 
can be done in this connection is to bind tariffs at applied rates. This is some-
thing many developing countries have not done, in part because of the mer-
cantilistic bias of the GATT/WTO negotiating process (govemments wanted 
to keep "negotiating chips"), and in part because many did not desire to be 
bound by GATT rules. Although there is mounting pressure on govemments 
to reduce the difference between bound and applied rates, there is no obliga-
tion to bind at applied rates. Binding at applied rates has been a voluntary step 
for developing countries' governments. In the RIA of the kind envisaged by 
the EU, binding is not voluntary, but required. An RIA may therefore help 
overcome internai political resistance to binding.4 It may also lead to greater 
credibility if monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are stronger. 
The greater credibility that may be associated with an RIA can lead to 
important dynamic growth effects insofar as more investment is fostered, 
greater adjustment efforts are made, and so forth. These effects are of course 
the important dimension. Unfortunately, quantifying them is very difficult. 
Nonetheless, the cross-border merger and acquisition activities that were 
associated with the EU's Single Market program in the late l 980s are indica-
tive of the type of market responses that may emerge following the initiation 
of a credible regional liberalization strategy. 
Harmonization: An important element of an RIA may consist of harmo-
nizing regulatory regimes and administrative requirements relating to product 
standards, testing and certification procedures, mutual recognition agree-
ments, common documents for customs clearance (for example, the EU's 
Single Administrative Document), coordination and cooperation on linking 
computer systems of Customs, and so forth. These are areas where the WTO 
is restricted to general principles (for example, national treatment and most 
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favored nation (MFN)). While such cooperative efforts can be pursued uni-
laterally, formai agreements may be necessary to induce the administrative 
bodies involved to cooperate. The associated reduction in trade and transac-
tions costs will benefit ail traders and consumers. Insofar as reductions in 
transactions costs are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, trade di version 
type issues do not arise. 
Security of market access: One benefit of an RIA may be that it prevents 
partner countries from imposing contingent protection, such as antidumping 
actions. To the extent that a substantial share of total trade is with partner 
countries, this arrangement could be of great value. In the multilateral context, 
such an agreement does not look feasible in the near future. Harmonization of 
administrative requirements and procedures rnay also help to improve the 
security of market access. An important area in this connection relates to 
product standards and their enforcement. 
Transfers: Another potential benefit of an RIA is that it may in volve trans-
fers from richer members to poorer ones. Such transfers may be financial, or 
take the form of technical assistance. To the extent that such transfers are con-
ditional upon membership of the RIA (that is., they are additional), they will 
help offset the possible losses associated with the implicit transfer of tariff 
revenue and the costs associated with trade diversion. Additionality is impor-
tant, and much may depend on how this is measured. For example, MENA 
countries already receive significant financial assistance from the EU, both 
through bilateral official aid, and through the Financial Protocols that are 
negotiated every 4 years under the auspices of the Cooperation Agreements. 
It can be argued that what matters in this connection is the comparison 
between the present discounted value of the expected transfers under the 
existing arrangements (Cooperation Agreements) and those that are anticipat-
ed under the new regime (the EMA). Given the generally declining trend in 
official aid, and the emergence of the CEECs as new "claimants," taking past 
transfers as the basis for an "additionality" test is probably unrealistic. 
Facilitation of general liberalization: A final, and very important potential 
rationale for regional integration along EMA lines relates to the opportunity 
to build on this preferential liberalization by liberalizing the economy more 
generally, that is., on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. The potential for 
trade diversion associated with an EMA will be curtailed if trade barriers 
against non-partner countries are also reduced. Adjustment costs associated 
with liberalization on an MFN basis are not likely to be much higher than 
those emerging from regional liberalization with the EU. The offei:: of finan-
cial and other assistance from the EU can then be used to facilitate the transi-
tion path to MFN reductions in trade barriers. Stated otherwise, the EMA may 
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allow a govemment to enhance the political feasibility of MFN liberalization. 
These are some of the economic arguments favoring a regional strategy. 
The extent to which they are sufficient to ensure a net welfare gain for any one 
MENA country in particular is an empirical matter. The scope of the trade 
agreement that is negotiated, the magnitude of the additional financial and 
other types of transfers, and the intentions of the govemments involved are all 
factors that influence the outcome. In summary, the necessary conditions for 
the EMA to be welfare- improving are: (i) the transfer of tariff revenue/trade 
diversion costs is offset; (ii) the EMA goes significantly beyond the current 
WTO disciplines - especially in areas such as investment and services; and 
(iii) that significant progress be made in the area of trade facilitation - cus-
toms procedures, documentary requirements, product testing and certifica-
tion. The case in favor of going regional will also be strengthened to the extent 
that the security of market access is enhanced. The next Section discusses the 
extent to which these necessary conditions appear to have been met. In gen-
eral, most RIAs have not satisfied them. Indeed, the history of preferential 
trade agreements generally shows that they have not gone much beyond the 
GATT (Hoekman and Leidy, 1993). 
The potential losses associated with an EMA will be reduced the more 
competitive are EU suppliers, and the lower are the tariffs imposed on imports 
of EU goods by MENA countries. As has been stated earlier, these losses may 
be further curtailed if efforts are made to reduce trade barriers confronting 
non-partner countries. Indeed, the importance of this cannot be over-empha-
sized. The strongest case that can be made in favor of regional integration 
along EMA lines is if it is used as part of a deliberate strategy to liberalize the 
economy more generally, that is, on an MFN basis. Very much depends in this 
connection on the willingness of the government to state clearly that general, 
MFN liberalization of the trade regime is indeed its objective. If this is not 
done, incentives may easily be created for the formation of coalitions between 
EU and domestic finns that oppose further opening of the market to (more 
efficient) third country suppliers. As noted by Bhagwati ( 1993), they may 
argue that the regional market is "our" market, that outsiders trade "unfairly" 
because they are subject to a more lenient regulatory environment, and so 
forth. 
The Europe Agreements and Recent Trade Performance of 
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)5 
This section brietly describes recent developments in MENA and CEECs trade 
with the EU, and explores the impact of measures to open the economy to 
international trade. While the comparison is somewhat "unfair" given the 
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greater levels of industrialization and human capital that exist m Eastern 
Europe relative to the MEN A region, the parallels between the two regions are 
close enough that a comparison is informative. Many countries in both regions 
started reforms in the late l 980s; the level of state intervention in both regions 
was high; and both are in geographical proximity to the European Union. 
Moreover, although CMEA-based trade dominated in the CEEC context, it 
was also significant for a number of Mediterranean countries (for example, 
Egypt)0 • Clearly the similarities should not be exaggerated. But the CEEC 
experience is informative because it provides data on the possible impact of an 
EMA. 
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Per capita exports for the MENA region as a whole are around US $225. 
They rose slightly between 1989 and 1994, with the share of exports going to the 
EU declining to 36.6 percent (Figure 1 ). MENA exports to the EU originale 
largely from the North African countries, which export most of their manufac-
tured goods to Europe. For the Middle Eastern countries, the EU is much Jess 
important. Althoogh aggregate exports of the CEECs to the world initially 
declined after 1989 - reflecting a large drop in output and exports as enterprises 
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adjusted to price liberalization and the demise of centralized trade - by 1993 per 
capita exports exceeded 1989 levels again. Whereas only some 29 percent of 
CEEC exports went to the EU in 1989, the proportion had risen to over 60 per-_ 
cent in 1994. The average annual growth rate of CEECs' exports to the EU (20.4 
percent) is two and a half times that of MENA countries (Table 1 ). 
















































Growth 1989 1994 
7.8 2.68 2.68 
12.1 0.02 0.03 
-2.8 0.03 0.02 
21.0 0.02 0.04 
6.1 0.81 0.75 
6.9 0.21 0.20 
7.0 0.70 0.67 
14.8 0.43 0.51 
8.4 0.06 0.06 
6.7 0.24 0.22 
5.2 0.04 0.03 
10.9 0.11 0.12 
20.4 2.79 4.83 
Intra-industry trade has been expanding very rapidly between the CEECs 
and the EU (Figure 2). Intra-industry trade is important because it is a major 
mechanism through which transfers of technology can occur. The Europe 
Agreements with the CEECs have created incentives for EU suppliers/retail-
ers to engage in so-called outward processing trade (OPT). This consists of 
shipping components or assemblies to a CEEC where further processing 
occurs. The processed good is then exported back to the EU supplier/retailer. 
Such processing trade benefits from liberal access to the EU, and has been 
used intensively for sectors such as garments, electrical machinery and fumi-
ture. As part of the subcontracting that is involved, EU counterparts will often 
provide designs, monitor quality, take care of marketing, and so forth. This is 
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a good way for finns in partner countries to reduce the costs and risks associ-
ated with development of export markets, while at the same time obtaining 
know-how from suppliers. While OPT is frequently restricted, at Ieast in the 
initial stages, to Iabor intensive, low value-added activities, these can create 
significant employment. 
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In the period following the implementation of the agreements with the 
CEECs, OPT exports accounted for about 18 percent of total CEEC exports 
to the EU in 1993, up from 10 percent in 1989. For Romania, processing 
activities generated 30 percent of exports to the EU in 1993. In contrast, 
exports to the EU of processed goods represented only 1.7 percent of total 
MENA eX.ports in 1993, a share that has remained constant since 1989 (Table 
2). Most of the processing occurs in leather/footwear, clothing, electrical 
machinery, precision instruments and furniture. OPT accounts for a substan-
tial share (about one quarter) of the growth in ex ports from the CEECs to the 
EU (Hoekman, l 995a). In contrast, it plays a very minor role in MENA coun-
tries, the two exceptions being Morocco and Tunisia. 7 
The data reveal clearly that the CEECs are moving rapidly to exploit the 
advantage of their geographic proximity to the EU, which in conjunction with 
their relatively low wages and significant stocks of human capital make them 
formidable competitors for the MENA region. The geographic advantage that 
the MENA region used to enjoy - because Eastern Europe was effectively 
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closed to open exchange with the West - has now disappeared. MENA firms 
must now compete head-to-head with companies located in the CEECs. This 
is indeed a challenge, not least because relative labor costs in the CEECs and 
MENA are not that different. Per capita incomes in the CEECs - one proxy 
for such costs - are close to MENA levels (World Bank, l 995a). Although 
factor endowments differ in important respects, it is also worth noting that 
some of the CEECs are producing and exporting similar products to the EU. 
Correlation coefficients between revealed comparative advantage indices of 
MENA and CEEC countries are sometimes significant. 8 Table 3 reports those 
cases where such correlation coefficients are above 0.1. In general, however, 
the data suggest that competition between firms located in different CEECs is 
more intense than that between the two regions. 
Table 2: Exports After Outward Processing 
(Share in Total Exports to EU) 
CEEC MENA 
1989 1993 1989 
Total 10.4 17.9 1.6 
Leather 38.9 34.5 8.0 
Garments 60.8 74.5 15.6 
Machinery 8.1 14.4 5.4 
Transport 12.3 4.7 4.5 
Instruments 6.4 11.9 6.5 
Furniture 26.5 13.9 1.2 









The extent to which the export performance of the CEECs is due to the 
Europe Agreements is very difficult to determine. It can be argued that to a 
large extent much of this would have been realized if the CEECs that were 
GATT contracting parties had simply locked in their trade Iiberalization 
through the WTO. Indeed, the GATT played a significant role in anchoring 
CEEC trade policy reforms, as most of the CEECs had low, bound tariffs. 
Once centralized trade was abolished, GATT commitments ensured a sub-
stantial amount of discipline. However, the Europe Agreements go far beyond 
the WTO, basically extending much of the EU's Single Market rules to the 
CEECs. They have provided an important political signal that the CEECs 
could aspire to membership of the EU - something that was acknowledged 
explicitly by the EU in June 1993 during the Copenhagen summit. The 
Agreements have thus greatly reduced uncertainty for investors regarding the 
future policy environment. Nonetheless, there are differences in opinion 
Catching Up with Eastern Europe 291 
regarding the extent to which the Agreements were instrumental in prevent-
ing the re-imposition of protection. Sapir ( 1995) argues that at least in the case 
of Hungary, the Agreement helped the govemment resist pressures for pro-
tection;9 Csaba ( 1995) argues that the Europe Agreements are too narrow in 
scope to create the institutional infrastructure needed to maintain a free trade 
stance. In his view it is the credible prospect of EU membership that is the key 
dimension in the CEEC context, as it is only this that will fundamentally con-
strain the use of various non-tariff barriers. 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients Between Revealed 
Comparative Advantage Indices, 1994 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Bulgaria 1.00 
Czech Rep. 0.19 1.00 
Hungary 0.37 0.23 1.00 
Po land 0.48 0.47 0.60 1.00 
Romania 0.33 0.49 0.48 0.60 1.00 
Jordan 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.08 
Le ban on 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.06 
Syria 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.01 
Tunisia 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.22 
UAE 0.11 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.20 
ALLMENA 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Source: Authors' mm calulatio11s 
EU membership is not on the agenda of Mediterranean countries. As far 
as MENA is concerned, the CEEC experience under the Europe Agreements 
that is perhaps of greatest relevance is the importance of OPT in driving 
export performance. While an EMA may enhance the incentives to use OPT, 
it should be recognized that MENA countries already have access to this cus-
toms regime. The Jack of OPT in the MENA region suggests the existence of 
administrative or regulatory barriers in MENA countries themselves. These 
may be offset to some extent under an EMA through harmonization of proce-
dures and technical assistance (economic cooperation). Action in this area is 
a priority to generate an export supply response. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Agreement With Tunisia 
Currently. economic relations bctween Mediterranean countries and the EU 
arc governed by Cooperation Agreements dating from the l 970s. These agree-
ments are not limited in their duration, and they provide duty-frce access to 
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EU markets for industrial goods, and preferential access for agricultural com-
modities. The agreements are not reciprocal in that partner countries may con-
tinue to apply MFN tariffs to goods of EU origin. They are complemented by 
Financial Protocols, which establish the amount of financial resources the EU 
will provide each partner country over a five year period. The key changes 
that will be implied by an EMA is a move to reciprocal free tracte in industri-
al goods, and the replacement of Financial Protocols with EMA-specific 
financial cooperation (see below). 
The basic objectives of the Euro-Med proposai are to: achieve reciprocal 
free tracte between the EU and Mediterranean countries in most manufactured 
goods; grant preferential and reciprocal access for agricultural products; 
establish conditions for graduai Iiberalization of tracte in services and capital; 
and to encourage the economic integration of Mediterranean countries. The 
goals and constraints imposed by Mediterranean countries are perhaps best 
stated in the EU Commission 's request for negotiating authority: 
in order to be able to enter progressively into free tracte with the Union 
and to take on board a wide range of trade-related Community regula-
tions (customs, standards, competition, intellectual property protec-
tion, liberalization of services, free capital movements, and so forth.) 
... Mediterranean countries ... insist on four fundamental aspects ... : the 
need for long transitional mechanisms and secure safeguards; the need 
to obtain improved access for their agricultural exports; the need for 
increased financial flows ... [and] the possibility to count on the 
Community's help to accelerate the modernization of their social and 
• 10 econom1c systems. 
The first Euro-Med Agreement (EMA), negotiated with Tunisia, was ini-
tialed in April 1995 and signed in July of the same year. (Hamdouch, 1995). 
As it is very similar in structure to the other agreements that were concluded 
subsequently (Morocco) or are still being negotiated at the lime of writing 
(Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon) what follows restricts attention to the Tunisian 
EMA. The agreement is unlimited in duration and is to be implemented over 
a twelve year period. Ils operation is overseen by an Association Council 
(meeting at Ministerial level at least once a year) and an Association 
Committee (meeting at the level of officiais, responsible for implementation 
of the Agreement). The EMA has six major elements: (1) political dialogue; 
(2) free movement of goods; (3) right of establishment and supply of services; 
(4) payments, capital, competition and other economic provisions (for exam-
ple, safeguards); (5) economic, social and cultural cooperation; and (6) finan-
cial cooperation. The structure of the EMA is similar to those of the Europe 
Agreements with the CEECs. The major difference is that no commitment 
has been made by the EU that the longer term goal is accession by partner 
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countries. Many of the provisions of the EMA are conditional upon the date 
it enters into force (for example, timing of tariff reductions). This in turn 
depends on how long it will take the• 15 EU Member States and the Tunisian 
parliament to ratify the agreement. 
Free movement of goods: As noted above, Tunisia already benefits from 
duty-free access to EU markets for manufactured goods under the 1976 
Cooperation Agreement, and additional Protocols ( 1982, 1988) negotiated 
after the enlargement of the EU in 1981 and 1986. This implies that Iiberal-
ization will mostly occur on the Tunisian side. As discussed below, the area 
where Tunisia potentially stands to gain significantly in terms of greater 
export opportunities - agriculture - was largely removed from the table. 
Quotas are to be abolished upon the entry into force of the agreement - except 
as allowed by GATT rules. In contrast to the CEEC Agreements, no special 
treatment was given to Tunisia as regards more rapid elimination of textile 
quotas than agreed under the GATT. However, Tunisia is reportedly only sub-
ject to two quotas, neither of which is close to being fully utilized (World 
Bank, 1994). Tunisia committed itself to gradually reducing tariffs on indus-
trial products of EU origin to zero. Five groups of products - at the seven-
digit Community Common Nomenclature (CCN) level - have been defined in 
this connection. Four of these groups have been defined explicitly in Annexes. 
Tariffs for the fifth group, the residual (that is., manufactured product that are 
not mentioned in any one of the Annexes) will be abolished upon the entry 
into force of the agreement. There are 470 six-digit tariff lines in this group, 
ail of which are either intermediate inputs or machinery (capital goods), 
accounting for 10 percent of 1994 imports from the EU (Table 4). 11 Annex 3 
to the Agreement contains a Iist of products for which tariffs and surcharges 
will be eliminated over a five-year period in steps of 15 percent, starting from 
the entry into force of the treaty. Products on this Iist, together with the group 
of goods to be Iiberalized immediately (that is., those not mentioned in an 
Annex) account for some 35 percent of 1994 imports by Tunisia. Annex 4 
comprises a Iist of products that will be Iiberalized over the full 12 year tran-
sition period, in steps of 8 percent per year. Products Iisted in Annex 5 will be 
subject to tariff reductions four years after the entry into force of thè agree-
ment, with reductions spread out linearly over the remaining eight years of the 
transition period (that is., annual culs of 11-12 percent). A final Iist of manu-
factured products contained in Annex 6 is exempted from tariff reductions. 
This Iist contains 37 six-digit tariff lines, comprising bread, pasta, and carpets. 
Import weighted average tariffs applying to the groups of goods to be Iib-
eralized range from 21 to 34 percent (Table 4). Goods to be Iiberalized imme-
diately have the lowest average tariffs, while those to be Iiberalized last have 
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the highest average rates. Liberalization of intennediate inputs and capital 
goods is front-loaded, whereas liberalization of consumer goods has been 
back-loaded. Sorne 90 percent of the goods in Annexes 3 and 4 are intenne-
diates or machinery; as compared to only 4 percent for Annex 5. It appears 
that some 75 percent of 1994 Tunisian exports to the EU involve goods con-
tained in Annex 5. These products accounted for over 40 percent of domestic 
production in 1992. Annex 4 covers another 20 percent of domestic output. 
Much of the liberalization commitments affecting the domestic industry is 
therefore graduai and back-loaded. Although this might be supported with the 
argument that such a strategy will assist the domestic industries concerned to 
prepare for greater competition from imports in the future (in part by raising 
effective protection through the more rapid reduction in tariffs on inputs and 
capital goods), there is no guarantee this will occur. Much will depend on the 
perceived credibility of the government's commitment to the EU, and on the 
use of provisions allowing for safeguard protection to be imposed. To the 
extent that the increase in effective protection of domestic industries during 
the first part of the implementation period leads to inefficient investment or 
non-adjustment, pressures may emerge in the future to resist market opening 
or impose safeguard actions. Moreover, the transition path chosen implies that 
there may be static welfare losses quite apart from the revenue transfer prob-
lem identified by Panagariya ( 1995), because the effective rate of protection 
will increase during the first stage of the transition." 
The approach taken by Tunisia with respect to tariff elimination is similar 
to that of the CEECs, albeit much more graduai. Poland committed itself to 
do away with tariffs on about 30 percent of its imports from the EU in 1992, 
and to abolish the remainder over a seven year transition period, with duty 
reductions taking place during the last four years. Hungary agreed to liberal-
ize 12-13 percent of its imports over a three year period in annual steps of 
one-third, another 20 percent between 1995 and 1997, again in steps of one-
third and the rest (two-thirds) between 1995 and 2001, in steps of one-sixth 
per year. The Czech and Slovak Republics are dismantling tariffs over a seven 
year period (like Poland, but somewhat Jess front-loaded). In addition to the 
speed of li beralization, another important difference relates to the fact that ini-
tial tariffs in Tunisia and the Mediterranean more generally are much higher 
than in the CEECs (Appendix Table 1 ). Average protection levels in the 
CEECs are in the 6 percent range, as compared to over 15 percent for many 
Mediterranean countries. For manufacturing, the differences are even greater, 
given that the average protection rate is in the 20-30 percent range. 
A possible factor underlying the back-loaded nature of the tariff reduction 
process is that the government may have been concerned with the revenue 
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implications of a more uniform move to free trade with the EU. The depen-
dence on trade taxes in Tunisia - as is the case in the other countries of the 
region - is relatively high. Sorne 28 percent of govemment revenues are 
derived from trade taxes. The EU accounts for 68 percent of total imports, and 
generates 58 percent of total tariff revenue. Most of the tariff revenue gener-
ated from trade with the EU is currently collected on the imports of consumer 
goods (Annex 5) whose liberalization is back-loaded, as compared to inter-
mediate and capital goods. Annex 5 accounts for 33 percent of total revenues, 
as compared to 12 and 9 percent, respectively, for Annexes 3 and 4 (Table 4). 
It is worth noting that the goods to be liberalized immediately generate only 
3.6 percent of total revenue. White the approach taken minimizes revenue 
tosses early in the program, the revenue constraint could have been addressed 
in a more uniform tariff reduction scenario. Alternative tax bases (excises, a 
value-added tax) are in effect in Tunisia. 
Agriculture: A distinguishing feature of the EMA is that little will change 
in respect of agricultural trade. The objective of the EMA is to gradualty .lib-
eralize trade in this sector. However, ait it does in concrete terms is to largely 
confirm the status quo (existing preferential arrangements), white offering 
only limited improvements in access for specific products through expansion 
of tariff quotas and reduction/elimination of tariffs for specific quotas. 
Negotiations to improve on existing agricultural concessions are to be initiat-
ed after January 1, 2000. In this respect there is a substantial difference with 
the CEEC agreements. The latter, white also excluding agriculture from the 
reach of free trade, do provide detailed provisions granting CEECs' farmers 
preferential access to EU markets. Continued restrictions on exports to EU 
agricultural markets is a major factor that constrain the benefits of an EMA 
for Mediterranean countries. For a number of these countries, the potential of 
agricultural export is important. In the Moroccan case, for example, some 28 
percent of ex ports to the EU are agricultural. The exclusion of this sector from 
liberalization seriously limits the potential welfare gains of an EMA. It is not 
that surprising therefore that the unwiltingness (inability) of the EU 
Commission to significantly expand export opportunities was the stumbling 
block for Morocco to reaching agreement with the EU (Hamdouch, 1995). 
Establishment: The right of establishment, that is., freedom to engage in 
FDI, is one of the objectives of the EMA. Modalities to achieve this objective 
are to be determined by the Association Council. No specific language is devot-
ed to this subject; and in addition, no lime path or target date is mentioned for 
the realization of the objective. In contrast, the right of establishment is a cen-
tral element of the CEECs Agreements since the EU has granted since 1992 free 
entry and national treatment to ait firms from the CEECs, except in air and 
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inland water transport and maritime cabotage. The CEECs also grant free entry 
and national treatment to EU firms, with transitional periods for certain sectors 
or activities. 13 This does not necessarily imply that FDI is restricted in Tunisia. 
However, it does signal that this was considered to be a "sensitive" issue, some-
thing that potential foreign investors may well take into account. 
Capital movement: The EMA only requires that capital flows related to 
direct investment in Tunisia by EU firms in companies formed in accordance 
with current laws can move freely, and that income can be Iiquidated and 
repatriated. The CEECs Agreements again go further by requiring free mobil-
ity of capital and unrestricted repatriation of profits. Payment flows (current 
account transactions) resulting from liberalization commitments under the 
CEECs agreements are also unrestricted. Full convertibility and liberalization 
of capital account transactions are longer term objectives, although no time 
frame is mentioned for their realization. 
Supply of service: Cross-border supply of services (that is, cross-border 
trade) has been excluded from both the EMA and the CEECs Agreements. 
The latter state that trade in services is to be liberalized progressively, taking 
into account the development of the services sector in each of the CEECs. 
This includes provisions relating to temporary movement of natural persons. 
No time frame is established for the liberalization of supply of services, nor 
is the achievement of freedom of supply of services mentioned explicitly as 
an ultimate objective. Separate disciplines are to be secured for air and inland 
water transport after the entry into force of each agreement. During the tran-
sitional period, the CEECs are to progressively adopt legislation consistent 
with that of the EU's in the field of air and land transport insofar as this serves 
to achieve the liberalization objectives of the agreement. International mar-
itime services are to be liberalized through the signatories undertaking to 
apply effectively the principle of unrestricted access to the market and traffic 
on a commercial basis. 
The EMA simply refers to the obligations of each country that were estab-
lished under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). These 
obligations did not exist at the time the Europe Agreements were negotiated. 
Obligations under the GATS do not imply much, if any, liberalization 
(Hoekman, I 995b). MENA countries made very limited commitments under 
the GATS, subjecting Jess than IO percent of their service sectors to the 
national treatment or market access principles (Hoekman, I 995a). No men-
tion is made of maritime or air transport as in the CEEC agreements. The 
objective of the GATS is not "free trade" in services. In contrast, given the 
objective of accession to the EU, foreign investors know that, where CEECs 
are concemed, free trade and investment is the goal. Even in the absence of 
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the accession issue, it can be argued that the non-reference to the GATS in the 
CEECs Agreements implies a stronger commitment to liberalization than is 
found in the EMA. While it may be understandable that possible labor 
movement associated with the provision of services is a sensitive issue for the 
EU - something that may also play a role in the FDl/capital movement con-
text - "reciprocity" concerns are not a good rationale for Mediterranean coun-
tries to abstain from making commitments in these areas. 
Competition policy: The EMA and Europe Agreements are similar with 
respect to the requirement to adopt the basic competition rules of the EU, in 
particular with respect to collusive behavior, abuse of dominant position, and 
competition-distorting state aid (respectively, Articles 85, 86, and 92 of the 
Treaty of Rome), insofar as they affect trade between the Community and 
each partner country. The implementation of the rules will proceed following 
their adoption by the Association Council within five years (as opposed to 
three years under the CEECs Agreements). Until then, GATT rules with 
respect to countervailing of subsidies will apply. State-aid, compatible with 
EU rules for disadvantaged regions (Article 92.3a Treaty of Rome), can be 
applied to the entire territory of Tunisia during the first five years. Such 
regional aid may be given by EU governments to regions in their countries 
with per capita incomes that are substantially below average, or to areas 
where there is significant unemployment. The low level of per capita incomes 
in the Mediterranean countries in comparison to those of EU states should 
ensure that non-industry specific state aids will be unconstrained in the medi-
um terrn. The agreements also provide for enhanced transparency of state 
aids, each party agreeing to provide annual reports on the total amount and 
distribution of the aid given. 
In both the Mediterranean and the CEECs cases, antidumping remains 
applicable to trade flows between partners. This despite the agreement by 
Tunisia (and the CEECs) to apply EU competition disciplines. One implica-
tion is that the security of market access rationale for regional integration was 
not met. At the very least, an analogue to Article 91 :2 Treaty of Rome could 
have been included, under which it is required that as of the entry into force 
of the Treaty, products originating in one Member state and exported to anoth-
er be free of duties, quotas and measures with similar effect if they are re-
exported. That is, efforts are required to ensure that arbitrage is possible. That 
being said, it is certainly the case that the enforcement of competition laws in 
the MENA region is important, and could have major benefits in terrns of 
ensuring that the benefits of trade liberalization are realized. Given existing 
market structures in these countries (in particular the prevalence of state-
owned enterprises), anti-competitive business practices may be a problem. 
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The intra-Mediterranean dimension and rules of origin: An objective of 
the Tunisian agreement is to promote the integration of the Maghreb coun-
tries. More generally, the EU is in favor of greater integration of the 
economies of the Mediterranean countries. This is important, as the negotia-
tion of bilateral agreements between the EU and each of the Mediterranean 
countries would otherwise lead to the so-called hub-and-spoke system. A 
problem with such an arrangement is that it creates incentives for firms to 
locate in the "hub", that is., the EU, as this gives them barrier-free access to 
ail the "spokes". Ali other things equal, this creates forces against inward for-
eign direct investment by EU-based firms producing tradable goods. Partly 
for this reason the CEECs established a Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA). To avoid a hub-and-spoke system from emerging, 
Mediterranean countries are well advised to pursue a similar strategy. 
Intra-regional trade in MENA is limited. In part this reflects the similarity 
in endowments, in part the non-competitiveness of processed and manufac-
tured goods that are produced. However, while currently small in absolute 
value (some $8.3 billion in 1990, or 8 percent of total exports), relative to the 
region 's participation in world trade, intra-regional trade is already qui te high 
(Yeats, 1994; Ekholm et al., 1995). Thus, the trade of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and 
Turkey with the region is four times more intensive than trade with the world 
as a whole. The only major economy in the region where intra-regional trade 
is clearly "too low" is Israel. Given the differences in the factor endowments 
and per capita income between Israel and some of its neighbors, intra-region-
al trade has the potential to grow substantially. More generally, intra-industry 
trade must expand if intra-regional trade is to grow substantially, as the 
endowments of many countries are qui te similar. This has already been hap-
pening to some extent. Although most intra-regional trade was in oil and oil 
products a decade ago, the share of oil has fallen significantly, standing at 
only 35 percent in 1992 (as opposed to 80 percent in 1980). Existing intra-
regional trade is to some (unknown) extent driven by barter deals and a web 
of preferential, commodity-specific "protocol trade" agreements. The latter 
involve preferential tariff rates on specific Iists of goods of Arab origin. In 
conjunction with the finding that intra-regional trade is already qui te high, this 
suggests that much of this trade may consist of the "wrong" goods, that is., 
those in which countries do not have a comparative advantage (see also 
Lawrence, et al. 1995 on this issue). Exports to non-regional partner countries 
may give a Jess biased view of potential trade inside the region. There appears 
to be little complementarity between exports of many of the countries in the 
region, in particular in the Middle East (for example, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Syria - see Appendix Table 2). 
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The rules of origin that are included in an FfA with the EU and in possi-
ble intra-regional agreements are important since they may contribute to trade 
diversion. The Tunisian agreement allows for cumulation for rules of origin 
purposes for products produced in Algeria and Morocco as well as the EU and 
Tunisia. This may help create backward and forward linkages between the 
Maghreb countries and enhance the potential for intra-industry trade. The 
extension of cumulation to other Mediterranean countries, and the CEECs, 
would be more beneficial to participants. This requires that barriers to intra-
regional trade are eliminated, and that existing commodity-specific preferen-
tial trade agreements are converted into full-fledged free trade agreements. As 
noted earlier, this will also ensure that the emerging hub-and-spoke nature of 
the EU's web of trade agreements is reduced. 
There are various Articles in the EMA which mention the intra-regional 
dimension. Article 1, outlining the objectives of the EMA lists integration of 
the Maghreb countries as one of the Agreement's ai ms. Article 43 (on scope 
of economic cooperation) mentions that one objective of cooperation (that is, 
technical assistance) is to "foster economic integration within the Maghreb 
using any measures Iikely to further such relations within the region." Article 
45 (Regional cooperation) states among other things that Parties will support 
activities that foster intra-regional trade within the Maghreb. Intra-regional 
integration 1s therefore defined rather narrowly (Maghreb, not 
Mediterranean). 
Economie cooperation: One-third of the Articles of the Tunisian EMA 
deal with cooperation in economic, social and cultural matters. The prime 
objective underlying economic cooperation is to target "first and foremost" 
activities "suffering the effects of internai constraints and difficulties or 
affected by the process of liberalizing Tunisia's economy as a whole, and 
more particularly by the liberalization of trade between Tunisia and the 
Community" (Article 43). Methods of economic cooperation mentioned in 
the EMA include information exchange, provision of expert services (consul-
tants), joint ventures (for example, the Euro-Partenariat program), and assis-
tance with technical, administrative and regulatory matters. Specific areas 
mentioned in the EMA include regional cooperation, education and training, 
science and technology, the environment, modernization of industry (includ-
ing agricultural processing), promotion and protection of investment (for 
example, negotiating investment protection and double taxation treaties), 
standardization and conformity assessment (introduction of EU 
procedures/rules, upgrading Tunisian testing labs), approximation of econom-
ic legislation, financial services (supporting restructuring; improvi_!lg auditing 
and supervision), agriculture and fisheries (modernization, diversification), 
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transport (modemization and restructuring; management; quality upgrading), 
telecommunications and information technology (standardization, introduc-
tion of electronic data interchange (EDI) and integrated service digital 
networks (ISDN)), energy, tourism, and statistics. 
The various Articles listed above are largely oriented towards upgrading 
Tunisian infrastructure broadly defined (both physical and regulatory) and 
providing support for restructuring the economy. This support is not just 
reflected in technical assistance and advice, but is supported by financial 
assistance as well (see below). The specific mentioning of an issue area under 
the economic cooperation chapter presumably signais that this is a legitimate 
subject for using EU financial resources. One area of great importance for 
many countries in the region is cooperation on customs matters (Article 59). 
The aim of such cooperation is the simplification of procedures, the introduc-
tion of the EU' Single Administrative Document and lin king EU and Tunisian 
transit systems. Active cooperation on these matters will be important for 
tracte facilitation. Another issue area that is important is standardization and 
conformity assessment. The longer run objective of the EMA is to conclude 
agreements for the mutual recognition of certification (Article 40). 
Social and cultural cooperation: This includes a number of Articles guar-
anteeing national treatment for Tunisian and EU nationals that have found 
legitimate employment in the partner country. As far as movement of workers 
is concerned, Parties are only committed to "dialogue" aimed at achieving 
progress in this area. Priority is to be given to projects and programs to reduce 
migratory pressure, inter alia by creating jobs and developing training in areas 
from which emigrants corne; promoting the role of women through education; 
improving social protection and health cover systems; and by improving liv-
ing conditions in poor, densely populated areas (Article 71). 
Financial cooperation: As mentioned earlier, Mediterranean countries 
have received financial transfers from the EU under the auspices of the revolv-
ing 5-year Financial Protocols. The sums involved vary per country, and are 
significant. During the period of the Fourth Protocol (1991-96), Tunisia was 
allocated a total of ECU 284 million." Under the EMA approach, financial 
protocols will not be renewed. Instead, the EU envisages earmarking a total 
amount of assistance - grants and loans - for all the Mediterranean countries. 
Individual allocations out of this total would not be pre-determined, but would 
in part be endogenous - depending on country performance, including the 
implementation of the EMA. Although not spelled out explicitly in the EMA, 
the Articles in the EMA on financial cooperation emphasize the link between 
EMA implementation and the provision of financial resources. 
Article 75 of the Tunisian EMA states that: 
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With a view to full attainment on the Agreement's objectives, financial 
cooperation ... shall entai!: 
- facilitating reforms aimed at modernizing the economy; 
- updating economic infrastructure; 
- promoting private investment and job creation activities; 
- taking into account the effects of the progressive introduction of a 
free tracte area on the Tunisian economy, in particular where the 
updating and restructuring of industry is concerned; 
- flanking measures for policies implemented in the social sectors. 
Moreover, Article 76 goes on to state that the Community will examine 
ways to support structural adjustment policies needed to restore financial 
equilibrium, while Article 77 seeks to establish a basis for coordinated 
approaches to dealing with "exceptional macroeconomic and financial prob-
lems which could stem from the progressive implementation of the 
Agreement." However, the exact modalities of financial cooperation are 
vague, the relevant procedures to "be adopted by mutual agreement between 
the Parties by means of the most suitable instruments once the Agreement 
enters into force" (Article 75). How future financial transfers will compare to 
past flows remains to be seen, although the absolute value of transfers is 
expected to increase. Sorne ECU 4.7 billion has been earmarked to support 
Mediterranean countries, to be complemented by an equivalent amount of 
European Investment Bank resources. 
Evaluation 
To what extent will the EMA help MENA countries catch up with the CEECs? 
In principle, the liberalization of trade should do much to induce firms to 
upgrade their production capacity and improve their efficiency. In the long 
run, the EMA is likely to be beneficial to ail of the countries involved. But it 
should be remembered that in principle the exercise may be economically 
welfare-reducing in the short-to medium-runs. Even if such proved not to be 
the case, there can easily be significant opportunity costs associated with pref-
erential trading arrangements. The major potential advantage of the EMA is 
that it provides a commitment mechanism to MENA governments, allowing a 
graduai reform path to be more credible than otherwise. Credibility may be 
enhanced through the binding nature of the agreement, the implicit linkage 
that has been made between official financial transfers from the EU and 
implementation of the EMA, and the offer of wide-ranging technical assis-
tance to help Mediterranean countries improve the administration of their reg-
ulatory regimes (for example, customs, certification of product standards). 
However, the absence of binding commitments in the areas of direct 
investment and supply of services, and the maintenance of antidumping 
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procedures, suggest that one potential justification for regional arrangements 
mentioned in Section II has not been met. That is, the EMA does not go 
significantly beyond existing multilateral (WTO) disciplines. Moreover, the 
transition path to free trade with the EU is a long one, with liberalization of 
goods competing with domestic production only starting five years after the 
entry into force of the agreements. This may well reduce the incentives to ini-
tiale rapid restructuring, and may create problems in implementing tariff 
reductions in the future (for example, through pressure for safeguard protec-
tion). The graduai liberalization may also be too slow in tenus of maintaining 
existing export markets and capturing new ones in the face of increased com-
petition from the CEECs and Asian economies, driven by the liberalization 
achieved in the Uruguay Round. 
A potential rationale in favor of regional integration noted earlier is the 
existence of enforcement mechanisms that are more effective than those avail-
able under the WTO. In the-EMA context, dispute seulement is dealt with by 
the Association Council. In the case of a dispute that cannot be addressed 
through consultations with the Council, one of the Parties may appoint an 
arbitrator. The other Party is then required to appoint a second arbitrator with-
in two months, and the Association Council appoints a third one. Decisions by 
the three arbitrators will be taken by majority vote, with the Parties required 
to implement them. This goes beyond the WTO, where parties to a dispute are 
always free not to implement a recommendation by a WTO panel if they are 
willing to succumb to possible retaliation. Time will tell how this dispute set-
tlement mechanism will work. lt is important to note, however, that dispute 
seulement will only work if there are binding obligations. In a number of 
areas that are particularly relevant from a market access viewpoint such oblig-
ations have yet to be established, for example, regarding product standards. 
Disputes on such issues, for example, allegations that standards are used as 
non-tariff barriers, can only be dealt with by the WTO. 
lt is i.mportant that concurrently with the implementation of the EMA, 
extemal barriers to trade and foreign investment are reduced as well. A key 
issue in this context is related to the trade diversion question - the extent to 
which a shift away from efficient third country suppliers toward Jess efficient 
EU finns occurs, and the efficiency losses and implicit tariff revenue transfer 
that are associated with this. Given the Jack of enhanced market access for 
Tunisian agricultural products, the extent for potential trade creation gains 
were limited. Much also depends on the value of the economic and financial 
cooperation that will tlow from the EU to Tunisia (and the other 
Mediterranean partners). Another potential problem that may arise in this con-
nection is the reliance on customs tariff for government revenue. As tariffs on 
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EU goods decline to zero, it may prove difficult to reduce MFN rates if alter-
native tax bases are not created. 
Of course, these are ail potential problems, and one can argue in favor of 
the liberalization strategy that was chosen. Thus, it may well be that by lower-
ing tariffs on intermediate and capital goods, domestic industries are granted 
some up front compensation for the adjustment costs that must be incurred 
later, and are given time to restructure. It could also be argued that this strate-
gy ensures that tariff revenues will gradually decline, again allowing more 
time to create alternative sources of funds for the Government. Nonetheless, 
the possible downside of the strategy should be recognized. It is clear that 
much will depend on the extent to which complementary actions are pursued 
to improve the functioning of the economy. An important point to raise in this 
connection is the fact that the EMA does little to ensure investors of national 
treatment or to grant the general right of establishment. This is a significant 
difference with the CEECs Agreements, which clearly spell out that right of 
establishment is a central part of the deal. Such establishment is permitted 
immediately for most activities, and a transition path is spelled out for the 
remainder. By signaling the fact that they are open to FDI and willing to Iock 
in the commitment, the CEECs increased the incentives for foreign firms to 
establish and transfer much needed know-how by reducing political risk. FDI 
is especially important in the services area, where establishment often remains 
the best way to con test a market. Efficient services are cruGial in terms of being 
able to participate in the global economy: telecommunications, inforination 
technology, port services, financial intermediation, and business support ser-
vices are ail key elements underlying the ability to compete on world markets. 
By limiting commitments to those made in the GATS, the EMA risks sending 
a signal that liberalization is not on the immediate agenda. It also puts the bur-
den on unilateral efforts by Mediterranean countries to move forward. 
An important factor underlying CEECs' export performance is the fact 
that firms are able to exploit sub-contracting of manufacturing products for 
export to the EU in a much greater degree than most MENA countries. Such 
OPT is important, as it greatly facilitates the penetration of EU markets. 
Foreign (EU) partners generally take care of distribution and quality contrai. 
OPT activities are frequently lime-sensitive. Under just-in-time management 
practices, the availability of adequate services links (transport, harbor ser-
vices, customs operations, telecommunications) plays a fondamental role in 
the decision on the location of outsourcing. Geography suggests that many 
Mediterranean countries could become competitive locations for outsourcing 
by European companies if access to efficient producer services is made avail-
able. Morocco and Tunisia illustrate this aspect as they are the only two 
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MENA countries to make use of OPT. However, in many countries in the 
region, significant changes in regulatory regimes and investment policies are 
required to improve the efficiency of services providers. Greater competition 
will do much to reduce price-cost margins and upgrade quality. 
Actions to reduce the role of the state are particularly important. Indeed, 
the need to reform regulatory regimes affecting FOI and the operation of the 
services sector is part of a more general need to decrease the size of the pub-
lic sector. Privatization of state-owned enterprises is a necessary condition for 
economic recovery and longer-run growth. Refraining from privatization will 
slow down the necessary adjustment process. Graduai implementation of free 
trade with the EU will put public sector enterprises under pressure to restruc-
ture, giving rise to pressure for assistance (subsidies, tax concessions, soft 
directed credit, capital infusions, and increase in import barriers). The net 
costs of an EMA without a significant privatization effort are likely to be 
much higher than if the implementation of the EMA is complemented by 
deregulation and privatization. At the very least, it would appear necessary 
that state firms confront hard budget constraints. Whether this is easier to 
achieve than privatization is an open question. 15 
Important political economy issues also arise in this context. Many 
MENA countries have a significant stock of educated workers that are either 
employed directly by the government's administration or by state-owned 
firms. They also have large pools of unskilled, under-employed labor. In addi-
tion, some countries such as Egypt have a substantial stock of unemployed 
university graduates (World Bank, I 995b). A necessary condition for the 
implementation of the EMA to be politically feasible is that increased job 
opportunities for the unskilled and the educated unemployed materialize, and 
that job losses in the state sector remain politically manageable. Greater 
employment opportunities for the unskilled may emerge through the creation 
of firms specializing in labor-intensive production (in part through exploiting 
the OPT option) and by improving access for agricultural exports. The latter 
has been excluded; a necessary condition for the former is the existence of 
adequate infrastructure and the absence of red tape (regulations, tax adminis-
tration, customs). As far as the more highly educated are concerned, many of 
the potential job opportunities lie in the services sector. Realizing this poten-
tial requires deregulating services activities and allowing establishment by 
foreign providers. Even then, realism suggests that in countries where the 
existing labor force employed in services is already significant, net losses may 
well occur initially. FOI can do much to stimulate both labor-intensive and 
more skilled activities, be they in services or manufacturing. But these oppor-
tunities will materialize only if the regulatory and institutional environment is 
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conducive to private sector investment. lndeed, in the absence of improve-
ments in the legal and regulatory frameworks, opening up to trade with the 
EU may result in greater competition from imports without much in the way 
of new investment. If so, the political viability of EMA implementation will 
decline. Much will also depend in this connection on how EU financial assis-
tance is used. A strong case can be made that there may be a high payoff for 
using EU grants to fund worker compensation schemes to facilitate downsiz-
ing of the public sector (World Bank, l 995b ). The wording of the Articles in 
the EMA on the scope and priorities for financial and economic cooperation 
creates the presumption that such funding is possible. 
Conclusions 
There is increasing evidence that trade Iiberalization and integration into the 
global economy is associated with higher rates of economic growth (Sachs 
and Warner, 1995). A problem confronting any government seeking to shift 
from an inward-looking to an export-oriented trade regime is the need to off-
set resistance by interest groups that are Iikely to Jose in the transition to a lib-
eral environment. In the mid to the late 1980s, this political economy con-
straint was overcome by many countries in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe as the result of external developments - the debt crisis, the fall 
of communism. In conjunction with the promise of large private financial 
inflows in the case of Latin America, and integration into Europe in the case 
of the CEECs, govemments were able to "sell" broad-based economic reform 
(Rodrik, 1995). The MENA region did not participate in the "shock approach" 
to reform. It pursued a very graduai reform path. In part this was because gov-
emments were not convinced of the need for wide-ranging market opening -
there was no external factor similar to the debt crisis in Latin America - but 
perhaps more importantly, because of the political costs that were expected 
from pursuing such a course. 
The CEECs illustrate the case that far-reaching liberalization and a strate-
gy of greater integration with the EU and the rest of the world will greatly 
expand trade and export-oriented production. Although the transition has been 
painful, the CEECs are now ail experiencing real economic growth. The 
Europe Agreements are by no means the primary factor underlying CEECs' 
economic performance, but they probably have played an important role in 
anchoring expectations. The EMA option provides a unique opportunity to the 
Mediterranean countries to credibly pursue far-reaching liberalization of trade 
in a graduai fashion. ln this respect they are therefore very beneficial. But in 
themselves the EMAs are not enough. They are limited to the liberalization of 
trade in manufactured products. They do little more than contain hortatory 
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language as regards the liberalization of service markets and foreign invest-
ment, something that is required to help ensure a supply response and create 
new employment opportunities. 
The absence of commitments in these areas may be related in part to the 
issue of privatization and the role of the State. Without public sector refonn -
at a minimum the introduction of hard budget constraints - the impact of tracte 
liberalization will be both muted and possibly more intense. The impact may 
be muted because public enterprises are given preferential treatment and 
retain substantial market power. The impact may be exacerbated if public 
enterprises are forced to adjust, but new employment opportunities do not 
emerge because barriers to entry persist. The recent literature evaluating alter-
native explanations for the success of particular countries in attaining and sus-
taining high rates of economic growth concludes that while openness to the 
world economy is very important, in itself it is not enough. Equally important 
are efficient public institutions, domestic competition, a well-functioning ser-
vices sector (finance, infrastructure, distribution, and so forth.), investment in 
human resources (education), high rates of private savings and investment, 
and a stable macro-economic environment. These factors cannot ail be 
"imported" through an agreement with the EU. Sorne, however, could have 
been included in the EMA, thereby reducing the burden on Mediterranean 
countries to unilaterally pursue the reforms needed. As emphasized earlier, the 
policy regimes pertaining to FDI and the services sector are of particular 
importance in this connection. By not committing to a concrete transition path 
towards a liberal economic environment in the mentioned areas, an opportu-
nity was missed. This is a malter of concern, especially when considering the 
magnitude of the capital (flight) owned by nationals of the region (World 
Bank, I 995a). 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the issue of the long-
terrn goal as regards the level of MFN tariffs that will be imposed on third 
countries. As noted earlier, one way for a regional agreement to be unam-
biguously welfare-improving is to use it as a deliberate strategy to offset exist-
ing political economy constraints on unilateral liberalization through the use 
of the financia.I and economic assistance that is on offer. Although this may 
indeed be the objective of Governments in the region, they have not publi-
cized it. Without such an explicitly stated long-terrn perspective, it may prove 
more difficult than otherwise for Governments to reduce MFN tariffs sub-
stantially in the future. This is because incentives will be created for not only 
domestic firms to seek to continue to benefit from somewhat sheltered home 
markets, but EU firms fearing competition from third countries may also be 
induced to lobby for protection to be maintained. A clear time-table and 
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trans1t1on path to be pursued concurrently with the implementation of the 
EMA would do much to avoid such problems, and would provide a strong 
signal to domestic producers that what ultimately counts is not the regional 
market, but the world market. 
Notes 
That is to say, the economic situation has never deteriorated to such an extent that 
"shock therapy" was unavoidable. 
2 ln what follows we abstract from the systemic or global welfare implications of 
regional integration. These are controversial and t)Je subject of ongoing debate. 
See Bhagwati ( 1993) and the contributions in Anderson and Blackhurst ( 1993). 
3 See Hoekman ( l 995b) for a detailed analysis of the GATS. 
4 Enforcement of binding commitments may also be stronger under a RIA. ln 
GATT, the ultimate enforcement is retaliation by "principal suppliers," the coun-
tries with whom a tariff concession was originally negotiated. Such retaliation, if 
it occurs, will take the form of increases in tariffS on exports of the country vio-
lating a binding. This may not constitute a sufficient deterrent threat. Altematively, 
the country may offer to compensate principal suppliers by lowering other tariffs 
(on an MFN basis). These mechanisms may not exist in the RIA context. ln the EU 
context, a FTA will not make allowances for the permanent re-imposition of tar-
iffs. GATT does. 
5 This section summarizes and updates material contained in Hoekman ( 1995). 
6 Membership in the Council for Mutual Economie Assistance (CMEA), the now 
dissolvedtrading system of the former communist bloc, consisted in 1989 of 
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam. 
7 The welfare implications of OPT may be ambiguous, insofar as the policy regime 
induces EU sourcing of inputs that are more costly than what is available on the 
world market. 
8 The RCA is defined as: 
x/X1 
!:;:, x / !:;:, X 
where x,, are exports of commodity i by country j, X, are country j's total exports, 
and N is the number of countries. 
9 lndeed, he also notes that the WTO was not considered a binding constraint by the 
Hungarian govemment; what counted was the commitment towards the EU. 
10 "Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a 
Euro- Mediterranean Partnership." Communication from the Commissio'n to the 
Council and the Parliament, October 1994. 
11 Tracte data reported by EUROSTAT is either on a 6 or 8-digit level basis, making 
it impossible to relate exactly the tariff commitments (which use 7-digits) to pub-
licly available tradestatistics. However, in most cases, a concordance from the 7 to 
the 6-digit level was straightforward. 
12 This is because firms get access to cheaper inputs as input tariffs fall to zero, white 
continuing to benefit from tariffs on the goods they produce. 
13 Poland, for example, granted immediate freedom of establishment and national 
treatment for construction and most manufacturing activities, with the exception 
of mining, processing of precious stones and metals, explosives, ammunition and 
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weaponry, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, high voltage power lines and pipeline trans-
portation. Ali but the last two activities are to be liberalized by the end of 1997, 
at which time most service sectors will also be liberalized (financial, legal and real 
estate services excepted). By the end of the transitional period (10 years under the 
CEEC Agreements) ail sectors are to be liberalized, except for acquisition and sale 
of natural resources and agricultural land and forests. The Czech and Slovak agree-
ments liberalize FDI in ail sectors immediately, except for the defense industry; 
steel; mining; acquisition of state-owned assets under privatization; ownership, 
use, sale and rent of real property; and the financial service industry. These 
activities are to be liberalized by the end of the ten year transition period. The 
Hungarian agreement is similar to the other CEEC agreements except that it adds 
legal services and gambling, lottery and similar services to the list of activities 
excluded indefinitely. 
14 The amounts have been steadily increasing in nominal terms. During 1978-81, 
Tunisia obtained ECU 95 million. This rose to ECU 139 during 1981-86 and ECU 
224 during 1986-91. 
15 In general, the answer may well be yes if the Government desires to reduce 
resource tlows to the public sector enterprises. By imposing an aggregate ceiling 
on the amount of such transfers, it may be able to insulate itself somewhat from 
individual claimants. Much depends here on the objective of the Government. 
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Appendix Table l: Trade Taxes in MENA and East European Countries, 1993 
Share of Import Duties in Total Share of "Other" Taxes in Total Average Collected Tariff 
Government Revenue Import Tax Revenue (Revenue/Imports) 
Morocco 17.7 52 17.5 
Tunisia 28.3 46 18.7 
Egypt 10.0 8 14.9 
Jordan 35.9 40 17.8 
Syria 10.0 25 16.4 
Oman 3.2 -- 3.0 
UAE 
Yemen 20.2 3 19.1+ 
Bahrain 9.2 -- 4.0 
Bulgaria 4.6 17 7.9 
Czech Rep. 3.9 23 2.2 
Hungary(l 991) 5.8 -- 8.6 
Pol and 6.5 -- 5.9 
Romania 3.8 -- 7.0 
Notes: -- Zero or negligible; 'Valued at the average pamllel market exchange rate, the average collection rate was around 8 percent. 














..... ..._ ..._ 
Appendix Table 2: Correlation of Regional Cooperation Agreement Indices of 
Exports to the EU, 1993 
JOR LEB SYR ALG SA KUW TUN UAE MOR ISR 
JORDAN l.00 
LEBANON -0.02 l.00 
SYRIA 0.01 0.44 l.00 
ALGERIA -0.04 -0.04 0.25 l.00 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.01 -0.04 0.55 0.46 l.00 
KUWAIT 0.09 -0.0l 0.56 0.46 0.95 l.00 
TUNISIA 0.16 0.01 -0.0l 0.39 -0.04 -0.02 l.00 
UAE 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.12 l.00 
MO ROCCO 0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.65 -0.05 -0.04 0.64 -0.00 l.00 
ISRAEL 0.21 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.14 l.00 
EGYPT 0.09 0.12 0.63 O. l l 0.30 0.32 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.00 
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The Free-Trade Area 
Between Morocco and the European Union 
Introduction 
The relations between Morocco and the European Union (EU) date back to 
the latter's establishment. These relations have faced growing difficulties over 
the past decade, mainly as a result of the enlargement of the EU to include 
those Mediterranean countries that compete directly with Morocco (Greece, 
Portugal, and especially Spain), the constraints imposed by the EU's Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the erosion of tracte preferences in the wake 
of the Uruguay Round. 
Along with its continental preoccupation and in parallel with its continued 
enlargement, the EU has developed a strategic interest in the Mediterranean 
Basin as a whole and, in particular, in those countries lying in the South 
Mediterranean, Morocco included. It is in this context that the EU has 
proposed a new mode of association with Morocco and other Southern 
Mediterranean countries. Central to this new mode of association is the cre-
ation of a free-trade area. But what are the issues at play and the likely con-
sequences of such an agreement in the case of Morocco? These are the ques-
tions that this chapter will attempt to answer. 
The Agreement was signed in February 1996 and it will corne into force 
following ratification by all EU states. The issues underlying the EU-Morocco 
Association Agreement are both economic and geopolitical. This necessitates 
a retrospective review of the historical relations between Morocco and the EU 
and the difficulties encountered over time. 
A Historical Overview of the EU-Morocco Relations 
The EU-Morocco relations date back to the former's creation in its original 
form - the European Economie Community - in 1957. Indeed, particular pro-
visions regarding relations with Morocco (and also with Tunisia) were already 
included in the Treaty of Rome. Two subsequent Agreements have regulated 
such relations: the 1969 Association Agreement and the 1976 Cooperation 
Agreement. However, neither Agreement resulted in improved EU-Morocco 
relations. 
The Treaty of Rome 
Two texts annexed to the Treaty of Rome made explicit reference to Morocco. 
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The first one was a Protocol. It stipulated that "the application of the treaty 
establishing the European Economie Community does not require any modi-
fication of the customs regime applied1 at the outset of the implementation of 
the treaty, to France's imports originating in Morocco".1 The customs regime 
referred to was that of customs exemptions applied to the vast majority of 
Morocco's exports to France.2 Such exports consisted almost entirely of food 
products (cereals, fruits, vegetables, canned goods), raw materials, and semi-
finished goods. Exports to France represented roughly 50 percent of 
Morocco's total exports. 
The Protocol thus allowed the application of unilateral advantages that 
were being threatened by the establishment of the European Community 
(such as the common external tariff and the common agricultural policy). 
Therefore, the Protocol was meant to cover a transition period that would 
evolve quickly into an association regime with the Community. 
The planned association regime was defined in the second text annexed to 
the Treaty of Rome - the "Declaration of Purpose" which stipulated that the 
six members of the European Community: 
Thking into account the Agreements and covenants of an economic, 
financial and monetary nature concluded between France and the other 
independent countries belonging to the Franc zone, 
lntent on maintaining and intensifying the traditional exchange links 
between the member states of the European Economie Community 
and the independent countries as well as contributing to the latter's 
social and economic development, 
Declare themselves ready, from the onset of implementation of the 
Treaty, to propose to these countries negotiations with a view to con-
cluding economic association Agreements with the Community.3 
The Association Agreement 
The 1969 Association Agreement actually turned out to be a commercial 
Agreement and of a limited duration (5 years). lt covered only partially the 
commercial exchanges between Morocco and the Community, and was con-
cluded based on the principle of reciprocity, to the extent that it stipulated 
advantages for both parties. The major preferences that were granted by the 
Community to the Moroccan exports were the following:• 
• Exemptions for industrial products and handicrafts, with the exception of 
agro-industrial products and cork products. Agro-industrial products - with 
the notable exception of wine, fruit juices~ and certain fruit and vegetable-
based canned products - were nonetheless granted some preferential access in 
respect of the applied customs duties (the fixed element of a common tariff 
duty). 
• As for agricultural products, only citrus fruits benefited from an 80 
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percent reduction of the common tariff duty, provided their prices were high-
er than a given reference price.5 
• Fish products, with the exception of canned goods, benefited from cus-
toms exemptions.6 The preferences granted to fish-based canned goods varied 
among European countries, from exemption of customs duties without quan-
titative limits in the BENELUX (Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
Luxembourg) to partial exemption within the context of quantitative quotas in 
the other countries of the Community. 
From Morocco's perspective, the main preferences granted to imports of 
European origin were as follows: 
• Exemptions from customs duties for a list of products representing three 
percent of total imports from the Community. 
• Tariff reductions in the order of 25 percent for another list of products rep-
resenting seven percent of total imports from the Community. 
• Given that such tariff advantages had been accorded erga omnes by the 
1906 Algeciras Act,' the Communify sought to obtain exclusive advantages, 
and that was accomplished by the adoption of global quotas in its own favor, 
representing 63 percent of ail imports subject to tariff duties in Morocco. 
Overall, this was an Agreement with limited impact that satisfied neither 
party. The advantages that were made available to Morocco were diluted by 
the proliferation of similar preferential agreements signed with other 
Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Israel, and so 
forth.). Negotiations were scheduled for the third year of implementation of 
the Agreement. In 1976 - that is, two years after the expiration of the 1969 
Association Agreement - they evolved into a larger agreement, the 
Cooperation Agreement. 
The Cooperation Agreement 
The Cooperation Agreement is part of a new type of more global Agreements 
comprising, in addition to the commercial track, other tracks including finan-
cial and technical cooperation as well as issues related to labor movement. 
These new aspects of the Agreement, albeit devoid of tangible and effective 
benefits, may be credited with initiating a new type of cooperation with a larg-
er scope. The Agreement had unlimited duration, and the commercial track -
which constituted a major portion thereof - no longer required reciprocity on 
the part of Morocco. 
The trade preferences accorded to Moroccan exports by the nine member 
Market were as follows: 8 
• Maintenance of exemptions for industrial products and raw materials -
again with the exception of cork products, which were subjected to a 
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progressive ceiling. 
• Agro-industrial products were still treated differently and Jess favorably 
than industrial products. They benefited generally from limited tariff reduc-
tions and were subjected to quantitative restrictions (quotas), minimum prices 
(reference prices) and quality conditions (as in the case of wine). 
• Fish products continued to benefit from unlimited customs exemptions, 
with the exception of Morocco's main export product - sardines, which were 
subjected to minimum price conditions. 
• As for agricultural products, an 80 percent tariff reduction was kept forcit-
rus fruits, and a 40 to 60 percent preference was accorded to fruit and veg-
etable products although these were also subjected to seasonal restrictions 
(limited periods) and to minimum price conditions. 
Finally, the Cooperation Agreement did not innovate as regards trade pref-
erences. lndeed, the issues associated with Morocco's agricultural and agro-
industrial exports to the European Community remained unresolved. These 
issues became more pressing following the accession of Greece, Portugal, and 
especially Spain to the Community.9 The 1988 Adaptation Agreement - which 
was meant to address the issues that surfaced in the wake of the Community's 
second enlargement to include Morocco's trade rivais - hardly provided for 
new solutions. 
The Erosion of Relations 
EU-Morocco relations have been constrained by two aspects: asymmetry and 
erosion. Asymmetry stems from differences in size, level of development and 
bargaining power between the two parties. The second aspect has been the 
continued erosion of privileged relations between Morocco and the European 
Union. Such erosion has been in fact unavoidable in light of the internai and 
external policy objectives of the EU, as well as the continued drive towards 
liberalization on a world-wide scale. 
The main objectives of the EU internai policies are to establish and deep-
en European integration. Two aspects of such a policy with particular impact 
on the relations with Morocco are "Green Europe" (the Common Agricultural 
Policy) and "Blue Europe" (the fishing policy). On the other hand, the EU's 
internai policy aims at enlarging the Union by extending membership to other 
countries. The EU has thus evolved from six to 15 member countries,10 and 
the tendency is for the Union ultimately to cover the whole of continental 
Europe. The enlargement of the European Union has made relatioris with 
Morocco ail the more difficult. By allowing some ofMorocco's trade rivais to 
become full EU members, the Union has raised its own self-sufficiency rate -
especially as regards agricultural products - and has thus accentuated the 
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asymmetry between the two partners. 
The EU's external policy has been increasingly marked by concerns over 
the intensification and harmonization of relations with its Mediterranean 
neighbors and those of Central and Eastern Europe. The proliferation of 
Association Agreements that were overtaken by Cooperation Agreements, 
and now by Free-Tracte Agreements has in fact trivialized the advantages and 
privileges that had at first benefited only a limited number of "associated" 
countries, including Morocco. 
The second element that has contributed to the erosion of the once-privi-
leged EU-Morocco relations is the globalization and liberalization of the 
world economy, an achievement sealed by the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round (UR). The UR Agreements have lead to the reduction of trade barriers 
and the extension of equal treatment in international exchanges, particularly 
concerning access to markets. What is of importance in as far as Morocco 
(and some other countries) is concerned is that the EU market will become 
more open and Jess preferential. Thus, any advantages the EU has extended to 
imports originating from Morocco and other associated countries - particu-
larly those industrial products benefiting from customs exemptions - will 
gradually disappear, as the margin of preference accorded to products origi-
nating from on the one hand countries that have concluded an Association 
Agreement with the EU and, on the other, those that have not, most notably 
Southeast Asian countries, is eroded. 
It is thus evident that the EU-Morocco Cooperation Agreement no longer 
fulfills Morocco's aspiration for privileged relations with the EU. The stakes 
at play are high, and they dictate the necessity to devise a new framework of 
cooperation between the two entities. 
What are the Stakes? 
The stakes underpinning negotiations with a view to the establishment of a 
new Association Agreement are very important at both the economic and 
geopolitical levels. What made the negotiations difficult is the fact that both 
parties differ in their assessment of these stakes. While for Morocco the aspi-
rations are mostly economic in nature, for the European Union they are both 
geopolitical and economic. 
The Stakes for Morocco 
The economic stakes for Morocco from privileged commercial relations with 
the EU are enonnous. The following indicators are revealing: 11 remittances 
from Moroccan nationals working in foreign countries represent the main 
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source of income as recorded in the country's balance of payments account 
(roughly US$ 2 billion in 1993), and over 90 percent of those remittances 
originate from Moroccan nationals residing in the EU. In addition, revenues 
from tourism are the second most important item on Morocco's balance of 
payments account (US$ 1.2 billion in 1993), and 80 percent of such revenues 
are brought in by EU citizens. Furthermore, 70 percent of ail foreign private 
investments made in Morocco originate in Europe. 12 In sum, the European 
Union is Morocco's single most important commercial partner, accounting for 
54 percent of Moroccan imports and 63 percent of exports in 1994. The fig-
ures are even higher if we consider some of Morocco's key exports - 83 per-
cent of finished products (representing over 29 percent of total exports), 
almost 94 percent of clothing and apparel products ( corresponding to 17 .6 per-
cent of exports), and over 75 percent of fresh fruits and vegetables (Table l ). 
Table 1: The Importance of Moroccan Exports to the EU 
by Major Product Group, 1994 (percentage) 
Food Products 
Fruits & Vegetables (not canned) 





Clothing & Apparel 
Total 
Share in Total Imports 
Coverage Ratio 
(Exports/Imports) % 
Source: BMCE ( 1995), Nos. 218-219. 
























The enhanced integration of the EU, its continued enlargement, and its 
evolving policy especially where it concerns the Mediterranean have posed 
formidable obstacles to Morocco's exports to the EU. The successful conclu-
sion of the Uruguay Round has made this situation even worse. In fact, the 
EU's offer to the GATI/WTO has created even larger barriers to lhe entry of 
Moroccan fruits and vegetables. Paradoxically, the changes in the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy that were undertaken to bring the latter into con-
formity with the Uruguay Round Agreements have made the EU agricultural 
The Free-Trade Area Between Morocco and the EU 319 
market more closed than ever before. "Tariff equivalents" have replaced 
"compensatory taxes" and, above ail, "entry prices" (minimum prices) to be 
applied ail year round have replaced "reference prices," which were only in 
force for a specified season during the year. The setting of so-called "entry 
prices" at high levels approaching Europe's even most marginal production 
lines may effectively bar the entry of Moroccan products. 13 This is what hap-
pened in the beginning of 1995 in the case of certain Moroccan vegetable 
exports, particularly tomatoes. 14 The same may happen in the case of citrus 
fruits with the application of the new regulations conceming fruits in early 
1996. Even agro-industrial products, which currently benefit from preferen-
tial conditions, will be subjected to customs duties at such high levels that 
they will no longer be competitive in the face of major competing products 
coming from Spain. That is what happened to Morocco's sardine exports 
starting in early May 1995. 15 
Over and above such immediate and tangible risks for a wide array of 
Moroccan exports to Europe, a much longer-term risk has started to take 
shape in a world economy marked by increased regionalization and global-
ization. That is the risk of marginalization faced by those small economics 
that fail to join the large dynamic regional blocs currently evolving in the 
world economy. 10 At stake here is a momentous strategic option. Morocco 
made its choice in 1984 by officially applying for membership in the 
European Union on the basis of economic and geopolitical reasons. 17 The 
same interests have permeated the proposed establishment of a permanent 
link with Europe through the Strait of Gibraltar (probably a tunnel), and the 
construction currently underway of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline. 
The Stakes for the European Union 
The stakes for the European Union are mostly geopolitical, since Morocco 
is only a small trading partner of the EU (indeed, the three main countries of 
the Maghreb - Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia - together account for Jess than 
one percent of the EU's total foreign trade). To be sure, some of Morocco's 
exports to the EU - most notably agricultural and fishing products - are far 
from negligible, but ail of them could easily be replaced with imports from 
other countries without any significant impact on prices. 
There are many other elements that shape EU's interests in Morocco. 
These relate to such issues as demography, culture, religion, strategic posi-
tion, as well as the fact that Morocco belongs at once to the Maghreb, to the 
Mediterranean Basin, to Africa, and to the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
However, in addition to the geopolitical elements, Morocco and other 
Mediterranean countries have also increased the economic stakes for the EU. 
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In the wake of the first "oil shock," the Euro-Arab dialogue was marked 
by the economic concerns of the European Economie Community. No com-
prehensive Mediterranean policy framework was elaborated. lndeed, during 
the decades of the l 960s and l 970s, the dialogue was limited to similar 
Association Agreements, followed by Cooperation Agreements signed with 
certain Mediterranean countries. lt was not until the l 990s that, in view of 
dramatic changes in the international context, the European Commission saw 
fit to design a "new Mediterranean policy," whereby it: 
... reiterates its conviction that the geographical proximity and the 
intensity of myriad links have tumed the stability and prosperity of 
DMCs (Developing Mediterranean Countries) into essential elements 
for the Community itself. The widening of social and economic gaps 
between the Community and the DMCs.would hardly be tolerable. 
Broadly speaking, the security of the Community is at stake. 18 
Likewise, the European Council of Heads of States and Governments con-
vening in Essen in December 1994 stated that "the Mediterranean represents 
an area of strategic importance for the European Union."'" 
At the economic level, the goal is to "establish a vast economic space 
encompassing geographic Europe and the Mediterranean"20 by means of a net-
work of agreements between the European Union and over 30 countries in its 
immediate neighborhood. The objective is to promote the integration of these 
countries in the European economy to varying degrees. In descending order of 
integration, one should note the "European Association Agreements" with ten 
countries in Central Europe, the "Customs Union Agreement" signed with 
Turkey, the "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements" with eight 
Mediterranean countries, and the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreements" 
with 12 countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The economic 
space envisioned through such Agreements will be shaped notably as a Euro-
Mediterranean Free-Trade Area.21 In a similar vein, a free-trade agreement is 
currently being negotiated between the EU and the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). Prospects for peace in the Middle East have 
opened up vast horizons for Europe's strategy, which is now faced only with the 
US strategy, since Middle Eastern countries lack their own strategy. Was itjust 
a coïncidence that the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona and 
the Second Middle East and North Africa Economie Summit held in Amman 
took place at roughly the same time, that is, in the Fall of 1995?22 
The Framework 
Negotiations have been difficult, perhaps even harder than those that led to 
the signing of the Agreements of 1969 and 1976. Exploratory meetings were 
The Free-Trade Area Between Morocco and the EU 321 
launched in 1992, followed by actual negotiations in early 1994. Morocco 
was the first country with which negotiations were started with a view to 
establishing the new "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements." 
Subsequently, similar negotiations were conducted with three other countries 
- Israel, Tunisia and Egypt, successively. Negotiations with Morocco were 
expected to be finalized by the end of 1995 in order to constitute the first 
series of such "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements". 23 A second 
series of Agreements will embrace four other countries (namely, Jordan, 
Algeria, Lebanon and Syria), but meetings remain at the exploratory stages.24 
This section will attempt to present the major features of the new Agreement. 
A New Type of Agreement 
The first thing one notices is the change in the title of the new generation of 
agreements. Indeed, the phrase "Association Agreements" dates back to the 
1969 Agreement. Apart from reciprocal advantages, however, these two types 
of Agreements have very little in common. Given the new regional and inter-
national context, the "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements" belong 
to a new generation of agreements concluded in a spirit of reciprocity but also 
of partnership, and not exclusively of assistance.'5 Having unlimited duration, 
they aim at establishing a free-trade regime, and they are not limited to the 
commercial domain. They go beyond economic and financial issues to 
encompass technical, cultural, social, political, and even ecological matters. 
In fact, as far back as April 1992, the EU's Council of Ministers made the 
decision to negotiate a new Agreement with Morocco on the basis of "four 
main pillars:" political dialogue; economic, technical and cultural cooperation 
covering ail fields of common interest to both parties; the progressive estab-
lishment of a free-trade area; and financial cooperation.'6 Moreover, this 
agreement was meant as the "first of a series of Euro-Maghreb Association 
Agreements"'1 as well as an example to other Maghreb countries.'" However, 
due to the difficulties encountered in the negotiations with Morocco, the first 
such "Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement" was signed with Tunisia 
on 17 July 1995 along the same principles. 
What the EU had proposed to Morocco seems to be "analogous with and 
as comprehensive as the European Association Agreements signed between 
the EU and Poland or Hungary, the only exception being the prospects for 
accession," which is restricted to European countries exclusively. 29 
The general aspects of the agreement are similar to those to be found in 
the Agreement between the EU and Tunisia.30 The Agreement includes com-
mitments in respect of : political discipline; free circulation of goods; rights 
of establishment; payments, movement of capital, competition pelicy and 
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other economic measures; economic and financial cooperation; and other gen-
eral measures. 
A Free-Trade Area 
The commercial track represents the centerpiece of the Agreement, around 
which other aspects of economic and financial cooperation are woven. It 
anticipates the progressive establishment - over a 12-year period - of a free-
trade area. 
There are differences in the treatment accorded to industrial products 
(which exclude agro-industrial and fishing products) and agricultural prod-
ucts, as well as between the pace of liberalization of the European and 
Moroccan markets so as to take into account differences in the development 
levels between the two parties. 
From the perspective of the EU, there has been confirmation of freedom 
of access in respect of industrial products - which already exists since the 
signing of the 1976 Cooperation Agreement - for Moroccan products through 
the exemption of customs duties and similar taxes. 
As for Morocco, immediately following the implementation of the pro-
posed Agreement, the country will no longer apply quantitative restrictions -
or any other equivalent measure - to imports from the EU. There are four dif-
ferent Iists of products, each of which will follow a specific lime-frame for the 
elimination of the customs and taxes of equivalent effects that apply to the 
importation of products of EU origin. The products contained in the first Iist 
will be liberalized upon entry into force of the Agreement; those in the second 
Iist in three years (including the elimination of reference prices that are 
applied to certain products in this Iist, notably textiles and clothing products); 
those in the third Iist between three to twelve years; and at the expiration of 
the transition period for products that are in the fourth Iist. 
Agricultural products and derivatives have been subjected to a lesser 
degree of Iiberalization. The label "agricultural products" encompasses agri-
cultural goods per se, the products of agricultural industries, and fishing 
products. The achievement in this sector has been Jess ambitious than in the 
case of industrial products, mainly as a result of the EU's CAP. The scheaule 
of concessions is partial and imprecise (indeed, vague), most strikingly in 
regard to its second phase. 
During a first phase, the Agreement will uphold the advantages already 
extended by the EU within the framework of the previous agreements, but 
with some minor adjustments and improvements. It includes: Iimited increas-
es in the volumes that are exempt of customs duties (three percent per year 
between 1997 and 2000) for certain fruits and vegetables (such as citrus fruits, 
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tomatoes, potatoes, orange juice, flowers); the partial extension to the whole 
Community market - which has evolved into a single market without internai 
borders - of those advantages embodied in the France-Morocco Protocol 
(Protocol 117); and exemption from customs duties within the framework of 
quotas for certain products that would not otherwise benefit from it under the 
current regime (such as canned and frozen vegetables). On the eve of the sec-
ond phase (that is, in the year 2000), the reciprocal Iiberalization of agricul-
tural exchanges will be examined. 
Financial, Economie and Technical Cooperation 
In the near future, the aid instruments of the new Mediterranean Policy and 
the current budgetary guidelines of the European Commission are to be main-
tained.31 Additional resources are made available in the medium term, partic-
ularly within the framework of the MEDA program. 32 A new balance in the 
policies of the EU - which has tilted excessively in favor of the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe - will entai) an increase in aid to Mediterranean 
countries.11 
Together with financial cooperation, Morocco considers economic and 
technical cooperation as key elements for the success of the free-trade area. 
Such cooperation is already quite significant. It will become even more 
important within the framework of the Agreement, which calls for eighteen 
different programs of action. They include, inter alia, support for the private 
sector, support for structural adjustment, and support for socio-economic pro-
grams.14 
Other Tracks 
The provision of services by nationals from the countries of one party in the 
territory of the other is allowed in most sectors. Service providers will be 
allowed to open branches, subsidiaries, and so forth , as well as to benefit 
from "national treatment" and to employ their own citizens in the case of key 
personnel. However, the lime frame for the implementation of these measures 
is not specified. 15 
The Agreement is limited mainly to the implementation of the social 
clauses embodied in the 1976 Cooperation Agreement, which have never been 
applied. Above ail, they call for non-discriminatory treatment regarding work 
conditions, remuneration and social protection for Moroccan immigrants 
residing in the European Union (which hosts 80 percent of ail Moroccan cit-
izens living abroad). Further, a social and cultural dialogue - also tied to 
immigration issues - is expected to take place. 
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ln addition, the Agreement includes systemic clauses which can be found 
in other free-trade agreements signed by the EU. These relate to nonns and 
standards, protection of intellectual propeny rights, competition rules, smug-
gling, and narcotics. Lastly, political dialogue has been institutionalized and 
reinforced at the executive and legislative levels as well as in civil society. 
Such is the current configuration of the future EU-Morocco Agreement. 
To be sure, obscure points, ambiguities and points of contention remain, but 
the negotiations currently underway are expected to settle them in due time. 
Potential Impact 
Sorne effects of the Agreement will be felt directly and in the near future, 
while others will take more time to materialize. Still, other effects - namely 
the dynamic ones, which are the most interesting and most promising for 
Morocco's future development - will depend not only on the liberalization of 
commercial exchanges, but also on a host of other factors, such as foreign 
investment and follow-up policies. 
To date, no comprehensive studies have been undertaken in order to assess 
the ultimate impact of the Agreement. Hence, this section will limit itself to a 
tentative analysis of the likely effects. The latter are comprised of general 
effects; those bearing on public finance; and those related to the various sec-
tors of economic activity. 
Macroeconomic Effects 
The establishment of a free-trade area with the EU is likely to add a great deal 
of dynamism to the Moroccan economy and raise its growth rate due to a 
combination of several factors, among which one should note: 
• The creation of an atmosphere of confidence in the Moroccan economy, a 
sort of insurance, the consolidation of the achievements of structural adjust-
ment and liberalization - such as accession to GATT in 1987, which led to the 
strengthening of the country's trade regime. In other words, it will act as a 
guarantee for the future of the Moroccan economy as it becomes tied to the 
largest market in the world. 
• The growth of foreign private investment, notably from Europe, which 
already accounts for the bulk of investment in Morocco. The one and a half 
million Moroccans living in Europe would participate in this trend, and would 
thus be encouraged by the birth of a new economic space to help boost busi-
ness links with Morocco by bringing in their savings and their expertise. 
• The promotion of competition in the domestic market and, as a result, the 
creation of a more competitive economy for exports. 
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• The encouragement of technical progress, research and training, boosted 
by the new dynamics and by the strengthening of econornic, technical and cul-
tural cooperation within the framework of the new Association Agreement. 
In conjunction with these clearly positive effects, other developments are 
likely to have mixed effects. First, by reducing and later eliminating tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers as well as by enhancing competition, the free-trade 
area will exert downward pressure on domestic prices. That is only truc for 
manufactured goods. For agricultural products, two other factors will act in an 
opposite direction: the high level of European prices and the reduction of sub-
sidies, notably for exports, caused by the Uruguay Round will likely exert 
upward pressure on the prices of agricultural products. 
The second impact will affect labor. By reinvigorating economic activity, 
particularly in labor-intensive sectors where Morocco has a comparative 
advantage, the free-trade agreement may help solve the country's unemploy-
ment problem, especially in the case of women, who constitute an economi-
cally active group with one of the highest unemployment rates in the econo-
my.36 By the same token, free trade may increase unemployment in other 
occupational categories, by creating difficulties in certain branches of eco-
nomic activity or by leading to the bankruptcy of non-perfonning companies. 
The net global impact on Morocco's labor force - much like the regional 
impact - will depend on the respective intensity of these two opposite effects 
as well as on restructuring and retraining policies. 
Impact on Public Finances 
The implementation of a free-trade area will lead to immediate and significant 
losses in budget revenues. Such losses will increase progressively, reaching 
more than six percent at the end of the first five-year phase. By the end of the 
12-year transitional period, these losses will have reached over two-thirds of 
customs revenues - that is, more than 13 percent of all budget revenues - and 
will represent over three percent of Morocco's GDP.37 Likewise, the eventual 
increase in the prices of imported agricultural goods may lead to increases in 
budget expenditures eannarked for consumption subsidies.38 
These two negative effects could be partially offset, in the medium tenn, 
by an increase in domestic fiscal revenues through the acceleration of eco-
nomic growth. Nevertheless, the net effect will certainly be overwhelmingly 
negative for quite a long time. Hence, compensation mechanisms must be 
sought, notably through the sort of financial cooperation called for in the 
Association Agreement, in order to avoid jeopardizing the hard-won achieve-
ments of Morocco's structural adjustment program.39 
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Impact on Industry 
lndustry is the sector where the impact of the free-trade area will be felt from 
the very beginning. Also, it is the sector where the potential dynamic effects 
are the largest. Given the framework of Morocco's structural adjustment pro-
gram, industry has undergone dramatic changes in the course of the past 
decade, mostly as a result of reforms in the incenti ve system and sharp reduc-
tions in tariff and non-tariff protection.40 To be sure, these changes give 
Moroccan industry an edge in terms of its trading opportunities with Europe. 
Added to that is Morocco's commitment, within the framework of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements, to apply a tariff ceiling of 40 percent to manu-
factured goods.41 
Table 2: lndustrial Sector: Sorne lndicators of Size 
and Competitiveness, 1980-91 
Number of Enterprises 
Value Added (1985 prices)1 
Employment (thousand) 
Value Added per Worker2 
Real Wage Level2 
Export/Output 
Output/ Absorption3 
lm ports/ Absorption 
Ex ports/lm ports 
'Millions of 1985 Dirhams; 
7 Thousands of 1985 Dirhams: 
'Absorption = Output + lmports - Exports 





















Between 1980 and 1991 the number of industrial enterprises and their 
value added at constant prices have more than doubled, while employment 
has grown at a slower pace (Table 2). Thus, the value added per worker has 
increased. In addition, since real wages have declined, the unit cost of labor 
has declined even more, but that has not improved Morocco's competitiveness 
relative to countries with lower wage levels and/or higher productivity.42 
By the same token, the ratio of exports to domestic production has ri sen. 
The same has happened to both the ratio of domestic production to absorption, 
and the coverage ratio of industrial imports by exports. These trends 
combined show a more focused orientation towards exports and higher 
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competitiveness. At the same time, however, the domestic market has become 
more open to foreign goods due to increases in the ratio of imports to absorp-
tion. 
The impact of the free-trade area on Morocco's industrial sector may be 
better understood through exports and imports of manufactured products. On 
the export front, Morocco's industrial goods43 already benefit from customs 
exemptions in the European Union, which explains their concentration in this 
market even before the signing of the free-trade agreement. The distribution 
of Morocco's exports that are destined to the EU varies from sector to sector, 
anywhere between 36 percent and 94 percent (Table 3). However, Morocco's 
industrial goods seldom account for more than one percent of the European 
market. 
Table 3: The Shares of Exports of Moroccan Industries to 
the EU Market (percentage) 
Export/ Share of Morocco's 
Output to the EU Share of EU 
Market 
Sector (1990) (1988) (1990) 
Food Industries 78 1.2 
Other Food Industries 25 38 0.5 
Beverages & Tobacco 72 0.9 
Textiles and Clothing 30 70 1.1 
Clothing and Apparel 85 94 1.4 
Leather/Leather Shoes 44 71 1.1 
Wood/Wood Products 20 62 0.9 
Paper/Cardboard 14 60 1.0 
Minerai Products 2 36 0.6 
Metallic Industries 16 62 1.0 
Meta) Works 2 46 0.7 
Equipment M"aterial 42 0.8 
Transport Equipment 1 1 64 0.8 
Electrical Equipment 16 78 1.3 
Office Equip/Precision Inst. 5 51 0.8 
Chemical Products 41 41 0.6 
Rubber/Plastic Goods 5 58 0.9 
Other Industries 9 73 1.1 
Source: Ministry of lndustry and Trade and World Bank. Cited in Jaidi (1995 ). p.151. 
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Does that mean that the prospects for Moroccan exports will be enhanced 
by the free-trade agreement? The actual situation is quite the opposite, most-
ly because of the Uruguay Round Agreements and the ensuing erosion of 
trade preferences previously enjoyed by Moroccan products. Textiles, which 
represent 40 percent of Morocco's industrial exports44 and have a good sales 
perfonnance in the European market, risk being adversely affected by the dis-
mantling - over a period of ten years - of the Multi-Fiber Agreement and the 
graduai reduction of European tariff protection. That is what led analysts to 
estimate that GATT 1994 will spell losses for Morocco, in the order of one 
percent of its GDP. 4' 
Hope is now centered around the export potential that could be mobilized 
due to increased competition and the actions undertaken by the Euro-Morocco 
partnership. Because of its potential for trade creation, the latter could com-
pensate for the trade diversionary effects Of the Uruguay Round. 
As for imports, the freedom of access that European manufactured goods 
will enjoy in the Moroccan market as a result of the free-trade agreement, 
albeit graduai, will pose a fonnidable challenge to Morocco's industry. But 
the situation varies from sector to sector, as indicated by differences in tariff 
protection rates and import penetration ratios (Table 4). 
The tariff protection rates vary from 24 percent for chemical and para-
chemical products to 57.5 percent for apparel, rubber and plastic goods. 
Added to that is the rate of quantitative protection. The fraction of production 
subject to quantitative restrictions shows a great deal of variance: 5 percent 
for non-electrical machinery; 12 percent for rubber products; 20 percent for 
transport materials; 46-47 percent for textiles and clothing; and 84 percent for 
shoes.46 
The import penetration ratio also shows variation: 3 percent for clothing; 
21 percent for leather and leather shoes; 38 percent for textiles and clothing 
products; 52 percent for transport materials; 66 percent for equipment mater-
ial; and 87 percent for other manufacturing industries (Table 4). 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade has divided Moroccan industrial sec-
tors into four groups on the basis of their degree of protection and their com-
petitiveness.47 One could classify them in ascending order of responsiveness 
to free trade as such: 
• Competitive industries enjoying little protection, such as the fertilizer indus-
try and certain agro-industrial products (for instance, wine and canned citrus 
fruits). Free trade would not pose any problem for these products. 
• Competitive industries enjoying a high degree of protection, such as yarns, 
shoes (both leather and plastic), electrical material, metal works, basic metallur-
gy, and beverages. In these cases, protection could be reduced with little damage. 
The Free-Trade Area Between Morocco and the EU 329 
• Non-competitive industries enjoying Iittle protection, mostly those sectors 
that manufacture intermediate goods, such as iron, glass products, textiles for 
clothing products and fine wheat tlour. The effects of free trade would be 
noticeable yet far from excessive. 
• Non-competitive industries enjoying a high degree of protection, such as 
cheeses, paper and cardboard paper, skins, vehicle frames and assembly, and 
bolts and screws. Here, protection can hardly be justified. These industries 
would be the most adversely affected in the event of the creation of a free-
trade area. 
lt is estimated in official circles that roughly 40 percent of Morocco's 
industries are competitive and export-oriented; about 20 percent have the 
potential to become competitive and need specific assistance in this regard; 
and the remaining 40 percent amount to non-competitive industries turned to 
the domestic market and highly protected. 48 
Table 4: Protection Rates and Import Penetration Ratios of 
Moroccan Industrial Sectors (percentage) 
Tariff Pen et ration 
Sector Rate Ratio1 
Food Industries 40.7 4 
Other Food Industries 50.6 12 
Beverages and Tobacco 49.5 8 
Textiles and Clothing 50.0 38 
Clothing and Apparel 57.5 3 
Leather/Leather Shoes 46.5 21 
Wood/Wood Products na 42 
Paper/Cardboard 50.5 17 
Minerai Products 25.5 9 
Metallic Industries 44.6 53 
Meta) Works 4:'i.9 18 
Equipment Material 44.4 66 
Transport Equipment 49.2 52 
Electrical Equipment 44.4 43 
Office Equip./Precision Inst. na 84 
Chemical Products 24.0 30 
Rubber/Plastic Goods 57.5 -22 
Other Industries na 87 
1 lmports!Absorption 
n.a: not available 
Source: Ministry of lndustry and Trade. Cited in Jaidi ( 1995), p. 156. 
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Impact on Agriculture 
Agriculture is a much more vulnerable sector than industry. Progress towards 
free trade in agricultural goods has been very limited so far. Regarding 
imports, the impact of the free-trade area on agriculture is now only hypo-
thetical. It is on the export front where problems arise. 
lndeed, as regards exports, 28 percent of trade revenues are at stake (Table 
1). In Morocco, agricultural activities directed towards the export market 
employ 500,000 people and provide for the livelihood of three million people 
concentrated in specific regions. The horticultural sector for export - which is 
under particular threat because of the EU proposai to GATT - employs over 
25 percent of agricultural manpower and accounts - fresh and industrialized 
goods alike - for 80 percent of Morocco's agricultural exports, of which the 
main market is the EU (78 percent).49 
On the import front, no significant liberalization is being expected during 
the first phase of the transitional period. Even though there has been a certain 
degree of rationalization of agricultural policies throughout the decade of 
structural adjustment, agriculture was less affected by liberalization than 
industry in Morocco. lndeed, the liberalization of imports and of prices of 
basic agricultural goods and their derivatives (such as sugar, cereals, oil seeds 
and oils) has been called off for the third time in 18 months. It was finally 
agreed in May 1996.50 Negotiations on agricultural issues were more difficult. 
owing to the complexity of the sector as well as important ramifications at the 
economic and social levels. Moreover, the consolidation of Morocco's tariff 
ceilings for agricultural products within the framework of the Uruguay Round 
took place at a very high level (289 percent), whereas the maximum tariff was 
much lower beforehand (45 percent). 51 
Future negotiations with the EU regarding free tracte should take into 
account the degree of sensitivity of agricultural products. The latter could be 
subdivided into three categories. The first one - agricultural inputs - could be 
liberalized quite soon. The second category - products other than basic goods 
- could be the subject of a graduai liberalization of imports, after an initial 
transition phase. Lastly, the third category and the most vulnerable one - basic 
foodstuff - could conceivably be liberalized at the last stage, and after a tran-
sitional period. 
Impact on Services 
The establishment of a free-trade area between Morocco and the EU would also 
have a considerable impact on the development of services in Morocco, partic-
ularly tourism, international transport, financial services (banks, insurance 
companies, stock markets), and so forth. In this regard, it is important to note 
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that Morocco has already proceeded, within its commitments in the Uruguay 
Round, to liberalize exchanges in a number of services, such as telecommuni-
cations, construction and engineering, environmental services, business, bank-
ing, insurance companies, tourism, as well as air and sea transport. 52 
Conclusions 
Privileged relations between Morocco and the European Union date back to 
the latter's creation, in its original form, with the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome. Such relations have evolved and gone through various phases: "asso-
ciation," "cooperation," and in the present a new mode of association whose 
principal element is the establishment of a free-trade area. Negotiations have 
always been long and difficult, but they have also invariably been successful-
ly concluded. This is explained by the stakes involved and the expected ben-
efits. Apart from these, the last phases of negotiations are particularly impor-
tant because of their strategic implications for the EU, for Morocco, and for 
the region as a whole. 
In as far as the EU is concemed, the Agreement with Morocco falls with-
in a strategic framework whose goal is to create a "vast economic space" cov-
ering Europe and the Mediterranean through a network of agreements that has 
the EU as its fulcrum. The Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area is expected to 
be established by the year 2010. In addition toits agreements with each indi-
vidual country, the EU has encouraged Mediterranean countries to establish 
agreements with each other as well. 53 
For Morocco, the free-trade area with the EU is the capstone of a strategic 
choice - that of consolidating the country's ties with Europe. 54 In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning that the project revolving around a "medium-term 
strategic program" stipulated the application of the Agreement with the EU 
starting in 1996.55 
For the region as a whole, the proliferation of Euro-Mediterranean associ-
ation agreements - eight already signed, with four Agreements that were 
scheduled to be signed in 1995 and four others at a later stage, in addition to 
the Customs Union Agreement signed with Turkey - heralds the triumph of 
Europe's strategic vision. Even though the EU has encouraged horizontal 
cooperation, as exemplified by the South Mediterranean free-trade 
Agreements, future exchanges are likely to be dominated by vertical integra-
tion in view of two factors: the gaps in levels of development and the absence 
of a regional strategic vision on the part of Middle East and North African 
(MENA) countries. Indeed, the only limit to Europe's strategic vision would 
be the existence of another "vision" for the MENA region, one which has 
begun to surface at the MENA Economie Summits. 
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Notes 
1 Cited in Mellah 1974, pp. 64-65. 
2 The only products excluded, with some exceptions, were finished goods. See 
Hamdouch 1983, p. 198. 
3 Cited in Mellah 1974, p. 61. 
4 See Oualalou 1980, p. 60, and Mellah 1974, p. 164. 
5 Ali other fruits and vegetables are thus excluded. 
6 With the exception of tuna, which is subjected to quota restrictions in France. 
7 The Algeciras Act of 1906 instituted the "open door" regime in Morocco. Above 
ail, it stipulated equal treatment for imports coming from the major industrial pow-
ers Hamdouch 1983, p. 24. 
8 Between the signing of the Association Agreement and that of the Cooperation 
Agreement, the European Community grew from six to nine members with the 
accession of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973. 
9 Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. This is refered to as the "second 
enlargement." 
10 After the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria in early 1995. 
11 Office des Changes 1993, and the Moroccan Bank of Foreign Trade 1995. 
12 For the first eleven months in 1994, see European Union 1995b. Total foreign pri-
vate investments amounted to US$ 590 million in 1993. See Office des Changes 
1993. 
13 Sasson 1994, p. 55. 
14 The situation was resolved by the adoption of a quota of 130,000 tons which was 
nonetheless clearly insufficient. See European Union 1995a, p. 4. 
15 Because of the cancelling of negotiations towards the renewal of the Fishing 
Agreement between Morocco and the European Union. ·See La Vie Economique, 
21 July 1995. 
16 Hamdouch 1995. 
17 The request was reiterated during the visit of the new French President to Morocco 
in July 1995. 
18 Le Monde Dossiers et Documents 1995, p. 2. 
19 European Union l 995a, p. 1. 
20 European Union 1995b, p. 1 and supplement. 
21 Ibid. 
22 The Amman Summit in October 1995 and the Barcelona Conference in November 
1995. 
23 Negotiations were started with Morocco on 14 February 1994, with Israel on 21 
February 1994, and with Tunisia on 23 January 1995. See European Union l 995b, 
supplement, and European Union 1995c,p.3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 The expression used in 1992 was "Partnership Agreement," but the European 
Union later changed it. See Alaoui 1994, pp. 79-83. 
26 Le Matin du Sahara, 17 March 1994, pp. 1-3. 
27 Project of negotiation guidelines adopted by the European Commission in 
December 1992. See Alaoui 1994, p. 83. 
28 Ibid. 
29 European Union 1995c, p. 1. 
30 See L'Economiste Maghrebin 1995, No. 132, and Realites 1995, No. 498. 
31 Memorandum presented by Morocco to the EU on 14 February 1994. In Le Matin 
du Sahara, 17 March 1994, p. 3. 
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32 European Union 1992. 
33 l'Economiste Maghrebin 1995, No. 132, p. 18, and European Union 1995a, sup-
plement 1996 and 1997: almost 5 billion ECUs (1 ECU = US$ 1.2) for the period 
1995-1999 which are earmarked to 12 Mediterranean countries (of which 450 mil-
lion ECUs for Morocco for the period 1996-1998) against 7 billion ECUs that have 
budgeted for East European countries. 
34 European Union l 995d, 1996 and 1997. 
35 With the exception of the transport sector. The right of establishment of natural 
persons and liberal professions was excluded. 
36 The rate of female unemployment in Morocco's urban centers is 25 percent, com-
pared to an overall rate of 16 percent for the total urban labor force. See Direction 
de la Statistique 1992. 
37 Customs revenues represent nearly 20 percent of budget revenues, of which two-
thirds (that is, roughly US$800 million, or 3.3 percent of Morocco's GDP) are 
accounted for by European product. Over 80 percent of these products are manu-
factured goods, of which 40 percent will be exempted from customs duties at the 
start of the first phase of the Agreement. See Le Matin du Sahara, 17 March 1994, 
BMCE 1995, No. 218, and Direction de la Statistique 1994. 
38 Subsidies for consumption goods have declined considerably in the course of the 
structural adjustment program. They have gone from 3.2 percent of Morocco's 
GDP in 1982 to less than O. 7 percent in 1992. However, they have recently 
increased again, reaching 1.1 percent of GDP in 1994. See Bank Al-Maghrib 1993, 
1994. 
39 Hamdouch 1990, 1995. 
40 Hamdouch 1990. Maximum import duties have decreased from 400 percent to 35 
percent, and quantitative restrictions are now only applied to less than ten percent 
of Morocco's industrial production. 
41 Zarrouk 1995, p. 32. 
42 In 1991, Indonesia, China and Malaysia had lower salaries and, above ail, much 
higher value added per worker in the sectors of textiles, clothing and shoes. Even 
countries with higher salaries, such as Tunisia and Turkey, have lower unit labor 
costs due to a greater differential in productivity. See Diwan 1995, Table 13. 
43 With the exception of agro-industrial products, which are treated in conjunction 
with agricultural goods. 
44 Ministry of Industry and Commerce 1994. 
45 Fontagne and Peridy 1995, p. 711. 
46 World Bank Report on lndustrial Development 1992, cited in Jaidi 1995, p. 155. 
47 Ministry of Industry and Commerce 1993. 
48 Jaidi 1995, p. 157 and Ministry of Industry and Trade 1996, p. 33. 
49 Le Matin du Sahara, 17 March 1994, p. 3. The agricultural sector is very impor-
tant in Morocco, employing 40 percent of the economically active population and 
accounting for nearly 20 percent of the country's GDP. 
50 l'Economiste 1995, No. 187; and 1996, No. 232, and la Vie Economique 1995, 
No. 3824; 1996, No. 3866; and 1996 No. 3898. 
51 Zarrouk 1995, p. 32. 
52 Ibid., p. 33. 
53 European Union l 995a, l 995b, l 995c. 
54 Hamdouch 1995. 
55 l'Economiste 1995, No. 193, 17 August. 
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Central, East European, Baltic and Turkish 
Economies: A View to Future Membership in the EU* 
Introduction 
Major changes have affected the future of European Union (EU) during the 
last six years. Six years ago, the future of the EU seemed set: a graduai deep-
ening towards real and monetary union. The breakdown of communism radi-
cally shifted the challenge from deepening to widening. First to corne were 
the countries of the EFTA (Europe Free Trade Association). Their member-
ship applications were a logical step. Since January 1, 1995 these countries 
have participated in the decision making process of the EU. Added to this list 
are the potential applicants from the Central European Economies: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. These countries may in 
fact have a solid claim to EU membership. Ali of them have signed 
Association Agreements with EU, but no timetable for accession has been 
offered. The next group of potential applicants consist of Bulgaria and 
Romania. These countries, which have also signed Association Agreements 
with the EU, have some way to go in policy refonns before becoming viable 
candidates. The third group of countries are the Baltic countries: Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. In addition, there are countries such as Slovenia which 
has indicated its desire to accede to the EU, and Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine whose potential membership is highly uncertain. Finally, we have the 
Mediterranean applicants consisting of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. 
The chapter presents a comparative study of the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), the Baltics and Turkey, and analyses the implications 
of an enlarged EU that includes countries in CEE, the Baltic countries and 
Turkey. The next section compares these economies, particularly in relation to 
their trade policies and the trade agreements they have concluded with the 
EU. This is followed by aspects related to Turkey-EU Customs Union 
Decision (CUD) and the Europe Agreements (EA). The chapter then turns to 
consideration of the potential for trade creation between the EU, CEE, the 
Bal tics and Turkey. The final section discusses the potential accession of these 
countries to the EU. 
*!am r.ratefu/ to Be mu rd Hoek11um for com111e11ts on m1 eurlier draft of thü chupter. Ali errors 
ure of course mine. 
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The Fundamentals 
The economies of the EU, CEE, the Baltics and Turkey are at different stages 
of development. The EU countries are déveloped economies. Turkey is a mid-
dle income, free market economy with a relatively large public sector. On the 
other hand, the CEE and the Baltic economies are since 1989 in the process 
of transition from centrally planned to free market economies, and they face 
ail of the associated difficulties. 
Table 1 provides basic data on the economies under consideration. Per 
capita income is lowest in Romania, followed by Bulgaria, Lithuania, Slovak 
Republic, Latvia, Turkey, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Slovenia. Turkey's per capita income lies between that of Poland and Latvia, 
and is higher than that of the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Bulgaria and 
Romania. This ordering changes if one examines per capita incomes calculat-
ed on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP). The poorest country is again 
Romania, though now it is followed by Lithuania, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, 
Latvia, Hungary, Slovak Republic, Estonia and Czech Republic. No figures 
are reported for Slovenia. Thus, in PPP terms, the Czech Republic is the rich-
est, and Turkish per capita income lies between that of Lithuania and 
Bulgaria. 
In 1993, the exports (imports) of CEE-4 countries amounted to $ 41.3 
(51.3) billion, those of the CEE-6 countries to $ 50.2 (61.9) billion, and those 
of Turkey to $ 18.1 (23.3) billion. Examination of the structure of production 
reveals that in Lithuania, the agricultural sector contributed 23 percent to the 
country's 1993 gross domestic product (GDP) The share of agriculture in 
Turkey's GDP during the same year was 15 percent, 16 percent in Latvia, 13 
percent in Bulgaria and 11 percent in Estonia. In ail of the remaining coun-
tries excluding Greece, the share of agriculture was Jess than 8 percent. 
During the period since the implementation of market oriented economic 
reforms, output in the region has declined sharply. Recently, output has start-
ed to stabilize. During 1993, output increased in Poland and Slovenia, and 
during 1994 it increased in ail of the transition economies. In ail the countries 
under consideration, inflation in 1994 did not exceed two digit figures except 
in Turkey where inflation reached a high of 106 percent. Inflation during ·1994 
was running at an annual rate of IO percent in the Czech Republic, 19 percent 
in Hungary and 32 percent in Poland (IMF, 1995a). By 1995 ail countries 
under investigation were under stand-by agreements with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, it should be noted that the rate of population 
growth in ail the countries under consideration is relatively low, save in the 
case of Turkey. 
Table 1: Basic Data on CEE, EU and Turkish Economies 1 () "' ;:s 
ppp Share of Average Estimated â .--
1993 1993 1993 Estimate of 1993 1993 Agricultural Real GDP Average Population 
~ Population GDP Area GNP/Pop GNP/Pop Exports lm ports Value Added ln Growth Rate lnnation Rate Growth Rate 





Czech Republic 10.3 31.61 79 2,710 7,550 12.93 13.49 5.3 -5.7 25.2 0.1 '"r;:i "' Hungary 10.2 38.10 93 3,350 6,050 8.89 12.60 7.7 -3.4 24.6 -0.4 ~
Po land 38.3 85.85 313 2,260 5,000 14.00 18.83 7.0 1.4 45.2 0.2 
_;:s 
Slovak Republic 5.3 11.08 49 1,950 6,290 5.45 6.35 6.4 -5.9 26.6 0.4 i:x, e.. 
CEE-4 64.1 166.64 534 2,574 5,810 41.26 51.26 6.8 -1.5 35.5 0.1 ~· 
Bulgaria 8.9 10.37 111 1,140 4,100 4.07 4.24 12.8 -5.0 146.1 -0.5 ~ 
Romania 22.8 25.97 238 1,140 2,800 4.89 6.40 20.9 -4.2 191, 1 -0.1 ;:s l:l.. 
CEE-6 95.8 202.98 883 2,317 5,337 50.23 61.91 8.9 -2.0 61.0 0.0 ~ 
Jlormer Yugoslavia * Slovenia 1.9 10.34 20 6,490 -- 6.09 6.50 5.1 3.2 26.1 0.1 r;;· ;::.-
Bal tic Countries ~ 
fatonia 1.6 5.09 45 3,080 6,502 0.46 0.62 11.1 -7.5 354.1 -0.5 c 
Lat via 2.6 4.60 65 2,010 5,010 0.46 0.34 15.7 -14.8 305.1 -0.8 
;:s 
c 
Lithuania 3.7 4.34 65 1,320 3,110 0.70 0.49 22.6 -23.1 431.9 -0.1 3 
Baltic Countries 7.9 14.03 175 2,185 4,964 1.62 1.44 16.5 -14.7 362.1 -0.4 ;:;;· "" European Union 
Au stria 7.9 182.07 84 23,510 19,430 40.17 48.58 2.7 1.9 -- 0.5 
Belgium 10.0 210.58 31 21,650 19,640 112.51 125.06 1.8 0.8 2.5 0.3 
Den mark 5.2 117.59 43 26,730 19,560 35.91 29.52 3.1 1.8 2.0 0.1 
Fin land 5.1 74.12 338 19,300 15,530 23.45 18.03 2.4 -2.1 -- 0.4 
France 57.5 1,251.69 552 22,490 19,000 206.26 202.27 2.6 0.8 2.3 0.4 
German y 80.7 1,910.76 357 23,560 16,850 380.15 348.63 1.0 1.7 3.5 0.2 
Grcece 10.4 63.24 132 7,390 9,000 7.96 20.54 12.5 1.2 14.3 0.3 
lreland 3.5 42.96 70 13,000 13,490 28.61 21.39 6.6 3.5 2.4 0.3 
ltaly 57.1 991.39 301 19,840 17,830 168.46 146.79 3.2 0.7 5.3 0.0 1 
....., ....., 
'O 
Table 1: Continued 
ppp Share of Average 
1993 1993 1993 Estimate of 1993 1993 Agricultural Real GDP Average 
Population GDP Area GNP/Pop ofGNP/Pop Ex ports lm ports Value Added ln Growth Rate Inflation Rate 
(million) ($ billion) (1000 Km2) ($) (1993,$) ($billion) ($billion) GDP(%) 1991-94 1991-94 
Luxembourg 0.4 14.78 3 37,320 29,510 -- -- 1.2 1.7 3.1 
Netherlands 15.3 309.23 37 20,950 17,330 139.08 126.56 3.6 1.3 2.7 
Ponugal 9.8 85.67 92 9,130 10,710 15.43 24.60 3.5 0.8 8.3 
Spain 39.5 478.58 505 13,590 13,510 62.87 78.63 3.5 0.8 5.7 
Sweden 8.7 166.75 450 24,740 17,200 49.86 42.68 0.6 -0.8 --
United Kingdom 57.9 819.04 245 18,060 17,210 180.58 206.32 2.0 0.4 4.8 
EU-12 369.0 6,718.43 3,240 19,685 17,276 1,451.30 1,439.59 2.4 1.1 4.1 
Turke;r 59.5 132.30 779 2,184 3,920 18.11 23.27 15.4 2.3 77.1 
Source: World Development Report 1995, World Bank; various i.uues of the "Economist lntelligenc Unit Country Reports" on CEE economies; 
OECD in Figurn. 1994 edition, OECD; various issues of European Economy, and Wor/d Economie Outlook, Oct 1995 /MF. 
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During the last five years, ail of the CEE and Baltic countries have made sub-
stantial progress in structural reform. In particular, prices in these countries 
are now largely determined by market forces. Privatization has proceeded 
rapidly in ail of the countries except in the cases of Romania, Bulgaria and 
Slovenia. The share of the private sector in GDP in the Czech Republic has 
increased from 3 percent in 1989 to 65 percent in 1994 and from 3 percent in 
1989 to 40 percent in 1994 in Bulgaria. By 1994, more than half of GDP was 
generated in most of the countries by the private sector. In comparison, one 
should note that the share of state owned enterprises in total value-added in 
the Turkish economy was 10.6 percent in 1990. 1 
The transition economies still need to achieve macroeconomic stability, 
reduce economic distortions and free resources for productive activity. The 
countries will then be on course for a sustainable economic growth. In the 
meantime, there is much to be done in order to make the economy more 
responsive to market forces. To this end, the countries have to foster compe-
tition. It is recognized that opening up to international trade would be the most 
effective mean to instill competition in the economy. 
Table 2 shows the direction of trade of the countries under investigation 
during the years 1988 and 1994 and Table 3 presents the commodity compo-
sition. The following aspects are worth noting: 
• The European Union has emerged to become the single most important 
trading partner for ail of the CEE countries and Turkey during the period 
1988-1994. 
• Germany is the single most important trading partner within the EU for the 
CEE countries. 
• Trade among the CEE countries has decreased during the period 1988-
1994. 
• Trade between CEE countries and the former Soviet Union has decreased 
substantially over the period 1988-1994. 
• Textiles and clothing goods are the most important export items of Turkey, 
CEE and the Baltic countries to the EU. 




during 1988 and 1994 N 
Partner Group Bulgaria Bulgaria Czech Czech Estonia Hungary Hungary Latavia Lithuania Poland Poland Romania Romania Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Turkey 
Rep. 
1988 1994 1988 1994 1994 1988 1994 1994 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994 1988 1994 
TOTAL 
EXPORTS 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
EU-15 19.13 48.36 29.84 59.39 49.23 30.34 60.67 39.33 30.11 35.85 69.21 29.23 48.21 47.84 65.54 45.66 47.69 
German y 5.63 14.01 15.11 34.74 7.56 10.91 28.04 I0.52 11.43 12.89 35.67 9.37 16.04 25.07 30.26 18.28 21.73 
Austria 0.85 1.90 4.23 7.03 0.14 5.70 9.90 2.12 0.30 3.02 2.20 1.67 1.57 6.71 5.48 1.53 1.38 
Finland 0.37 4.74 0.70 2.41 0.61 0.93 3.34 1.42 1.18 1.40 4.00 0.11 5.13 2.33 8.59 0.15 0.17 
CEE& Baltic 
Countries and 
Slovenia 31.71 5.11 16.80 24.75 13.49 11.70 7.04 10.82 18.14 11.60 5.27 12.80 6.27 43.28 4.89 1.80 4.00 
Former Soviet 
Union na 10.79 34.20 4.90 29.35 27.70 14.63 36.80 46.67 24.30 8.27 24.40 6.25 3.83 4.63 2.30 7.80 
Turkey 0.47 3.67 0.56 0.41 0.19 1.04 0.38 0.10 0.20 0.74 0.20 2.10 4.09 0.30 0.12 
TOTAL 
IMPORTS 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
EU-15 36.42 45.35 33.30 63.99 63.62 34.67 56.35 40.66 32.21 33.89 65.31 7.08 48.18 43.14 68.42 42.88 46.91 
German y 16.75 14.24 17.70 35.09 9.64 13.90 23.56 13.61 13.75 13.00 27.47 2.50 17.96 21.43 23.55 14.30 15.67 
Austria 3.69 2.50 5.30 7.40 0.54 7.20 10.51 0.72 0.62 4.30 2.57 0.80 2.74 6.70 10.27 1.50 0.91 




Slovania 19.33 5.30 16.80 17.73 5.48 12.30 6.03 12.88 11.66 12.00 4.39 17.60 5.12 33.04 6.79 2.80 3.10 ::::: 
Former Soviet ~ 
Union na 24.48 31.40 10.31 21.53 25.10 22.96 30.35 50.29 28.20 9.32 35.40 17.89 12.50 2.24 3.10 7.80 ~ Turkey 0.53 1.80 0.34 0.28 0.03 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.08 0.44 0.43 0.44 2.12 0.08 0.29 -- --
~ 
Note: Trade durinR 1988 between each of the CEE countries and "CEE & Ba/tic Countries and S/ovenia ·· refers on/y to trade between those countries and CEE countries. OQ t:l 
Source: Direction o(Trade Statistics, /MF, 1995. ;:: 
Table 3: Commodity Composition Of Exports and lmports of CEE 1 ("') ~ 
;:::: 
::; 
Exports Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia Turkey $::, :-
SITC COMMODITY t'?1 $::, 
~ 
0-08+4 I +42 Food 8.35 2.67 5.67 12.71 1.22 3.76 8.52 3.16 1.64 2.02 17.45 t'?1 
2 1 Beverages and Tobacco 4.51 0.50 0.07 0.58 0.05 o.m 0.09 0.38 0.18 0.02 :::: 1.45 è:1 
3 08+22 + 43 Other Food Items 1.10 0.64 0.78 1.73 0.05 0.63 0.43 0.23 0.13 0.51 0.18 '"1:::l ~ 
4 2-22-27-28 Agricultural Raw Materials 4.36 4.30 14.18 2.93 16.79 6.22 3.78 1.68 2.07 3.01 2.37 
$::, 
,;:: 
5 27+28 Crude Fertilizers and tx:i 
Metallic Ferrous Ore 3.63 2.65 9.93 1.96 5.57 11.07 1.64 0.97 0.40 1.80 2.06 ê;. 
6 3 Energy 1.64 2.86 13.30 1.10 43.51 35.09 7.81 2.99 0.00 0.39 2.16 ;::;· 
$::, 
7 67+68 Iron and Steel and 19.63 8.21 8.72 6.6.5 9.25 4.96 12.07 14.26 6.65 15.88 2.46 ;:::: 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
$:l.. 
~ 8 65+84 Textiles and Clothing 18.24 11.40 12.74 15.47 8.61 14.50 17.87 33.46 17.97 17.91 49.83 ~ 
9 61+83+85 H ides and Leather 6.24 2.97 2.59 4.47 1.42 2.46 1.99 9.53 3.55 3.96 0.59 ;;;· ;::::--
10 63+82 Wood Manufactures and Fumiture 1.88 5.23 9.15 3.19 5.47 3.34 10.22 10.89 9.36 4.66 0.58 
~ 
Il 64 Paper 0.32 1.59 0.16 0.72 0.10 0.27 1.26 0.32 3.40 3.90 0.34 0 ;:::: 
12 66 Non-Metallic Minerai 0 ;::: 
Manufactures 1.90 5.95 2.64 1.79 0.44 0.63 3.46 2.88 2.24 5.63 2.44 ~-
13 5+62 Chemicals and Rubber Products 11.69 9.54 Il .56 8.93 3.37 10.66 5.65 5.81 6.04 10.52 4.14 "' 
14 69 Meta! Products 1.54 6.23 1.34 3.30 0.31 1.02 4.56 1.7 4.84 3.92 1.20 
15 7 Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment 12.06 25.62 1.95 28.79 1.62 3.58 16.58 8.63 33.81 20.98 9.90 
16 81 +86+89+9 Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles 2.89 9.64 5.22 5.60 2.21 1.79 4.07 3.09 7.71 4.90 2.83 
First Three Sectors with 
Highest Shares 7, 8. 15 15. 8. 16 4.6.8 15. 8. 1 6.4. 7 6.8.5 8. 15. 7 8. 7. 10 15. 8. 10 15. 8. 7 8, 1. 15 . 
""' ~
""' 





lm ports Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia Turkey 
SITC COMMODITY 
0-08+4 l +42 Food 9.52 5.16 21.46 5.12 14.43 10.26 7.45 5.06 5.23 5.05 1.55 
2 1 Beverages and Tobacco 3.47 0.78 5.07 0.49 10.74 11.5 0.51 0.74 1.30 0.63 0.57 
3 08+22+43 Other Food Items 0.36 0.87 0.74 0.79 0.39 0.67 1.44 0.64 0.26 1.10 0.19 
4 2-22-27-28 Agricultural Raw Materials 2.69 1.38 1.10 1.76 1.03 1.37 1.89 1.28 2.38 1.82 2.63 
5 27+28 Crude Fertilizers and 0.39 0.43 8.08 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.67 0.98 0.22 4.66 
Metallic Ferrous Ore 
6 3 Energy 3.39 0.82 1.44 0.58 2.01 0.49 1.84 2.52 2.02 0.48 1.70 
7 67+68 Iron and Steel and 2.00 3.85 1.03 2.78 0.69 1.23 2.69 1.60 4.88 4.61 5.27 
Non-Ferrous Metals 
8 65+84 Textiles and Clothing 10.75 6.99 6.38 10.75 8.77 9.60 12.92 21.35 12.29 9.87 5.26 
9 61+83+85 Hides and Leather 3.13 1.76 1.94 3.58 2.47 1.45 1.28 6.28 2.71 2.69 1.27 
IO 63+82 Wood Manufactures and Furniture 1.63 1.78 1.27 1.89 2.07 1.87 1.00 1.06 2.01 1.75 0.63 
Il 64 Paper 1.80 1.49 0.86 1.90 1.10 0.89 2.27 1.10 1.80 1.10 1.26 
12 66 Non-Metallic Minera 
Manufactures 1.56 2.07 1.28 1.96 1.46 1.06 1.95 1.22 1.80 1.82 1.22 
13 5+62 Chemicals and Rubber Products 16.39 12.06 9.91 13.43 7.87 10.39 15.24 9.04 11.33 12.19 15.82 
14 69 Meta! Products 1.86 4.19 1.90 3.40 I.60 1.60 3.09 2.31 3.06 2.92 1.88 
15 7 M achinery and 32.49 44.21 34.33 41.30 34.54 36.48 34.85 35.94 39.60 44.35 44.29 
Transportation Equipment 
Vi 
16 81+86+89+9 Miscellaneous Manufactured !::: <:::r-
Articles 8.59 12.15 11.12 10.06 10.72 11.09 II.IO 9.08 8.33 9.33 11.80 § 
First three sectors with 
highest shares 15, 13, 8 15, 16. 13 15, 1, 16 15, 13, 8 15, 1, 2 15, 2, 16 15,13,8 15, 8, 16 15, 8, 13 15, 13, 8 15, 13, 16 èl 
OQ 
Cl 
Source: Author's Calculations. ::s 
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Table 4 shows the coefficient of similarity between the exports and 
imports of Turkey with those of the countries in transition. The index of sim-
ilarity is calculated by comparing the export vector x with the import vector 




where X,' de\)otes country j 's export of commodity i, X' refers to total ex ports 
of country j, M.' j-th çountry's import of commodity i, M' total imports of 
country j, x,' =(,X,' IX') is the share of commodity i in country j's total exports, 
m,' = (M,' /M') sha,re of commodity i in country j 's total imports, x,' = (x' , .. , x .. ' 
) sountryj's export share vector, and m' = (m,', .. ,m 11 1 ) COU1i1try j'~ import share 
vector. 
The coefficient of similarity varies between zero and one and has a 
straightforward interpretation. It is equal to one if the two (export and import) 
vectors are exactly the same. Conversely, the coefficient will equal zero in 
which case the two vectors are orthogonal if for each commodity exported the 
corresponding import of the same commodity equals zero, and for each com-
modity imported the export of commodity equals zero. Examination of the 
coefficient of similarity in the trading relationship between Turkey and the EU 
shows that: 
• Turkish exports to the EU are similar to those of Romania, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Hungary to EU. The similarity between Turkish exports to 
the EU on the one hand, and the exports of the Bal tic countries to the EU 
on the other hand is relatively low. 
• Turkish exports to the EU are not similar to the imports of CEE countries 
from EU. 
• Turkish imports from the EU are similar to the exports of Czech Republic 
to the EU. The similarity between Turkish imports from the EU and the 
exports of Latvia, Romania and Lithuania is relatively low. 
• Turkish imports from the EU are similar to the imports of CEE and Baltic 
countries imports from the EU. 
To analyze the sectors where countries have a comparative advantage, we 
calculate the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) which is given 
by: 
(X/ X) 
RCA =ln( ' ) 
, (X~"/ X'") 
where X, denotes export of commodity i by the country considered, X its total 
exports, X," refers to the total exports of commodity i to the EU from ail 
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Table 4: Indexes of Similarity for Turkish Exports to and 
Turkish Imports from European Union with 
CEEC's Trade with European Union 
Turkish Exports Turkish Imports 
Bulgaria 
Ex ports 0.6896 0.3757 
lm ports 0.3768 0.7884 
Czech Rep. 
Ex ports 0.4808 0.7157 
lm ports 0.2831 0.8769 
Estonia 
Ex ports 0.3668 0.3247 
lm ports 0.2288 0.7143 
Hungary 
Ex ports 0.6814 0.5442 
lm ports 0.3341 0.8595 
Lat via 
Ex ports 0.1879 0.1768 
lm ports 0.3391 0.6542 
Lithuania 
Ex ports 0.3512 0.2308 
lm ports 0.3096 0.7464 
Poland 
Ex ports 0.7221 0.4004 
lm ports 0.3353 0.8442 
Romania 
Ex ports 0.8221 0.2164 
lm ports 0.4073 0.7588 
Slovakia 
Ex ports 0.5981 0.5728 
lm ports 0.2886 0.8923 
Slovenia 
Ex ports 0.5993 0.5909 
lm ports 0.3178 0.7874 
Level of Aggregation: 2-digit SITC 
Source: Author "s calculation. 
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sources excluding the exports of commodity i of the country under consider-
ation; X'" refers to the total exports to the EU from ail sources excluding the 
total exports of the country under consideration. If this ratio is greater than 
one, then the country is said to have a comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of that product relative to the rest of the world. Altematively, if the RCA 
is Jess than unity, then the country is said to have a comparative disadvantage 
in the production of the said commodity vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Table 5a shows the thirteen 2-digit SITC commodity groups (see the 
Appendix for a description of the 2-digit SITC groupings) with the highest 
RCA values in 1994. The table reveals the following aspects: 
• the Czech Republic has a comparative advantage in the production of 
"sanitary, plumbing and heating" (SITC 81) materials, "coal" (SITC 32) 
and "cork and wood" (SITC 24). 
• Hungary has a comparative advantage in the production of "live animais 
chiefly for food" (SITC 00), ")lleat and meat preparations" (SITC 01) and 
"footwear" (SITC 85). 
• Poland has a comparative advantage in "coal" (SITC 32), "furniture" 
(SITC 82) and "cork and wood manufactures" (SITC 63). 
• Bulgaria has a comparative advantage in "manufactured fertilizers" (SITC 
56), "non-ferrous metals" (SITC 68) and "footwear" (SITC 85). 
• Romania has a comparative advantage in "footwear" (SITC 85),"furni-
ture" (SITC 82) and "clothing" (SITC 84). 
• Turkey has a comparative advantage in "clothing" (SITC 84), "vegetables 
and fruit" (SITC 5) and "textiles" (SITC 65). 
• Comparison of the sectors where the CEE countries enjoy a comparative 
advantage with those where Turkey has a comparative advantage reveals 
that both the Czech Republic and Turkey enjoy a comparative advantage 
in the production of the commodities "sanitary, plumbing and heating" 
(SITC 81 ), "non-metallic minerai manufactures" (SITC 66) and "manu-
factured fertilizers" (SITC 56); that Hungary and Turkey have a compar-
ative advantage in "clothing" (SITC 84) and "sanitary, plumbing and heat-
ing" (SITC 81 ); that Pol and and Turkey have a comparative advantage in 
"manufactured fertilizers" (SITC 56), "clothing" (SITC 84) and "crude 
fertilizers" (SITC 27); that Bulgaria and Turkey have a comparative 
advantage in "manufactured fertilizers" (SITC 56), "travel goods" (SITC 
83), and "inorganic chemicals"; and that Romania and Turkey have a com-
parative advantage in the production of "clothing" (SITC 84), "manufac-
tured fertilizers" (SITC 56), and "non-metallic minerai manufactures" 
(SITC 66). 
TabJe Sa: Thirteen SITC Divisions with Highest RCA VaJues Computed for Trade with EU During 1994 
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1.285 56 2.910 0 1.715 24 2.906 56 3.183 32 2.440 85 2.235 56 1.737 63 1.883 84 2.224 
1.173 24 2.650 1 1.439 21 2.109 28 2.319 82 1.800 82 2.205 67 1.564 82 1.588 5 1.897 






28 2.259 22 1.296 63 1.854 61 1.755 0 1.746 67 1.157 82 1.048 
32 2.251 84 1.161 28 1.655 24 1.693 56 1.373 0 1.087 0 1.030 
63 2.120 71 1.001 26 1.006 33 1.654 84 1.338 56 1.042 84 1.027 
52 1.844 81 0.899 61 0.734 63 1.129 68 1.314 68 0.925 61 0.941 
82 1.316 77 0.718 67 0.693 84 0.975 24 1.120 21 0.718 24 0.927 
84 1.185 27 1.264 
81 1.070 12 1.109 
62 0.904 26 0.838 
85 0.787 81 0.516 
69 0.722 62 0 .. 480 
0.877 3 1.122 82 0.712 68 0.544 32 0.922 27 0.802 63 0.417 63 0.921 52 0.670 29 0.420 
0.781 25 0.895 29 0.693 32 0.476 59 0.824 61 0.686 61 0.343 66 0.892 77 0.611 52 0.324 
0.734 81 0.837 41 0.689 82 0.377 68 0.418 69 0.663 66 0.224 81 0.847 68 0.602 56 0.098 
0.674 68 0.811 28 0.596 84 0.342 82 0.288 3 0.437 81 0.194 62 0.846 24 0.544 66 0.058 









Source: Author:1 calculatùms usinli 2-difiil S/TC trade datafrom Euro.~lllt. 
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Table Sb identifies the "winning" sectors in each of the countries under 
consideration. These winning sectors have been identified as those that have 
experienced the larges! growth rates in any one country's exports during the 
period 1988-1994. From the table it follows that the winning sectors for Turkey 
are "coal" (SITC 32) and "paper" (SITC 64), for Hungary "power generating 
machinery" (SITC 71) and "office machines" (SITC 75), and for Bulgaria 
"non-ferrous metals" (SITC 68) and "other transport equipment" (SITC 79). 
Table 6 shows the trade relations between CEE and Baltic countries on the 
one hand and Turkey on the other over the period 1985-1994. The table 
reveals that the exports of Turkey to the CEE and Baltic countries have 
increased from $ 107 million in 1985 to $ 723 million in 1994; even with this 
phenomenal increase of close to seven-fold, the trading relations between 
these countries and Turkey remain limited: in 1994 only 4 percent of Turkey's 
total exports found their way to the markets of the CEE and Baltic countries. 
Similarly, only 3 percent of Turkey's total import bill in 1994 were account-
ed for by exports from the CEE countries. 
Table 7 gives the commodity composition of trade between CEE countries 
and Turkey during 1994. The table reveals that: 
• The main export items from Turkey to Poland are "textiles and clothing", 
"hides and leather" and "chemicals and rubber products". These commodi-
ties account for 92 percent of ail exports to Poland. On the otherhand, 
Turkey's main import items that originated from Poland were "machinery 
and transport equipment", "energy" and "textiles and clothing". These com-
modities account for 70 percent of ail imports from Poland. 
• The main export items from Turkey to Romania are "food", "machinery 
and transport equipment" and "chemicals and rubber products". These 
commodities accounted for 75 percent of Turkey's total exports to 
Romania. On the other hand, the main items that Turkey imported from 
Bulgaria in 1994 were "chemicals and rubber products", "energy" and 
"food". These commodities accounted for 38 percent of ail imports from 
Romania. 
• The main export items from Turkey to the Czech Republic in 1994 were 
"textiles and clothing", "food" and "hides and leather". These commodi-
ties accounted for 69 percent of total Turkish exports to the Czech 
Republic. On the other hand, Turkey's main import items from the Czech 
Republic were "machinery and transport equipment", "chemicals and rub-
ber products" and "iron and steel and non-ferrous metals". These three 
commodities accounted for 86 percent of ail imports from the Czech 
Republic. 




to Export Shares in 1989 for Trade with EU a 
Rank Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Pol and Romania Slovakia Turkey 
68 8.896 96 16.656 71 5.808 61 7.091 21 777.746 79 17.544 32 21.796 
2 79 7.616 75 9.601 75 5.533 9 5.730 32 766.878 61 9.087 64 13.782 
3 9 7.432 77 5.367 43 4.912 63 2.649 25 124.935 56 7.584 79 6.254 
4 85 5.954 61 4.850 78 3.741 81 2.439 8 109.572 68 6.757 42 5.981 
5 61 5.624 79 4.363 25 3.536 89 2.224 43 34.989 42 4.271 25 5.517 
6 42 4.911 68 4.061 81 3.354 55 2.222 79 19.283 77 3.805 59 4.354 
7 88 3.727 69 3.873 76 2.691 82 2.215 61 6.681 76 2.697 77 3.744 
8 52 3.348 81 3.531 77 2.401 54 2.053 85 6.392 84 2.552 22 2.967 
9 43 2.643 56 3.258 88 2.275 56 1.851 42 5.360 69 2.436 24 2.543 
IO 81 2.447 8 2.914 21 2.236 84 1.810 () 5.007 81 2.279 81 2.374 
li 71 2.379 87 2.535 91 1.699 66 1.797 93 4.954 64 2.082 54 2.304 
12 53 2.358 42 2.439 64 1.626 26 1.761 28 4.671 8 2.021 82 2.001 
13 84 2.017 88 2.292 69 1.540 78 1.701 27 4.390 85 1.927 62 1.979 
Turkish 
Comparative 
Advantage 79, 42, 81 77, 79,42 81,77,64 81, 82, 54 25, 79, 42 79,42, 77 
81, 64 1 Vi :;::, 
<::)-






Table 6: Trade Between Turkey and CEE and Baltic Countries During 1985-1994 (Million US$) 1 (j "" ;:s 
EXPORTS â .-
Total Share of Exports Io gi 
Total CEE Turkish CEE and Baltic Countries ::; 
Bul~aria Czech Czech Rep. Slovakia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovcnia and Baltic Trade Exports in Turkish Exports 
t">i 
;::: 
1985 7.7 14.4 -- 3.7 -- 34.4 47.0 107.2 7958 1.3 èl 
1986 14.9 23.9 -- 12.5 -- 41.0 39.9 132.2 7457 1.8 ~ "" 1987 14.5 27.1 18.1 -- 25.7 48.7 134.1 10.190 1.3 l:l _;::: 
1988 28. l 35J 24.8 77.6 76.0 -- 241.8 11.662 2.1 
tti 1989 26.7 39.2 -- 24.5 -- 71.4 52.8 214.6 11.625 1.8 e.. 1990 10.4 64.4 -- 30.6 -- 103.4 83.2 292.0 12.959 2J ~· 1991 76.1 64.1 34.6 141.3 109.4 425.5 13.593 3.1 
1992 72.2 52J 27.0 186J 173.l 510.9 14.715 3.5 
l:l -- ;:s 
1993 86.2 58.4 15.7 ()3 37.5 2.9 4.0 234.8 151.7 30.2 621.7 15.345 4.1 l:l.. 
1994 1337 62.2 12.8 0.8 58J 2.1 8J 249.5 175.3 19.9 723 0 18.106 4.0 ~ 
* IMPORTS <::;· ;:::;-
Total Share of lm ports Io 
~ Total CEE Turkish CEE and Baltic Countries c 
Bul~aria Czech Czech Rep. Slovakia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovenia and Baltic Trade lm ports in Turkish Imports ;:s 
c 
1985 98.7 39.0 53.6 49J 63.6 304.2 li J43 2.7 
3 -- -- ;;;· 
1986 41.2 67.3 -- 38.2 127.9 109.6 384.2 11.105 3.5 ""' 
1987 9.4 45.9 -- -- 70.6 -- 62.5 229.4 -- 417.8 14.158 3.0 
1988 15.7 27.8 -- 92.9 -- 78.6 197.9 412.9 14J35 2.9 
1989 3.3 72.1 -- 87.2 98.1 238.5 499.2 15.792 3.2 
1990 31.9 143.4 -- -- -- 110.4 -- 210.3 202.5 698.5 22.302 3.1 
1991 139.9 155.4 -- 133.6 -- 150.6 198.6 778.1 21.047 3.7 
1992 224.5 183.7 -- -- 97.1 -- 86.6 256.1 848.0 22.870 3.7 
1993 243.2 -- 223.0 21.9 3.4 86.7 2.7 13.8 91.1 300.8 45.9 1.032.6 29.429 3.5 
1994 195.5 -- 94.7 26.4 1.9 55.5 4.4 7.7 69.1 228.9 31.6 715.7 23.270 3.1 
Sou1a: Foreip1 Trade Statistics. State lnstitute of Statistics. Ankara. 1 '"""' V, ._ 




and Baltic Countries during 1994 N 
EXPORTS 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia 
SITC COMMODITY 
0-08+41+42 Food 29.96 13.49 19.23 9.02 13.97 41.38 2.36 43.36 22.05 20.57 
2 1 Bcvcrages and Tobacco 0.26 3.55 0.00 4.96 0.00 0.41 1.20 0.05 1.79 0.00 
3 08+22+43 Other Food Items 1.56 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.71 0.08 1.53 0.00 0.00 
4 2-22-27-28 Agricultural Raw Materials 1.14 0.70 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.08 0.00 2.65 
5 27+28 Crude Ferti lizers and Metallic 2.66 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.01 0.40 2.61 0.03 17.09 
Fcrrous Ore 
6 3 Energy 0.11 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
7 67+68 Iron and Steel and Non-Ferrous 2.18 0.05 0.00 1.06 1.33 0.94 0.01 0.43 16.48 0.00 
Metals 
8 65+84 Textiles and Clothing 8.86 57.96 67.07 47.92 50.33 18.75 80.99 11.20 22.34 38.43 
9 61+83+85 Hides and Leather 8.54 9.29 1.63 7.81 3.54 1.81 5.54 0.79 10.66 0.59 
IO 63+82 Wood Manufactures and Furniture 1.75 0.10 0.00 0.03 2.32 1.04 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.30 
li 64 Paper 2.39 0.04 0.00 1.26 0.49 2.26 0.07 1.96 0.09 0.01 
12 66 Non-Metallic Minerai Manufactures 5.51 0.28 0.83 1.07 5.71 1.16 0.28 1.11 0.34 0.01 
13 5+62 Chemicals and Rubber Products 15.82 4.65 4.15 7.50 4.88 8.83 5.31 13.95 16.23 3.57 
14 69 Meta! Products 1.77 0.84 0.00 0.29 5.25 3.04 0.35 0.71 0.15 8.40 V) 
15 7 Machinery and Transportation ;;:, <::l-
Equipment 12.10 2.93 7.09 15.55 9.18 16.97 2.04 17.71 6.95 6.44 ! 16 81 +86+89+9 Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles 5.38 4.69 0.00 2.94 3.02 2.68 1.01 4.12 2.82 1.92 Ol 
O"Q 
First three sectors with highest >:) :: 
shares 1, 13, 15 8, 1, 9 8, 1, 15 8, 15, 1 8, 1, 15 1, 8, 15 8, 9, 13 1, 15, 13 8, 1, 7 8, 1, 5 
Table 7: Continued 1 ri 
"' ::. 
IMPORTS R 
Bulgaria Czcch Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Litbuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia gi 
SITC COMMODITY "' -
0-08+41+42 Food 3.15 3.65 17.22 16.71 0.00 11.37 1.66 17.48 397 9.91 
gi 
(3 
2 1 Beverages and Tobacco 0.00 0 OO 000 0.01 000 000 000 000 000 0 OO ~ "' !::) 3 08+22+43 Other Food Items 5.33 O.<XJ (J.()0 <U3 0 OO 000 0.01 0.04 000 0.02 _::. 
4 2-22-27-28 Agricultural Raw Materials 9.44 2.93 81.78 2.42 54.77 33.67 5.88 6.22 () 57 0.17 l:i;:, 
5 27+28 Crude Fertilizers and 0.50 0.02 000 om 000 000 9.5 0.40 000 (J.()0 ê;. ;:;· 
Metallic Ferrous Ore !::) 
::. 
6 3 Energy 14.74 O.<XJ 0.43 0.()5 0 OO 0 58 19.61 20.o:l 000 0.00 ~ 
7 67+68 Iron and Steel and 34.48 5.99 000 7.52 41.65 000 1.43 1399 34.43 20.64 :::i 
Non-Ferrous Metals ~ 
t:;· 
8 65+84 Textiles and Clothing 3.44 2.96 000 1.66 000 5.59 14.53 5.16 28.73 24.96 ;::.. 
9 61+83+85 Hides and Leather 0.38 0.00 0 (X) 0.36 0 OO 000 0.03 0.19 0.13 1.82 
t"'1 ,.., 
Cl 
IO 63+82 Wood Manufactures and Furniture 0 22 0.02 O.<XJ 014 000 O.<XJ 000 0.22 ll.04 0.16 ::. Cl 
li 64 Paper 0.26 0.66 0.00 3.88 2.97 0.00 2.26 0.20 1.76 136 :; ;;;· 
12 66 Non-Metallic Minerai Manufactures 137 2.14 0.00 1.09 0.00 2.10 1.57 2.69 0.87 0.07 "' 
13 5+62 Chemicals and Rubber Products 22.24 6.81 0.00 19.76 O.<XJ 0 (X) 6.64 28.79 7.68 4.75 
14 69 Meta! Products 0.28 0.50 000 2.89 0.00 000 0 58 0.51 0.06 1.17 
15 7 Machinery and ,Transportation 
Equipmcnt 2.78 68.65 000 4131 0 61 43.32 35.57 369 21.64 30.92 
16 81 +86+89+9 Misccllaneous Manufactured 
Art ides U7 5.66 0.57 1.83 0.00 3.37 0.67 0.41 () 14 4.04 
First three sectors with highest 
1 """' shares 7, U. 6 15, U, 7 4, 1, 16 15, U, 1 4, 7, li 15, 4, 1 15, 6, 8 13, 6, 1 7, 8, 15 15, 8, 7 V, 
"""' 
Source: Awhor :\' c11/rn/a1io11s usil1K 2-dil(il SITC Ira de da ra f/'0111 Swre illsrirure of Srarisrics. Ankara. 
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Turkey-EU Customs Union Decision and the Europe 
Agreements 
The Turkey-EU Customs Union Oecision (CUO) and the EA represent major 
contributions to the integration process of CEE and Turkish economies with-
in Europe. The implications of these Agreements are far reaching, going 
beyond trade-related aspects to include such aspects as the progressive adap-
tation of the le gal framework in the CEE and Baltic countries and Turkey to 
EU legislation. 
Turkey-EU Customs Union 
Turkey's application to join the European Economie Community (EEC) was 
made on July 31, 1959. Following difficult and protracted negotiations, the 
application ultimately resulted in the signing in Ankara on September 12, 
1963 of the Association Treaty. The stated objective of the Agreement is to 
promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic 
relations between the parties, while taking full account of the need to ensure 
accelerated development of the Turkish economy and the need to improve the 
level of employment and living conditions of the Turkish people. According 
to the Ankara Treaty, the association was to be implemented in three phases: 
a preparatory phase, a transition phase and a final phase. 
Ouring the preparatory period, the EEC granted unilateral concessions to 
Turkey in the form of financial assistance and preferential tariffs against 
Turkey 's traditional ex ports. In the meantime, Turkey did not have to alter its 
trade regime. On May 16, 1967, Turkey lodged in Brussels its application for 
negotiations to enter the transition phase. The Additional Protocol to the 
Ankara Treaty was signed on November 23, 1970, and became effective on 
January l, 1973. The basic aim of the Additional Protocol was the eventual 
establishment of a customs union which was eventually concluded on March 
6, 1995. Hern:eforth, the final phase of the association process became effec-
tive following ratification by the European Parliament on January 1, 1996. 
As of January 1, 1996, gonds started to circulate freely between the terri-
tories of the parties. In addition, Turkey has adopted of January 1, 1996 the 
Community's common external tariff (CET) on goods from third parties and 
it will embrace by the year 2001 ail of the preferential trade agreements the 
EU has concluded over time. 
Table 8 provides estimates of the nominal protection rates for the years 
1994 and 2001, by which time ail the adjustments required by the CUO have 
been completed. The economy-wide nominal protection rate (NPR) against 
imports from the EU was 10 percent in 1994 when weighted by the sectoral 
Central, East European, Ba/tic and Turkish Economies 355 
import values, against 22 percent against imports from third countries. 
Detailed examination of the structure of protection against goods originating 
from the EU during 1994 reveals that the highest Turkish NPRs were in the 
sectors of "fruits and vegetables" (72 percent), "alcoholic beverages" (72 per-
cent) and "non-alcoholic beverages" (57 percent). In the case of tracte with 
third countries we note that during 1994 the highest NPRs were in the sectors 
"processed tobacco" ( 1 OO percent), "alcoholic beverages" (94 percent) and 
"fruits and vegetables" (73 percent). 
Table 8: Turkish Nominal Protection Rates before and after 
the Customs Union with EU 
1-0 SECTOR NPR with EU NPR with EU NPR with Third Average MFN Average Tariff 
CODE in 1994 After Customs Countries in Tariff Rates Rates for GSP 
Union 1994 after Customs Beneficiaries 
Union after Customs 
Union 
Agriculture 41.27 41.26 41.65 41.26 41.26 
2 Animal Husbandry 3.48 137 4.18 137 1.37 
3 Forestry 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
4 Fishery 47.92 47.84 54.08 47.84 47.84 
5 Coal Mining 3.33 0.00 3.33 4.00 0.00 
6 Crude Petroleum 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 0.00 
7 Iron Ore Mining 000 0.00 2.22 0.00 0.00 
8 Other Metallic Ore Mining 0.13 0.00 1.21 0.00 0.00 
9 Non-Metallic Mining 9.09 0.00 11.02 0.95 0.95 
10 Stone Quarrying 1.95 0.00 2.18 0.02 000 
Il Slaughtering and Meat 10.21 10.21 10.21 I0.21 10.21 
12 Fruits and Vegetables 72.49 68.01 72.62 68.01 68.01 
13 Vegetable and Animal Oil 16.31 16.31 16.38 16.29 16.29 
14 Grain Mill Products 41.33 41.02 41.33 41.02 41.02 
15 Sugar Refining 28.79 28.79 28.79 28.79 28.79 
16 Other Food Processing 26.47 18.31 28.99 18.31 18.31 
17 Alcoholic Beverages 72.IO 5.25 94.28 11.28 7.35 
18 Non-Alcholic Beverages 56.92 0.00 69.81 14.83 0.00 
19 Processed Tobacco 44.40 0.00 99.91 9.40 0.00 
20 Ginning 0.00 0.00 2.22 0.72 0.72 
21 Textiles 2119 0.00 27.10 17.30 7.60 
22 Clothing 14.75 000 20.65 19.90 9.30 
23 Leather and Fur Production 7.85 000 12.57 I0.20 2.80 
24 Footwear 24.40 0.00 35.70 22.50 9.10 
25 Wood Products 15.25 000 18.97 2.00 0.05 
26 Wood Furniture 26.22 0.00 32.64 5.50 0.00 
27 Paper and Paper Products 13.59 000 17.58 2.70 000 
28 Printing and Publishing 8.23 0.00 10.79 4.52 0.00 
29 FertiliZers 8.22 0.00 16.38 8.IO 0.00 
30 Pharmaceutical Production 3.33 0.00 8.99 5.30 000 
31 Other Chernical Production 10.79 0.00 17.62 8.71 0.04 
32 Petroleum Refining 22.54 0.00 24.35 2.70 0.00 
33 Petroleum and Coal Products 5.62 0.00 7.52 2.15 0.00 
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Table 8: Continued 
1-0 SECTOR NPR with EU NPR witH EU NPR with Thini Average MFN Average Tariff 
CODE ln 1994 After Customs Countries in Tariff Rates Rates for GSP 
Union 1994 after Customs Beneflciaries 
Union after Customs 
Union 
34 Rubber Products 19.57 0.00 23.91 5.60 0.03 
35 Plastic Products 24.61 0.00 31.68 9.90 0.00 
36 Glass and Glass Production 16.85 0.00 21.94 5.76 0.00 
37 Cernent 30.45 0.00 32.88 3.14 0.00 
38 Non-Metallic Minerai 18.33 0.00 23.21 5.47 0.00 
39 Iron and Steel 8.00 0.00 10.70 5.50 3.30 
40 Non-Ferrous Metals 4.52 0.00 8.43 3.20 0.50 
41 Fabricated Meta! Products 18.36 0.00 25.29 6.00 0.11 
42 Non-Electrical Machinery 7.36 0.00 12.50 4.40 0.00 
43 Agriculrural Machinery 6.98 0.00 12.18 3.50 0.00 
44 Electrical Machinery 9.69 0.00 16.64 8.30 0.00 
45 Shipbuilding and Repairing 6.13 0.00 12.89 0.50 0.00 
46 Railroad Equipment 0.00 0.00 4.61 4.04 0.00 
47 Motor Vehicles 27.33 0.00 33.10 9.40 0.00 
48 Other Transport Equipment 0.01 0.00 176 1.60 0.00 
49 Other Manufacruring 
Industries 2.92 0.00 8.19 2.95 0.00 
MEAN 10.22 1.34 22.14 6.92 2.71 
STANDARD DEVIATION 17.68 14.48 15.36 13.79 14.51 
Source: Author's calculations. 
Own calculations for ail sec tors in columns 1, 2 and 3. 
NPRs for sectors 21. 22, 23, 24. 39 and 40 in column 4 have been obtained /rom Laird and Yeats 
(1990); for sectors 25. 26, 27. 30, 34, 35, 42. 44, 45 and 47 /rom GA7T(l993); and author 's cal-
culations for remaining sec tors. 
The Additional Protocol to the Ankara Treaty divided up the imports of 
Turkey between two lists. Those industrial products in which it was thought 
that Turkey could achieve international competitiveness relatively early were 
placed on the "12-year list." Other manufactured products were put on a 22-
year list, for which a customs union (CU) would not be achieved until 1995. 
With the formation of the CU with the EU, Turkey has reduced the NPRs to 
zero on all the commodities that were included in the 12-year and 22-year 
lists. 
Two other sets of products were treated separately: (i) agricultural prod-
ucts and (ii) products falling within the mandate of the "European Coal and 
Steel Community" (ECSC). In order to establish freedom of movement of 
agricultural products, Turkey will have to adjust its policy in such a way as to 
adopt the EU common agricultural policy (CAP). But as will be explained in 
more detail, it is most unlikely that the freedom of movement of agricultural 
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products will be achieved in the near future. Therefore we expect the NPR's 
on agricultural products to remain unchanged over the next few years. As for 
the products falling under the ECSC, these were subsequently treated under a 
"Free Trade Agreement" (FTA) which was signed in December 1995. The 
FTA envisions the graduai liberalization of trade in ECSC products over a 
period of three years. Therefore by the year 2001, the NPR's for products 
included in the 12 and 22-year lists and the ECSC products are projected to 
be zero. Referring back to Table 8, 38 industries will enjoy zero NPR. After 
the formation of the customs union, the average nominal protection rate in 
trade with EU will be reduced to 1.34 percent. Furthermore, we note that the 
highest NPR in trade with the EU will affect the following sectors: "fruits and 
vegetables" (68 percent), "fishery" (48 percent) and "agriculture" ( 41 per-
cent). 
ln the case of trade with third parties, a distinction has to be made in 
respect of trade with member countries of the EFTA, the Mediterranean coun-
tries, the Central and Eastern European countries, the Baltic countries, devel-
oping countries having the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) treat-
ment and the Lomé Convention countries. With each of these country groups, 
EU has concluded preferential trade agreements. Since Turkey after the for-
mation of the CU will have to apply the Community's CET and accept ail of 
the preferential agreements the EU has concluded over time, at the latest by 
2001, Turkey in five years will be faced with different sets of tariff rates for 
different groups of countries. In the case of EFTA countries, CEE countries, 
the Baltic countries and Israel, which have free trade agreements with the EU, 
the nominal tariff rates that will be applied by Turkey in the year 2001 on 
imports from these countries will be identical to those applied on imports 
from the EU. Thus the NPR's given in column 2 of Table 8 will have to apply 
to about 54 percent of imports, which is the average share of Turkish imports 
from EU, EFTA, CEE and Baltic countries and Israel in total imports during 
the 1991-1993 period. For these countries, the average tariff will decrease 
from 22 percent to 1 percent. The share of developing countries that enjoy 
preferential access to the Turkish market (through the GSP) is around 28 per-
cent. Finally the share of countries like the USA, Japan and Canada, - whose 
exports to the EU face the CET, in Turkish imports is 19 percent. Columns 4 
of Table 8 shows the average most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates obtained 
under the assumption that Turkey does not change the NPR's on agricultural 
commodities. Similarly column 5 of Table 8 shows under the same assump-
tions the average tariff rates for GSP beneficiaries. Thus we assume that the 
tariff rates Turkey will apply by 2001 will be as shown in columns 2, 4 and 5 
of Table 8. Note that the average NPR for EU countries and for countries that 
enjoy free trade agreements with the EU will be 1 percent, for countries like 
358 Sübidey Togan 
USA, Japan and Canada 7 percent and for GSP beneficiaries 3 percent. 
Table 9 shows the average share of imports from different country groups 
in total Turkish imports as well as the corresponding Turkish NPR's applica-
ble on imports from these country groups before and after the formation of the 
customs union with the EU. The table makes it clear that ail ofTurkey's trad-
ing partners stand to benefit from the formation of the CU. 
Table 9: Share of Country Groups' Imports in Total 
Turkish Imports 
Share in NPR NPR 
Imports 1994 2001 
(1991-1993 Average) (Before CU) (After CU) 
EU Countries 46.02 10.22 1.34 
Countries EU has FfA with 7.75 22.14 1.34 
GSP Countries 27.54 22.14 2.71 
Countries EU Applies the 
MFN Tariffs 18.46 22.14 6.92 
Mediterranean Countries 1.60 22.14 2.71 
Source: Autilor's calculatio11s based 011 Foreign Trade Statistics, State lnstitute of Statistics, Ankara. 
Regarding market access for Turkish exports to the EU, we note that the 
latter had abolished the nominal tariff rates on imports of industrial goods 
from Turkey on September 1, 1971. However, certain exceptions were made. 
The Community retained the right to charge import duties on some oil prod-
ucts over a fixed quota, and to implement a phased reduction of duties on 
imports of particular textile products originating in Turkey. In addition, trade 
of ECSC products have been protected by the Community through application 
of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and anti-dumping measures. After the year 2001, 
the NPR applied by the EU on imports of ail industrial goods from Turkey 
including textiles and steel products will be reduced to zero as long as Turkey 
will fulfill ail of its obligations stated in the CUD. This means that Turkey 
needs to effectively implement the measures regarding "intellectual, industri-
al and commercial property rights" and "competition policy" including mea-
sures regarding "public aid". Furthermore, Turkey has to adopt EU garments 
and textile agreements with third countries. As emphasized above, the market 
access conditions of the Agreement will not cover the agricultural commodi-
ties. Finally one should note that in the event of non-fulfillment of obligations 
by Turkey by the year 2001, the country will still be faced with anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty measures. In this case market access restrictions by 
2001 would extend from the agricultural commodities to sensitive products 
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such as textiles, clothing, iron and steel products. 
The CUD offers rapid liberalization of tracte. But there are some draw-
backs in the liberalization provided through countervailing duties, anti-dump-
ing procedures and safeguard measures which are mentioned in Articles 36, 
42, 61 of the CUD. Article 36 specifies that as long as a particular practice is 
incompatible with the competition rules of the CU as specified in Articles 30-
32 of the CUD and "in the absence of such rules if such practice causes or 
threatens to cause serious prejudice to the interest of the other Party or mate-
rial injury to its domestic industry" the Community or Turkey may take the 
appropriate measures. Article 42 allows anti-dumping actions as long as 
Turkey fails to implement effectively the competition rules of the CU and 
other relevant parts of the acquis communautaire. In those cases, Article 47 of 
the Additional Protocol signed in 1970 between Turkey and the EC will 
remain in force. Finally, Article 61 is about safeguards which offer another 
drawback in the liberalization. The Article states that safeguard clauses as 
specified in Article 60 of the Additional Protocol will remain in effect. 
According to Article 60 the Community may take necessary protective mea-
sures if serious disturbances occur in a sector of the economy of the 
Community or prejudice the extemal financial stability of one or more 
Member States, or if difficulties arise which adversely affect the economic sit-
uation in a region of the Community. 
The Europe Agreements 
During the l 990s, the CEE and Baltic countries introduced sweeping reforms 
which changed the nature of their trading regime, and set the stage for their 
enhanced integration into the world economy. The tracte reforms comprised 
three elements. First, the system of compulsory import and export licenses of 
the period before 1990 was abolished and with it the state monopoly over for-
eign tracte. Second, current account convertibility of the currencies was intro-
duced. Finally, nearly ail quantitative restrictions on exports and imports were 
lifted. As a result, the customs tariff has become the primary instrument of 
foreign tracte policy. There were frequent tariff adjustments during the period. 
Table 10 summarizes the developments in the tracte regimes of the countries 
in transition. 
The CEE countries sought support from the EU immediately following the 
political upheaval in their countries in the late l 980s. Support came in the 
form of Tracte and Co-operation Agreements that were signed during the peri-
od 1988-1990. Negotiations for the Association Agreements called the 
"Europe Agreements" (EA) between the EU on the one side and the Czech, 
Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland on the other side started in 
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December 1990 and were signed on December 16, 1991. The Interim 
Agreements which cover the trade aspects of the Europe Agreements entered 
into force on March 1, 1992. Similar Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria 
have been signed during 1993 and the Interim Agreement with Romania 
became effective starting May 1, 1993 and in the case of Bulgaria starting with 
February 1, 1994. ln the meantime ail of the above Agreements have been rat-
ified by national parliaments and the European Parliament. In 1995, negotia-
tions with the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) were concluded and 
the Agreements were signed, and in 1996 Slovenia followed suit. The last four 
agreements have not, as of January 1997, been ratified. 
Ali of the EAs have similar structure and contain between 122 and 124 
Articles. Articles 1-6 deal with political dialogue and general principles. 
Articles 7-36 refer to the movement of goods, and Articles 37-58 to the move-
ment of workers and establishment and suppl y of services. Articles 59-69 cover 
issues related to movement of capital, competition and approximation of laws. 
Articles 70-103 refer to economic, cultural and financial co-operation. Articles 
104-124 contain institutional, general and final provisions. Each EA is accom-
panied by a set of Annexes and Protocols. 
According to the stipulations of the Interim Agreements, a free trade area is 
to be established at the end of a transitional period of a maximum duration of 
ten years, divided into two successive stages of five years each, starting from 
the entry into force of the Agreement (March 1992). Thus by March 2002 the 
countries consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic and the EU Member States will form a free trade area. On the 
Community side, the Association Agreements consolidate ail the previous uni-
lateral trade concessions, while laying the ground for the complete removal of 
ail trade obstacles by the end of the transitional period. The trade provisions 
involve the immediate removal of ail quotas on industrial commodities except 
for textiles and ESCS products, while import tariffs will be progressively elim-
inated over a period ranging between 2 and 5 years. The CEE countries will rec-
iprocate more slowly by phasing out tariffs and quotas over 4 to 9 years. To 
qualify for concessions under the EA, products must originate in CEE coun-
tries. The EAs recognize the minerai and agricultural products exported from 
the CEE countries as commodities originating in CEE countries. For ail other 
commodities the rules of origin require that imported materials from outside of 
the CEE countries do not exceed 40 percent or 50 percent of the value of the 
output. In other words, this is a 60 percent local content requirement, which is 
rather strict. Finally, it should be stressed that the provisions of the EAs provide 
for a cumulation of origin among the CEE countries. 
Table 10: Regimes of the Countries in Transition 
CEE Countries 












TradcTariff and Non~ Tariff Import Barri ers 
Average wc1ghtcd tariff 5.7 % in 1993. Quantitative import 
restrictions on some agneultural products, tcxt1lcs, dothing, steel and mal; 
J10.:nces for oil, gas and wcapons 
A 10 9f surcharge on imports cstahlishcd m March 1994 was rcmovcd in 
August. Average wcightcd tariff in 1993 was 5.7 %. Quantitative import 
n:strictions on sumc agricultural prnduc:ts, tcxti\cs. dothing. steel and coal; 
imprn1 licenscs for oil. gas and wcapons 
Ahout 10 9f ol 1mpons suhjn:t to 4uota or liccnsmg rcstnc11ons, with num-
hcr incrcasmg in 1994. Average unwcightcd tariff changcd from 13 9f (1989) 
to 119< (1991)to 169< (1992);furthcrincreascin 1994. 
Average wcightcd tariff 11 <if on mdustnal products and 1 M <'k on agricul-
tural products ( 1993 ). Most 4uanutativc restrictions climmatcd in 1990. 
Quotas on whcat, cars, alcohol, çigars. cigarettes. cnginc oil and pctrol. 
Most liccnsmg rc4uircmcnts cl1mmatcd m May 1992. Wcightcd avcrJgc tar-
ilT 11.7 <,; ( 1993). Restrictions only for arms, drugs and items affcctmg 
natmnal hcalth. 30 % anti-<lumpmg duty on akohol, vchidcs, TVs and 
vidct>-rccordcrs imposcd hctwccn May-Oct. 1993 
Average tariff from 13 % (1989) to 11 % (1991) to 16 9f. (1992). 22 <;f aver-
age tariff on industrial goods rcponcd in 1994. Minimum pnccs for tyrcs and 
steel pipes. Rcstncuvc import licences for a limitcd numhcr of products. 
Sorne tariff 4uotas on proccsscd foods and agricultural products. 
Gcncrally tariff frcc. Whcrc tariffs arc applicd rates range up to a maximum 
of 25 %. Customs formalitics tax of 1 %. Sorne 4uota~ on agricuhural and 
textile products (96 9f of products frcc of 4uotas). 
Only 14 % of imports arc suhjcct to dutics ( 10 % for furs, sca and road vchi-
dcs). average wcighted tariff 1.4 % ( 1993 ). Licences for alcohol and tohac-
co. No 4uantitative restrictions. Import suhsidics aholishcd hcgmning ol 
1992. 
Ba<;ic tariff 15 9f· (as tlf March 1994), hut many exceptions al 0.5 <;{ (raw 
matcrials, food products); somc high agricultural tarills. Import llccnsing 
and 4uolas for mihtary produclS and lohacco. No impun suhsidics. 
Import tarills 5-15 'k-; highcr for food products. akohol, tohacco and ahout a 
dot.en manufacturcd goods (carrymg tariffs up to 25 9f ). No 4uotas since 
Ckt. 1993 cxçcpt for hcalth and safcty rca~ons. 
Source: Eumpean Run/.:.jàr Recom;truction and IJeveJopment. Transition Report. October /1)94 
Export Quotas and other Export Barriers 
20 percent of ex ports rc4uircd liccnsing in 1992. Export tax of 100 q;. 
apPlics only to anti4ucs and art works. Export licrnsmg for livcsttx:k 
and plants, somc natural rcsourccs. and pnx.lucts such as textiles and 
stcd which arc suh.1cc1 to 4uotas m othcr countncs. 
Export liccnsing for livcstock and plants. somc natural rcsourccs, and 
prtx.lucts such as textiles and steel which arc suh1cct Io 4uotas in othcr 
t.:ountncs. 
Exprnt ol luds, whcat and mdustnal raw matcnals suhJcct to licences 
(a littk Jess than 25 '* of ex ports). MO 9f of the agncultural hudgct in 
1993 dcvotcd Io export suhsid1cs. ln 1992 thcsc amountcd to an csti-
matcd 13 9f of export value. 
Minimal export rcstncuons MoM export suhsid1cs wcrc dimmatcd in 
1990. 
Export 4uotas on raw matcrials for conservation rca.,ons and drugs for 
pricc support rcasons. {Xcasional cxptHt hans on ftKx.I. huits and wo1x.I 
pnx.lucts. Rcduccd cxptlrt liccnsmg n.:4uircmcnts sincc June 1993. 
Export taxes on 30 items, mainly fmxlstuffs, have rcplaccd most export 
4uotas. Export 4uotas on six primary comm1x.litics. {Xcas1onal export 
hans on agricultural pnx.lucts Rcgistrauon and liccnsing restrictions 
still opcrauvc 
Tcmptlrary cxptlrt dulies of I0-25 9f on raw matcnals. 
Permit for cxptlrt or susccptihk g1Kxis 
Mmimal cxptlrt hamcrs. 100 9f export taxon anu4ucs and art works. 
Quotas rcmovcd cxcept for cxptlrl han on gravd and 
S(X.'Cialiscd day. Most licrnsing rc4uircmcnts rcmovcd {Xt. 1991. No 
export suhsidics. 
Export taxes on raw matcrials, prccious mctals and anti4ucs. Fcw 
4uantita1ivc n.:stnctions, mostly for hcalth and national sccurity rca-
sons. No cxptm. su\));idi~. 
Sorne cxptlrt taxes on raw matcrials and f1xx.lstuffs. No export subsi-
dies. Somc 4uantitativc restrictions. Exptirt liccnsing system abolishcd 
in July 1993. 
Exchange Regime 
Currrnt account convc.rtîhilîty for cnterpriscs, 
somc capital ct1ntrols. Pcg to DM/USD haskct. 
Currcnt account convcrtibility for entcrpriscs, 
somc ..:apital contrnls. Pcg to DM/USD haskct. 
Currcnt account convcrtihility (cxccpt 
tourism). Sorne rcsLri..:tions rcmain on capital 
account. Pcg to USD/ECU haskct. 
Largdy ..:urrcnt account convcrtihility, limits 
on rcsidcnt capital account transa..:tions. 
Prcannounn:.d crawlrng pcg rcgîmc. 
Virtual currcnt account convcrtîhilîty (cxccpt 
tourism). hut capital contrnls. Floatmg 
cxchangc rate. 
Fcw ri.;strlctions on current account, hcavy 
controls on capital account. Floating rate. 
Full currcnt account convcrtihility, some 
restrictions on capital account. Floating 
cxchangc ralc. 
Full currcnt account, virtual capital account 
convcrtihility. Currcncy hoard wîth rJtC fixcd 
toDM. 
Full currcnt and capital a..:count convcrtihility. 
Informai pcg to SOR. 
Full currcnt and (virtually) capital account 
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The critical issue considered in the Agreements is access to the EU mar-
ket that is granted to countries in transition. Most products defined in the 
international trade classifications, with the notable exclusion of agricultural 
products, are offered access to the EU markets free of tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions (QR) within one year. ln the case of agricultural products, the 
Agreements affect five main product groups: meat, live animais, fruit, veg-
etables and processed agricultural commodities. Trade in grain is not covered 
by the Agreements. Agricultural exports from CEE countries will be permit-
ted to increase by 10 percent in each of the next five years. Variable levies 
will decrease by 30-60 percent over a three-year period. Quantities exported 
by CEE countries above the quota limits will be subject to full tariffs and 
levies. 
Karninski ( 1994) examined in depth the industrial commodities covered 
by the EAs. He found that these commodities account for more than three 
quarters of EC imports from the CEE countries. Only Bulgaria and Hungary, 
with strong specialization in agricultural products, have relatively low shares 
as shown in Table 11. The table shows the average tariff rates applied by the 
EU on industrial imports from CEE countries during the pre-Agreement peri-
od. The average tariff rate was 0.1 percent for Poland, a GSP beneficiary 
country, and 6.9 percent for Bulgaria, a country that did not have GSP status. 
However, in addition to tariff barriers, the CEE countries faced (NTBs), 
which had become the major instrument of protection in the EU. NIB cov-
erage ratios, as measured by the share of imports subject to NTBs in total, has 
varied among the CEE countries. lt is highest in the case of Romania and 
lowest in the case of Bulgaria. 
Karninski (1994) divides the industrial commodities into six groups: 
immediate free trade group, textiles and clothing group, ECSC group, the 
quota/five year delayed group, the one-year delayed free trade group, and the 
four-year delayed free trade group. The "quota/five year delayed" group 
(includes organic and inorganic chemicals, some leather products, cork and 
wood products, glass, electric machinery, optical goods, plastics, footwear, 
furniture, motor vehicles and toys) is quite large in terms of CEE exports to 
the EU. This group accounts between one fourth and one third of CEE's 
industrial exports. The trade liberalizing measures for this group are a mix-
ture of cuts in custom duties and increases in tariff quotas and ceilings. 
Custom duties are suspended within the lirnits of tariff quotas which will be 
increased annually by about 20 percent. Custom duties on imports in excess 
of quotas are to be reduced progressively to zero by the end of the fifth year. 
By 1997 there will no longer be either quotas or tariffs. 
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Table 11: Importance of Industrial Products in CEE 
Exports to EU and Pre-Agreement Market Access for 
Different Industrial Commodity Groups 
Share of lndustrial Simple Average Tariff 
Commodities in Rate NTB Coverage Ratio 
Total Exports to EU 
during 1991 lndustrial Other Indus trial Other 
Bulgaria 730 6.9 11.6 22.5 48.3 
Czechoslovakia 92.0 7.0 11.7 24.0 52.5 
Hungary 730 0.1 9.4 24.2 57.7 
Poland 81.0 0.1 10.5 23.6 48.6 
Romania 94.0 0.0 8.6 28.4 59.8 
lmmediate Free Trade Group 
Simple 
Share in Average NTB 
lndustrial Tariff Coverage 
Exports Rate Ratio 
Bulgaria 43.0 5.6 3.6 
Czechoslovakia 44.0 5.7 3.8 
Hungary 50.0 0.0 3.7 
Pol and 41.0 0.1 3.8 
Romania 32.0 0.0 3.4 
Textiles and Clothing Group 
Bulgaria 20.9 10.8 90.6 
Czechoslovakia 13.6 10.7 87.6 
Hungary 21.4 0.1 85.1 
Poland 17.6 0.0 88.8 
Romania 28.2 0.1 86.2 
The Steel ECSC Sub-Group 
Bulgaria 11.4 5.4 74.6 
Czechoslovakia 10.5 5.6 64.4 
Hungary 4.2 0.0 58.2 
Po land 4.5 0.1 57.4 
Romania 3.6 OO 68.2 
The Quota/Five Year Delayed Free Trade Group 
Bulgaria 16.3 8.6 18.8 
Czechoslovakia 26.5 8.7 20.6 
Hungary 24.3 0.0 21.0 
Pol and 23.6 0.0 21.7 
Romania 31.4 0.0 23.7 
Source: Kaminski ( 1994). 
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For ECSC products, specific provisions will apply. In particular, customs 
duties on imports applicable in the EC on steel products will be completely 
eliminated by the beginning of the fifth year. Quantitative restrictions on iron 
and steel products were eliminated with the entry into force of the lnterim 
Agreements. In the case of coal products the time required for liberalization 
of trade is four years. The Community will abolish quantitative restrictions in 
one year. Certain imports will be liberalized by Spain and Germany within 
four years. Kaminski (1994) estimates that in the case of "steel ECSC sub-
group" the MFN tariffs are in the range of 5.4-5.6 percent, and the GSP tar-
iffs 0.-0.1 percent. The NTB coverage ratios vary between 57.4 and 74.6 per-
cent. The share of this group in industrial exports was 11.4 percent in the case 
of Bulgaria and 3.6 percent in the case of Romania. On the other hand, import 
duties on textiles and clothing by the EC will be abolished over five years and 
those on outward processing trade immediately. Quantitative restrictions will 
be removed in not Jess than five years. Finally, one should note that in accor-
dance with the asymmetry principle, custom duties on most industrial prod-
ucts originating in the EC are to be progressively reduced to zero. The time 
schedule for Poland is five years and for the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovak Republic it is nine years. 
The above considerations reveal that by the end of the century the NTB 
coverage ratios, the average tariff rates and their standard deviation will be 
reduced to zero for ail the groups of EU industrial imports originating from 
CEE countries. Similarly, in the case of EU industrial exports to CEE coun-
tries, the NTB coverage ratios, the average tariff rates and their standard devi-
ation will be reduced to zero by the year 2002. Thus the EAs offer rapid lib-
eralization of trade. But there are as in the case of CUD some drawbacks in 
the liberalization provided through anti-dumping procedures, countervailing 
duties and safeguard measures which are mentioned in Articles 29-31, 33 and 
62-64 of the EAs. Article 29 allows anti-dumping actions. It is well known 
that EU anti-dumping practices create another form of NTBs. The 
Agreements specify that anti-dumping actions must accord with Article VI of 
the GATT, but most EU practice is GATT-consistent. Hence there is little 
comfort for CEE exporters. However, the EU has given a major concession in 
this field. Immediately after signing the European Agreements, the EU com-
mitted itself to treating the CEE countries as "market" rather than "non-mar-
ket" economies. This is of prime importance for these countries as the man-
ner in which anti-dumping investigations are carried out depend on whether a 
country is considered of one or the other type. The "state trading country" 
arrangements which the Community applied in respect of dumping practices 
were replaced on March 1, 1992 by the normal GATT arrangements. 
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Countervailing duties are dealt with in Article 62-63 of the EA with 
Hungary, and again these can only applied in a GATI-consistent manner. 
Safeguards offer another drawback to the drive towards trade liberalization. 
The general safeguard clause contained in the Agreements ties in perfectly 
with GATI rules. The Community has allowed the CEE countries to protect 
their incipient industries during the transition period. Another derogation 
enables them to deal with balance of payments difficulties. From the point of 
view of the EU, the Agreements allow for unspecified safeguard measures. 
Following Article 30, safeguard measures are permitted if imports from CEE 
countries cause either "serious in jury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products" or "serious dis turban ces ... or difficulties which could 
bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation of a region." Article 
21 is a special safeguard provision for agricultural goods allowing discre-
tionary contingent protection when imports originating from one party cause 
serious disturbance to the markets of the other party. Following the bilateral 
consultation procedures provided for in the agreements, greater importance is 
attached to consultations and conciliation than to unilateral actions. 
In respect of movement of workers, establishment and services, the 
Agreements do not guarantee any access to workers from CEE countries to 
the Community's labor market beyond what is guaranteed bilaterally by the 
member states. They guarantee CEE countries workers non-discrimination 
and certain rights in the EC so long as they are "legally employed." In gener-
al, each party agrees to grant treatment to the other party's enterprises and 
workers no Jess favorably than that granted toits own companies or nationals. 
Freedom of establishment is, however, Iimited by restrictions on the 
Community side which affect the free movement of labor, for example, a 
Hungarian firm can be established in the Community but must employ, with 
only few exceptions, staff recruited within the Community. 
The Impact of Turkey-EU Customs Union and of the Europe Agreements 
When Turkey signed the Customs Union Decision, and when the CEE coun-
tries signed the EAs, they ail committed themselves to undertaking some dras-
tic tasks that include, inter alia, harmonization of commercial legislation as 
regards competition policy, state aids, intellectual and industrial property 
rights, and adoption of new rules on customs classification, valuation, rules of 
origin, technical regulations, standards and govemment procurements, and so 
forth. 
Historically, Turkey has been using intensively during the past two 
decades three different tools of industrial policy: investment incentives, 
export incentives and the overall policy framework affecting state-owned 
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enterprises. In addition, subsidies were also prevalent, though they are no 
longer compatible with the ru les of the Turkey-EU CUD. Articles 30-41 of the 
CUD require that Turkey adopts the EU competition rules, including mea-
sures regarding public aid within two years, that Turkey's legislation in the 
field of competition rules is made comparable with that of the Community 
and that the legislation is applied effectively. 
Since 1967 Turkey has also granted production incentives in order to pro-
mote investment in activities and areas which the govemment regarded as 
desirable. The incentives, regulated by laws and decrees, aimed at reducing 
the cost of investment and the need for external financing as well as increas-
ing profitability. The various types of investment incentives used until lately 
included: customs exemptions; low interest credit for investment; tax exemp-
tions and exemptions from some fees and duties; contributions from the 
Resource Utilization Support Fund; postponement of the value-added tax and 
exemption from construction fee; allocation of foreign exchange for invest-
ment purposes; investment incentive allowance; support from the Investment 
Finance Fund; real estate tax exemption; accelerated deprecation and re-eval-
uation; incentive premium; land allocation; incentive for additional employ-
ment; and special incentives for scientific research and development (R&D). 
Through the use of these measures, the Turkish government has been able to 
increase the profitability of investments. According to a study by the 
Commission of the European Communities ( 1989), the investment incentives 
in Turkey can lead to very high aid levels. It has been estimated that the aid 
level may reach a high of 77 percent of the investment cost of a project in 
developed regions, and to even higher levels in regions enjoying priority in 
development. 
On the export side, the various types of export incentives provided by the 
govemment during the l 980s and l 990s included: export tax rebates; foreign 
exchange allocations; payments from the "Support and Price Stabilization 
Fund"; duty free imports of intermediate inputs; exemption from corporate 
income tax; payments from the Resource Utilization Support Fund; rebates on 
freight charges; exemptions from various taxes; fuel oil and electricity subsidy; 
and a deduction system. Togan (1994) shows that the average economy wide 
export subsidy rate has decreased from 32 percent in 1983 to 13 percent in 
1990. Finally, in respect of the policy on state-owned enterprises in Turkey, we 
note that the Turkish public enterprise sector is very large. The state had for a 
long time monopolies in the following sectors: tobacco, war weapons, railways, 
air-transport, air and sea-port administration, post and telecommunication and 
sugar production; and in the manufacturing sector the state-owned enterprises 
were heavily concentrated in basic metals, chemicals, petrochemicals, fertiliz-
ers, newsprint, paper, oil refineries, cernent and textile production. The 
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state-owned enterprises have shown in general poor economic performance due 
to the soft-budget constraint they faced. These firms are not submitted to com-
mercial code and as such they escape bankruptcy laws. The state-owned enter-
prises receive subsidies from the govemment in the form of direct transfers, 
equity injections and debt consolidation. There are also barriers to exit in 
Turkey. Public firms are often not allowed to go bankrupt. 
The investment incentive schemes in Turkey sought to encourage invest-
ment, rather than to increase competition. The credit incentives, which were 
supposed to promote entry, have often tumed into instruments that reinforced 
the position of the large incumbents. Furthermore, the government with its 
large share of the banking system has exercised direct contrai over the allo-
cation of credit, and credit from public banks has often been extended not on 
the basis of commercial considerations. For a long time, neither a specific 
competition Iegislation was enacted nor a competition policy was in fact 
enforced. To promote competition within the country, Turkey during the 
l 980s has eliminated quantitative restrictions in foreign trade and decreased 
substantially the levels of nominal and effective protection rates. However, 
these reductions were not sufficient to ensure the proper functioning of the 
markets. There was an urgent need for competition policies which would 
relax barriers to entry and exit. Thus, in December 1994, Turkey adopted its 
own competition policy (the "Law on the Protection of Competition"), which 
was largely modeled on EU practice. 
In respect of the export regime, Turkey had subscribed to the GATT 
Subsidies Code in 1985, thus agreeing to eliminate export subsidies by 1989. 
And since Turkey's status in the GATT has become that of a member of the 
World Trade Organization, it had signed the GATT 1994 Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) which prohibits governments 
from granting subsidies contingent upon either export performance or domes-
tic content requirements. Recently, Turkey has eliminated most of the invest-
ment and export incentives. Within this context, GATT-Iegal subsidies, such 
as those earmarked for (R&D) and those that are intended to facilitate the 
adaptation of plants to new environmental regulations, have been introduced 
in 1995. It has been emphasized that export subsidies will be restricted to 
those provided to R&D activities, to environmental projects, and to export 
promotion activities that involve participation in trade fairs, conducting mar-
ket research and organization of educational activities such as seminars and 
conferences. 
Although considerable progress has been achieved in the fields of invest-
ment and export incentives, such was not the case in the area of public enter-
prises. Notwithstanding the fact that privatization had become a prominent part 
of the Turkish structural adjustment program since 1983, many difficulties 
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made it hard to move forward on this front. 
Thus, in order to comply with the rules of the CUD, Turkey will have to 
stop subsidizing its public enterprises at the prevailing rates, align its state aid 
policies to those of the EU, and it will have to apply the same competition 
policies to ail firms, private or public. This adjustment will certainly be cost-
ly, but unless it is undertaken and the rules applied effectively to ail private 
and public firms, the EU may resort to commercial defense instruments (anti-
dumping and countervailing duties) against Turkey. 
The CUD's rules on subsidies will have a positive impact on competition 
in the economy. When faced with intensified competition, domestic indus-
tries, which may have reaped monopolistic profits in a relatively protected 
domestic market, will be forced to act competitively. The relatively high con-
centration ratios in Turkey are expected to decline over time. Furthermore, the 
markups between prices and marginal costs will tend to decline in the private 
sector following the effective implementation of competition policies, and 
firms in the public sector will be expected to act more competitively. 
Similar considerations apply in the cases of the EAs. For example, the 
competition provisions of the EA that were signed between Hungary and the 
EU are contained in Articles 62-67. Articles 62.1, 62.2 , 62.4 (a) and 64 which 
read as follows: 
62.1: The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of 
the Agreement, in so far as they may affect tracte between the 
Community and Hungary: 
(i) ail agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition; 
(ii) abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the 
territories of the Community or of Hungary as a whole or in substan-
tial part thereof; 
(iii) any public aid which distorts or threaten to distort competition 
by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods; 
62.2: Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the 
basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules of Articles 85, 
86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing European Economie Community. 
62.4 (a): For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1 
(iii), the Parties recognize that during the first five years after the entry 
into force of this Agreement, any public aid granted by Hungary shall 
be assessed taking into account the fact that Hungary shall be regard-
ed as an area identical to those areas of the Community described in 
Article 92 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Economie 
Community. The Association Council shall, taking into account the 
economic situation of Hungary, decide whether that period should be 
extended by a further period of five years. 
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64: With regard to public undertakings, and undertakings to which spe-
cial or exclusive rights have been granted, the Association Council 
shall ensure that as from the third year following the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the 
European Economie Community, in particular Article 90, and the prin-
ciples of the concluding document of the April 1990 Bonn meeting of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in particular 
entrepreneurs' freedom of decision, are upheld. 
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Thus, the EAs' rules on competition relate to agreements between finns 
restricting competition, abuse of dominant power, the behavior of public 
undertakings and competition-distorting state aids. The rules are concerned 
with the behavior of governments as well as finns. According to Article 64, 
public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights 
have been granted are to be subject to the principles of Article 90 EEC with-
in three years of the entry into force of the association agreement. Article 62.4 
(a) states that state aid, compatible with the EU rules for disadvantaged 
regions (Article 92.3 (a) of the Treaty of Rome) can be applied to entire terri-
tories during the first five years. Since the EA competition rules are similar to 
those specified in Articles 30.1, 31.1, 32.1 and 33 of the Turkey-EU CUD, 
considerations similar to those expressed in the case of Turkey will apply. In 
the meantime, ail of the CEE countries have introduced competition legisla-
tion. The CEE laws have also been modeled on the EU appr.oach to competi-
tion policy. 
The success of the transition from an environment where anti-dumping 
measures are used as in the cases ofTurkey-EU and CEE-EU tracte, to a situ-
ation where commercial relations are govemed by competition rules, depends 
on the evolution of the level of integration between States. This integration 
will be accelerated as stressed by Marceu ( 1995) as long as markets are har-
monized through stronger competition enforcement and the phasing-out of 
anti-dumping measures. Thus, the success depends on the effective imple-
mentation of competition policies by the national governments in Turkey and 
CEE countries. 
In addition to competition policy, the CUD contains commitments on 
intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights. The Agreement 
requires that Turkey insures adequate and effective protection and enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights and that it will implement the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on 'Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" 
(TRIPS) by 1999. Furthennore, Turkey will have to adopt by January 1, 1998 
legislation to secure the patentability of phannaceutical products and produc-
tion processes. Regarding copyright, the Agreement requires that piracy such 
as counterfeiting or boot-legging be effectively banned and that the tenns of 
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protection in cases of translation, should not be inferior to fifty years in those 
cases in which the term is calculated on a basis other than the life of the per-
son. Turkey by now has a new Copyright Law and a new Patent Law which 
are in conformity with the EU conditions. Similar considerations apply in the 
context of the EAs. Articles 63-64 of the EA with Hungary states that the lat-
ter will provide in five years a level of protection of intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property rights similar to that that exists in the Community, 
including comparable means of enforcing such rights. 
The economic rationale for the protection of intellectual property rights is 
framed in terms of costs and benefits (Hoekman, 1995). The costs include 
increase in payments for proprietary knowledge, price increases associated 
with greater market power for knowledge producers, the costs associated with 
the displacement of pirate activities, the costs of additional R&O and those 
related to administrative and enforcement of intellectual property rights pro-
tection. Potential benefits include new inventions fostered by higher levels of 
R&O, greater technology, increased foreign trade, increased foreign direct 
investment flows and hence increases in per capita income of the country. 
Within this context, the main task facing Turkey and the CEE countries is the 
transformation of their intellectual property rights regime into an effective 
instrument for the promotion of innovation, and hence increases in income. 
Article 26 of the CUO requires Turkey to adopt the EU's customs provi-
sions in the fields of (i) origin of goods, (ii) customs value of goods, (iii) the 
introduction of goods into the territory of the customs union, (iv) customs 
declaration, (v) release for free circulation, (vi) movement of goods, (vii) cus-
toms debt, and (viii) right of appeal. Article 8 of the CUO states that Turkey 
shall incorporate within five years into its internai legal order the 
Community's instruments relating to the removal of technical barriers to 
trade. Furthermore, Article 46 of the Customs Union Oecision specifies that 
negotiations aiming at the mutual opening of Contracting Parties' respective 
government procurement markets be initiated as soon as possible after 
January 1, 1996. In addition, effective functioning of the customs union 
requires the modemization of the customs system in Turkey. A new draft cus-
toms law has been prepared replacing the current customs law. The new draft 
customs law aims for speedy customs release, simplified procedures and full 
automation of customs procedures. Recently, the customs administration has 
been going through extensive training programs. Turkish customs will begin 
to use computer systems and will introduce on-line declaration procedures. 
The computer will make it possible to have at each customs point not only the 
relevant information for the collection of customs duties, but also the neces-
sary information on preferential agreements and anti-dumping regulations 
needed to determine the correct amount of taxes to be collected. 
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The above provides a welcome opportunity to improve the functioning of 
the markets in the economies under consideration. During the transition peri-
od until about 2002, each of the economies under consideration can be con-
sidered as moving from an inefficient production point located inside the soci-
ety 's production possibility frontier (PPF) towards an efficient production 
point on the PPF. Furthermore, the new rules and disciplines, such as the rules 
on intellectual property rights, will over time shift the PPF outward as a result 
of technical progress that will be achieved during the adjustment period. 
We now turn to consider the impact of changes in tariffs on the allocation 
of resources. As nominal protection rates change, so will domestic prices. 
These changes will affect different sectors in different ways, and we will aim 
to identifying those sectors that would potentially Jose from these changes, 
and those that may gain. This necessitates an in-depth calculation of effective 
protection rates (EPR) for the years 1994 and 200 I. The results are reported 
in Table 12. From the table it follows that the formation of the customs union 
will lead to an increase in the value-added of the following sectors: "grain mill 
products", "sugar refining" and "clothing". On the other hand, the following 
sectors will experience a decline in value-added: "processed tobacco", "petro-
leum refining" and "non-alcoholic beverages". The table indicates that the 
most sensitive ten sectors in the Turkish economy are the following: 
processed tobacco, petroleum refining, non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic 
beverages, wood furniture, footwear, plastic products, cernent, motor vehicles 
and wood products. 
Potential for Trade between EU, CEE and Baltic Countries 
and Turkey 
As the CEE and Baltic countries complete their transition to market-based 
economies and enhance their market access opportunities to the EU markets, 
the geographic distribution of trade will change. A critical question is: what is 
the potential for trade between EU, CEE and Baltic countries and Turkey. This 
question has been answered by various economists including Winters and 
Wang (1994) and Baldwin (1994) for the CEE and Baltic countries. They 
show that the potential trade with the EU is much larger than the actual. Thus, 
once the CEE and Baltic countries complete their transition to market 
economies, become further integrated into the world economy, and reap the 
benefits of the Europe Agreements and Free Trade Agreements, trade between 
CEE and Baltic countries on the one hand and EU on the other will increase. 
Baldwin estimated how much trade would have occurred in 1989 if the CEE 
and Baltic countries had never been under communist regime, but did enjoy 
the same level of income as they did in 1989 and if the countries did not face 
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Table 12: Turkish Effective Protection Rates Before and 
After the Customs Union with EU and Sensitive 
Sectors in the Turkish Economy 
1-0 SECTOR EPR EPR Effects of the 
CODE 1994 2001 Customs Union 
19 Processed Tobacco 159.71 -84.25 -243.96 
32 Petroleum Refining 180.44 3.75 -176.69 
18 Non-Alcholic Beverages 128.03 -40.69 -168.72 
17 Alcoholic Beverages 145.43 -13.57 -159.00 
26 Wood Furniture 62.67 1.67 -61.00 
24 Footwear 67.17 15.12 -52.05 
35 Plastic Products 48.45 2.22 -46.24 
37 Cernent 46.02 0.65 -45.37 
47 Motor Vehicles 46.21 1.97 -44.24 
25 Wood Products 37.28 0.67 -36.61 
41 Fabricated Metal Products 35.90 0.66 -35.24 
34 Rubber Products 33.95 1.29 -32.66 
21 Textiles 28.79 2.68 -26.11 
38 Non-Metallic Minerai 26.79 1.30 -25.49 
36 Glass and Glass Production 25.54 1.26 -24.28 
16 Other Food Processing 29.37 5.33 -24.04 
27 Paper and Paper Products 19.20 -0.04 -19.24 
44 Electrical Machinery 16.83 1.97 -14.87 
29 Fertilizers 13.63 1.78 -11.85 
31 Other Chemical Production 12.61 1.45 -11.16 
23 Leather and Fur Production 10.73 0.43 -10.30 
9 Non-Metallic Mining 9.91 0.47 -9.45 
39 Iron and Steel 11.10 2.88 -8.22 
42 Non-Electrical Machinery 8.37 0.45 -7.92 
45 Shipbuilding and Repairing 6.51 -0.83 -7.34 
43 Agricultural Machinery 6.82 0.03 -6.79 
12 Fruits and Vegetables 291.43 285.80 -5.63 
40 Non-Ferrous Metals 6.11 0.85 -5.27 
30 Pharmaceutical Production 4.52 0.50 -4.02 
28 Printing and Publishing 4.42 1.04 -3.39 
2 Animal Husbandry -18.61 -21.65 -3.04 
49 Other Manufacturing Industries 1.91 -0.04 -1.95 
20 Ginning -138.12 -139.98 -1.86 
5 Coal Mining 1.81 0.71 -1.10 
10 Stone Quarrying 0.29 -0.09 -0.37 
3 Forestry -0.28 -0.01 0.26 
6 Crude Petroleum -0.78 -0.06 0.72 
46 Railroad Equipment -0.21 0.57 0.78 
48 Other Transport Equipment -0.84 0.23 1.07 
1 Agriculture 44.41 45.60 1.19 
4 Fishery 56.58 58.10 1.52 
8 Other Metalic Ore Mining -1.68 -0.13 1.54 
13 Vegetable and Animal Oil 6.62 8.76 2.14 
7 Iron Ore Mining -2.74 -0.21 2.53 
Il Slaughtering and Meat 16.82 21.36 4.55 
33 Petroleum and Coal Products -6.14 0.08 6.23 
22 Clothing 7.44 17.35 9.91 
15 Sugar Refining -54.25 -35.98 18.27 
14 Grain Mill Products 281.46 301.45 19.99 
MEAN 18.44 1.12 
STANDARD DEVIATION 72.32 65.39 
Source: Author's calculations. 
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any market access restrictions. The ratio of potential to actual trade of the 
EU( 12) to the CEE countries would have been twice as large as the actual fig-
ures. Similarly, the ratio of potential to actual exports of CEE countries to 
EU(l 2) varies from 1.2 for Romania to 5.2 for Bulgaria. But these estimates 
ignore an important point. The old planning regime depressed trade as well as 
incomes. As trading partners get richer, bilateral trade flows will tend to rise. 
The reason for this is straightforward. As a country grows richer, it buys and 
sells more abroad. 
In an attempt to assess the magnitude of new market opportunities 
between Turkey on the one hand and the CEE and Baltic countries on the 
other, a gravity model of trade flows can be utilized. Gravity models have 
been successfully applied to different types of flows, such as migration, com-
muting. recreational traffic, and interregional and international trade. 
Typically, the log-linear equation used specifies that a flow from origin a to 
destination b can be cxplained by supply conditions at the origin, demand 
conditions at the destination, and economic forces either assisting or resisting 
the flow's movement. 2 
In its basic form, the equation is written as: 
lnX," =a+ a, ln(GNP, !POP)+ a, ln(GNP" /POP»+ a, ln POP, 
+ a, ln POP"+ a, ln DIST," 
where X,, is the US dollar value of exports from country (a) to country (b), 
GNP,, and GNP, are, respectively, income in country a and country b 
expressed in US dollar, POP, and POP, are, respectively, the population of 
country (a) and (b), and DIST,, denotes the distance from the economic cen-
ter of a to that of b in kilometers. 
Deflated GNP data were obtained from various issues of the "World 
Development Report" prepared by the World Bank for the period 1990-1992. 
The data on bilateral trade flows between 20 industrial countries over the peri-
od 1990-92 were extracted from the "Direction of Trade Statistics" and have 
been converted to real value using the export unit values reported in the 
"International Financial Statistics" of the IMF. The estimated equation is 
given by: 
ln X,"= - 27.881 + 1.051 ln (GNP, /POP)+ 0.422 ln (GNP" /POP") - 0.839 ln DIST," 
(-33.875) (18.633) (8.894) (-47.457) 
+ 0.824 lnPOP, + 0.812 lnPOP" 
(41.75) (50.207) 
n = 1200, R' = 0.8772; r = 0.183; DW = 2.067 
(6.411) 
where n refers to number of observations, and the t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis for each estimated coefficient. 
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The gravity model, which was estimated on data that do not include the 
CEE and Baltic countries and Turkey, gives a relationship between GNP, dis-
tance and bilateral trade flows for a "normal" pair of countries, that is coun-
tries that are integrated into the world trading system. Applying the estimated 
coefficients to the actual data on the countries under investigation, we can 
predict the trade flows between Turkey and CEE and Baltic countries once the 
latter set of countries become "normal" countries. That is to say, once they 
complete their transition to market economies, are fully integrated into the 
world trading system and face no major market access problems. The 
mechanics of the projection is simple. Estimates for the relevant countries' per 
capita GNP, population and distance are plugged into the equation which gen-
erates the import and export pattern for trade between concerned countries. 
Table 13 shows the potential values of exports and imports for trade 
between Turkey and CEE and Baltic countries for the year 1992. It is clear 
from Table 13 that the potential trade with CEE and Baltic countries is much 
larger than the actual. The data reveal that Turkey's exports to CEE and Baltic 
countries could increase by about 150 percent above their 1993 level and that 
Turkish imports from CEE and Baltic countries would increase by 45 percent. 
Chances of EU Membership 
To study the chances of EU membership of the CEE and Baltic countries and 
of Turkey we consider the evidence from previous EU enlargements. The 
results are reported in Table 14. The table reveals that the EU has shown more 
concem in respect of the following parameters: the prospects of functioning 
democracies in applicant countries, the level of per capita incomes in those 
countries, the size of the population and the share of the agricultural sector in 
a country's GNP. In all of the previous cases of successful applications, the 
applicant country had to prove that it had functioning democracies for a peri-
od of at least seven years (Greece). In no previous case the successful appli-
cant country (Portugal) had a per capita income which was Jess than 61 per-
cent of the poorest EC member (Greece), and a population that was larger than 
27 percent at the accession (UK). Finally, in no case had the share of agricul-
ture in GDP exceeded 18 percent (lreland). Table 15 gives basic data on the 
actual and potential applicant countries consisting of CEE countries, Baltic 
countries, Slovenia and Turkey. Ali of the transition economies started to have 
functioning democracies only during the early l 990s. Turkey on the other 
hand has moved back to an open, liberal political system since 1983. In 
respect of population, we note that the EU population consisting of 15 coun-
tries would increase by 16 percent in case Turkey accedes and by 10 percent 
if Poland becomes a member. The size of the population of all the remaining 
Table 13: Actual and Potential Trade Between EU, CEE and 
1 
~ 
Baltic Countries and Turkey During 1992 ;:s ... 
~ .-
Actual Potential Ratio of Actual Potential Ratio of ~ 
Ex ports Ex ports Potential to lm ports lm ports Potential to "' ... 
from from Actual into into Actual gi 
Turkey Turkey Ex ports Turkey Turkey Ex ports ~ 
Country ~ "' (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) (US$ million) ~ ,;:s 
Bulgaria 86.22 235.23 2.73 243.24 178.98 0.74 ~ ::;-
Czech Republic 58.45 134.01 2.29 222.99 150.13 0.67 ;::;· 
~ 
Estonia 0.30 20.58 69.29 3.44 24.29 7.07 ;:s 
~ 
Hungary 37.51 196.40 5.24 86.68 248.35 2.87 ~ 
Lat via 2.89 29.45 10.18 2.75 27.93 10.16 * Lithuania 3.95 35.25 8.92 13.82 26.31 1.90 ;;;· ;:s-
Po land 234.80 342.83 1.46 91. IO 333.48 3.66 ~ 
Romani a 151.65 408.19 2.69 300.78 283.59 0.94 8 ;:s 
Slovak Republic 15.74 82.46 5.24 21.91 78.87 3.60 <:> ;:i 
Slovenia ~ ~ 2.34 45.M ill.12. 3.13 ;:;;· 
"' 621.72 1,554.94 2.50 1,032.57 1,495.72 1.45 
Note: The actual trade figures refer to the year 1993. 
Source: Author's calculations and Foreign Trade Statistics, State Jnstitute of Statistics, Ankara 
...... 
\:;! 
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countries is relatively small. The share of agriculture in GDP is 23 percent in 
the case of Lithuania, 21 percent in Romania, 16 percent in Latvia, 15 percent 
in Turkey, 13 percent in Bulgaria and 11 percent in Estonia. 
Since the CEE countries have not yet produced national accounts that are 
up to Western standards, various sources have estimated national incomes for 
these countries and those estimates vary enormously thus giving rise to diffi-
culties in providing a realistic assessment of the development level of the 
countries. Table 15 is based on two sets of estimates of per capita incomes as 
reported in the "World Development Report 1995" of the World Bank. The 
first estimate is per capita income measured in current US dollars and the sec-
ond takes into account the purchasing power parities of national currencies 
(PPP). Examining the per capita income levels measured in current US dol-
lars we note that per capita income in Romania during 1993 is 15 percent of 
the per capita income of the poorest EU member, namely Greece. The per 
capita income of Bulgaria is also 15 percent of the income level in Greece, 
that of Lithuania is 18 percent, the Slovak Republic 26 percent, Latvia 27 per-
cent, Turkey 29 percent and Poland 31 percent. The situation looks different 
if one examines these figures using PPP Thus per capita income in Romania 
reaches 31 percent of that of Greece; Lithuania's is 35 percent; Bulgaria's is 
46 percent and so on. If the EU were to apply the 61 percent threshold to the 
applicant countries, then only Slovenia would satisfy the criteria if per capita 
incomes are measured in current US dollars. On the other hand, if the EU 
were to base its opinion on the PPP, then Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Turkey would fail the test. Ali of the other countries 
would satisfy the 61 percent threshold. 
A related question is how incomes are expected to evolve over time, and 
whether the CEE countries, the Baltic countries and Turkey would be able to 
catch up to the 61 percent per capita income level of the poorest EU member 
in the near future. Table 16 contains data on the growth rates of population pro-
jected by the World Bank for the period 1992-2000 and reported in the "World 
Development Report 1994". During the period 1970-1992, Greece's GNP has 
grown at an annual rate of 3 percent and that of Turkey at 5 percent. In what 
follows, we shall consider the potential developments in CEE, Baltic coun-
tries' and Turkey's per capita GNP in comparison to the potential develop-
ments in Greece's per capita GNP. We assume that Greece's GNP will grow in 
the future at the same growth rate that has been achieved over the period 1970-
1992 (that is, 3 percent). Furthermore, we assume that the population of 
Greece will grow at the annual rate of 0.5 percent. Table 16 has been prepared 
for different values of the growth rate of real GNP for the CEE, the Bal tics and 
Turkey. We assume following Sheehy ( 1994) that the CEE and the Bal tics can 
grow at either the pessimistic rate of 3 percent, or at the probable rate of 5 
Table 14: Previous EC Enlargements 
UK lreland Den mark Greece Spain 
Democracy Restored 1974 1977 
EC Accession 1973 1973 1973 1981 1986 
Per Capita Income at Accession 
% of EC Average 82.0 53.5 122.9 40.7 49.5 
% of Poorest EC Member 113.4 74.1 170.2 75.7 133.5 
Population at Accession 
% of EC Total at Accession 26.9 1.5 2.4 3.5 13.3 
Share of Agricultural Value Added in 
GDP at Accession 3.0 18.3 7.1 16.1 5.6 
Source: Author's c11/cu/11ti011s using d11111from various issues of European Economy. 
Portugal A us tria Finland 
1974 
1986 1995 1995 
22.8 118.6 97.3 
61.4 312.9 256.7 
3.5 2.3 1.5 
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percent or at the optimistic rate of 6 percent. Regarding Turkish GNP the pes-
simistic rate is assumed to be 4 percent, the probable rate 5 percent and the 
optimistic rate 7 percent. Table 16 which is based on current US dollar values 
of per capita incomes reveals the following aspects: 
• If the GNP of the CEE and the Baltic countries grows at the pessimistic 
growth rate of 3 percent and Turkish GNP at the rate of 4 percent, none of 
the countries except Slovenia will reach 61 percent of the Greek per capi-
ta income Jevel over the next 25 years. 
• If the CEE and Bal tic countries' GNP grows at the probable rate of 5 per-
cent and Turkish GNP at the rate of 5 percent, Hungary will reach the 61 
percent threshold value after 15 years and Estonia after 21 years. With the 
exception of Slovenia, the remaining countries will fail to satisfy this 
threshold. 
• If the GNP of the CEE and the Baltic countries grows at the rate of 6 per-
cent and Turkey's GNP at the rate of 7 percent, the Czech Republic will 
satisfy the threshold value after 19 years, Hungary after 12 years, Poland 
after 25 years, Estonia after 14 and Turkey after 19 years. This will how-
ever not be the case in the Slovak Republic, Romania, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
Baldwin ( 1994) summarizes the conditions for EU membership under 
eight headings: 
1. free movement of goods, services and factors of productions within the 
Union; 
2. adoption of EU's common external tariff and trade policy vis-à-vis the 
third countries; 
3. harmonization of commercial legislation; 
4. participation in the European Monetary System and future monetary sys-
tem; 
5. adoption of EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); 
6. supranational appellate system to enforce consistent application of 
Community Jaw throughout the Union; 
7. open government procurement; and, 
8. common policy promoting the disadvantaged regions by structural spend-
mg. 
As emphasized above, Turkey, by forming the CU with the EU will satis-
fy the first condition partially, the second and third components of member-
ship will only be satisfied by the year 2001. It is worth noting that the CUD 
does not cover the free movement of services or Jabor. The Agreement is also 
silent on movement of capital. The fourth component (participation in EMU) 
Table 15: Basic Data on Actual and Potential Applicants 
1 
~ 
for Membership in EU ;::s ::, 
l:l 
:-
Bulgaria Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Po land Romania Slovak R. Slovenia Turkey gi 
"' Democracy Restored 1990 1990 1992 1990 1993 1992 1990 1990 1990 1992 1983 ..... l:?j 
:;::: 
Per Capita Income Relative to EU è! ~ 
Income in 1993 "" l:l;s 
% of EC Average 5.8 13.7 15.6 16.9 10.2 6.7 11.4 5.8 9.9 32.8 11.0 O:l 
l:l 
:::;-
% of Poorest EC Member 15.4 36.7 41.7 45.3 27.2 17.9 30.6 15.4 26.4 87.8 29.6 ;:::;· 
l:l 
Per Capita PPP Income Relative 
;::s 
:::... 
to PPP EU Income in 1993 ~ 




% of Poorest EC Member 45.6 83.9 72.2 67.2 55.7 34.6 55.6 31.1 69.9 -- 43.6 R1 
~ 
;::s 




Population in 1993 ;;;· 
"' 
% of EC Total 2.3 2.8 0.4 2.8 0.7 1.0 10.4 6.2 1.5 0.5 16.1 
Share of Agricultural Value Added 
in GDPduring 1993 (%) 13.2 5.5 15.2 8.2 15.0 24.8 7.4 21.6 6.6 5.0 15.4 
Share of Agricultural Labor in 
Total Civilian Employment 1(%) 17.4 6.5 15.4 8.1 18.4 19.0 26.9 32.2 10.3 -- 42.8 
Source: Author '.ç ca/culations using data from various issues of World Development Report and European Economy. 1 <....., 
~ 
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Table 16: Expected Developments in CEE, Baltic Countries 
and Turkey's Per Capita GNP 
Assumed Assumed YEARS ELAPSED 
Per Capita Annual Growth Annual Growth 
lncome ofGNP of Population 5 10 15 20 25 
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO 
CEE Countries 
Czech Republic 2,710 3.0 0.2 36.49 36.32 36.14 35.97 35.79 
Slovak Republic 1,950 3.0 0.6 26.26 26.13 26.01 25.88 25.75 
Hungary 3,350 3.0 -0.4 45.ll 44.89 44.68 44.46 44.25 
Pol and 2,260 3.0 0.2 30.43 30.29 30.14 29.99 29.85 
Romani a 1,140 3.0 0.0 15.35 15.28 15.20 15.13 15.06 
Bulgaria 1,140 3.0 -0.4 15.35 15.28 15.20 15.13 15.06 
Baltic Countries 
Estonia 3,080 3.0 -0.3 41.48 41.28 41.08 40.88 40.68 
Latvia 2,010 3.0 -0.4 27.07 26.94 26.81 26.68 26.55 
Lithuania 1,320 3.0 0.0 17.78 17.69 17.60 17.52 17.43 
Slovenia 6,490 3.0 0.1 87.40 86.97 86.55 86.13 85.72 
Turkey 2,184 4.4 1.9 31.46 33.50 35.66 37.97 40.43 
Greece 7,390 3.1 0.5 
PROBABLE CASE 
CEE Countries 
Czech Republic 2,710 5.0 0.2 40.18 44.02 48.23 52.84 57.89 
Slovak Republic 1,950 5.0 0.6 28.91 31.67 34.70 38.02 41.65 
Hungary 3,350 5.0 -0.4 49.67 54.41 59.62 65.32 71.56 
Poland 2,260 5.0 0.2 33.51 36.71 40.22 44.06 48.28 
Romani a 1,140 5.0 0.0 16.90 18.52 20.29 22.23 24.35 
Bulgaria 1,140 5.0 -0.4 16.90 18.52 20.29 22.23 24.35 
Baltic Countries 
Estonia 3,080 5.0 -0.3 45.66 50.03 54.81 60.05 65.79 
Latvia 2,010 5.0 -0.4 29.80 32.65 35.77 39.19 42.94 
Lithuania 1,320 5.0 0.0 19.57 21.44 23.49 25.74 28.20 
Slovenia 6,490 5.0 0.1 96.22 105.42 115.49 126.54 138.63 
Turkey 2,184 5.4 1.9 33.00 36.85 41.15 45.95 51.30 
OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO 
CEE Countries 
Czech Republic 2,710 6.0 0.2 42.13 48.39 55.59 63.87 73.37 
Slovak Repulic 1,950 6.0 0.6 30.31 34.82 40.00 45.96 52.79 
Hungary 3,350 6.0 -0.4 52.08 59.82 68.72 78.95 90.69 
Pol and 2,260 6.0 0.2 35.13 40.36 46.36 53.26 61.18 
Romania 1,140 6.0 0.0 17.72 20.36 23.39 26.87 30.86 
Bulgaria 1,140 6.0 -0.4 17.72 20.36 23.39 26.87 30.86 
Baltic Countries 
Estonia 3,080 6.0 -0.3 47.88 55.00 63.19 72.59 83.38 
Latvia 2,010 6.0 -0.4 31.25 35.89 41.23 47.37 54.42 
Lithuania 1,320 6.0 0.0 20.52 23.57 27.08 31.11 35.74 
Slovenia 6,490 6.0 0.1 100.89 115.90 133.14 152.95 175.70 
Turkey 2,184 7.0 1.9 35.58 42.84 5158 62.10 74.77 
Source: Aurhor '.v calculario11s 
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is not a requirement for membership. The CUD addresses condition 5, but it 
does not seem to be possible for Turkey to adopt the CAP in the near future. 
External assistance would be essential for the implementation of this condi-
tion. In the case of CEE countries, they will satisfy in the near future the third 
condition of membership completely. The first condition will be satisfied par-
tially as the EAs do not cover the free movement of labor. The Europe 
Agreements contain sections on services and on capital movements. Since the 
EAs are free tracte agreements, the CEE countries will not satisfy condition 2 
of membership. The countries are free to determine the level of tariffs against 
third coùntries. Regarding the CAP, similar considerations as in the case of 
Turkey apply. Again, as in the case of Turkey, the fourth component (partici-
pation in the European Monetary Union) is nota requirement for membership. 
The components that are of real concern to the EU are the fifth (CAP) and 
eighth (structural funds), especially since both involve transfer of resources 
from the EU to the acceding member. The net cost to the EU should not threat-
en the prospect of receiving more transfers than the richer EU countries can 
reasonably be expected to finance. To determine the net costs associated with 
the membership of the CEE and Baltic countries and of Turkey we make use 
of the results obtained and of the approach developed by the Center for 
Economie Polie y Research (CEPR, 1992) and Baldwin (1994 ), where the net 
cost is defined as the difference of between on the one hand the structural 
funds and the Common Agricultural Policy price support received by the 
countries, and of the national budgetary contribution to the EU on the other. 
Consider first the problems associated with the adoption of CAP by the 
countries concerned using the example ofTurkey, where agriculture has econ-
omy-wide implications. During 1994, agriculture accounted for about 15 per-
cent of GDP and 44 percent of total employment in the economy. Although 
these shares have been falling over time, they do not compare favorably with 
those found in the EU countries. According to the Organisation for Economie 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1994), the value-added per agricul-
tural worker in Turkish agriculture amounts to only 21 percent of the value-
added per non-agricultural worker in Turkish non-agricultural sector. The low 
productivity in agriculture is associated with a farm structure characterised by 
small, fragmented holdings, a poor level of education and training of farmers 
leading to low farm household incomes. Furthermore, nearly half of the pop-
ulation of Turkey still lives in rural areas. In Turkey, population growth rates 
have exceeded 2 percent annually. The highest fertility rates are found in rural 
areas, with out-migration from these areas also tending to be high. Although 
emigration has slowed down, internai migration towards urban areas contin-
ues at a fast pace. 
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The objectives of Turkey's agricultural policy are to: 
• ensure adequate levels of nutrition and food supplies at reasonable prices 
to consumers; 
• raise production levels and yields while reducing the vulnerability of pro-
duction to adverse weather conditions; 
• move towards self-sufficiency, increase farm incomes and improve 
income stability; 
• increase exports; and, 
• to develop rural areas. 
In pursuit of these objectives, the government has implemented a set of 
measures that provide support to producers prices, complemented by trade-
related measures, the subsidization of farm inputs, and transfers related to 
investments in infrastructural projects. The OECD (1994b) cumulated all 
these support measures into the Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE) which 
measure the value of monetary transfers to producers from consumers of agri-
cultural products and from taxpayers resulting from a given set of agricultur-
al policies in a given year. According to the OECD study, total support as 
measured by the PSE is estimated to have risen during the period 1991-93 to 
around 40 percent - double the rate in the period 1979-81, and the share of 
total agricultural transfers in total GDP has amounted to 14 percent in 1991, 
12 percent in 1992 and 11 percent in 1993. Thus, the average annual amount 
of total transfers to agriculture over the 1991-1993 period was about $14 bil-
lion. At this point, it should be noted that agriculture besides being subsidized 
has also been heavily protected as is evident from inspection of columns 1 and 
3 of Table 8. 
During the last few decades, Europe has been experiencing a dramatic 
decline in agriculture. The graduai but massive transfer of labor from farms in 
Europe has created severe economic and social problems especially for 
uprooted families and their dependents. This is the prime justification for 
ambitious agricultural policies introduced under the name "Common 
Agricultural Policy" which is intended to alleviate the burden of relocation 
from farm to city. According to the Treaty of Rome, the major goals of the 
CAP are to increase agricultural productivity, insure a fair standard of living 
for farm community, stabilize farm product markets, provide food security 
and secure supplies to consumers at reasonable prices. 
The CAP is based on three guiding principles: (i) unity of the market, (ii) 
Community preference, and (iii) financial solidarity. According to the first 
principle, free movement of agricultural commodities is achieved through the 
common market order; the second principle provides agricultural markets 
with protection from foreign competition through market interventions; the 
Central, East European, Ba/tic and Turkish Economies 383 
third principle guarantees the financing of agricultural support programs from 
the EU budget mainly through the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (FEOGA). Kirmani ( 1994) reports that high levels of support 
are provided to agriculture in the EU where the PSE ratio was 46 percent in 
1990, 47 percent in 1992 and 48 percent in 1993. The support has signifi-
cantly reduced the EU's net food imports since the l 970s, and has substan-
tially increased self-sufficiency ratios in the EU. But the CAP has been under 
great pressure to reduce the drain on the EU budget. The 1992 MacSharry 
reform of the CAP aimed at curbing excess production of cereals by means of 
set-asides of arable land and reductions in guaranteed prices, with compensa-
tion to farmers in the form of a fixed payment per hectare under cultivation. 
The reforms are an important step towards the market-oriented system. It was 
expected that by the end of the 1995/96 marketing season, intervention prices 
would have been reduced to world prices (European Economy, 1994 ). Had 
such a plan been implemented, there would have been no need for export sub-
sidies or import taxes starting from 1996 onwards. Even if such a policy was 
in fact implemented, it should be stressed that it would not imply that the PSE 
ratio in the EU would decline to zero. The system of regionally calculated 
"compensatory" area payments tied to set-aside schemes will insure that the 
decline in agricultural incomes is reduced over time. Thus, in the EU, the 
"market price support" would decline to zero but positive amounts of "direct 
payments" would still be paid. As a result, the PSE ratio could be held at its 
present levels. 
According to Articles 22-25 of the CUD, Turkey, in order to establish the 
freedom of movement of agricultural products, will have to adjust its agricul-
tural policy in such a way as to adopt the CAP measures. But is this possible? 
What does the adoption of CAP measures mean for Turkey'7 
At current domestic prices, Turkey is a net exporter of some and net 
importer of some other farm products. But those domestic prices when con-
verted at equilibrium exchange rates are below the EU domestic prices. 
Should Turkey be given preferential, tariff-free access to the EU agricultural 
markets at existing EU prices, then overall supply could be expected to 
increase in Turkey. The output of ail farm products in Turkey will be higher. 
The aggregate level of food self-sufficiency will rise. Turkish consumers 
would face higher prices. Anderson and Tyers (1993) have determined that 
Visegrad farmers would be better off by $ 52.5 billion annually. Thus, allow-
ing Visegrad countries into the CAP would involve a massive transfer from 
the EU taxpayers and Visegrad consumers to Visegrad farmers. Anderson and 
Tyers estimate that the total extra cost to the EU budget w~uld amount to $ 47 
billion each year. This cost would bankrupt the CAP Since similar results 
would be obtained in the Turkish case, the problem faced by Turkey is who is 
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going to provide the necessary funds? Since Turkey cannot devote an amount 
similar to the figures given above from its own resources for the support of 
Turkish agricultural sector, and since the EU would be unwilling to bear the 
cost, the idea of establishing a fund similar to FEOGA in Turkey would have 
to be abandoned. As a result, it seems that freedom of movement of agricul-
tural products between Turkey and the EU cannot be achieved in the near 
future. 
Furthermore, the adoption of the CAP might also involve the equalization 
of PSE ratios and also the equalization of farm incomes. Can Turkey raise the 
standard of living of Turkish farm population to that of the EU? At this point, 
it should be noted that the average yields of wheat and Barley in Turkey are 
2 tons/hectare, whereas the same yields in France are 6.4 and 5.9 tons/hectare 
respectively (OECD, l 994a). Thus, even if in Turkey and in the EU com-
modity prices were equalized and all kinds of subsidies in the form of direct 
payments to producers, subsidies to capital and other inputs, subsidies in the 
form of general services, regional subsidies and tax concessions were elimi-
nated, '1gricultural incomes in Turkey would be lower than those in France 
because of the large productivity differential. In order for Turkey to increase 
its agricultural income levels to those in France, it would in addition have to 
increase agricultural productivity through additional investments in agricul-
ture, which will probably take a long lime. Ali these arguments lead to the 
conclusion that the freedom of movement of agricultural products between 
Turkey and the EU cannot be achieved in the near future. Similar arguments 
hold in the case of the CEE and the Bal tic countries. 
Consider next the issues related to structural funds. These are transfers 
from Brussels to poorer member states and regions. The funds are aimed at 
encouraging greater economic and social cohesion. About half of structural 
funds is channeled into low income regions defined as the regions with per 
capita incomes Jess than 75 percent of the EU average. The funds are used to 
improve infrastructure in the low income regions and to provide local training. 
A recent study by the EC Commission (European Economy, 1993) asserts that 
Portugal and Greece are likely to receive ECU 400 per capita in the future. 
Using this approach the Visegrad-4 would receive 32.5 billion US dollars. 
The budget revenue of the EU consists of receipts based on national value-
added taxes (VAT) receipts, tariff revenues, variable dulies and GNP contri-
butions. Currently, the EU budget amounts to about 1.2 percent of the Union's 
total GDP. This fraction is set to go up to 1.3 percent by the year 2000. Using 
the 1.3 percent figure, the contribution of the Visegrad countries is determined 
as US $ 6.9 billion. Hence, the net budgetary cost to the EU of admitting 
Visegrad-4 as members would amount to US $ 72.6 (47 + 32.5 - 6.9) billion. 
Baldwin admits that the figure is too large. His own estimates of the net cost 
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of membership are shown in Table 17. From the table it follows that admit-
ting the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia as new member states of the 
Union would cost EU US $ 5.63 billion. Admitting in addition Poland as a 
new member would increase the cost to US$ 13.75 billion. Admitting in addi-
tion the Baltic countries, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Romania would 
increase the annual cost to US $ 33.38 billion. 
Table 17: Total Budget Cost of EU Membership 
(billion US $) 




Po land 8.13 
Sub-Total 13.75 
Estonia 0.75 





Slovak Republic 1.13 
Sub-Total 33.38 
Source: R.E. Baldwin. ( 1994). 
The estimates presented are rather rough. But one aspect is clear. The CEE 
and the Baltic countries and Turkey would impose a large burden on the EU 
taxpayers if they would accede to the EU, and the latter were to apply its cur-
rent rules of the CAP and the structural funds. Note that the 1994 EU budget 
has amounted to ECU 72.3565 billion ECU. Hence the burden of admitting 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia into the EU would con-
stitute about 15.2 percent of the EU budget. Admitting the remaining CEE and 
the Baltic countries to the Community would increase the cost to 36.9 percent. 
These figures are indeed large for the Community. If the EU intends to admit 
these countries as new members, then either the budget has to be increased 
considerably or the rules on "structural funds" and "price support under CAP" 
have to change. 
The budgetary outlays to the EU have to be evaluated relative to potential 
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gains which would corne in terms of increased trade and political stability. 
Estimates of potential EU trade with' the CEE and the Baltic countries and 
with Turkey using the Gravity mode! reveals that the trade of the CEE, the 
Bal tics and Turkey with the EU would increase considerably over the coming 
decades. Politically, there are gains to be derived from a future stable central 
and eastern Europe and Asia Minor. It seems that sustainable high growth of 
GNP by potential candidates is a prerequisite for membership to the EU. But 
the whole question boils down to how much the EU would be willing to spend 
to integrate these countries into its own economy. 
Notes 
1 OECD Economie Surveys: Turkey 1992-1993. Paris: OECD. 
2 The gravity equation has been justified theoretically by Bergstrand ( 1985) among 
others. 
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Appendix 
Classification Scheme for Revised SITC, Revision 2 
SITC COMMODITY 
Food and Li•e Animais Chieny for Food 
OO Live Animais Chiefly for Food 
01 Meat and Meat Preparations 
02 Dairy Products 
03 Fish and Fish Preparations 
04 Cereals and Cereals Preparations 
05 Vegetables and Fruits 
06 Sugar and Sugar Preparations 
07 Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices 
08 Feeding Stuff for Animais 
09 Miscellaneous Edible Products 
Be•erages and Tobacco 
11 Beverages 
12 Tobacco and Tobacco Manufactures 
Crude Materials, Inedible, Except Fuels 
21 Hides,Skins and Furskins, Raw 
22 Oil Seeds and Oleaginous Fruit 
23 Crude Rubber 
24 Cork and Wood 
25 Pulp and Wasre Paper 
26 Textile Fibres and rheir Wasres 
27 Crude Fertilizers and Crude Minerais 
28 Meralliferrous Ores and Metal Scrap 
29 Crude Animal and Vegerable Marerials 
Minerai Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials 
32 Coal 
33 Petroleum & Perroleum Producrs 
34 Gas, Natural and Manufactured 
35 Electric Currenr 
Animal and Vegetable Oils, Fats, and Waxes 
41 Animal Oils and Fars 
42 Fixed Vegerable Oils and Fars 
43 Animal and Yegerable Oils and Fars, Proc. 
Chemicals and Related Product 
51 Organic Chemicals 
.'i2 lnorganic Chemicals 
53 Dyeing ,Tanning and Colouring Marerials 
54 Medicinal and Pharmaceurical Producrs 
55 Essenrial Oils and Perfume Marerials 
56 Fertilizers, Manufactured 
57 Explosives 
58 Plastic Marerials 
59 Chemical Marerials and Producrs. N.E.S 
SITC COMMODITY 
Manufactured Goods Classified Chieny by 
Material 
61 Learher Manufactures 
62 Rubber Manufactures 
63 Cork and Wood Manufactures 
64 Paper 
65 Textiles 
66 Non-merallic Minerai Manufactures 
67 Iron and Steel 
68 Non-ferrous Merals 
69 Manufactures of Meral 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 
71 Power Generaring Machinery and Equipmenr 





General lndusrrial Machinery and Equipmenr 
75 Office Machines 
76 Telecommunicarions Apparatus 
77 Elecrrical Machinery 
78 Road Vehicles 
79 Orher Transport Equipmenr 
M iscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
81 Sanirary, Plumbing, Hearing 
82 Furniture 
83 T rave) Goods 
84 Clorhing 
85 Foorwear 
87 Scienrific Instruments and Oprical Goods 
88 Phorographic Appararus and Oprical Goods 
89 Miscellaneous Manufacrured Articles 
Commodities and transactions not classified 
elsewhere in the SITC 
91 Posral Packages 
93 Special Transactions 
94 Animais, Live 
95 Armoured Fighring Vehicles 
96 Coin 
97 Gold, Non-Monerary 
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